sociopsiquiatrica del terrorismo

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American Academy of Political and Social Science

A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of TerrorismAuthor(s): Franco FerracutiReviewed work(s):Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 463,International Terrorism (Sep., 1982), pp. 129-140

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ANNALS, AAPSS, 463, September 1982

A SociopsychiatricInterpretationof TerrorismBy FRANCO FERRACUTI

ABSTRACT:Definitions of terrorism are imprecise and difficult.Even the units of analysis are not uniform, and existing typologiesare merely descriptive. Forecasting, however, particularly middle-and long-range, would improve if we could provide a valid theoreti-cal formulation. This would have to be interdisciplinary and shouldencompass both the idioverse of the terrorist and the universe of theterrorist events. Psychiatric contributions are few and they lackgeneral validity. Violence and death wishes, which translate intofantasy war, are generally accepted characteristics. Four theoriesare briefly discussed: (1) frustration-aggression, (2) unbalance ofthe social system, (3) Olson's rational choice, and (4) Marxist theory.A subcultural approach would allow consideration of group andindividual factors and would permit some valid policy choices.

Franco Ferracuti has been professor of criminological medicine and forensicpsychiatry, University of Rome, since 1973, and previously taught criminology,clinical psychology,and psychopathology here.Since 1977, he has beena consultant,Departmentof Social Services, governmentofPuertoRico;from 1980-81,consultant,project on drugs and crime; and consultant on kidnapping in Sardinia, UnitedNations Social Defense ResearchInstitute, Rome; rom 1978-81, consultant,ItalianMinistry of the Interior on antiterrorism. He has beenvisiting professorat variousuniversities in the United States and was aformer staff member,UN Secretariat. Heis a memberof the American and International Societies of Criminology and wasformer chairman and memberoftheCriminological Scientific Councilofthe Councilof Europe.129


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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYEFINITIONSof terrorism,aswell as descriptive or histori-cal studies, are many and severalattempts have been made to outlineprescriptions for the prevention,control, and management of thephenomenon.Attempts to explain this emer-gence of terrorism at a group pheno-menon level, or the process ofbecoming a terrorist, are less com-mon. They range from individual,biographical accounts to sweepingsociopolitical or psychiatric gener-alizations. No single theory hasemerged, and the various hypo-theses that have been proposed arestill awaiting testing and confirma-tion. The attempt will be made topresent an integrated, interdiscipli-nary theoretical approach, keepingin mind existing studies and therather disappointing lessons that

criminologists and psychiatristshave learned whenever they havetried to reach a scientifically accep-table level of theoretical exploration.Some preliminarydefinitionsand/or statements of approach areobviously needed.WHICH TERRORISM?

Terrorism is not new. Its impactis, though, and it has forced itselfinto the limelight of internationalawareness. Many types of terror-isms coexist, and anobjective defini-tion, in spite of the many attempts, isstill debated. One obvious difficultyis the need to abstain from valuejudgments and personal involve-ments, a position that is practicallyimpossible in relation to a pheno-menon in which we can all be partic-ipants, victims, or even actors.Moral and political judgments cloudthe issue, and today's terrorist canbe tomorrow's freedom fighter, ifhis actions are successful. Pontara's

definition is as good a starting pointas any: A terrorist act is any actioncarried out as part of a method ofpolitical struggle, aimed atinfluencing, or conquering ordefending the State power, imply-ing the use of extreme violence(inflicting death, or suffering orinjuries) against innocent, non-combatant persons. 1 This defini-tion includes both terrorism frombelow and terrorism fromabove,by a state against its internal orexternal enemies.In the following discussion, onlypolitical terrorism will be consid-ered, and within this category,criminal or frankly psychopatholog-ical subjects will also be excluded.Although terrorist movements canuse the criminal element, or mergewith it, and although mentallyimbalanced individuals, in the psy-chiatric range, can be used by ter-rorist groups, what is of greaterinterest is, of course, the normalterrorist, that is, the individual whois mentally sane, or only slightlyaltered, at most in the psychoneu-rotic or psychopathic range, andwho is engaged in subrevolutionaryor revolutionaryactivities. Criminalterrorists are using terror, but theirgoals and motivations remain crimi-nal, and they must be approachedassuch. Psychiatric terrorists andassassins of major political figuresremain unpredictable, almostchance occurrences, and defy fore-casting and theoretical explana-tions.2

