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SEP09

The Public Cost of Private Security in AfghanistanBriefing Paper

Jake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico

CENTER ON

INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

New York University


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In Pursuit o Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins o Mediation

About the Center on International Cooperation

The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University

works to enhance international responses to humanitarian crises

and global security threats through applied research and direct

engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy

community. It has an international reputation or agenda-setting

work on post-conict peacebuilding, global peace operations, and UN

reorm.

CICs Aghanistan Reconstruction Project (ARP) carries out research

and public education about selected issues related to the rebuilding oAghanistans institutions, society, and economy. The project supports

eorts by the Aghan government, Aghan civil society, the United

Nations Assistance Mission in Aghanistan, and donors to carry out a

more eective reconstruction mission based on the Bonn Agreement

and the Aghanistan Compact ocused on Aghan ownership.

About the Authors

Jake Sherman

is Associate Director or Peacekeeping and SecuritySector Reorm at the Center on International Cooperation, and a

member o CICs Aghanistan Reconstruction Project (ARP) team.

Victoria DiDomenico is a Program Ocer or CICs Peacekeeping and

SSR Program.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Royal Government o Norway

or its generous support o the ARP. We also grateul to Dr. BarnettR. Rubin, Director o ARP, Mark Sedra, and several anonymous peer

reviewers or their comments on earlier versions o this report. The

views expressed in this report do not necessarily reect those o the

Norwegian Government.

Center on

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Cooperation


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Executive Summary 01

Introduction 02

The Private Security Phenomenon 03

Afghan Regulation Initiatives 04

Employing and Empowering Illegal Militias 06

Rivals to State Authority 07

The Need for Credible Public Security 09

Conclusion 10

Annex

The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan

Briefing PaperJake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico

Table oContents


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Center on

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Cooperation

Acronyms

ACOD Armed Contractor Oversight Division

AGNA ArmorGroup North America

ANA Aghan National Army

ANP Aghan National Police

ANSF Aghan National Security Force

APPF Aghan Public Protection Force

ASG Armed Support Group

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Aghanistan

DIAG Disbandment o Illegal Armed GroupsDoD US Department o Deense

DoS US Department o State

FDD Focused District Development

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

MoI Ministry o Interior

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSC Private Security Company

PSP Private Security Provider

SIGAR Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction

UN United Nations

USAID US Agency or International Development

USPI US Protection and Investigations

USSF US Special Forces


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The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan

The absence o eective oversight o the private

security sector in Aghanistan undermines the

credibility and saety o the Aghan government and

the international stabilization eort. In September

2009, an investigation into ArmorGroup North America,

the private security company (PSC) contracted by the US

Department o State to protect the US embassy in Kabul,

Aghanistan revealed misconduct and poor management

that jeopardized the saety o embassy personnel. Their

culturally oensive behavior, graphically documented,

is likely to urther damage Aghan perceptions o PSCs

and could potentially erode the legitimacy o the United

States and its allies.1

The private security industry in Aghanistan has

grown apace with demand. As o August 2009, the total

number o private security personnel employed by the US

Department o Deense the largest employer o private

security in the country increased 19 percent (rom 4,373

to 5,198) in response to the deployment o additional

military orces.2 Since 2001, a range o private security

providers (PSPs)3 has emerged, including international

and national PSCs operating with or without the required

Aghan licensing permits, as well as militias hired as armed

support groups (ASG) by international military orces.

Many PSPs are controlled by prominent Aghan amilies,

including Hashmat and Ahmed Wali Karzai, brothers o

President Hamid Karzai; Hamid Wardak, the son o Deense

Minister Rahim Wardak; Gul Agha Shirzai, the governor o

Nangarhar province; and Hajji Jan Mohammad Khan, the

ormer governor o Uruzgan.

The use o unregistered PSCs and militia groups by

the NATO International Security Assistance Force and

US military contingents is widespread. Many o these

PSPs serve as ready-made militias that compete with state

authority and are requently run by ormer military com-manders responsible or human rights abuses or involved

in the illegal narcotics and black market economies. Fi-

nancing armed, alternative power structures ullls secu-

rity needs in the short-term at the cost o consolidating

government authority in the long-term.

PSPs ulfll a need or which there is no clear, immediate

alternative. There are too ew Aghan National Police to

provide protection or the sta, premises, and projects o

the international community and too little condence

in their ability among most internationals to entrust

them with protection responsibilities. Better government

regulation, monitoring, and enorcement by international

consumers o private security will help ensure that private

security works towards the stabilization o Aghanistan.

To date, regulation o PSCs in Aghanistan has been

more reactive than proactive. The Ministry o Interior

has issued operating licenses to 39 PSCs under an interim

licensing procedure designed to limit the transormationo illegal armed groups into PSCs and to prevent their

involvement in criminality. The interests o Aghan elites

and the international community have proven an obstacle

to strengthening and enorcing the existing national

regulatory and legislative ramework, though new

regulations and audits by the US Government suggest

that it may mandate more oversight o PSC contracts.

The goal should be a private security sector that is bet-

ter regulated and controlled by the Aghan govern-

ment and, critically, by the international community that

constitute their primary source o contracts and revenue.

