Spetsnaz:SPETSNAZ desde o fim da URSSA dissoluo da Unio Sovitica no final de 1991 marcou o incio de um tempo detumulto em toda a Eursia. A nova militar russo encontrou-se ter quelidar com uma misso incerta, uma enorme escassez de financiamento, e uma srie de novocrises. O Spetsnaz foram, como sempre, na vanguarda, no menos importante em ajudar Moscoualiados ganhar guerras civis locais. Eles tiveram que cumprir esta tarefa, apesar da transferncia deunidades para outros Estados ps-soviticos, como a 10 Brigada para a Ucrnia ea15 para o Uzbequisto. A 3 Brigada retornou Rssia em 1991, com a ltimaelementos do Grupo de foras soviticas na Alemanha, e foi ento transferidoao Distrito Militar de Volga. A 4 Brigada, que tinha sido baseada noagora independente Estados blticos, foi dissolvida. Enquanto isso, em 1992, o VDVComando das Foras Airborne criou a sua prpria unidade de foras especiais, os Guardas 45Regimento de Reconhecimento independente, fora da antiga 901 IndependentAir Batalho de Assalto e agresso a 218 Independent Air Spetsnaz Batalho.Spetsnaz da Rssia se esforou para manter sua vantagem na dcada de 1990. Eles encontraramse a ser modo entre trs presses contraditrias: doutrina,recursos e necessidade. A perspectiva de uma enormeconfronto com a NATO de repente pareceu desaparecer,levantando a questo de apenas o que o Spetsnaz - originalmentecriado para neutralizar armas nucleares tticas ocidentaise estruturas de comando - foram para. Embora o Afeganistotinha mostrado o seu potencial, a hierarquia militar russoestavam ansiosos para limpar esse conflito infeliz de suamemria coletiva, e que esperava para garantir que o armadoforas nunca mais seria implantado em tal guerra. Oinovaes desenvolvidas por Fortieth do exrcito - de invocarbrigadas mais flexveis ao invs de divises maiores, todo omaneira de aumentar o nmero de atiradores de elite em unidades - foramConsidera-se o anncio hocresponses a uma situao nica, nolies para o futuro. Tendo perdido seu antigo papel, a Spetsnazviram-se forados a abandonar a sua nova.Enquanto isso, durante o reinado catico do presidente BorisYeltsin (1991-1999), o militar estava passando por um perodocrise financeira sem precedentes de como os oramentos encolheram, os salriosestavam sendo pagos com atraso (quando foram pagos em tudo), eforas que foram sendo retirados a partir dos cantos doImprio sovitico tinha de alguma forma para ser acomodados. OSpetsnaz, relativamente caros homem-a-homem eacostumados a um certo grau de ateno e cuidados especiais,parecia um luxo caro naqueles tempos precria.A GRU parecia ser mais interessados em tentarsalvar suas operaes de inteligncia no exterior, eo corpo parecia maior VDVpara oferecer melhores perspectivas de carreira do que a Spetsnaz - especialmente tendo em conta que o GenPavel Grachev, Ministro da Defesa em 1992-1996, era um ex-comandante daVDV que promoveu muitos de seus antigos camaradas. O resultado foi que capazoficiais procuraram transferncias para os pra-quedistas, e do Spetsnaz esprit de corpsveio sob a presso sria. Nem eram imunes desmoralizaoe criminalidade to comum entre os militares como um todo. Com sede em Moscou A16 da brigada, por exemplo, tornou-se notrio tanto para prestarassassinos "bicos" para as gangues do crime organizado que estavam lutando paracontrole do submundo, e para a formao de pistoleiros nas suas prprias instalaes.Esta foi tambm uma poca de crises e conflitos na ex-imprio sovitico,quando se amargo guerras locais muitas vezes no declarado desafiou Moscow Regionalautoridade. Com tantas unidades desmoralizados e interrompido, o punhado relativode elementos que ainda estavam operacionais encontraram-se em desproporcionadoexigem. Durante a guerra civil no Tajiquisto 1992-1997, Spetsnaz foram anexadaspara o 201 Motor Rifle Diviso russa, que foi implantado em apoiodas foras do governo contra os rebeldes. Alguns tambm foram anexados ao 15Brigada, ento tecnicamente parte das foras armadas de pases vizinhosUzbequisto mas na prtica ainda dependente pessoal russo.Spetsnaz tambm desempenhou um papel menor em 1992 Transnstria Guerra, quandoos russos tnicos que vivem ao longo da margem oriental do rio Dneistr se separaramindependente da Moldvia. Temores de que eles enfrentaram assimilao foradas amaioria da populao de etnia-Romeno foram deliberadamente incentivado porMoscou, e desta vez o Spetsnaz estavam apoiando os rebeldes. Quando umcessar-fogo foi organizado, a ser garantido pela XIV Exrcito local, da Rssia,a maior parte do Spetsnaz calmamente retornou Rssia, alm de um punhadorealizao de misses de campo de reconhecimento Rssia enviou uma unidade de brigada-fora para juntar-se a implementao liderada pela NATOForce (IFOR), que manteve a paz na Bsnia-Herzegovina em 1995-96aps a assinatura dos Acordos de Paz de Dayton. Esta primeira Independente AirborneBrigada, com sede em Ugljevik, estava sob o comando operacional do liderada pelos Estados UnidosDiviso Multinacional (Norte). Como resultado, ele foi saudado - e na equidade,deve ser considerado - como um exemplo da nova esprito da cooperaoentre Moscou eo Ocidente. Alguns dos razvedchikiwere da brigadarumores de ser Spetsnaz, trazidos para a unidade no apenas para fornecer habilidades muchneeded mas tambm para aproveitar a oportunidade para reunir informaes sobre locaise as foras ocidentais igualmente. Isso no est confirmado, embora elementos da45 Reconnaissance Regiment independente da VDV e 22 IndependentAirborne Regiment foram anexados fora (e, posteriormente, fez Spetsnazrecrutar um nmero de veteranos de IFOR contingente da Rssia).Todas estas operaes foram apenas sideshows, no entanto, em comparao com oteatro principal em que a Spetsnaz iria encontrar-se operando noera ps-sovitica: a Chechnia.CHECHNYAEm meados dos anos 1990 um nmero significativo dos habitantes da Chechnia - umetnicamente distinta e repblica tradicionalmente muulmana no Cucaso, a longoinfeliz sob o domnio russo - levou pelo valor de face o novo presidente russoOferta de Yeltsin s regies constituintes da Federao Russa para "tomar comotanta liberdade quanto voc pode mastigar. "Isto comeou um slide para no um, mas doisguerras sangrentas. Como o Afeganisto era para a Spetsnaz Sovitica, ento as guerras chechenasforam cruciais na evoluo de foras especiais militares da Rssia. Eles adquiriram umaampla gama de papis, da caa lderes rebeldes para interceptar comboios de abastecimento,mas eles tambm encontraram-se lutando contra um inimigo que incluiu muitos ex-soviticaSpetsnaz entre suas fileiras, levando a alguns srios reveses6.A Primeira Guerra chechena, 1994-1996Por parte da Rssia da primeira guerra chechena foi mal concebido, mal planejadas, emal executada. Na sequncia de uma tentativa fracassada de derrubar o presidente checheno Dzhokar6 Ver Histrias essenciais 78, Guerras da Rssia na Chechnia 1994-2009Dudayev usando rebeldes chechenos e mercenrios, foras russas invadiram a autoproclamada "Repblica Independente chechena de Ichkeria." O ministro da DefesaGrachev tinha airily prometeu o presidente Yeltsin uma vitria rpida e fcil, mas oforas destacadas eram muito poucos e muito pobre em um estado de prontido de combate intimidar ou dominar os combatentes chechenos ferozes e eficazes. Como o Russoalto comando procurava desesperadamente para recuperar a situao que teve de reunirforas genuinamente operacionais de onde quer que ela poderia encontr-los, que vo desde aInfantaria Naval a polcia de choque OMON do Ministrio do Interior. Contingentes Spetsnazde todo o pas foram enviados Chechnia, at mesmo elementos da NavalSpetsnaz. Por exemplo, WO Andrei Dneprovsky de 42 de Frota do PacficoIndependente de Propsito Especfico Naval Ponto Reconnaissance foi postumamentefez um Heri da Rssia depois de sua morte por bala de um franco-atirador em maro.O seu principal papel nos primeiros estgios da guerra era a sua tradicional decampo de batalha de reconhecimento, mas quando os russos invadiram a chechenoo capital Grozny em 1995, pelotes Spetsnaz encontraram-se a ser utilizado comotropas de choque. Suas habilidades eram naturalmente valioso, mas a guerra urbana notoriamente uma carne-moedor impiedoso, especialmente quando os defensores tm ohabilidades e tempo para se preparar para o ataque. Tenacidade lendria Os chechenos 'e entusiasmo blico tinha a inteno de que eles tinham sido desproporcionalmenterepresentados nas fileiras da Spetsnaz e VDV durante os tempos soviticos, ento elestinha uma boa idia das tticas os russos estariam usando. Como resultado, oSpetsnaz Russo levou pesadas perdas; por exemplo, todo um peloto deMoscou foram aniquilados quando foram atradas para um edifcio que tinha sidoarmadilhado com explosivos.Confrontado com o choque e raiva entre os comandantes Spetsnaz - eameaas por parte de soldados no terreno, de graves consequncias se eles foram usadosnovamente em uma forma to Cavalier - os comandantes invaso comearam a perceber adesperdcio de empreg-los neste papel. A maioria das unidades Spetsnaz GRU (eo 45 Regimento de VDV) foi retirada em meados de 1995, deixando o22 Brigade como a principal fora no pas, e em 1996 viu-o reviver muitosdas lies aprendidas no Afeganisto. O Spetsnaz comeou a ser usado especialmentepara emboscar foras rebeldes, o lanamento de ataques contra alvos de alto valoridentificado por linhas de abastecimento humanos ou de inteligncia tcnica e interdio.A guerra estava se mostrando um embarao caro para Moscou, especialmenteaps os chechenos conseguiu retomar Grozny em maro de 1996. Em agosto daquele anoas foras do governo federal preparado para investir a cidade novamente, com ameaasque usariam bombardeiros estratgicos e msseis. No entanto, o nacionalconselheiro de segurana (e veterano da guerra afeg) Alexander Lebed entrou em cena, enegociou um cessar-fogo com o comandante rebelde Aslan Maskhadov. OAgosto 1996 Khasav-Yurt Accord e posterior 1997 Tratado de Moscoutrouxe um fim desconfortvel para a guerra; mas ficou claro que a nova da Chechniaestado - como nem independentes, nem verdadeiramente parte da Federao