1. G.Pontara, Violenzae Terrorismo: lProblema della Definizione e della Giustifi-cazione, n Dimensioni del TerrorismoPoli-tico, ed. L. Bonanate (Milan:Franco Angeli,1979), pp. 25-98.2. Many studies of political assassina-tions exist. Two recent examples are: M. C.Havens, C. Leiden, and K. M. Schmitt, ThePolitics of Assassination (Englewood Cliffs,

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SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC NTERPRETATIONThe phenomenon of terrorismalsomergeswithotherformsofdis-sent and protest. The range ofactions begins with legal andaccepted forms of dissent, such asindividualoralprotests,petitionsorgrievances, and peaceful demon-strations;moves to illegal but oftentoleratedbehavior, uchas coercivedemonstrations, iolentdemonstra-tions,seizuresof propertyand van-dalism; and finally escalates toillegal and unacceptablebehavior,such as sabotage,personalassault,bombing,kidnapping,and assassi-nation.3The latter can take the for-mat of mass murder, and seriouswarnings have been voiced aboutthe possibilityof future chemical,bacteriological, r nuclearthreats.4The warby proxy, which terror-ism is, goeson inspiteofoccasional,oftentemporary victories ycoun-

NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970);and J. F. Kirkham,S. Levy, and W. J. Crofty,Assassination andPolitical Violence,Vol. 8 of a report to theNational Commission on the Causes andPrevention of Violence (Washington, DC:GovernmentPrinting Office, 1969).3. B. McClure,TheDynamics of Terror-ism (Washington,DC:InternationalAssocia-tion of Chiefs of Police, 1976).4. Among the manystudies offuture ter-rorist strategy, the following are some of themost often quoted:B. M. Jenkins, Interna-tional Terrorism: A New Modeof Conflict,in International Terrorismand WorldSecur-ity, eds. 0. Carlton and C. Schaerf (NewYork: Halsted Press, 1975), pp. 13-49;B. M.Jenkins, High Technology Terrorism andSurrogate War:TheImpact of New Technol-ogy on Low-Level Violence, P-5339 (SantaMonica:CA:The RandCorporation,1975);B.M. Jenkins, Terrorism: Trends and Poten-tialities (Santa Monica,CA:The RandCorpo-ration, 1977); R. H. Kupperman and D.Trent, Terrorism:Threat,Reality, Response(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,1979); National Advisory Committee onCriminal Justice Standards and Goals,Dis-orders and Terrorism Washington,DC:U.S.Department of Justice, 1976);P. Wilkinson,Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan,1974).

terterrorists,perhaps becauseit isthe onlypossiblemethodof wagingwar left ina worldwhere arge-scalewarfare has been rendered un-thinkableby the finality of globalatomic destruction.As it will beseen later, this perceptionof low-levelconflict,representedbyterror-ism as war, may be essential to theterroristmind set.Inthefinalanalysis, herelativityand the ex postfacto natureof theconceptofterrorismdefydefinition.Cynically,butperhaps ruly,terror-ism could be defined as whattheotherpersondoes. Whatwe, orthestate, do is anti- or counter-terrorism, but obviouslythe posi-tions can be reversed by shiftingsides, or simply by the flow ofhistory.THE UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Leavingaside,atleastmomentar-ily, a generaldefinition,we cantryto satisfyourhistoricallyandstatis-tically orientedcolleaguesand con-centrate on a description of aterroristact as a unit of analysis.Again,seriousdifficultiesarise.The scale of events, which hasalready been presented, rangesfromveryminoracts, someof themeven quasi-legal or at least toler-ated, such as painting graffiti on anationalmonument o the BolognaRailroad Station massacre, at the100 casualties level. Obviously, hetwo events cannot be counted asequal.Also,thevalenceof theeventmustbeassessedagainst hegeneralclimate of the country,or even thearea of thecountry,nagivenhistor-icalandpoliticalmoment.Toburnapolicecar in CentralAmerica or inNorthern Ireland has a differentvalue and impact than the sameevent,undoubtlyllegalandclaimedas terrorist, in Switzerland or in