Building a credible and accountable public security sector

is a long-term process, however; one that will not address

the immediate security needs o international and nation-

al stakeholders in Aghanistan. Nor, in the longer term, will

it completely replace the market or PSCs both by the local

and international community.

The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan 0

Executive Summary

For the purposes o this study, private securityproviders (PSPs) reers to: (i) national and internationalprivate security companies (PSCs), both licensed and

unlicensed by the Aghanistan Ministry o Interior,and (ii) armed support groups (ASGs) illegal militias

employed by international military orces.


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The absence o eective oversight and control o private

security providers (PSPs)4 employed by the international

community undermines the credibility and eectiveness

o the Aghan government, the international military and

diplomatic presence, and reconstruction organizations.

Weak regulation and enorcement also strengthen

alternative power structures, including criminal groups,

urther undermining the authority o the Aghan

government and the security o its citizens.

Militia groups employed by oreign military orces pose

an even greater regulatory challenge than private

security companies (PSCs) and do more long-term harm

to stabilization eorts in Aghanistan. Although there is

a well-dened legal ramework outlawing militia and

paramilitary groups, it is unclear whether these laws

apply to the armed support groups (ASGs) used by

oreign orces. Nonetheless, these orces are prima acie

violations o Presidential Decree 50 on demobilization

and disarmament, the Law on Firearms, Ammunition,

and Explosives, the Procedure or Regulating Activities

o Private Security Companies in Aghanistan and the

Strategy or Disbandment o Illegal Armed Groups

in Aghanistan.5 Furthermore, many o their military

commanders are responsible or human rights abuses

and are involved in criminal activities, including narcotics

tracking.

There are also visible indications that the private security

arena is better armed and better paid than their coun-

terparts in the Aghan National Security Forces (ANSF).6

While there are no concrete gures on the amount omoney spent on private security, as contracts are either

condential or cannot be substantiated, several sources

within the private security sector and the Aghan gov-

ernment estimate that 10 - 20 percent o reconstruction

unding is spent on security.9

This would amount to USD300-600 million per year, based on current Ocial Devel

opment Assistance gures; however, this gure does no

refect the ull scope o contracts rom international mili

Militia groups employed by foreign military forces pose

an even greater regulatory challenge than private security

companies and do more long-term harm to stabilization

eorts in Afghanistan.

The Public Cost o Private Security in Aghanistan02

The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan

Center on

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Public Disclosure o Misconduct by

ArmorGroup North America

In September 2009, the Project on Government

Oversight (POGO) publicized gross negligence by

ArmorGroup North America (AGNA), a private security

company contracted by the US Department o State

to protect the US embassy in Kabul. Inappropriate

conduct by AGNA personnel including hazing, sexual

misconduct, and drunkenness resulted in complete

distrust o leadership and a breakdown o the chain

o command, which jeopardized the security o the

embassy.7 According to POGO, misconduct was notlimited to a ew AGNA personnel on a ew occasions;

AGNA has a record o documented, systemic contractual

violations at the US embassy. During 2007-2008, the

DoS identied numerous perormance deciencies,

including insucient numbers o guards, resulting in

sleep deprivation; poor prociency in English among

the majority o the guard orce; and victimization

o Aghan sta. A subsequent investigation by the

Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight in

June 2009 ound that, despite the ailure o AGNA

to redress these shortcomings, the DoS renewed the

AGNA contract through July 2010, with an option to

extend to 2012.8 These shortcomings demonstrate

the ailure o eective oversight and its potential

consequences; the activities reported also show a

proound disrespect or local cultural and religious

norms and Aghan law, urther damaging the local

perception o PSCs and, potentially, the legitimacy o

the United States and its allies.


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tary orces, embassies, non-governmental organizations,

and the private sector. One senior Aghan government

ocial privately estimated the total spending at three

times that spent on the Aghan National Police (ANP)

and Aghan National Army (ANA) salaries.10 I correct, this

would amount to between USD 6-10 billion.

Private security adds to the cost o reconstruction in

Aghanistan. According to the World Bank, contracted

security increased the cost o highway reconstruction

projects by 3-15 percent.11 Security concerns are routinely

cited as the main impediment to implementation o

development and reconstruction projects, eectively

stunting the fow o aid.12

At the same time, amidworsening insecurity, maintaining the delivery o

reconstruction assistance across the country and the

willingness o governmental, non-governmental, and

private reconstruction organizations to deploy sta to

Aghanistan depends upon the protection services o a

range o private security entities.

Indeed, the burgeoning private security sector in

Aghanistan poses a dilemma. PSPs ulll a need or which

there is currently no clear, immediate alternative. There are

too ew ANP to provide protection to the sta, premises,

and projects o the international community and too

little condence in their ability among most internationals

to entrust them with protection responsibilities. Better

government regulation, monitoring, and enorcement

by international consumers o private security will help

ensure that it enables, rather than hinders, the stabilization

o Aghanistan.

The Private Security Phenomenon

Since 2001, the international military orces, reconstruc-

tion and development contractors, as well as embas-sies, international organizations, and businesses have

extensively utilized private security. PSPs initially served

as a surrogate or the Aghan state security sector, but

the local and international community have yet to su-

ciently alter their reliance on PSPs as these services and

structures have become available. There is a wide range o

PSPs operating in Aghanistan today: rom international

and national PSCs operating with or without the required

Aghan licensing permits, to illegal militias hired as ASGs

by international military orces.