Russa -No poderia ser uma resposta a longo prazo.A segunda guerra chechena, 1999-2002A Chechnia autnoma seguida degenerou em caos e criminalidade, eExtremistas islmicos comearam a montar uma tentativa cada vez mais agressiva para tomarsobre o que tinha sido anteriormente uma revolta essencialmente nacionalista. Em Moscouo governo comeou a preparar-se para uma revanche, no menos importante, atravs de uma melhorutilizao do Spetsnaz. Quando, em agosto de 1999, extremistas do auto-declaradoBrigada Islmica Internacional invadiram a repblica vizinha do Daguestodesafiando as ordens de Maskhadov, este deu o Kremlin a desculpa de que precisavapara lanar uma nova guerra. A Federao j tinha um novo primeiro-ministro, oex-oficial da KGB Vladimir Putin, que estava ansioso para provar a si mesmo para umPopulao russa mal desmoralizadas pelo caos dos anos Yeltsin.Primeiro veio uma campanha area massiva, enquanto Primeiro-Ministro Putin montadoum exrcito para a invaso. Em 01 de outubro de 1999 Moscou declarou que nomais reconhecia a legitimidade de Maskhadov, ea Rssia lanou o primeiropalco de uma ofensiva terrestre. Este metodicamente rolou atravs do nortePlancies chechenos antes sitiando Grozny - que caiu em fevereiro - emovendo-se para as terras altas. Embora a maior parte dos combates foi tratadapor tropas do Exrcito e Interior regulares, a Spetsnaz desempenhou um papel significativoem incurses e campo de batalha de reconhecimento, incluindo manchar para sesses de artilhariae ataques areos. O grosso das foras especiais implantado novamente veio do22 Brigade, que, como resultado em 2001 foi designada uma unidade de Guardas (oprimeiro a ser dada essa honra desde o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial).O Spetsnaz realizado seus papis habituais de reconhecimento profundo,interdio, a recolha de informaes e de resposta rpida, mas geralmente commaior sucesso e apoio do que durante a primeira guerra. No s eram maisforas regulares cometeu esse tempo, mas tinham sido feitos esforos para melhorarcondies para os soldados, seu nvel de formao ea sua preparao.Por conseguinte, a Spetsnaz foram capazes de operar como eles foram feitos para fazer,e teve uma srie de sucessos. Eles tambm foram capazes de reviver vriosPrticas de guerra afegos, como "partidos de embarque" transmitidas por helicptero que fariaprestar ateno para o trfego rodovirio e interceptar potenciais comboios de combatentes earmas. Alm disso, juntamente com novas tropas especialista montanha do Exrcito,eles foram cruciais para operaes nas terras altas do sul.As coisas nem sempre seguir o seu caminho, no entanto. Em fevereiro notrio2000 batalha para Altura 776, por exemplo, uma fora mista compreendendopra-quedistas da Diviso Aerotransportada 104 Guardas apoiado por umapeloto de Spetsnaz do ooSn 411th foi cortado e rodeado por ummuito maior fora rebelde checheno no Vale Argun. Quando parecia que oRussos seria invadido o comandante da companhia chamou para baixo artilhariafogo em sua prpria posio; dos 91 soldados russos, 84 foram mortos. Enquanto umderrota em termos militares, a recusa da VDV e Spetsnaz a render-seao enfrentar todas as adversidades e morte quase certa fez com que oacoplamento uma fonte de orgulho perverso, semelhante ao ataque Krer em 1986.O Kadyrovtsy, eoVostok BatalhoEm abril de 2002 Moscou declaroua guerra ter terminado, embora"operaes antiterroristas"continuou at abril de 2009. Porpor volta de 2005 mais militarSpetsnaz foi retiradada prpria Chechnia, mesmo seunidades semelhante designadosresponsvel perante o FederalServio de Segurana (FSB) eMinistrio da Administrao Interna(MVD) permaneceu. Em vez disso, o seumisses atribudos a foras locaisque veio a ser conhecido comoKadyrovtsy ("Kadyrovites").O seu aumento foi uma das principaisinovaes da SegundaGuerra chechena. Moscou"Tchetchenizao" da guerraesforo de recrutamento envolvidosChechenos, incluindoex-rebeldes desiludidos, para formar unidades especiais capazes de caar os rebeldes emseus prprios termos e em seu prprio territrio. Estas unidades foram chamados s vezes"Spetsnaz", e muitas vezes tecnicamente relatado para o GRU. Mais, no entanto, eramUnidades Kadyrovtsy- pessoalmente leais a Ahmed Kadyrov, o primeiro proMoscow presidente da Chechnia, e, aps o seu assassinato em 2004, a suafilho e sucessor Ramzan. Em 2006 eles somavam cerca de 5.000 homens em duasunidades principais, o 141 "Ahmed Kadyrov" Special Purpose Polcia Regiment,eo regimento de Petrleo (Neftepolk), cujo papel era proteger oficialpipelines que atravessa Chechnia. Enquanto Ramzan Kadyrov trouxeram suas foras sob o checheno InteriorMinistrio (e mais estreita na sua rbita pessoal), tambm foram, durante algum tempo, doisunidades autnomas chechenos formado e financiado pelo GRU: o Zapad("Ocidentais") e Vostok ("Oriente") batalhes, formados em 2002 e 2003respectivamente. Depois de Vostok foi implantado na Osstia do Sul durante o breveGuerra da Gergia, a dissoluo oficial de ambas as unidades no final de 2008marcou a consolidao final do controle pessoal de Kadyrov sobre a Chechnia deforas de segurana. (Vostok fez um reaparecimento inesperado, pelo menos no nome,no leste da Ucrnia em 2014, embora desta vez o GRU aparentemente em brevedispensado com a maioria ou todas das pessoal originais chechenos.) Estas unidadesforam difceis e ativos de contra-insurgncia e de segurana eficazes, capazes de operarnas terras altas do norte do Cucaso, bem como quaisquer rebeldes. Eles eram,no entanto, propenso a indisciplina e mtodos "heterodoxas", e foramrepetidamente acusado de abusos por parte de Direitos Humanos, nacionais e internacionaisorganizaes. Eles no estavam Spetsnaz no verdadeiro sentido da palavra.O SPETSNAZ MODERNOEmbora Spetsnaz continuaria a operar na Chechnia esporadicamente depoiso fim da fase principal militar, em 2002, de novo se encontraram emuma posio incerta. Eles tinham demonstrado o seu valor no tipo de hipossinal, conflitos Brushfire altamente mveis que parecem prestes a dominar o inciodcadas do sculo 21. Por outro lado, as foras de terra e regularesa VDV, com cimes tanto de seus oramentos e funes, no estavam dispostos areconhece que o Spetsnaz poderia fazer o que eles no podiam - e queesses servios no queria tocar, o FSB e MVD queria reivindicar parasi mesmos. A Doutrina Militar 2000, o documento fundamental noque a Rssia baseia seu planejamento militar, reconheceu as ameaas deterrorismo e instabilidade nas fronteiras do pas; mas o aparelho de seguranaalegou que o primeiro foi em sua jurisdio, enquanto o VDV alegouser o mais adequado para lidar com este ltimo.Como resultado, o Spetsnaz continuou a estar na posio de ser irnicoglorificado em pblico (em 2002 houve at uma minissrie de televiso russoschamado Spetsnaz, que mostrou-lhes como figuras hericas fazendo de tudo, desde frustrar financiadores do terrorismo para resgatar refns), mas ainda marginalizadosdentro das foras armadas. Em seu favor, esse foi um momento em que o Presidente Putin foidramaticamente intensificao das despesas de defesa; este ajudou a Spetsnaz tanto pararecrutar mais carreira ("Contrato") soldados para reduzir a proporo derecrutas em suas fileiras, e desenvolver seus programas de treinamento e instalaes.Eles tambm encontraram-se frequentemente a ser selecionado para testar novos sistemas de armasreservados para uso mais amplo, e eles desempenharam um papel importante na concepo deo novo ratnik ("Guerreiro") sute equipamento pessoal introduzida em 2013.Surpreendentemente, no entanto, seria a guerra da Rssia com a Gergia em agosto de 2008- Que durou menos de uma semana - que iria consolidar a posio daSpetsnaz, em uma nova militar russo que foi finalmente libertar-se da suaPreocupaes guerra fria com grandes guerras terrestres na Europa ou na sia.Georgia, 2008As regies rebeldes anti-georgianas da Osstia do Sul e Abkhazia teve longasido uma frustrao para o governo da Gergia em Tbilisi. Ansioso para ensinar ooutspokenly presidente anti-russo Mikheil Saakashvili uma lio que fariano se perca em outros lderes ps-soviticosque possam pensar de desafiar Moscouhegemonia regional, o Kremlinencorajou seus aliados locais para provocar oGeorgianos. Depois de meses de cross-borderinvases, ataques sniping, e at mesmo de artilharia,Tbilisi subiu para a isca e invadiu SulOsstia em 7 de agosto de 2008. A prximamanh as foras russas de cinqenta e oitoExrcito comeou a rolar para a Osstia do Sul,alegando que eles estavam l para restaurara paz; simultaneamente o Mar NegroFrota comeou bloqueando o Georgiancosta, um barco afundando mssil Georgianque desafiou a frota russa.