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

Norway.Thelevelof reportingwillalso vary, according to the fre-quencyofeventsandthepublicper-ception of them. Criminologistshavebeen facedwith theproblemofindexing crimes, and the Sellin-Wolfgang ndexhasmarkedamajorprogress n theattempt o refineourmeasurements.5 Not only does itallowfor theweightingof eventsbutit alsotakesinto account he relativ-ity and the temporalvariationsoftheweights.Sofar,such anindexismissingin the studyofchronologiesof terroristeventsandisobviouslyarequiredtoolbeforeadequatecom-puterizationcan be attempted6orbeforestatisticaltests, such as thePoisson model,7can be applied toseries of incidents. The rarity ofevents makesstatisticaltests ques-tionable and unreliable. Morerefined measures-or entirely dif-ferentareas,such as thepublicper-ception or fear of terrorism, orpublic concern-may have to betappedif we are to makeour mea-surementsmeaningful.8

5. T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, TheMeasurement of Delinquency (New York:John Wiley, 1964).6. See, for a concise discussion, D. A.Waterman and B. M. Jenkins, HeuristicModeling Using Rule-Based ComputerSys-tems, in Terrorism,eds. R. H. Kuppermanand D. Trent, pp.285-330;andW. W.Fowler,An Agenda for QuantitativeResearchon Ter-rorism (Santa Monica,CA:The RandCorpo-ration, 1980).7. J. M. Gleason, A Poisson Model ofIncidents of International Terrorism in theUnited States, Terrorism, 4(1-4):259-65(1980).8. For an example of a public opinionstudy, see S. G. Levy, Special ResearchReport: Attitudes Toward Political Vio-lence, in Assassination and Political Vio-lence,eds. J. F. Kirkham, S. Levy, and W. J.Crofty, 1969. Examples of Italian studies,unpublished,are reportedin F. Bruno and F.Ferracuti, Aggression in Perspective:Italy, in GlobalPerspectiveson Aggression,eds. A. P. Goldstein and M. Segall (NewYork:Pergamon Press, forthcoming).

Typologiesare alsoof questiona-blevalue.Tobeuseful,theymust beat least descriptive, inclusive,dis-crete, endowedwith forecastingorprognostic alue,policy-generating,possibly etiological, and theoreti-cally grounded.No such taxonomyexists for terrorism,and availabletypologiesof revolution r destabili-zationdonot farebetter.McClure'stypes by cause are of somehelp inidentifying the main motives,butthey stopat a very superficial evelof ideologicalcommitmentandfallshortof anyothercriterionof valid-ity.9 He lists five major types bycause :

-resistance to colonialrule, forexample, Algeria or Cyprus,theonlytypefadingintohistor-ical oblivionater victory andinternationalglobal support;-separatism, for example, theBasquesor the PuertoRicans,alliedto colonialresistance,butethnicallybasedandpoliticallyvaried;-internal-political, for example,early Maoor early Castro, n-volving an attempt to seizepowerwithin a countrywhichmay have different political

connotations and may evenchangepoliticalaffiliations;-ideological, forexample,Tupa-maros, he RedBrigade,BaaderMeinhof, or Weather Under-ground; hisis themostdanger-ous and the one that attractstheoreticalattention;hegoalisthe destructionof the systemwithouta viable and coherent

alternative n view;-supporting external takeover,for example, Vietnam in the9. B. McClure,TheDynamics of Terror-ism, 1976.

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SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC NTERPRETATIONsixties, which may be a covertoperation,and is generally oflimited interest.

The five types may merge, andthe identificationof the terroristgroup may attempt to encompassmore than one type, such as theunsuccessful attempt by the RedBrigade to establish a Sardinianbranch, labeled BarbagiaRossa,exploiting deep-rootedfeelings ofindependence.Bonanate10presents a concisetypology, based on the doubledichotomy of tactical/strategicalandinstrumental/goal-orienteder-rorism. This is orientedprimarilytoward hemodusoperandiandcar-ries little explanatorypower.A sociopsychiatric theory willhave, at present,to concentrateonideological, oal-orientederrorism.

Manydescriptiveworksexistontheindividual and group characteris-tics of othertypes,suchasthe well-documented study by A. R.Molnar, but their transferabilityto the pure, deologically ommit-ted, full-timeenemyof the state islimited. Thus the heuristicvalueofexistingtypologies emains imited.THEORY AS PREDICTIONA sociopsychiatricheoryof ter-rorism, like any theory of deviantbehavior,or in general,any theoryat all, is a logicallyintegratedsetofpropositionsabout the relationsofmeaningful variables. The requi-

10. L. Bonanate,ed., Dimensioni del Ter-rorismo Politico (Milan: Franco Angeli,1979);and L. Bonanate, Realta e Miti di unFenomeno a Piu Varianti, Politica Interna-zionale, 11-12:59-67 1981).11. A. R. Molnar, Human Factors Con-siderations of Undergrounds n Insurgencies(Washington, DC: Special OperationsResearchOffice,The AmericanUniversity, 1December 1965).

sitesofa theoryhavebeentheobjectof serious scrutiny by social andbehavioral scientists. For TalcottParsons the principal criteria ofgoodtheoryare conceptualclarity,precision,and logicalintegration.12The cleareststatementof criteriaisprobably that made by ClarenceSchrag for criminological heory.s1For him, beforetheorycan be usedin predictionsand explanations, tmust be given an empirical inter-pretationbyoperational efinitions.