The main services oered by PSPs in Aghanistan are:

static guarding o premises and construction projects;

close protectionl; escorting convoys; security assessment

and training; intelligence and risk management;

electronic security and surveillance; and quick reaction

orces. PSPs have also been contracted or de-mining,

poppy eradication, supporting the electoral process, andtraining Aghan security orces.13 Although there is little

public inormation, incidents like that in Kandahar in June

2009 [See box on Page 8] also suggest the use o private

security providers or black ops, including detention and

interrogation.

The United States, which has the largest military and

diplomatic presence in Aghanistan, is the largest

employer o private security in the country. The practice

o using PSCs to guard US embassies dates to the US

intervention in Haiti in 1994; using PSCs to guard military

bases was rare beore September 11, 2001, but has become

commonplace as troops have been mobilized to ght

in Aghanistan and Iraq.14 According to the Commission

on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, there

were 4,373 private security personnel on US Department

o Deense (DoD) contracts and 689 US on Department

o State (DoS) contracts in March 2009.15

O these 5,062personnel, 4,402 (85 percent) were Aghan nationals.16 In

response to the deployment o additional military orces

the total number o DoD PSC personnel increased 19

percent (rom 4,373 to 5,198) as o August 2009.17

0

Better government regulation, monitoring, and

enforcement by international consumers of private

security will help ensure that it enables, rather than

hinders, the stabilization of Afghanistan.


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US Government Private Security Contractor Sta in

Aghanistan, August 2009

Total US/

Coalition

Third

Country

National

Local/Host

Country

National

DoD PSCs18 5,198 19 264 4,915

DoS PSCs19 689 273 341 75

There are discrepancies, however. In July 2009, or

instance, a US military spokesperson stated that the US

military has 72 contracts or private security at orward

bases and other local command posts in Aghanistan,

employing 5,600 mostly Aghan civilian guards.20

Use o private security by the US in combat zones has

grown despite congressional legislation and guidance

stating that PSCs cannot undertake inherently govern-

mental unctions.21 Employment o PSCs is one aspect

o a growing trend by the US government to contract a

broad range o support services (e.g., construction, lin-

guistics, logistics, transportation). In act, the total num-

ber o DoD contractor personnel in Aghanistan (68,197)

now exceeds that o uniormed personnel (52,300). Con-

tractors comprised 57 percent o the DoDs workorce in

Aghanistan in March 2009 the highest percentage ever

used by the US in any confict.22

Afghan Regulation Initiatives

While the private security industry in Aghanistan has

grown apace with demand, regulation has been more

reactive than proactive. In mid-2007, at least 18 domes-tic and 57 international PSCs were operating in Aghani-

stan.23 In February 2008, the Aghan Ministry o Interior

(MoI) Disarmament and Reintegration Commission intro-

duced an interim licensing procedure or existing PSCs2

in an eort to limit the transormation o illegal armed

groups into PSCs and to prevent their involvement in tra

cking arms and narcotics and other criminal activity.25

All PSCs then operating in Aghanistan were notied tha

they had 45 days in which to complete their application

or a permit. The processing o applications by the Mo

High Coordination Board o Security Companies Aairs

was monitored by the United Nations (UN), the NATO

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Com

bined Security Transition Command-Aghanistan (CSTC

A), and various embassies. MoI issued operating licenses

to 39 international and Aghan-owned PSCs, [See Annexon Page 11] eectively capping the size o the industry.2

Together these companies account or some 19,260 se

curity personnel,27 the majority o whom are locally-hired

Aghan personnel working in Kabul. 28

PSPs operating without a license have since accused

the government o avoring companies with ties to

government ocials an accusation acilitated by the

notorious corruption associated with MoI. While many o

the 39 PSCs with licenses are connected to Aghan elites

according to a ormer ocial amiliar with the process

those without licenses ailed to submit an application by

the deadline.29 Some likely assumed they would be able to

get a license through corruption. When this eventually did

not work, they began voicing concerns about the integrity

o the licensing process in order to prevent closure. 30

The PSC regulation denes the ollowing: illegal activities

or PSCs (including what might be regarded as state

unctions, e.g., border protection, securing governmen

oces); requirements or oreign and local security

companies to be issued operating and weapons licenses

terms and conditions o employment includingvetting personnel or past criminal activities and human

rights violations; guidelines or uniorms; restrictions

on procurement o equipment and ammunition; and

While the private security industry in Afghanistan has

grown apace with demand, regulation has been more

reactive than proactive.