Em 12 de agosto, o Kremlin declarouo fim das operaes militares. ORussos haviam expulsado os georgianos fora da Abkhzia e da Osstia do Sul econfigurar estados independentes auto-proclamada em ambas as regies. (Estes so realmenteprotetorados: a comunidade internacional em geral no conseguiram reconhecer-los, mas a sua soberania garantida pelas tropas russas e bases). OMilitar georgiano tinha sido espancado, e Moscou tinha provado que a suadisposio de usar sua fora militar no deve ser subestimada. Se tivessequisesse, ele poderia facilmente ter atingido em Tbilisi e ido muito mais longena Gergia.No entanto, enquanto esta foi uma vitria russa, nunca houve qualquerquesto de saber qual pas iria ganhar: Fifty-Oitavo Exrcito s tinha maisque o dobro de soldados e cinco vezes mais tanques como todo o Georgianmilitar. Em vez disso, a questo era a facilidade com que os russos iria ganhar, e mesmoaps oito anos de defesa inflado de Putin de passar a operao, na verdade,deficincias graves reveladas. Obsoleto, inseguro, e muitas vezes no confiveiscomando, sistemas de controle e comunicao levou a "amigvel-fogo"incidentes, com oficiais sendo forado a usar seus celulares pessoais em vez disso.A Fora Area no conseguiram alcanar o tipo de superioridade area convincentes de que eraesperado, e problemas na coordenao significava que suas aeronaves vriosvezes veio sob o fogo dos soldados russos ou aliados milcias da Osstia do Sulque os confundiu com georgiana. Embora Moscou nega isso, credvelcontas sugerem que trs dos seis avies perdido caiu para tal "fogo amigo".A maior parte da luta real acabou sendo realizado por pra-quedistas da76 e 98 Airborne Divises, com um papel desproporcional tambm serdesempenhado por 45 Reconnaissance Regiment Guards Independente da VDV, comobem como Spetsnaz do 10o e 22o Brigadas. Embora o GRU como umtodo no saiu da guerra bem (no menos importante, porque a inteligncia obsoletodesde que eles levaram a vrios aerdromos desocupados georgianas sendobombardeado), a Spetsnaz si fez demonstrar suas habilidades de campo usuais.Como as foras armadas russas lentamente modernizar e adaptar a um futurosusceptvel de ser impulsionada pela projeo de poder, contra-insurgncia e antiterroristaoperaes, o papel do Spetsnaz est a aumentar, mas isto provocouquestinculas invejoso. Depois de jogar um papel importante no sucesso do 2008Operao Gergia, em 2011 eles perderam o seu estatuto especial como reportando-se diretamentepara a Direco Principal de Inteligncia do Estado-Maior Geral (GRU), e foramformalmente anexado a todos os comandos regionais-armas. Em parte, isso refletiu mais amplapresses polticas sobre o GRU, mas tambm uma conscincia crescente daimportncia da Spetsnaz na guerra futura, e um desejo de fazer-lhes ofoco da maior parte das operaes.Comando de Operaes EspeciaisHouve sugestes de anos que a GRU deve focar militarespionagem, enquanto o Spetsnaz - como ferramentas de reconhecimento do campo de batalha -devendo antes ser subordinada diretamente aos comandos de campo. A experinciada Guerra da Gergia s fortaleceu o caso daqueles que defendiamintegrao mais estreita com as foras de campo.Para este fim, em 2010, foi anunciado que as brigadas Spetsnaz fariaser transferidos para os quatro distritos militares, que estar operacionalComandos em tempo de guerra. Enquanto isso, o treinamento e as operaes Senezhcentro em Solnechnogorsk seria tirada da GRU e relatrioem vez disso, o Estado-Maior Geral, em primeiro Gen Medoyev, ento Gen Miroshnichenko - tellingly, ambos veteranos da rival Alpha do FSBfora de comando antiterrorista. Senezh, nomeado para um lago a noroeste deMoscou, iria se tornar a base de um novo Comando de Operaes Especiais(KSO, Komanda spetsialnogo naznacheniya), incluindo um opSn fora doestrutura brigada regular, um helicptero de ataque e de transporte no esquadroTorzhok base area e um esquadro de Il-76 "Candid" transporte heavy-liftaeronave. Os papis do KSO que variam de operaes antiterroristas emtempo de paz para sabotar e assassinato na guerra. A necessidade de segurarqualquer potencial ameaa para os Jogos Olmpicos de Inverno de 2014 em Sochi, perto daturbulento norte do Cucaso, estimulou sua formao, e que do Spetsnaz346 Brigada e 25 Independent Regiment.O KSO foi oficialmente operacional a partir de incio de 2013, e, de acordo comChefe do Estado-Maior General Valery Gerasimov, destinado principalmente paramisses fora da Rssia, que vo todo o caminho de participao na ONUoperaes de manuteno da paz para as intervenes unilaterais. Dado que o presidentePutin estava advertindo simultaneamente que a retirada iminente da Alliedtropas do Afeganisto ameaado um surto de caos na Rssia do sulflanco, presumivelmente implantaes na sia Central estavam sob considerao.A GRU aguerrido, 2010-13Enquanto isso, as falhas demonstradas durante a Guerra da Gergia tinha dadoO ministro da Defesa, Anatoly Serdyukov a oportunidade que precisava para forar oalto comando para aceitar reformas militares radicais. O objetivo era afastar-a partir do foco Sovitica tradicionalmente dominante em uma grande guerra com terraNATO ou da China, e, em vez de criar estruturas capazes de lutar em uma variedade dediferentes tipos de operaes, com maior flexibilidade e independncia.Divises foram substitudos por brigadas menores como os blocos de construo bsicos deo Exrcito; a nfase deslocou-se lentamente das foras tanque-pesado tradicionaispara unidades mais leves e ativos especializados, tais como tropas de montanha, e umarenovado esforo foi feito para aumentar a proporo de voluntrios de carreira emas fileiras.A ironia que este trouxe uma nova presso sobre o GRU, desde a suarivais polticos foram agora questionar seu papel e valor (e russopolticas burocrticas so especialmente sanguinrio). As Foras Terrestres queriaos Spetsnaz para vir sob seu controle direto; o Servio de Inteligncia Externa(SVR) queria humilhar uma agncia rival;os pra-quedistas da VDV senti que elespoderia fazer tudo o que podia Spetsnaz;e vozes no aparelho de Estado-Maior Generalestavam questionando especial do GRUstatus, que deram um (ressentido) directolinha para o Kremlin. Assim, em outubro24, de 2010 - o dia em que aSpetsnaz estavam celebrando o 60aniversrio de sua formao - oForas Terrestres vice-chefe do Estado-Maior paraReconnaissance, Col Vladimir Mardusin,anunciaram a sua subordinao comandos territoriais (ver acima, sob"Comando de Operaes Especiais").Este parecia vir como uma surpresa paraa GRU; seu comandante na poca,ColGen Alexander Shlyakhturov, era umfigura relativamente fraca que estava em licena mdica quase permanente. Almde lhe serem retirados de suas foras especiais, o GRU estava sendo espremido em outromaneiras. O "Aquarium" - sua sede expansivo em Khodynka de Moscousubrbio - teve que derramar mais de mil funcionrios, incluindo 80 de seus 100generais. H ainda foi falar que a Direco de Inteligncia Principal fariaser rebaixado para uma direco regular de Estado-Maior General, privando-o demaior autonomia e autoridade.A partir desse ponto baixo, no entanto, o GRU eo Spetsnaz rapidamenterebote. Geral Shlyakhturov se aposentou no final de 2011, e seu sucessor,LtGen Igor Sergun, provou ser um chefe muito mais activa e eficaz. No clssicoEstilo russo, o GRU agora travaram uma ao de retaguarda, nominalmente transferiro Spetsnaz s foras terrestres, mas, na prtica, colocando o movimento fora por tantotempo possvel. Talvez o golpe final de boa sorte para o GRU foi onomeao de ColGen Valery Gerasimov como Chefe do Estado-Maior Geral, emno final de 2012. Um pensador, bem como um comandante, Gerasimov era umdefensor de uma nova forma de "hbrido" ou a guerra "no-linear", pelo qualRssia poderia afirmar os seus interesses atravs de uma mistura imaginativa de poltica,econmico, inteligncia e operaes militares. A Spetsnaz parecia serinstrumentos ideais para essas operaes - mas isso obrigava-os a ser estratgicoativos, ao invs de apenas batedores batalha subordinadas aos comandos territoriais Como resultado, em 2013, o resubordination do Spetsnaz foi tranqilamentecair, e voltaram a (se tivessem sempre realmente esquerda) o controlo doGRU. Isso tambm salvou de uma oferta de aquisio pelos pra-quedistas daquele ano,quando VDV comandante ColGen Vladimir Shamanov debatido que a Spetsnazdeveria ser parte de novas foras de reaco rpida, o que inevitavelmente seriaser controlado por seu servio maior. Isso no deu em nada, no entanto; e em 2014o prestgio do GRU subiria novamente com a anexao da Crimia, seguidopor uma campanha semi-encoberta de insurreio e desestabilizao no lesteUcrnia (ver abaixo).Organizao de 2014A partir do final de 2014, Spetsnaz da Rssia composto por sete brigadas regulares de vriostamanhos, no total, compreendendo talvez 19 ooSns batalho de tamanho. Eles soresponsvel para Quinta Direco da GRU (Reconnaissance Operacional),embora no campo, esto subordinados aos comandantes operacionais. Oquatro Pontos de Propsito Especfico reconhecimento naval Independentes (omrpSpN,anlogo ao brigadas) ainda so tecnicamente parte da Quinta Direco, masso mais estreitamente ligada s suas frotas pai. Alm disso, h os VDV de45 prpria Guarda Independente de Propsito Especfico Regiment (opSn), e trsoutros elementos Spetsnaz separadas. Um deles, o 100th Brigada Independente, frequentemente utilizado como um banco de ensaio para novas idias e equipamentos. Como acima mencionado,dois outros foram criados em 2011-12, como parte dos preparativos de segurana paraos Jogos Olmpicos de Inverno de Sochi, no sudoeste da Rssia: o 25 IndependentesRegiment (opSn), otimizado para operaes no turbulento norte do Cucaso,ea Brigada 346, o que parece estar mais perto de desapego (regimento)tamanho, e ter-se tornado elemento operacional da KSO.Recrutamento e formaoExiste uma presso constante para tentar assegurar que as unidades so compostas Spetsnazexclusivamente de voluntrios profissionais "recrutas contrato" em russojargo. Isto est a revelar um desafio, no entanto, e embora alguns elementos sotodo-voluntrio, a partir de 2013 alguns outros foram, tanto quanto 50 por cento compostade recrutas - ainda que a escolha da cultura, escolhidos pela sua destreza fsica e interesse prvio em atividades como tiro, orientao, e esportes.No entanto, isso no significa que a maioria das unidades sofrer "churn", bianual com novarecrutas sobre mandatos de um ano que entram em maio e novembro (aps quatromeses de treinamento bsico), sargentos e especialistas em julho e janeiro (apsseis meses), oficiais subalternos e frescos de todos os colgios militares setembro.O treinamento uma mistura intensa de condicionamento fsico, mental, orientao -grande nfase colocada na tentativa de surpreender os recrutas, e desenvolver a suacapacidade de responder rapidamente ao inesperado - e conferir necessriohabilidades tticas e tcnicas. Profissionais podem muito bem aprender o bsico de umlinguagem relevante para a rea de seu brigada especfica de operaes, mas isso no uma questo central; no h expectativa de que eles vo adquirir qualquer coisa comofluncia, a menos que eles so susceptveis de transferncia para operaes de inteligncia do GRU.Enquanto eles geralmente recebem um tratamento melhor do que tropas regulares, e vontademuitas vezes estar na posse de bnus de combate, a Spetsnaz sofrer o russo habitualdesvantagens da administrao desigual e pay s vezes tarde. Mesmo durante a segunda guerra chechena houve protestos sobre pagamento de combate no serequipamentos desembolsados e prometeu no se materializando. H