Therequisitesalso nclude he fol-lowing:-logical adequacy;-generality;-comprehensiveness (numberand relevanceof variablesac-counted or);-informative content;-fertility (adaptability o math-ematical and logical operationand, of course, heuristic fer-tility for better heories);-parsimony (the eliminationofredundancy);-credibility (congruence etweenclaimsand observedevidence);-significance (capacityfor solv-

ing problems); nd-predictability (will the claimshold for futureobservations?).For GunnarMyrdal,theoryis apriorito the empiricalobservationoffacts,butinscience, actsaresov-

12. T. Parsons, Comment o L. Gross,Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework,American Journal of Sociology, 67:136-40(Sept. 1961).13. C. Schrag, Some Notes on Crimino-logical Theory, in Conferenceon ResearchPlanning on Crime and Deliquency, ed. R.Larson(Los Angeles: University of SouthernCalifornia Youth Studies Center, 1962),p. 2.

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ereign.14 Given the paucity, thelimited validity, and the relativity offacts about terrorism, a theoreti-cal statement may well bepremature.Yet forecasting requires theory,to get out of actuarial straitjacketsand to allow planning. In terrorism,two kinds of forecasting obviouslycoexist.On one side, limited, short-rangeforecasting, which does not tamperwith major variables but only withpredictable terrorists' and otheractors ' activities and behaviors,essentially a police or criminalisticoperation, is better solved by suchtested tools as simulation games,association charting, and profiles orpsychobiographies.On the other hand, middle- andlong-range forecasting imply a dif-ferent set of operations to be con-ducted using the full array of thesocial planner's and policymaker'stools, from Delphi methods tomathematical modeling to systemsanalysis. Admittedly, the differencebetween short-, middle-, and long-range forecasting is not simply anissue of temporal extension, and thevariables to be included in the analy-sis may extend beyondgenerationallimits, thus raising the interestingquestion of our right to make policychoices for future generations.16

14. G. Myrdal, Value and Social Theory:A Selectionof Essays on Methodology, d. P.Streeten (New York: Harper & Row, 1958),p. 236.15. On forecasting, many methodologicalissues have been raised. For a discussion ofpertinent aspects, see G.Marbach,Previsionidi LungoPeriodo:Analisi esplorative Milan:Franco Angeli, 1980); G. Marbach, Condi-tions and Problems of the Scientific Studyofthe Future, EconomicNotes, 10 (1981);andW. W. Deutsch, Some Prospects for theFuture, Journal of International Affairs,31(2):315-26 1977).

Another problem in forecasting isthe difference between (1) the pre-diction of future actions by individu-als, or the identification ofprospective terrorists, their entryinto the groups, their careers, andthe forced or spontaneous termina-tion of their activities comparedwith (2) the analysis of future behav-ior of groups, or the forecasting ofdestabilization.Forecasting individuals' behav-ior is a clinically oriented activitywhere psychiatrists and criminolo-gists have not fared too well. Theidioverse of the individual terrorist,in spite of various in-depth analysesand biographies,16remains largelyunknown except for a few unrelatedfacts. The risk of overgeneralizationand overprediction remains large.Forecasting group behavior hasseen a relatively large body of stu-dies, particularly by political scient-ists searching for the correlates andpredictors of destabilization.17The