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weakness, the vested interests o Aghan elites and

the international community have so ar proven a key

obstacle to strengthening and enorcing the existing

national regulatory ramework or private security and,

more broadly, the presidential decree outlawing armed

groups outside o government security orces.34

Although the Aghan regulation is neither ormalized nor

comprehensive, only ty other countries have domesticpolicies relating to regulation o PSPs.35 Contracting ac-

countability on the behal o the international community

is an issue yet to be ully addressed, however. The United

States has taken several recent initiatives in an attempt to

exert greater oversight over its contracts or private secu-

rity:36

In February 2009, the DoD established the Armed

Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD) in Aghanistan

to implement contractor policies, procedures,

processes or and liaison with PSCs, as well as

to investigate incidents involving the use o orce.37

Aegis, a British PSC was contracted to run ACOD, but

with limited US Government supervision rom the US

military.38

The Special Inspector General or Aghanistan

Reconstruction (SIGAR) announced on July 31, 2009

that it was initiating an audit on the use o private

contractors by the US DoD, DoS, and US Agency

or International Development (USAID) to provide

security or reconstruction activities.39

The DoD Interim Final Rule on the use o PSCs in

support o contingency operations, released in July

2009, is a rst step towards mandating more oversight

and ormalized procedures or PSC personne

employed by the US Government in designated

areas o combat. Implementing this policy may prove

challenging given the heavy dependence o US

activities on PSPs both within and outside the lega

parameters.40 The ongoing deployment o additiona

US and other NATO troops to Aghanistan will urthe

increase this dependence.

Employing and Empowering Illegal Militias

The Aghan government maintains that, through the PSC

licensing process, it has given conditional permission to

hire reliable and proessional private security companiesthat can adhere to Aghanistans laws and accepted

standards to provide security to the ISAF military bases

embassies, and large economic projects. 41

ISAF and US Special Forces, which operate outside o the

ISAF chain o command, employ a range o private security

providers to augment their security. Employment o PSP

enables more troops to be sent out on patrol to interact

with the local population and on combat operations

(though historically, base security in other theaters has

been perormed by military police). While ISAF and

US contingents employ licensed security companies

in some locations, the use o unregistered companies

and illegal armed support groups, with little oversight

or accountability, appears to be widespread among

international military orces.

Sources estimate that there are also as many as 1,000 to

1,500 illegal ASGs that have been employed, trained, and

armed by ISAF and Coalition Forces to provide security

to orward operating bases, escort supply convoys, and

perorm other unctions, as well as by developmen

agency contractors and provincial reconstruction teams(PRTs) to protect assistance projects.42

These security providers are requently run by orme

military commanders with ethnic, political, or kinship ties

The use of unregistered companies and illegal armed

support groups, with little oversight or accountability,

appears to be widespread among international military

forces.


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Examples o both unregistered private security

companies and armed support groups employed by

international military orces:

In Parwan province, Baghram Airbase employs a

PSC run by Asil Khan, a ormer Northern Alliance

commander allied with Haji Almas, a member o

parliament rom Parwan and ormer Northern

Alliance military commander.43

In Uruzgan province, the Australian Deense

Forces employ a 2000-strong paramilitary orce,

the Kandak Amnianti Uruzgan (Uruzgan Security

Battalion), privately run by Col. Mutiallah Khan to

provide security along the Kandahar-to-Tarin Kowt

road.44 The same company is also used by US Special

Forces.

In Kandahar province, the Canadian Forces have

contracted deense services rom Gul Agha Shirzai

(via Commando Security) and Gen. Gulalai, both

ormer military commanders. Shirzai, currently

governor o Nangarhar province, was previously

governor o Kandahar. The Canadian PRT has hired

the militia o Col. Haji Toorjan, an ally o Sherzai, to

provide camp security services.45

In Badakhshanprovince, security or the German PRT

is provided by Gen. Nazri Mahmad, a ormer Shura-

i-Nazar commander known to control a signicant

portion o the provinces lucrative opium industry.

The use o ASGs or security services is not conned to

international military orces: in the best documented

case o a PSC employing militia, US Protection and

Investigations (USPI) partnered with Northern

Alliance military commanders like General Din

Mohammad Jurat to provide their oot soldiers to the

company. USPI the American owners o which have

been ederally indicted or raud in the US has held,and continues to hold, contracts with the USAID, the

World Bank, the Japan International Cooperation

Agency, the UN, and private businesses.46

to serving and ormer government ocials and other

Aghan elite. Many are responsible or human rights

abuses and are involved in the illegal narcotics and black

market economies. In the south o Aghanistan, there is

also a tribal dimension.

PSPs are associated with the tribe o their leader, (e.g.,

Kandak Amnianti Uruzgan and its commander Matiullah

Khan with the Popalzai). In Kandahar, there are Popalzai-

and Barakzai-aliated PSPs (e.g., those linked to the Karzai

amily and Gul Agha Shirzai, respectively). 47

Rivals to State Authority

The mandate o the Coalition Forces and ISAF is to support

the Aghan government and the Aghan National Security

Forces (ANSF). However, by employing ASGs, the interna-

tional community strengthens PSP power relative to A-

ghan government institutions. The authority wielded by

the heads o PSPs surpasses that o provincial governors

and police chies, as they are better armed and unded.

This signals to the Aghan public that their security and

well-being is not a priority. Local commanders and their

militias are a primary source o insecurity or Aghan citi-

zens, as they violate basic human rights with impunity.48

Many o these PSPs continue to serve as ready-made

militias that compete with the state or otherwise

protect the power and interests o their commanders.

The employees or most private security companies

particularly registered companies based in Kabul are

hired through an open recruitment process and vetted

by MoIs Criminal Investigation Department. There isno accountability or sta o PSPs operating outside the

regulatory ramework. Moreover, illegal PSPs are generally

the most lucrative option available to ormer combatants

0

By employing armed support groups, the internation-

al community strengthens private security provider

power relative to Afghan government institutions.