tambm especficoquestes para oficiais ambiciosos, como o posto mais alto encontrado dentro do Spetsnaz coronel, para uma kombrig (comandante de brigada). Aqueles com aspiraes mais elevadasou deve mover-se na estrutura GRU linha principal, que dominado poroficiais de inteligncia em vez de comandos, ou ento fazer a difcilmudana de lado na VDV, o que significa uma ponte inter-brao de longa datarivalidade. A este respeito, eles so muito menos bem colocada do que policiais VDV, quetm posies de comando mais elevados disponveis dentro de seu prprio brao de servio, eque tambm pode transferir mais facilmente para regular de posies de comando ou de postos de pessoal militar do Ministrio daDefesa ou Estado-Maior General. Este um problema de longa data:Valery Vostrotin, um oficial pra-quedista highlydecoratedque se aposentou como um colonelgeneral e tornou-se presidentedos veteranos VDV 'associao, contou que, comoum cadete no final1970 girou para baixo achance de participar da 9aEmpresa no Ryazan VDVAcademia de Formao, que foipara Spetsnaz, precisamente porqueera um beco sem sada carreira.Crimia e Ucrnia de 2014O Spetsnaz desempenhou um muitopapel significativo na virtualmenteanexao sem derramamento de sangue doCrimia, em maro de 2014, e ema muito mais sangrenta e, aomomento da escrita, ainda em cursoInsurgncia apoiado pela Rssia na regio Donbas oriental da Ucrnia. Noprocesso, eles exemplificou a nova doutrina que ColGen GerasimovDefendido, que prev a fora militar a ser utilizado com preciso, nocontexto das estratgias mais amplas que contam pelo menos tanto sobre a subverso,misdirection, influncia econmica e poltica, e de inteligncia misses.Protestos polticos na corrupo e cada vez mais pr-Moscouorientao do presidente ucraniano, Viktor Yanukovych levou a confrontos sangrentosem Kiev, e levou-o a fugir do pas em 21 de fevereiro de 2014. Um novogoverno provisrio tomou o poder; Moscou, irritado e assustado com asada de seu aliado, e com medo de que a Ucrnia iria deixar sua esfera de interesse, rapidamente comeou a fazer seus prprios preparativos. No dia seguinte, a VDV de45 opSn foi colocada em estado de alerta, como foi o terceiro Spetsnaz Brigade, e dois ooSnda 16 Brigada deixaram sua base em Tambov.Uma questo-chave era o futuro da Crimeia. Esta pennsula tem uma maioriade lngua russa, e tinha sido apenas (controversa) entregue aoUcrnia pela Rssia em 1954. Foi tambm a base da russa do Mar NegroFleet, na sequncia de um acordo com Kiev. Locais foras pr-russas comearam aformam "milcias de auto-defesa," claramente apoiado ou mesmo instigado por Moscoutrabalhando com os fuzileiros navais do 810 de Infantaria Naval IndependenteBrigada j com base l. Homens no identificados com armas militares comearambloqueio bases ucranianos, e em 27 de fevereiro cerca de 50 homens aproveitaram aEdifcio do parlamento da Crimia. Embora afirmando ser uma milcia local, este bem armados e unidade altamente profissional acabou por ser a primeira implantao deoperadores da KSO, apoiados por elementos de opSn 45 da VDV. Odia seguinte Mi-8 "hip" helicpteros de transporte, escoltado pela mais recente Mi-35M"Hind-E" helicpteros, voou em Spetsnaz Naval do 431 omrpSpN.Navios de desembarque, em seguida, trouxe elementos da Spetsnaz 10 e 25Brigadas em Sevastopol porto, e todas as bases ucranianos veio progressivamentesob bloqueio. Durante a prxima semana, as foras da 3 e 16 Brigadase os 25 opSn tambm foram transferidos para Crimeia. Isso deu aos russos umafora de vrios milhares de operadores altamente qualificados, mas muito pouco pesadoequipamento. Tinha os ucranianos sido dispostos e capazes de lutar (como se viupara fora, o governo provisrio em Kiev era incerto o quo longe ele poderia confiarsuas prprias foras armadas, e por isso nunca deu essas ordens), este poderia ter sido umproblema para os invasores russos, ento a prioridade deslocou-se para implantar maisunidades convencionais com blindados e artilharia elementos. The Independent 727Naval Batalho de Infantaria, 291 Brigada de Artilharia, e 18 IndependentMotor Rifle Brigade foram introduzidas para fornecer esse apoio mais pesado. Em 16 de Maro um referendo se apressou em Crimeia registou uma votao esmagadoraem favor da reunificao com a Rssia, ea pennsula foi devidamente anexada. OSpetsnaz, em seguida, levou ao caminho, nas muitas vezes contundentes, mas no letais se move pararestantes bases ucranianos que levaram renncia ou retirada de todosremanescente tropas do governo. Um dos ltimos redutos, a elite primeira marinhaRegiment, foi invadido por Spetsnaz em 24 de maro; eles utilizados apenas atordoargranadas e fumaa, mas foram apoiados por BTR-82A blindadoportadores armado com 30 milmetros autocannon, bem como dois helicpteros.O conflito no leste da Ucrnia - o Donbas predominantemente industrialregio, com a sua grande proporo de falantes de russo, e importantebase industrial - tem sido um empreendimento muito menos cirrgico. L, o conflito temsido travada em grande parte por milcias locais, incluindo desertores do ucranianoExrcito e polcia apoiada por um grande nmero de russo e cossacovoluntrios. Muitos deles parecem ter sido montados, armados, e at mesmopago pela GRU, em uma operao executada a partir da vizinha cidade de Rostov.Persistentes relatos no confirmados, mas sugeriu que Spetsnaz de uma variedade deunidades, incluindo opSn 45 da VDV, foram mobilizados s vezes para evitaras foras do governo de obter uma vitria convincente contra o rebeldemilcias. Controle central em ambos os lados pode ser problemtico, uma vez que as foras de Kievtambm incluem unidades irregulares levantadas pelos oligarcas individuais. No momento deescrevendo um cessar-fogo oficial est sendo observado apenas de forma inconsistente, e da Rssiatem sido acusado pelos EUA de insero de mais tropas e blindados emreas disputadas.O "outro Spetsnaz"Tambm importante notar que Spetsnaz da Rssia tambm devem lidar com a ascenso dos vezes parceiro, s vezes rivalizar Spetsnaz em outras repblicas ps-soviticas aps o desmembramento daas foras soviticas em 1992.Inevitavelmente, no momento em que isso causoutodos os tipos de luxaes,especialmente como muitos tnicoSpetsnaz do russo optou portransferir para unidades restantessob o controle de Moscou. Temser dito que alguns deles"Novo" Spetsnaz conseguirampara manter o profissionalismoe capacidades operacionais queherdado da poca sovitica.A 10 Brigada, com sede emIzyaslav, transferido paraServio ucraniano, ondetornou-se a base para a especialforas que em 2014 tomaramparte na operao de Kiev contraMoscou rebeldes apoiados noleste do pas. A 5Brigada, com sede em MariynaGorka, veio sob o controleda Bielorrssia; este foi um especialsoprar, uma vez que tinha sido um dosas unidades maiores, e os seusmodernas instalaes extensas includos os campos de treinamento onde o Spetsnaztinha vindo a testar novos planadores e ultraleves. A 15 Brigada foitransferido para o Uzbequisto, juntamente com o orSn 459, eo treinamentoinstalao construda para preparar as foras para as operaes no Afeganisto, mas russoforas continuam a ter ligaes estreitas com esta brigada e consider-lo uma fora aliada. Alm disso, at mesmo repblicas que no foram capazes de reivindicar SoviticaUnidades Spetsnaz criou foras especiais muito em sua imagem, tais como"Boinas marrons" do Azerbaijo e "boinas pretas." Da ArmniaO futuroAps ter sofrido um certo grau de negligncia na dcada de 1990 e incio de 2000, oSpetsnaz esto de volta no corao da nova forma da Rssia moderna de guerra. Qualquersugestes de que o GRU deve ser desclassificados ou a Spetsnaz subordinadospara as foras terrestres ou o VDV parecem ter sido enterrados para ofuturo previsvel. Os talvez 15,000-17,000 oficiais e homens dentrovrias formaes Spetsnaz so de nenhuma maneira todos (ou mesmo principalmente) at opadro de verdadeiras foras especiais ocidentais, sobretudo porque muitos continuamrecrutas. A maioria deve antes ser considerado como de alta qualidade luz infantaria,parecido com o Exrcito dos EUA Rangers ou o segundo francs Parachute da Legio EstrangeiraRegiment. Talvez s o KSO e elementos especiais dentro das outras unidades,no mais de um milhar de homens no total, seria considerado "de Camada 1" emJargo ocidental - em outras palavras, se aproximando do padro de SAS da Gr-Bretanhaou a Delta e US DEVGRU. No entanto, que um instrumento poderoso, eele d uma capacidade adicional vital para um militar russo ou seja, mesmo depoisas reformas realizadas desde a dcada de 1990, uma fora relativamente pouco sutil. claro, o termo "Spetsnaz" tambm tem utilizao muito maior na Rssia, e ele claro que outros policiais, inteligncia e agncias de segurana vo manter a suaforas especiais (e s vezes no to especiais) prprios. A maioria destes temfunes especializadas totalmente diferentes das do GRU Spetsnaz. Paraexemplo, como descrito na Elite 197 Segurana russo presente do autor eForas paramilitares desde 1991, as unidades de Alpha do FSB so essencialmente equipes contra o terrorismo, enquanto que a equipe Zaslon do SVR mantida por covertoperaes no exterior. No entanto, tambm existem foras que se sobrepem muito maisem estreita colaborao com o Spetsnaz militar. No menos do estes so os MVD deTropas Interior Spetsnaz, como o 33 de Propsito Especfico baseado em MoscouDesapego, tambm conhecido como Peresvet; este lutou na Chechnia, e treinadoe equipado muito parecido com os seus homlogos GRU. Dada tradicional do Kremlinpropenso para permitir que, at mesmo incentivar a proliferao de foras que se sobrepema fim de evitar a dependncia excessiva em uma nica agncia (um hbito nascido de umamedo de golpes histrico), este provvel que se mantenha o caso.O futuro para a Spetsnaz , portanto, um rosado, uma perspectiva que fazno necessariamente agradar a muitos dos vizinhos da Rssia. Embora a probabilidadeque a Rssia vai conseguir seu objetivo de montar um exrcito todo-profissional at 2020ainda parece remota, as chances so de que o Spetsnaz vai certamente ser todoscontratar voluntrios bem antes dessa data. Como a reforma realmente cria "doisexrcitos "na Rssia - uma fora de interveno operacional pequeno, bem equipado, e verstil de menos de 60 mil homens, e um maior, ainda relativamentegarupa unreformed de algumas foras terrestres 100.000 para a defesa territorial esegurana da segunda onda - a Spetsnaz, juntamente com a VDV, continuar arepresentar a "ponta de lana".ARMAS E EQUIPAMENTOSRussia's Special ForcesSPETSNAZ SINCE THE END OF THE USSRThe dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 ushered in a time of turmoil throughout Eurasia. The new Russian military found itself having to cope with an uncertain mission, a massive funding shortfall, and a series of new crises. The Spetsnaz were, as ever, in the forefront, not least in helping Moscows allies win local civil wars. They had to fulfill this task despite the transfer of units to other post-Soviet states, such as the 10th Brigade to Ukraine and the 15th to Uzbekistan. The 3rd Brigade returned to Russia in 1991 with the last elements of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and was then transferred to the Volga Military District. The 4th Brigade, which had been based in the now-independent Baltic States, was disbanded. Meanwhile, in 1992 the VDV Airborne Forces command created its own special forces unit, the 45th Guards Independent Reconnaissance Regiment, out of the former 901st Independent Air Assault Battalion and the 218th Independent Air Assault Spetsnaz Battalion.Russias Spetsnaz struggled to keep their edge in the 1990s. They found themselves being ground between three contradictory pressures: doctrine,resources, and necessity. The prospect of a massive confrontation with NATO suddenly seemed to disappear, raising the question of just what the Spetsnaz originally established to neutralize Western tactical nuclear weapons and command structures were for. Although Afghanistan had shown their potential, the Russian military hierarchy were anxious to wipe that miserable conflict from their collective memory, and hoped to ensure that the armed forces would never again be deployed in such a war. The innovations pioneered by Fortieth Army from relying on more flexible brigades rather than larger divisions, all the way to increasing the numbers of snipers in units were deemed to be ad hocresponses to a one-off situation, not lessons for the future. Having lost their old role, the Spetsnaz found themselves being forced to abandon their new one.Meanwhile, during the chaotic reign of President Boris Yeltsin (199199) the military was going through a period of unparalleled financial crisis as budgets shrank, wages were being paid late (when they were paid at all), and forces that were being withdrawn from the corners of the Soviet empire had somehow to be accommodated. The Spetsnaz, relatively expensive man-for-man and accustomed to a degree of special care and attention, seemed a costly luxury in those straitened times.The GRU appeared to be more interested in trying to salvage its intelligence operations abroad, and the larger VDV corps seemed to offer better career prospects than the Spetsnaz especially given that Gen Pavel Grachev, Defense Minister in 199296, was a former commander of the VDV who promoted many of his old comrades. The result was that able officers sought transfers to the paratroopers, and the Spetsnazs esprit de corpscame under serious pressure. Nor were they immune from the demoralization and criminality so rife within the military as a whole. The Moscow-based 16th Brigade, for example, became notorious both for providing moonlighting assassins for the organized-crime gangs that were fighting for control of the underworld, and for training hitmen in their own facilities.This was also a time of crises and conflicts in the former Soviet empire, when bitter if often undeclared local wars challenged Moscows regional authority. With so many units demoralized and disrupted, the relative handful of elements that were still operational found themselves in disproportionate demand. During the 199297 civil war in Tajikistan, Spetsnaz were attached to the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division, which was deployed in support of government forces against the rebels. Some were also attached to the 15th Brigade, by then technically part of the armed forces of neighboring Uzbekistan but in practice still dependent on Russian personnel.Spetsnaz also played a minor role in the 1992 Transnistrian War, when the ethnic Russians living along the eastern bank of the Dneistr river seceded from independent Moldova. Fears that they faced forced assimilation into the majority ethnic-Romanian population were deliberately encouraged by Moscow, and this time the Spetsnaz were supporting the rebels. When a ceasefire was arranged, to be guaranteed by Russias local Fourteenth Army, most of the Spetsnaz quietly returned to Russia, apart from a handful carrying out field reconnaissance missions Russia sent a brigade-strength unit to join the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) which kept the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 199596 after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. This 1st Independent Airborne Brigade, based in Ugljevik, was under the operational command of the US-led Multinational Division (North). As a result, it was hailed and in fairness, should be considered as an example of the new spirit of cooperation between Moscow and the West. Some of the brigades razvedchikiwere rumored to be Spetsnaz, brought into the unit not just to provide muchneeded skills but also to use the opportunity to gather intelligence on local and Western forces alike. This is unconfirmed, although elements from the VDVs 45th Independent Reconnaissance Regiment and 22nd Independent Airborne Regiment were attached to the force (and Spetsnaz did subsequently recruit a number of veterans from Russias IFOR contingent).All these operations were just sideshows, however, compared with the main theater in which the Spetsnaz would find themselves operating in the post-Soviet era: Chechnya.CHECHNYAIn the mid-1990s a significant number of the inhabitants of Chechnya an ethnically distinct and traditionally Muslim republic in the Caucasus, long unhappy under Russian rule took at face value the new Russian President Yeltsins offer to the constituent regions of the Russian Federation to take as much freedom as you can chew. This began a slide toward not one, but two bloody wars. As Afghanistan was to the Soviet Spetsnaz, so the Chechen wars were crucial in the evolution of Russias military special forces. They acquired a wide range of roles, from hunting rebel leaders to intercepting supply convoys, but they also found themselves fighting an enemy that included many ex-Soviet Spetsnaz among their ranks, leading to some serious reverses6.The First Chechen War, 199496On Russias part the First Chechen War was ill-conceived, under-planned, and badly executed. Following a failed attempt to unseat Chechen President Dzhokar 6 See Essential Histories 78, Russias Wars in Chechnya 19942009Dudayev using rebel and mercenary Chechens, Russian forces invaded the selfproclaimed Independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Defense Minister Grachev had airily promised President Yeltsin a quick and easy victory, but the forces deployed were too few and in too poor a state of combat readiness to overawe or overpower the fierce and effective Chechen fighters. As the Russian high command desperately sought to retrieve the situation it had to gather genuinely operational forces from wherever it could find them, ranging from the Naval Infantry to the Interior Ministrys OMON riot police. Spetsnaz contingents from across the country were sent to Chechnya, even elements from the Naval Spetsnaz. For example, WO Andrei Dneprovsky from the Pacific Fleets 42nd Independent Special Purpose Naval Reconnaissance Point was posthumously made a Hero of Russia after his death from a snipers bullet in March.Their main role in the first stages of the war was their traditional one of battlefield reconnaissance, but when the Russians stormed the Chechen capital Grozny in 1995, Spetsnaz platoons found themselves being used as shock troops. Their skills were naturally valuable, but urban warfare is notoriously a merciless meat-grinder, especially when the defenders have the skills and time to prepare for the assault. The Chechens legendary toughness and warlike enthusiasm had meant that they had been disproportionately represented in the ranks of the Spetsnaz and VDV during Soviet times, so they had a good idea of the tactics the Russians would be using. As a result, the Russian Spetsnaz took heavy losses; for example, one whole platoon from Moscow were wiped out when they were lured into a building that had been booby-trapped with explosives.Faced with shock and anger among the Spetsnaz commanders and threats by soldiers on the ground, of grave consequences if they were used again in so cavalier a fashion the invasion commanders began to realize thewastefulness of employing them in this role. Most GRU Spetsnaz units (and the VDVs 45th Regiment) had been withdrawn by mid-1995, leaving the 22nd Brigade as the primary force in-country, and 1996 saw it reviving many of the lessons learned in Afghanistan. The Spetsnaz began to be used especially for ambushing rebel forces, launching raids against high-value targets identified by human or technical intelligence, and interdicting supply lines.The war was proving an expensive embarrassment for Moscow, especially after the Chechens managed to retake Grozny in March 1996. That August the Federal government forces prepared to invest the city again, with threats that they would use strategic bombers and missiles. However, the national security advisor (and Afghan war veteran) Alexander Lebed stepped in, and negotiated a ceasefire with the rebel commander Aslan Maskhadov. The August 1996 Khasav-Yurt Accord and subsequent 1997 Moscow Treaty