16. See, for example, F. J. Hacker, Cru-saders, Criminals, Crazies:Terror and Ter-rorism in Our Time (New York: W. W.Norton,1976);F. J. Hacker, TerrorandTer-rorism: Modern Growth Industry and MassEntertainment, Terrorism, 4(1):163-69(1980). See also K. Kellen, Terrorists-WhatAre They Like? How Some Terrorists Des-cribe Their World and Actions (Santa Mon-ica, CA: The Rand Corporation,1979).For arecent autobiography, see Giorgio,Memoriedalla Clandestinita:un TerroristaNon Pen-tito Si Racconta(Milan:Savelli, 1981).17. The correlates of destabilization andrevolution have been analyzed by manyauthors; few large-scale studies, however,exist. See the following: S. Lipset, PoliticalMan: TheSocial Bases ofPolitics (New York:Doubleday, 1960); J. C. Davies, Toward aTheory of Revolution, American Sociologi-cal Review,27:5-19(1962);C. Johnson,Revo-lutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown,1966); S. P. Huntington, Political Order inChanging Societies (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1968);T. R.Gurr,WhyMenRebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1970);T. R. Gurr, The Revolution-

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SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC NTERPRETATIONinstability of political systemsneither automatically generates ter-rorism nor ensures its vitality.Whatever theory emerges, itshould admittedly be interdiscipli-nary and should attempt to encom-pass both the idioverse of theterrorist and the universe of his orher social systems.Of course, forecasting could befutile. To quote Ortega y Gasset ina 1951 speech on the occasion of hisAd Honorem Doctorate at the Uni-versity of Glasgow: Man is at alltimes projectedover the frighteningemptiness which future is. 18 Butaccording to Ortega, the future isempty because it is the problematicdimension of our life: For him,prophets were useless:With the noon-bright clarity whichGreekmindsenjoyed, lreadyOeschilussaysto the first prophetess,Cassandra,that to prophetize s the most uselessoperationof all, because t leads to twoalternatives only: if to prophetize afuture disaster could be useful, menwouldavoid t, andthe prophecy,beingunfulfilled,would notbe valid.If, how-ever, the prophecywould anyhowbefulfilled, t wouldmeanthattoforecastthe negative future would have beenuseless.Thus Apollus gave Cassandra thegifts to see the future, on the oneconditionthat nobodywould pay herany attention.Social Change Nexus: Some Old Theoriesand New Hypotheses, ComparativePolitics,Apr. 1973, 359-92; J. C. Davies, Aggres-sion, Violence, Revolution and War, ch. 9 inHandbookof Political Psychology,ed. J. N.Knutsen(San Francisco:Jossey-Bass, 1973),pp. 234-60;E. N. Muller,AggressivePoliticalParticipation (Princeton,NJ: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1979);D. J. Monti, TheRela-tion Between Terrorism and Domestic CivilDisorders, Terrorism, 4(1-4):123-61(1980).18. J. Ortega y Gasset, Sobre la Rebelionde las Masas, Apendice 11 in La Rebelion delas Masas (Madrid:Revista de Occidente enAlianza Editorial, 1980).

Forecasting terrorist activities,in spite of Ortega's pessimism, is aneeded art. In a way, terrorists aresomewhat helpful. Their need for anaudience and, in most instances,their highly politicized behavioralpatterns make some forecastingfeasible.

AVAILABLE FACTSA. C. Hazelip has tried to deter-mine the unity in the principles of

terrorists, and their adherence tothe same principles, through ananalysis of the statements of promi-nent terrorist leaders, ranging fromBakunin to Marighella.19 The 12principles are the following: (1) Vio-lence is necessary to overthrowoppression. (2) There is no limit tothe extent of violence justified. (3)Actions should clearly convey theirpurpose. (4) Reprisal killings arecounterproductive. (5) Ruthlessnessand extraordinary violence areessential to terrorist success. (6)Government failures can be used togain popular support. (7) Terrorismexposes the repressive side ofgovernment. (8) Terrorists aim toincapacitate government directly orindirectly. (9) Secrecy is importantto terrorist operations. (10) Syste-matic planning and execution arecritical to terrorist success. (11)Small-scale, persistent attacks aremost effective. (12) Terrorists arededicated to destruction for the sakeof their cause.From a behavioral science pers-pective, the most important ele-ments appear to be the commitmentto violence and the operational flexi-bility, a contrast to the rigidity of the

19. A. C. Hazelip, TwelveTenetsof Ter-rorism An Assessmentof Theoryand Prac-tice (Ann Arbor, MI:University MicrofilmsInternational, 1980).