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that have either been excluded rom or ailed by the

international communitys disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration initiatives.49 Many have been lured

back to PSPs, including those lead by their ormer

commanders.

Drug tracking and other criminal activities in which

commanders may be involved and or which their militiasprovide security is a lucrative source o illegal revenue

that can then be used to bribe government ocials and

strengthen shadow structures o authority. Illicit taxation

o PSPs escorting convoys and other scams on private

transport and security are also an important source o

unding or corrupt police and insurgents. The Kandak

Amnianti Uruzgan, or example, secures protection by

paying a hety toll to the policeman in charge o the

road. 50 Although it is transportation and construction

companies, both international and national, who are

the main source o protection revenue, private security

escorts also pay Taliban not to be attacked. According to

an Aghan intelligence ocial, there are examples o PSPs

paying as much as 60 percent o their gross prots or

convoy security to the Taliban and other insurgent-cum-

criminal groups or protection.51 (An international analyst

and a private security manager based in Aghanistan

thought the usual rate was likely much lower, but did not

discount the practice.)

Co-opting ormer Aghan military commanders as anti-

Taliban allies has been a centerpiece o international

military operations in Aghanistan since the 2001military intervention. The US armed and unded military

commanders many with egregious human rights

records in the initial war to overthrow the Taliban. The

existing system to protect US orces dates rom this period

As there was eectively no government and hence no

public security service commanders private militias were

hired or security. During 2003-2006, these commanders

and their militias were supposedly dismantled,52 and state

security orces established. But many o the same military

commanders still lead the same armed men in the orm o

ASGs and PSCs, licensed and unlicensed.

Today, there is an elected government, but the interna

tional community has not altered its security practices

PSPs, especially unlicensed security companies and ASGs

are dependent on short-term contracts with oreign enti

ties and have no prospect o sustainability. Hence, when

the oreign entities eventually leave or terminate theicontracts, these PSPs are likely to reocus on illegal eco

nomic activities and will ght among themselves or mar

ket share better trained and better armed than beore.

08

PSPs are generally the most lucrative option available

to former combatants that have either been excluded

from or failed by the international communitys

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

initiatives.The June 29, 2009 Kandahar Incident

The challenge posed by illegal militia groups

employed by oreign armed orces to Aghan state

authority was demonstrated on June 29, 2009, when41 Aghan nationals employed by an armed support

group (ASG) an unregistered militia orce run byUS Special Forces (SF) out o Camp Gecko in Kandahar

killed the chie o police o Kandahar province and veother police ocers. The incident occurred during a

gun battle inside a government compound ater theASG sought the release o a one o their membersarrested earlier that day. When the provincial attorney

general reused and called the Aghan National Police,the reght broke out. USSF claimed they could not

be held responsible or the actions o the ASG, but theincident raised the question o how 41 heavily armed

men and their vehicles could simply drive out o aUSSF-run base. President Hamid Karzai responded

to the killing, stating, Such incidents negativelyimpact the state-building process in Aghanistan andweaken the government. 53


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that the model the old Pashtun tribal militia system

has been corrupted by war and has no basis elsewhere

in the country, and that it thereore risks introducing

more uncontrollable armed groups and stoking ethnic

tensions.

Initial evidence suggests that the APPF is neither

prepared nor willing to tackle the insurgency. Pashtun

tribes are especially reluctant to provide young men or

ear o reprisal rom the Taliban.58 There may be a role

or these groups in combating local crime but this will

only be eective where there is stable local governance

and eective local, i not national oversight. The oversight

mechanism or the APPF has not been adequatelyestablished within the MoI prior to establishing the militia

groups. There are additional unresolved issues vetting

o members, ensuring ethnic balance, command and

control, payment, rules o engagement, policies on arrest

and detention that need to be resolved beore arming

and training additional armed groups in Aghanistan. 59

Without eective public security orces, peace is

impossible. Yet maintaining and expanding the ANSF is

prohibitively expensive or Aghanistan, which has current

annual revenue o some USD 700 million. According to the

US DoD, expanding the ANA alone will cost between USD

10-20 billion over a seven year period; recurrent costs have

been calculated at USD 2.5 billion per year or the ANA

and USD 1 billion per year or the ANP. Foreign donors,

principally the United States, supply the overwhelming

share o nancial support or ANSF.60

Building more credible public security orces is not

just a matter o greater investment. Financing armed,

alternative power structures ullls the security needs

10

o international diplomatic, military, and reconstruction

personnel in the short-term at the cost o consolidating

government authority and protecting Aghan citizens

in the long-term. Ending the impunity o powerholders

whether local or national, will increase public trust in the

state and Aghans willingness to support it in its struggle

against insurgents.

Conclusion

The majority o Aghans cannot aord private security. The

existence o a credible and accountable public security

orce, sized and trained commensurate to the scale and

nature o insecurity in Aghanistan, would mitigate theneed or international donors to contract billions o

dollars on the private security industry above all on

unaccountable illegal companies and armed suppor

groups. Investing a greater share o current private

security expenditure on the Aghan National Police would

help break the cycle o insecurity and insurgency by bette

resourcing the police, disempowering illegal militias and

other competitors to the state, and building public trus

in public security.