brought an uneasy end to the war; but it was clear that Chechnyas new status as neither independent, nor truly part of the Russian Federation could not be a long-term answer.The Second Chechen War, 19992002The autonomous Chechnya then degenerated into chaos and criminality, and Islamic extremists began to mount an increasingly aggressive attempt to take over what had previously been an essentially nationalist revolt. In Moscow the government began to prepare for a rematch, not least by making better use of the Spetsnaz. When, in August 1999, extremists of the self-declared International Islamic Brigade invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan in defiance of Maskhadovs orders, this gave the Kremlin the excuse it needed to launch a new war. The Federation now had a new prime minister, the former KGB officer Vladimir Putin, who was eager to prove himself to a Russian population badly demoralized by the chaos of the Yeltsin years.First came a massive air campaign, while Prime Minister Putin assembled an army for the invasion. On October 1, 1999 Moscow declared that it no longer recognized Maskhadovs legitimacy, and Russia launched the first stage of a land offensive. This methodically rolled through the northernChechen lowlands before besieging Grozny which fell in February and moving up into the highlands. Although the bulk of the fighting was handled by regular Army and Interior Troops, the Spetsnaz played a significant role in raids and battlefield reconnaissance, including spotting for artillery shoots and air strikes. The bulk of the special forces deployed again came from the 22nd Brigade, which as a result was in 2001 designated a Guards unit (the first to be given that honor since the end of World War II).The Spetsnaz performed their usual roles of deep reconnaissance, interdiction, intelligence-gathering, and rapid response, but with generally greater success and support than during the first war. Not only were more regular forces committed this time, but efforts had been made to improve conditions for the soldiers, their level of training and their preparation. Consequently the Spetsnaz were able to operate as they were meant to do, and scored a number of successes. They were also able to revive several Afghan war practices, such as helicopter-borne boarding parties that would watch for road traffic and intercept potential convoys of fighters and weapons. Beyond that, along with the Armys new specialist mountain troops, they were crucial in operations in the southern highlands.Things did not always go their way, however. In a notorious February 2000 battle for Height 776, for example, a mixed force comprising paratroopers from the 104th Guards Airborne Division supported by a platoon of Spetsnaz from the 411th ooSn was cut off and surrounded by a much larger Chechen rebel force in the Argun Valley. When it looked as if the Russians would be overrun the company commander called down artillery fire on his own position; of the 91 Russian troops, 84 were killed. While a defeat in military terms, the refusal of the VDV and Spetsnaz to surrender when facing overwhelming odds and near-certain death has made the engagement a perverse source of pride, akin to the Krer raid in 1986.The Kadyrovtsy, and the Vostok BattalionIn April 2002 Moscow declared the war to be over, although antiterrorist operations continued until April 2009. By around 2005 most military Spetsnaz had been withdrawn from Chechnya itself, even if similarly designated units responsible to the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) remained. Instead, their missions devolved to local forces that came to be known as Kadyrovtsy(Kadyrovites).Their rise was one of the key innovations of the Second Chechen War. Moscows Chechenization of the war effort involved recruiting Chechens, including disillusioned former rebels, to form special units able to hunt the rebels on their own terms and in their own territory. These units were sometimes called Spetsnaz, and often technically reported to the GRU. Most, though, wereKadyrovtsy units personally loyal to Akhmad Kadyrov, the first proMoscow President of Chechnya, and, after his assassination in 2004, to his son and successor Ramzan. By 2006 they numbered some 5,000 men in two main units, the 141st Akhmad Kadyrov Special Purpose Police Regiment, and the Oil Regiment (Neftepolk), whose official role was protecting pipelines running through Chechnya. While Ramzan Kadyrov brought his forces under the Chechen Interior Ministry (and closer into his personal orbit), there were also, for a time, two autonomous Chechen units formed and funded by the GRU: the Zapad (West) and Vostok (East) battalions, formed in 2002 and 2003 respectively. After Vostok had been deployed in South Ossetia during the brief Georgian War, the official disbandment of both these units at the end of 2008 marked the final consolidation of Kadyrovs personal control over Chechnyas security forces. (Vostok made an unexpected reappearance, at least in name, in eastern Ukraine in 2014, though this time the GRU apparently soon dispensed with most or all of the original Chechen personnel.) These units were tough and effective counterinsurgency and security assets, able to operate in the highlands of the North Caucasus as well as any rebels. They were, however, prone to indiscipline and unorthodox methods, and were repeatedly accused of abuses by domestic and international human-rights organizations. They were not Spetsnaz in the true sense of the word.THE MODERN SPETSNAZ Although Spetsnaz would continue to operate in Chechnya sporadically after the end of the main military phase in 2002, they again found themselves in an uncertain position. They had demonstrated their value in the kind of lowintensity, highly mobile brushfire conflicts that look set to dominate the early decades of the 21st century. On the other hand, the regular ground forces and the VDV, jealous alike of their budgets and roles, were disinclined to acknowledge that the Spetsnaz could do what they could not and what those services did not want to touch, the FSB and MVD wanted to claim for themselves. The 2000 Military Doctrine, the foundational document on which Russia bases its military planning, acknowledged the threats of terrorism, and instability on the countrys borders; but the security apparatus claimed that the former was in their jurisdiction, while the VDV claimed to be the best suited for dealing with the latter.As a result, the Spetsnaz continued to be in the ironic position of being glorified in public (in 2002 there was even a Russian television miniseries called Spetsnaz, which showed them as heroic figures doing everything from thwarting terrorist financiers to rescuing hostages), but still marginalized within the military. In their favor, this was a time when President Putin was dramatically scaling up defense expenditure; this helped the Spetsnaz both to recruit more career (contract) soldiers to reduce the proportion of conscripts in their ranks, and to develop their training programs and facilities. They also often found themselves being selected to test new weapons systems earmarked for wider use, and they played a significant role in the design of the new Ratnik (Warrior) personal equipment suite introduced in 2013. Surprisingly, however, it would be Russias war with Georgia in August 2008 which lasted less than a week that would consolidate the position of the Spetsnaz, in a new Russian military that was finally freeing itself from its Cold War preoccupations with major land wars in Europe or Asia.Georgia, 2008The anti-Georgian rebel regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had long been a frustration for the Georgian government in Tbilisi. Eager to teach the outspokenly anti-Russian President Mikheil Saakashvili a lesson that would not be lost on other post-Soviet leaders who might think of challenging Moscows regional hegemony, the Kremlin encouraged its local allies to provoke the Georgians. After months of cross-border raids, sniping, and even artillery attacks, Tbilisi rose to the bait and invaded South Ossetia on August 7, 2008. The next morning Russian forces from Fifty-Eighth Army began rolling into South Ossetia, claiming that they were there to restore the peace; simultaneously the Black Sea Fleet began blockading the Georgian coast, sinking a Georgian missile boat that challenged the Russian flotilla.

On August 12 the Kremlin declared an end to military operations. TheRussians had driven the Georgians out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and set up self-proclaimed independent states in both regions. (These are really protectorates: the international community has generally failed to recognize them, but their sovereignty is guaranteed by Russian troops and bases.) The Georgian military had been mauled, and Moscow had proved that its willingness to use its military strength should not be underestimated. Had it wanted to, it could easily have struck at Tbilisi and gone much further into Georgia.However, while this was a Russian victory, there had never been any question as to which country would win: Fifty-Eighth Army alone had more than twice as many troops and five times as many tanks as the entire Georgian military. Instead, the issue was how easily the Russians would win, and even after eight years of Putins inflated defense spending the operation actually revealed severe shortcomings. Obsolete, insecure, and often unreliable command, control, and communications systems led to friendly-fire incidents, with officers being forced to use their personal cellphones instead. The Air Force failed to achieve the kind of convincing air superiority that was expected, and problems in coordination meant that their aircraft several times came under fire from Russian troops or allied South Ossetian militias who mistook them for Georgian. Although Moscow denies this, credible accounts suggest that three of the