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYpolitical credo. Another commonelement in ideological errorism s,as A. Koestler ndicated, heurgetodedicateoneselfto a cause,a leader,an ideology.20 his can be a neededreplacementfor anomie or for anexistential vacuum, which maydriveother ndividuals odriftingorto enteringthe drug culture.Thus,to engage in terrorismmay be anadoptive response, and this mayexplain its appeal for affluent ormiddle-classyouthfaced withvalueconflicts.21 lternativeexplanationsare Davies's2 gap between risingexpectationsand need satisfaction,andGurr's23 odel,already mpliedin Marx,24which introduces thediscrepancybetween valueexpec-tations and valuecapabilities ofyouth'senvironment.Aggressionandviolentaction,asF. Fanon25stated, increase self-esteem, thus generating Sorel'ssentimentof glory. 26A blockade ypothesishasbeenformulatedby Bonanate, omewhatin line with the earlierfrustration-aggression hypotheses.27 vailablefacts, at least in Europe,contradictthe blocks, nlesstheyare seenas

20. A. Koestler, quoted by J. C. Davies,Aggression,Violence, Revolutionand War.21. F. Ferracuti and F. Bruno, Psychiat-ric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy, in TheMad, the Bad and theDifferent,eds. I. L.Barak-Glantzand C. R. Huff (Lexington,MA:Lexington Books, 1981).22. J. C. Davies, Aggression, Violence,Revolutionand War.23. T. R. Gurr, WhyMen Rebel;and T. R.Gurr, TheRevolution-Social ChangeNexus.24. K. Marx, Wage,Labor and Capital,in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works nTwo Volumes (Moscow: Foreign LanguagePublishing House, 1949) 1.25. F. Fanon, quoted by J. C. Davies,Aggression,Violence, Revolutionand War,p. 245.26. Sorel, quoted, ibid., p. 245.27. L. Bonante, Dimensioni del Terro-rismo Politico.

internal, perceived obstacles, notrelated to socialrealities.In line with a more psychiatricapproach,patricidalimpulses,rig-idity, and death wishes have beeninvoked as explanations.They allfall short of predictivepowerandgeneralapplicability.Therelationshipwith death is aninteresting,dynamicelement of theterrorist'spersonality.The biologi-cal instinctto survive,for the indi-vidualand society,is the authoritythat vetoesthe acceptanceof death.Manescapes romdeathusingeveryavailable mechanism,but particu-larly througha specific psychologi-calattitude,definedas thedelusionofimmortality, hroughwhichmanlivesdayby dayas ifdeatheitherdidnot exist or did not concern him.This defense mechanism s a remo-val and denial of reality,an escapefromreality.Deathpersecannotbeaccepted at the experiential leveland mustthereforebe rationalized,attributed to chance or to naturalprocesses,madeinto a symbolof anexceptional event, or denied andlivedsimplyas areligious ransitionfrom life on earthto eternallife.The only conditionunder whichthis attitudetowarddeathis drasti-cally changed and the survivalinstinct appears not to operate, iswar. Ina warsituationmanappearsreadyto kill andbe killed,the mostaberrant forms of aggression arecarriedout by highlycivilizedcul-tures,andeverysoldiercanengagein murder.Warpermitsthe ruleofdeath over life and the legitimiza-tionof terror.The normal error-ist is therefore ike a soldieroutsideof time andspace, ivingin a realityof war that exists only in his orherfantasy.This is widely reflectedinterrorists'writingsand in theirpos-ture, when captured, of claimingprisoner f war status.

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SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC NTERPRETATIONAt this point, to understand hedifferencesamongterrorists, nor-mal citizens,andcriminals, t may

be useful to analyze the elementsthat allow one to live in a fantasystateofwarwithin a realityofpeaceanddemocracy, nd tocompareandcontrastrealwarwith the terrorist'sfantasywar.28Real war is a complex pheno-menoninvolvingthe subversionofnorms,values,andhabits n the livesof two or more societies trying tosolve through strength a conflictbasedonopposite nterests.A statusof real war can take place only ifsome conditionsexist. The first isthe needfortwoor moreclearlydis-tinguishable groups or societies,eachwitha clearanddiscretesocialidentity. War is a collective andorganized phenomenon.Oneneces-saryandirreplaceableprerequisitefor a collectiveeventis theexistenceof a collectivity.To modify itselfthrougha state of war, it mustpos-sessa certaindegreeoforganizationandsovereignty.Theorganizationsneeded norder o maintainaviablesocial structure, and sovereigntyensuresthe independence f powerfrom the structure.A secondcondition ora real warto take place is the existence of acrisis involvingtwo or more collec-tivities due to areciprocal onflictofinterests.Inotherwords,for war tohappen, the concernedgroups ornations must experience the needfor theappropriationfsomething-a physicalobjectoran instrumentalasset-whose propertyis contestedand whichis considered ndivisible.

The third condition s the transi-tionfroma stateofpeace oastateofwar, with the acceptance of newvalues, new goals, and new behav-28. F. Bruno and F. Ferracuti, Aggres-sion in Perspective: Italy.

ioralpatterns,which must be func-tional to the new lifestyle.The last condition s the needforthe use of strength and all thesophisticated technological aidsman has created to multiply hislimitedphysical powerfor the pur-poseof inflictingharm.The processthat precedesenter-inga stateofwarinvolves he identi-fication by the participatingsocietiesof the enemy s such andthereforeof the latter's ransforma-tion into somethingalien and hos-tile. Impliedis a projectionof one'sown dramaticanxietiesoverthe lossor destruction of the contestedobject;alsoimplied s thedecision odestroythe enemy in orderto pre-vent the appropriationor destruc-tion of the object.Together and parallel with theprocessof alienationof the enemy,there is a maniacal feeling ofincreasingpowerandinvulnerabil-ity in the parties involved.All these mechanisms producewhat the Latinexpression dentifiesas the animusbelli,thewill towagewar that is psychologicallydomi-nantinat least oneof thecontendinggroups.Theoppositegroup, norderto survive, must assume a similarposture.Terrorism, however, is fantasywar, real only in the mind of theterrorist.Fantasywar,ofcourse, sonlypartialwar,real foronlyoneofthe contestantswhothenadoptswarvalues,norms,andbehaviors gainstanother, generally larger group,trying to solve throughstrength aconflictbasedonlegitimateorilleg-itimategrievances.A fantasywarisneitheracceptednoracknowledgedby the other group who, in effect,tends to deny it. Fantasy war istherefore an ongoingphenomenon,in a continuouslyunstable balancebetween two possible stabilizing

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processes: ealwaror diffuse error.Fantasy war becomesreal only ifacknowledgedby the enemy, ndbecomesterrorismwhen,unabletocompel heenemy oaccepta stateofwar,it mustlimit itself toharassinganddestabilizingheenemy hroughthe utilizationanddiffusionof fear.Theoperational onditions ffan-tasywarare similarto thoseof realwar,but are in partartificiallypro-duced so as to mimic reality. Forexample,evenfantasywar needs heexistenceof at leasttwogroups,dis-tinct and organized. Within thesame society,since sovereigntycanonlybe attributed o onegroup, hatto whichit is deniedtriesto achieveit, carryingout the symbolicdutiesandprivilegesoftheother,dominat-ing group and rejecting existinglaws andprevailingvalues.Thus heterroristgroupclaimspowerof lifeand deathovercitizens,engages incriminal activities while claimingtheir lawfulness,establishescourtsof law, and promulgates entences,applyingnewlaws.A crisisisneces-sary (if none is takingplace, t mustbegenerated); olutions o the crisisare rejected ( reforms delay therevolution );nd the existenceof aloveobject,perceivedas in danger,is also necessary.Thisobjectis notcontestedby the othergroup,but itis threatened in its structure andfunctions. The process of singlingoutandalienating heenemy s iden-tical towhattakesplaceinrealwar,but it can assume much moreserious pathological connotationsbecause it is less subjectto realitytesting and criticism.

Lastly,fantasywar, as real war,is carriedoutby executingprojectsof destruction,but the chain reac-tion, not being completely main-tained by counteractions by theothergroup,must be self-sustainedthroughan escalationof terrorthat

does not permit the participants oabstainfrom actionorevento lowerthe level of conflict.As already stated, two possiblescenarios exist in fantasy war:either it changesinto realwar,andthus endswith the defeatof onecon-testant;or it stabilizes tselfinto er-ror,andinthis caseit canonlyenterintoa newcrisis,thusremoving hethreat to the objectand making itaccessibleto both contestants,or itcan changethe system,reducingor

abolishing heprerequisitesof war.At this point,it can be hypothes-ized thatterroristsdifferfrom nor-mal citizens and from criminalsfirst of all because they perceivethemselves as different and alienvis-a-visthe ruling society;becausethey belong o agroupcharacterizedbyastrong deological, ultural,andpolitical identity;and also becausethey feel that their love object isthreatened by the rest of society,whichtheyidentifyasanenemyandtherefore ry to destroy.Toachievethis goal,whichis love andnothate,theychooseviolence,whichtheyuseto generate terror, this being theonlyoption, ntheirperception, pento them.

AVAILABLE THEORIESSalert has summarizedthe fourmain theories.29 riefly, theyare asfollows:1. Olson30 heory,or Revolutionas a RationalChoice.Revolution sthe best alternative,given the pre-vailing socialcircumstances.Gametheory and cost-benefit analysis29. B. Salert, Revolutionsand Revolution-aries: Four Theories (New York: Elsevier,1976).30. J. M. Olson, The Logic of CollectiveAction, rev. ed. (New York:SchockenBooks,1971).

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SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC NTERPRETATIONshouldpermitverification,givenitsinherent rationality. No role isenvisagedfor individualmotives.2. A PsychologicalTheory.31hisis mostly based on frustration-aggression,and on thealready-citedDavies reformulation.32his movestheproblem rom hesocialuniverseto the idioverse, and motives andcountermotives are superficiallyhandled.Also,the theoryis at leastpartially tautologicaland does notaccount or thosewhoabstainfromterrorism, although frustrated, orfor repented errorists.3. A Theoryof the Unbalanceofthe Social System. Proposedby C.Johnson, his is a homeostatic, sys-tem approach, ssentiallybasedonthe validity of the selection ofvariables-increase of ideologicalactivity,armedforces,generalandpoliticalcriminality,and suicide-as an index of anomie.33 gain, theindividual idioverse componentisoverlooked.4. Marxist Theory.34 his is themost difficultto synthesizebecauseof its long history and its variousinterpretations. Its elaborationshave followed different paths,althoughnotnecessarily ncompati-ble, such as the scientific-positivisticononeside,basedonthesocial and economicaspects, con-trastedwith theHegelian, ndividu-alistic,praxis-oriented spect,as inMarcuse.35he transferfrom class

31. T. R. Gurr, WhyMenRebel;and T. R.Gurr, The Revolution-Social ChangeNexus.32. J. C. Davies, Aggression, Violence,Revolution and War.33. C. Johnson,RevolutionaryChange.34. K. Marx, A Contributionto the Cri-tique of Political Economy, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. R. C. Tucker (New York:Norton, 1972), pp. 4-5.35. H. Marcuse, Ragione e Rivoluzione:Hegel e il Sorgere della Teoria Sociale(Bologna:II Mulino, 1965).

consciousness to revolutionaryconsciousness emainshistoricallyunproved,and further conceptualelaborationsare in progress,as inNegri.36 t is important o acknowl-edge the officialrejectionof revolu-tionaryterroristviolenceby classicMarxism.None of the four theories ana-lyzedbySalertfulfills the criteriaofsoundtheoryor providesadequatebasis for forecastingand planning.New efforts are needed, particu-larly if the attempt is going to bemade to cover universe and idio-verse.Terrorists iveinculturesandtry to establishtheir own valuesys-temsandsubcultures,both ojustifythemselves and to proselytize. Asubcultural approach37would fallwithin an established orm of refer-ence for the analysis of violentbehavior,ofwhichpoliticalviolencewould be a specific subcategory.Thelearningprocess, mplied n thesubculturaltheory, would explainindoctrination and terroristcareers.At the sametime, individ-ual differences in life experiencewouldfind properplacement n theprocessof enteringthe subculture.Moreover, the psychologicaldynamicswouldpermit psychiatrichandling n termsof valuechanges.Co-option,or example,would be amorevalidpolicy hanmilitarycon-trol. In addition, dispersal of thesubculture, orexample,in the pri-son environment, ouldbe a usefulindication or short-termpolicy.Ofcourse,verifications forthefuture,and constitutesthe task facing thebehavioral scientist approachingthe subjectof terrorism.

36. A. Negri, II Communismoe la Guerra(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980).37. M. E. Wolfgang and F. Ferracuti, TheSubculture of Violence (London: Tavistock,1967).

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYIn closing,a statementby HenryDavidThoreau,dated1849, n CivilDisobedience should guide thesearch forunderstanding: Allmenrecognize the right of revolution;that is the right to refuseallegianceto and to resist the government,when its tyrannyor its inefficiencyare great andunendurable.

Terroristsarenotaliens; heyareouryouth.We cannotdismissthemas enemies,except in a short-rangeapproach.In the long range, if wewant to stop terrorism, we mustunderstand errorists.

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sociopsiquiatrica del terrorismo

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