Nonetheless, building a credible public security secto

is a long-term process; one that will not address the

immediate security needs o international and nationa

stakeholders in Aghanistan. Nor, in the longer term

will it completely replace the market or PSCs. The role

o the ANA and ANP is not to provide static and convoy

security; placing them in that role would detract rom

their essential task o saeguarding public security and

saety and deteriorate their perormance o these

responsibilities. The goal, thereore, should be a private

security sector that is better regulated and controlled

by the government o Aghanistan and, critically, by the

international community that constitute their primarysource o contracts and revenue.

Financing armed, alternative power structures fulills

the security needs of international diplomatic, military,

and reconstruction personnel in the short-term at

the cost of consolidating government authority and

protecting Afghan citizens in the long-term.


15/20


AEGIS

http://www.aegisworld.com/

United Kingdom

Armor Group

http://www.armorgroup.com

United Kingdom

ARGS Aghanistan

Asia Security Group (ASG)

http://www.asg.a/

Aghanistan

Kabul-Balkh Security Services

http://www.kbss.a/

Aghanistan

Burhan Aghanistan

Blue Hackle

http://www.bluehackle.com/

United Kingdom

Blackwater

http://blackwatersecurity.com/services.html

United States

Commercial Security Group Aghanistan

Compass Security

http://ozziewebs.org/compass/contact-us.htm

Australia

Control Risks Group

http://www.controlrisks.com/deault.aspx?page=495

United Kingdom

DynCorp

http://www.dyn-intl.com/

United States

Edinburgh International

http://www.edinburghint.com/

United Kingdom

EODT/GSC

http://www.eodt.com/

United States

Four Horsemen/ARC

http://www.theourhorsemeninternational.com/securitydivision.html

United States

GardaWorld

http://www.garda-world.com/

Canada

Global

http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/index.html

United Kingdom

Good Knight Security Services

http://gkssecurity.com/

Aghanistan

HART Security

http://www.hartsecurity.com/

Aghanistan

IDG

http://www.idg-security.com/

United Kingdom

1

Source: Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Kabul County Council (http://kabul.osac.gov/)

Annex: Afghanistan Ministry of Interior-Registered Private Security CompaniesCountry RegisteredCompany Name


16/20

Center on

International

Cooperation


ISS Aghanistan

Khorasan Aghanistan

NCL Aghanistan

Olive

http://www.olivesecurity.com/

United Kingdom

PAGE Associates

http://www.pageassociates.net/services.htm

United Kingdom

Pride Security Services Aghanistan

REED Inc

http://www.reedinc.com

United States

RONCO

http://www.roncoconsulting.com/

United States

Saladin

http://www.saladin-security.com/html/aghan.shtml

United Kingdom

Siddiqi Security Aghanistan

Shield Aghanistan

SOC - Ag

http://www.soc-usa.com

Aghanistan

Strategic Security Solutions International (SSSI)

http://www.universalguardian.com/

United States

TOR Australia

Tundra SCAhttp://www.tundra-security.com/#

Aghanistan

USPI

http://uspi.us/

United States

UNITY - OSG

http://www.olympus-security.com/contact_us.html

Dubai

WATAN Risk Management

http://watanrisk.com/

Aghanistan

White Eagle Aghanistan

Annex: Afghanistan Ministry of Interior-Registered Private Security Companies continued

Source: Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Kabul County Council (http://kabul.osac.gov/)

Country RegisteredCompany Name


17/20


End Notes

1Project on Government Oversight, POGO Letter to Secretary o State Hillary Clinton regard-

ing U.S. Embassy in Kabul, http://www.pogo.org/pogo-les/letters/contract-oversight/co-

gp-20090901.html#18.

2Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency

Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, Interim Report, June 2009, p. 62. http://www.

wartimecontracting.gov/images/download/documents/reports/CWC_Interim_Report_At_

What_Cost_06-10-09.pd; US Department o Deense, Contractor Support o U.S. Operations

in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009, www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_

vault/5A_august_3rd_qtr_2009.doc.

3For the purposes o this study, private security providers reers to: (i) national and international

private military and security companies, both licensed and unlicensed by the Aghanistan

Ministry o Interior, and (ii) armed support groups illegal militias employed by international

military orces..

4For denition o private security providers as used in this study, see ootnote 2 above.

5Illegal armed groups are dened by the ollowing Aghan laws and regulations: (i) Presidential

Decree 50 Legal Prosecution o the violators o the Disarmament and Demobilization process

(July 2004), which denes as illegal, inter alia, (1) those who maintain their armed groups, military

and paramilitary units out o Ministry o Deences structure or recruit others to do so; (2) Those

whose military structures, armed groups and other military and paramilitary ormations within

MoD structure have been dismantled, but reorganized them again;...(4)Those who entered DDR

and submitted their weapons, and later enlisted to the ormations out o the MoD.; (ii) the Law

on Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives (June 2005), which restricts those institutions that

may legally acquire, carry, keep, use, purchase, import and export rearms and ammunition to

the Ministry o Deense, Ministry o Interior, and the General Directorate o National Security; its

Article 6 (4) provides exemptions or private security companies, as dened by (iii) The Interim

Private Security Regulation (February 2008). The Strategy or Disbandment o Illegal Armed

Groups in Aghanistan urther denes as illegal a group o more than ve armed individuals

operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion rom (a) loyalty to the commander, (b) receipt o

material benets, (c) impunity enjoyed by the members, (d) shared ethnic or social background,

United Nations Development Program, Strategy or Disbandment o Illegal Armed Groups in

Aghanistan, 2006, p. 2.6Following pay reorms, the salary or ANP patrolmen is between USD 100-110 per month; private

security personnel on basic guard duty earn between USD 200-300 per month. Police salary

gures rom US Government Accountability Oce, U.S. Programs to Further Reorm Ministry o

Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack o Military Personnel and Aghan Cooperation,

March 2009, p. 37; estimates o current PSC salaries rom email communication by author with

private security ocial in Kabul, on le. See also, The Privatization o Security in Aghanistan

When nobody guards the guardians, SwissPeace, June 2007, p. 22.

7Project on Government Oversight, op. cit.

8Ibid.

9Estimates provided to author by anonymous sources within the Ministry o Interior and a private

security company, record on le with authors. This gure is consistent with security expenditures

in Iraq.

10Private comments by senior Aghan government ocial to ARP sta, on le with the authors.

11Nicole Ball, William Byrd, Peter Middlebrook, and Christopher Ward, Improving Public Financial

Management in the Aghan Security Sector, Report No. 34582-AF, (Washington DC: World Bank,

2005), p. 29.

12Oce o the Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 30,

2009 Report To Congress.

13Unpublished study on the use o private sector security providers in Aghanistan, on le with

the authors.

14Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, op. cit. p. 60.

15Ibid., p. 62.

16

Ibid.17Ibid.; US Department o Deense, Contractor Support o U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM

AOR, Iraq, and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009.

18US Department o Deense, Contractor Support o U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR,

Iraq, and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009.

19Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, op. cit., p. 62.

20Walter Pincus, Military Weighs Private Security on Front Lines, The Washington Post,

July 26, 2009,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/25/

AR2009072501738.html?reerrer=emailarticle. C. Zucchio, op. cit.

21See, in particular, 110th Congress, Senate Bill S. 3001, National Deense Authorization Act

or Fiscal Year 2009. http://rwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_

cong bills&docid=:s3001pcs.txt.pd and Public Law 110-417, Sec. 832, Sense o Congress

on Perormance by Private Security Contractors o Certain Functions in an Area o Combat

Operations. http://rwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_

public_laws&docid=:publ417.110.pd.

22Moshe Schwartz, Department o Deense Contractors in Iraq and

Aghanistan:Background and Analysis, Congressional Research Service. August 13, 2009.

p. 8.

23 The Privatization o Security in Aghanistan-When nobody guards the guardians,

SwissPeace, June 2007.

24In February 2008, the Procedure or Regulating Activities o Private Security Companies

in Aghanistan entered into orce. The regulation was established pursuant to the drat law

on Private Security Companies approved by the Council o Ministers in January 2008 (still

pending beore parliament) and the Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, and Explosives.

25Ibid., p. 2.

26MoI is considering procedures to raise the cap on a case-by-case basis. It is also reviewing

license applications or twelve new private security companies.

27Unocial Ministry o Interior document, PSCs that have received Temporary Registration

Licences (FINAL), dated September 21, 2008, on le with author. An alternative gure o

23,000 personnel is cited in David Zucchio, Deadly contractor incident sours Aghans,

LATimes, August 13, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-g-

aghan-contractors132009aug13,0,5499394.story. 28Unpublished study on the use o

private sector security providers in Aghanistan, on le with the authors.

29Comment provided in communication with authors.

30Over a dozen private security companies operating without a license were subsequently

shutdown. See or example, Anthony Loyd, A ride out with the Aghan fying squad on

its mission to shut down rogue security rms, The Times, October 31, 2007, http://www.

timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2774227.ece.

31Author interview with MoI and UN ocials, on le with the author.

32Procedure or Regulating Activities o Private Security Companies in Aghanistan, pp.

29-30. Emphasis added.

33A Workshop with the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, International Peace Institute,

New York, July 29, 2009.

34Presidential Decree 50 Legal Prosecution o the violators o the Disarmament

and Demobilization process (July 2004). The decree criminalizes acts against the

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process and punishes individuals who

endanger the countrys security, maintain military ormations, armed groups, and othermilitary or militia units outside o the governments security orces, or recruit persons or

those purposes[.]

35PMSC Regulation Database. Geneva Centre or the Democratic Control o Armed

Forces (DCAF), July 20, 2009, http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/pmsc-regulation-

1


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Center on

International

Cooperation


database. At the international level, the UN Working Group on the Use o Mercenaries is currently

drating a convention on the regulation, oversight, and monitoring o private military and

security companies the rst o its kind but it is unclear what impact the eventual ratication

o such a convention would have at the national level. For an overview o extant national and

international regulatory mechanisms and potential models or the private security industry,

see James Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security Industry, (New

York: International Peace Institute, 2009).

36US Department o Deenses Contractor Support o U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq,

and Aghanistan, 3rd Quarter FY2009, list o improvements to management and oversight o

DoD contractors contains ourteen separate items.

37Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Aghanistan, op. cit., p. 74.

38Ibid. Aegis does not currently have armed personnel in Aghanistan.

39Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction, Letter rom John Brummet, Assistant

Inspector General or Audits, OSIGAR, dated July 31, 2009, copy on le with the authors.

40Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, US Department o

Deense Interim Final Rule, July 17, 2009.

41Unpublished study on the use o private sector security providers in Aghanistan, on le with

the authors.

42Numbers independently provided to CIC by two ormer UN ocials. The United Nations

estimated in 2005 that there were nearly 5,000 militias nationwide -- upwards o 120,000

armed individuals. To date, only some 300 militia groups have been disarmed or their members

arrested. In most districts, local commanders still remain in power and beyond the law.

43Asil Khans brother reportedly owns a cement actor with extensive contracts or construction

at Baghram airbase.

44Mark Dodd and Jeremy Kelly, ADF plays down warlords role on crucial supply chain, The

Australian, April 28, 2009.

45Mike Blancheld and Andrew Mayeda, Military hires ormer Aghan ghters as security guards,

CanWest News Service, November 22, 2007; Blancheld and Mayeda, The civilian presence in

modern warare, The Ottawa Citizen, November 19, 2007.

46See The Privatization o Security in Aghanistan When nobody guards the guardians,

SwissPeace, June 2007; Daniel Schulman, The Cowboys o Kabul, Mother Jones, July 27, 2009

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/cowboys-o-kabul.

47That the chie o police and the armed support group involved in the June 29, 2009 incident in

Kandahar were rom rival tribes was a probable actor in the escalation.48See or example, Fatima Ayub, Antonella Deledda, and Patricia Gossman, Vetting Lessons or

the 2009-10 Elections in Aghanistan, Intern ational Center or Transitional Justice, New York,

January 2009.

49Disbandment o Illegal Armed Groups in Aghanistan, DIAG Evaluation, 22 April 2009, on le

with authors.

50Jeremy Kelly, The Long Road to Tarin Kowt, The Australian, April 28, 2009. According to

the article, Matiullah receives at least $US1700 a truck to ensure each convoy arrives at its

destination saely; with about 200 trucks a month going to Tarin Kowt is worth nearly USD

340,000/month.

51Private comments by senior Aghan government ocial to ARP sta, on le with the authors.

52Ater the all o the Taliban, Northern Alliance militia groups were organized into the Aghan

Military Force. This orce was the target o disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

under the Aghanistan New Beginnings Program, which ran rom 2003-2006. It was succeed by

the DIAG program, which targeted illegal, independent militias that remained.

53

Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Aghan Security Guards Are Blamed in a Gun Battle That Killed a PoliceChei, New York Times, June 30, 2009. Additional details o incident provided to author by

anonymous source, record on le with authors.

54Between 2007-2009, 1,504 ANP were killed in action, compared to 568 ANA soldiers. Factbox

Aghanistan National Security Forces,Reuters, March 27, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/

latestCrisis/idUSISL112818.

55David Kilcullen, interviewed by George Packer, Kilcullen on Aghanistan: Its Still Winnable, But

Only Just, The New Yorker, 14 November 2008, via http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs

georgepacker/2008/11/kilcullen-on-a.html.

56 To rectiy this situation, police units are now being retrained through the Focused Distri

Development program, which, though in its early stages, has shown promising results. I

February 2009, the US Department o Deence assessed 19 percent o retrained units as capabl

o conducting missions on their own and 25 percent as capable o doing so with outside suppor

But, again, without enough trainers, rolling out the program countrywide will be impossible

Government Accountability Oce, Aghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reorm

Ministry o Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack o Military Personnel and Aghan

Cooperation, March 2009.

57A letter sent to the international and national business community in Aghanistan, dated

February 9, 2008, inormed o the new security company regulations, stating Clients wishing to

hire Security Service Providers may approach the existing registered 39 companies or approach

the Ministry o Interior to provide services through the Public Guard Force at cost to the client.

Copy on le with the authors. The Public Guard Force resembles, albeit on a smaller scale and

ideally, with greater oversight and control, the Facilities Protection Service established in Iraq

ollowing its consolidation and transer to the Iraqi Ministry o Interior payroll.

58Author interviews, Kabul, April 2009. Also see CJ Radin, The Aghan Public Protection Forc

pilot program is underway, Long War Journal, March 25, 2009, via http://www.longwarjourna

org/archives/2009/03/aghan_public_protec.php; Anand Gopal, Lessons rom Iraq? US create

local militias to ght Taliban, Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2009, via http://www.csmonito

com/2009/0413/p06s10-wosc.html; Dexter Filkins, In Recruiting an Aghan Militia, U.S. Face

Test, The New York Times, April 14, 2009, via http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/world

asia/15aghan.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Filkins&st=nyt.

59Author interviews, Kabul, April 2009.

60In 2005, Aghanistan spent 56.5 percent o GDP on the security sector. Eighty percent o

overall security expenditure in Aghanistan was directly executed by donors or their contractor

through the external budget, instead o going through the core budget process o the Ministry

o Finance. Ball et al., op cit., p. 23. (These gures do not represent the authorized increase in size

o ANA and ANP; as a result, the percentage o external expenditure has likely increased.)

14


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