six aircraft lost fell to such friendly fire.Most of the actual fighting ended up being done by paratroopers from the 76th and 98th Airborne Divisions, with a disproportionate role also being played by the VDVs 45th Guards Independent Reconnaissance Regiment, as well as Spetsnaz from the 10th and 22nd Brigades. Although the GRU as a whole did not come out of the war well (not least, because stale intelligence that they provided led to several unoccupied Georgian airfields being bombed), the Spetsnaz themselves did demonstrate their usual field skills.As the Russian armed forces slowly modernize and adapt to a future likely to be driven by power-projection, counterinsurgency and antiterrorist operations, the role of the Spetsnaz is increasing, but this has provokedenvious wrangling. After playing a significant part in the success of the 2008 Georgia operation, in 2011 they lost their special status as reporting directly to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), and were formally attached to regional all-arms commands. In part this reflected wider political pressures on the GRU, but also a growing awareness of the importance of the Spetsnaz in future warfare, and a desire to make them the focus of most operations.Special Operations CommandThere had been suggestions for years that the GRU should focus on military espionage, while the Spetsnaz as tools for battlefield reconnaissance should instead be subordinated directly to field commands. The experience of the Georgian War only strengthened the case of those who argued for closer integration with the field forces.To this end, in 2010 it was announced that the Spetsnaz brigades would be transferred to the four Military Districts, which would become Operational Commands in time of war. Meanwhile, the Senezh training and operations center at Solnechnogorsk would be taken away from the GRU and report instead to the General Staff, under first Gen Medoyev, then Gen Miroshnichenko tellingly, both of them veterans of the rival FSBs Alpha antiterrorist commando force. Senezh, named for a lake northwest of Moscow, would become the base of a new Special Operations Command (KSO, Komanda spetsialnogo naznacheniya), including an opSn outside the regular brigade structure, a helicopter attack and transport squadron at Torzhok air base, and a squadron of Il-76 Candid heavy-lift transport aircraft. The KSOs roles would range from counterterrorist operations in peacetime to sabotage and assassination in war. The need to insure against any potential threat to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, close to the turbulent North Caucasus, spurred its formation, and that of the Spetsnaz 346th Brigade and 25th Independent Regiment.The KSO was officially operational as of early 2013, and, according to Chief of the General Staff Gen Valery Gerasimov, it is primarily intended for missions outside Russia, ranging all the way from participation in UN peacekeeping operations to unilateral interventions. Given that President Putin was simultaneously warning that the imminent withdrawal of Allied troops from Afghanistan threatened an upsurge in chaos on Russias southern flank, presumably deployments into Central Asia were under consideration.The GRU embattled, 201013Meanwhile, the failings demonstrated during the Georgian War had given Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov the opportunity he needed to force the high command to accept radical military reforms. The aim was to move away from the traditionally dominant Soviet focus on a major land war with NATO or China, and instead to create structures able to fight in a variety of different kinds of operations, with greater flexibility and independence. Divisions were replaced by smaller brigades as the basic building blocks of the Army; the emphasis slowly shifted from the traditional tank-heavy forces toward lighter units and specialist assets such as mountain troops, and a renewed effort was made to increase the proportion of career volunteers in the ranks.The irony is that this brought new pressure to bear on the GRU, since its political rivals were now questioning its role and value (and Russian bureaucratic politics are especially bloodthirsty). The Ground Forces wanted the Spetsnaz to come under their direct control; the Foreign Intelligence Service(SVR) wanted to humble a rival agency; the VDV paratroopers felt that they could do everything that Spetsnaz could; and voices in the General Staff apparatus were questioning the GRUs special status, which gave it a (resented) direct line to the Kremlin. Thus, on October 24, 2010 the very day when the Spetsnaz were celebrating the 60th anniversary of their formation the Ground Forces Deputy Chief of Staff for Reconnaissance, Col Vladimir Mardusin, announced their subordination to territorial commands (see above, under Special Operations Command).This seemed to come as a surprise to the GRU; its commander at the time, ColGen Alexander Shlyakhturov, was a relatively weak figure who was on near-permanent medical leave. In addition to being stripped of its special forces, the GRU was being squeezed in other ways. The Aquarium its expansive headquarters in Moscows Khodynka suburb had had to shed over a thousand officers, including 80 of its 100 generals. There was even talk that the Main Intelligence Directorate would be downgraded to a regular directorate of the General Staff, depriving it of much autonomy and authority.From that low point, however, the GRU and the Spetsnaz would quickly rebound. General Shlyakhturov retired at the end of 2011, and his successor, LtGen Igor Sergun, proved a much more active and effective chief. In classic Russian style, the GRU now fought a rear-guard action, nominally transferring the Spetsnaz to the Ground Forces but in practice putting the move off for as long as possible. Perhaps the final stroke of good luck for the GRU was the appointment of ColGen Valery Gerasimov as Chief of the General Staff at the end of 2012. A thinker as well as a commander, Gerasimov was an outspoken advocate of a new form of hybrid or non-linear war, by which Russia could assert her interests through an imaginative mix of political, economic, intelligence, and military operations. The Spetsnaz appeared to be ideal instruments for such operations but this required them to be strategic assets, rather than just battlefield scouts subordinated to territorial commands As a result, in 2013 the resubordination of the Spetsnaz was quietly dropped, and they returned to (if they had ever really left) the control of the GRU. This also saved them from a takeover bid by the paratroopers that year, when VDV commander ColGen Vladimir Shamanov mooted that the Spetsnaz ought to be made part of new Rapid Reaction Forces, which inevitably would be controlled by his larger service. This came to nothing, however; and in 2014 the GRUs prestige would rise again with the annexation of Crimea, followed by a semi-covert campaign of insurrection and destabilization in eastern Ukraine (see below).Organization, 2014As of late 2014, Russias Spetsnaz comprise seven regular brigades of various sizes, in total comprising perhaps 19 battalion-size ooSns. They are responsible to the GRUs Fifth Directorate (Operational Reconnaissance), although in the field they are subordinated to operational commanders. The four Independent Special Purpose Naval Reconnaissance Points (omrpSpN, analogous to brigades) are still technically part of the Fifth Directorate, but are more closely tied to their parent Fleets. Beyond that, there is the VDVs own 45th Guards Independent Special Purpose Regiment (opSn), and three other separate Spetsnaz elements. One, the 100th Independent Brigade, is often used as a test bed for new ideas and equipment. As mentioned above, two others were created in 201112 as part of the security preparations for the Sochi Winter Olympics in southwestern Russia: the 25th Independent Regiment (opSn), optimized for operations in the turbulent North Caucasus, and the 346th Brigade, which appears to be closer to detachment (regiment) size, and to have become the KSOs operational element.Recruitment and trainingThere is constant pressure to try to ensure that Spetsnaz units are made up exclusively of professional volunteers, contract servicemen in Russian parlance. This is proving a challenge, however, and while some elements are all-volunteer, as of 2013 some others were as much as 50 percent composed of draftees albeit the pick of the crop, chosen for their physical prowess and prior interest in such activities as shooting, orienteering, and sports. Nonetheless, it does mean that most units suffer biannual churn, with new conscripts on one-year terms entering in May and November (after four months basic training), sergeants and specialists in July and January (after six months), and junior officers fresh from military colleges every September.Training is an intense mix of physical conditioning, mental orientation great emphasis is placed on trying to surprise the recruits, and develop their ability to respond quickly to the unexpected and imparting necessary tactical and technical skills. Professionals may well learn the basics of a language relevant to their specific brigades area of operations, but this is not a core issue; there is no expectation that they will acquire anything like fluency, unless they are likely to transfer into the GRUs intelligence operations.While they receive generally better treatment than regular troops, and will often be in receipt of combat bonuses, the Spetsnaz suffer the usual Russian handicaps of patchy administration and sometimes late pay. Even during theSecond Chechen War there were protests about combat pay not being disbursed and promised equipment not materializing. There are also specific issues for ambitious officers, as the highest rank found within the Spetsnaz is colonel, for a kombrig(brigade commander). Those with higher aspirations must either move into the mainline GRU structure, which is dominated by intelligence officers rather than commandos, or else make the difficult sideways shift into the VDV, which means bridging a long-standing inter-arm rivalry. In this respect they are much less well placed than VDV officers, who have higher command positions available within their own arm of service, and who can also transfer more easily into regular military command positions or staff posts at the Ministry of Defense or General Staff. This is a long-standing problem: Valery Vostrotin, a highlydecorated paratroop officer who retired as a colonelgeneral and became chairman of the VDV veterans association, recounted that as an officer cadet in the late 1970s he turned down the chance to join the 9th Company at the Ryazan VDV Training Academy, which was for Spetsnaz, precisely because it was a career dead end.Crimea and Ukraine, 2014The Spetsnaz played a very significant role in the virtually bloodless annexation of the Crimea in March 2014, and in the much bloodier and, at the time of writing, still ongoing Russian-backed insurgency in Ukraines eastern Donbas region. In the process, they exemplified the new doctrine that ColGen Gerasimov championed, which envisions military force being used with precision, in the context of wider strategies that rely at least as much on subversion, misdirection, economic and political leverage, and intelligence missions.Political protests at the corruption and increasingly pro-Moscow orientation of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych led to bloody clashes in Kiev, and prompted him to flee the country on February 21, 2014. A new provisional government took power; Moscow, angered and alarmed at the departure of its ally, and fearful that Ukraine would leave its sphere of interest, quickly began making its own preparations. The next day the VDVs 45th opSn was put on alert, as was the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade, and two ooSn of the 16th Brigade left their base at Tambov.A key question was the future of Crimea. This peninsula has a majority of Russian-speakers, and had only been (controversially) handed over to Ukraine by Russia in 1954. It was also the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, following an agreement with Kiev. Local pro-Russian forces began to form self-defense militias, clearly backed or even instigated by Moscow working through the marines of the 810th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade already based there. Unidentified men with military weapons began blockading Ukrainian bases, and on February 27 around 50 men seized the Crimean parliament building. While claiming to be a local militia, this wellarmed and highly professional unit turned out to be the first deployment of operators from the KSO, supported by elements of the VDVs 45th opSn. The next day Mi-8 Hip transport helicopters, escorted by the latest Mi-35M Hind-E gunships, flew in Naval Spetsnaz from the 431st omrpSpN.Landing ships then brought elements of the 10th and 25th Spetsnaz Brigades into Sevastopol harbor, and all Ukrainian bases progressively came under blockade. Over the next week, forces from the 3rd and 16th Brigades and the 25th opSn were also moved into Crimea. This gave the Russians a force of several thousand highly skilled operators, but very little heavy equipment. Had the Ukrainians been willing and able to fight (as it turned out, the provisional government in Kiev was uncertain how far it could trust its own military, and so never gave such orders), this could have been a problem for the Russian invaders, so the priority shifted to deploying more conventional units with armor and artillery elements. The 727th Independent Naval Infantry Battalion, 291st Artillery Brigade, and 18th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade were introduced to provide that heavier support. On March 16 a hurried referendum in Crimea registered an overwhelming vote in favor of reuniting with Russia, and the peninsula was duly annexed. The Spetsnaz then led the way in the often forceful but non-lethal moves on to remaining Ukrainian bases that led to the surrender or withdrawal of all remaining government troops. One of the last holdouts, the elite 1st Marine Regiment, was stormed by Spetsnaz on March 24; they used only stun grenades and smoke, but were backed up by BTR-82A armored personnel carriers armed with 30mm autocannon, as well as two helicopter gunships.The conflict in eastern Ukraine predominantly the industrial Donbas region, with its large proportion of Russian-speakers, and important industrial base has been a much less surgical venture. There the conflict has been fought largely by local militias, including defectors from the Ukrainian Army and police supported by large numbers of Russian and Cossack volunteers. Many of these appear to have been assembled, armed, and even paid by the GRU, in an operation run from the nearby city of Rostov. Persistent but unconfirmed reports suggested that Spetsnaz from a variety of units, including the VDVs 45th opSn, were deployed at times to prevent government forces from winning a convincing victory against the rebel militias. Central control on both sides may be problematic, since Kievs forces also include irregular units raised by individual oligarchs. At the time of writing an official ceasefire is being observed only inconsistently, and Russia has been accused by the USA of inserting more troops and armor into disputed areas.The other SpetsnazIt is also worth noting that Russias Spetsnaz must also cope with the rise of sometimes partner, sometimes rival Spetsnaz in other post-Soviet republics following the dismemberment of the Soviet forces in 1992. Inevitably, at the time this caused all kinds of dislocations, especially as many ethnic Russian Spetsnaz opted to transfer into units remaining under Moscows control. It has to be said that few of these new Spetsnaz have managed to maintain the professionalism and operational capabilities they inherited from Soviet times.The 10th Brigade, based in Izyaslav, transferred to Ukrainian service, where it became the basis for the special forces that in 2014 have taken part in Kievs operation against Moscow-backed rebels in the east of the country. The 5th Brigade, based in Mariyna Gorka, came under the control of Belarus; this was a particular blow, since it had been one of the largest units, and its extensive modern facilities included the training grounds where the Spetsnaz had been testing new gliders and microlights. The 15th Brigade was transferred to Uzbekistan, along with the 459th orSn, and the training facility built to prepare forces for operations in Afghanistan, but Russian forces continue to have close links with this brigade and consider it an allied force. Furthermore, even republics that were not able to lay claim to Soviet Spetsnaz units created special forces very much in their image, such as Azerbaijans maroon berets and Armenias black berets.The futureHaving suffered from a degree of neglect in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Spetsnaz are back at the heart of modern Russias new way of war. Any suggestions that the GRU should be downgraded or the Spetsnaz subordinated to the Ground Forces or the VDV appear to have been buried for the foreseeable future. The perhaps 15,00017,000 officers and men within various Spetsnaz formations are by no means all (or even mainly) up to the standard of true Western special forces, not least because many remain conscripts. Most should instead be considered as top-quality light infantry, akin to the US Army Rangers or the French Foreign Legions 2nd Parachute Regiment. Perhaps only the KSO and special elements within the other units, no more than a thousand men in total, would be considered Tier 1 in Western parlance in other words, approaching the standard of Britains SAS or the US Delta and DEVGRU. Nonetheless, that is a formidable asset, and it gives a vital additional capability to a Russian military that is, even after the reforms pursued since the 1990s, a relatively unsubtle force.Of course, the term Spetsnaz also has much wider use in Russia, and it is clear that other police, intelligence, and security agencies will retain their own special (and sometimes not-so-special) forces. Most of these have specialized roles wholly different from those of the GRU Spetsnaz. For example, as described in the present authors Elite 197 Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991, the FSBs Alpha units are essentially counterterrorist teams, while the SVRs Zaslon team is maintained for covert operations overseas. However, there are also forces that overlap much more closely with the military Spetsnaz. Not the least of these are the MVDs Interior Troops Spetsnaz, such as the Moscow-based 33rd Special Purpose Detachment, also known as Peresvet; this fought in Chechnya, and is trained and equipped much like its GRU counterparts. Given the Kremlins traditional propensity to allow, even encourage the proliferation of overlapping forces in order to avoid overdependence on a single agency (a habit born of a historic fear of coups), this is likely to remain the case.The future for the Spetsnaz is therefore a rosy one, a prospect that does not necessarily please many of Russias neighbors. Although the likelihood that Russia will achieve its goal of fielding an all-professional army by 2020 still appears remote, the odds are that the Spetsnaz will certainly all be contract volunteers well before that date. As reform actually creates two armies in Russia a small, well-equipped, and versatile operational intervention force of fewer than 60,000 men, and a larger, still relatively unreformed rump of some 100,000 Ground Forces for territorial defense and second-wave security the Spetsnaz, along with the VDV, will continue to represent the tip of the spear.WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT