relações internacionais e globalização · a crise de 2008: um brevíssimo vocabulário 9...

Relações Internacionais e Globalização DAESHR014- 13SB

(4-0-4) Professor Dr. Demétrio G. C. de Toledo – BRI

[email protected]

UFABC – 2017.I

(Ano 2 do Golpe)

Aula 15

6ª-feira, 31 de março

A Crise de 2008

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Módulo II: Módulo II: Breve introdução à

história de nosso tempo futuro

Aula 15 (6a-feira, 31 de março): A Crise de 2008

Texto base:

VAROUFAKIS, Yanis (2016), “Colapso”, p. 183-203 (português), p. 146-168 (inglês).

PEREZ, Carlota (2010) “The Advance of Technology and Major Bubble Collapses: Historical Regularities and Lessons for Today”, p. 1-9.

Texto complementar:

TEMIN, P. (2010) “The Great Recession and the Great Depression”. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15645.

STIGLITZ, Joseph (2010) O mundo em queda livre.

DUMÉNIL, Gérard, LEVY, Dominique (2011) “A crise do neoliberalismo na história do capitalismo. 2008-2011, os dois primeiros atos”, p. 1-22. 3

A Crise Global

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• A Crise de 2008 é um ponto de inflexão da história do capitalismo moderno, comparável à Crise de 1929.

• Segundo Ben Bernanke (presidente do FED de 2006-2014), “September and October of 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global history, including the Great Depression”. Segundo Bernanke, as consequências mais brandas da Crise de 2008 em relação à Crise de 1929 resultaram da resposta mais rápida dos governos e bancos centrais, que, entre outras vantagens, contavam com o conhecimento histórico sobre a Crise de 1929.

Capitalismo, ou Teoria da Crise Permanente

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• Primeiro Choque do Petróleo (1973)

• Segundo Choque do Petróleo (1979)

• Recessão, choque dos juros, crise das dívidas da AL (começo anos 1980; década perdida da AL)

• Black Monday (1987)

• Recessão e crise de poupança e liquidez (começo anos 1990)

• Crise Indiana (1991)

• Crises Finlandesa e Sueca (começo anos 1990)

• Colapso da Bolha Imobiliária no Japão (1992)

• Crise do México (1994)

• Crise da Ásia (1997)

• Crise da Rússia (1998)

• Crise do Brasil (1999)

• Crise da Argentina (1998-2002)

• Bolha dot.com (2001)

• Crise do Petróleo (2003-2008)

• Crise do Subprime (2007-2009, colapso da bolha imobiliária estadunidense)

• Grande Recessão (2008-presente)

• Crise da Islândia (2008-2012)

• Crise da Irlanada (2008-2010)

• Crise da Grécia (2010-presente)

• Crise da Rússia (2014-20160

• Crise da China (2015)


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A Crise de 2008: um brevíssimo vocabulário

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• “Subprime: Subprime is a classification of borrowers with a tarnished or limited credit history. Lenders will use a credit scoring system to determine which loans a borrower may qualify for. Subprime loans carry more credit risk, and as such, will carry higher interest rates as well. Approximately 25% of mortgage originations are classified as subprime”. (Investopedia)


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• “Mortgage: A mortgage is a debt instrument, secured by the collateral of specified real estate property, that the borrower is obliged to pay back with a predetermined set of payments. Mortgages are used by individuals and businesses to make large real estate purchases without paying the entire value of the purchase up front. Over a period of many years, the borrower repays the loan, plus interest, until he/she eventually owns the property free and clear. Mortgages are also known as "liens against property" or "claims on property." If the borrower stops paying the mortgage, the bank can foreclose”. (Investopedia)


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• “Mortgage: In a residential mortgage, a home buyer pledges his or her house to the bank. The bank has a claim on the house should the home buyer default on paying the mortgage. In the case of a foreclosure, the bank may evict the home's tenants and sell the house, using the income from the sale to clear the mortgage debt”. (Investopedia)


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• “Subprime Meltdown: the sharp increase in high-risk mortgages that went into default beginning in 2007, contributing to the most severe recession in decades. The housing boom of the mid-2000s – combined with low interest rates at the time – prompted many lenders to offer home loans to individuals with poor credit. When the real estate bubble burst, many borrowers were unable to make payments on their subprime mortgages”. (Investopedia)


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• Crise, regulação financeira, bonança, desregulação financeira, crise, regulação financeira…

– Crise de 1929: Glass-Steagal Act (1933), separou bancos comerciais e de investimentos.

– Bonança dos anos 1990 (bolha dot.com): Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999), substitiu partes centrais do Glass-Steagal Act, entre as quais a remoção da separação entre bancos comerciais, de investimentos e seguradoras e reduzindo o controle da SEC (Stock Exchanges Comission, equivalente à CVM brasileira) sobre grandes hondings financeiras.

Temin (2010) “The Great Recession and the Great Depression”

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• “The housing boom flourished in recent years, nourished by the availability of Chinese capital and the ruling economic theory of the Washington Consensus. This term indicated a set of economic policies that ranged from stable exchange rates and responsible fiscal policies to deregulation and privatization. It was an adaptation of the Gold Standard to current conditions, stipulating stable instead of fixed exchange rates to avoid the rigidities of the Gold Standard that were so harmful in the 1930s. (…) The government should stay out of the way so that private finance and industry could prosper in this theory; competition would ensure continued growth and prosperity. Like the Gold Standard, the Washington Consensus was based on the enlightenment ideas of Hume and Smith and promulgated as a way to organize the postwar world.” (Temin 2010: 5, grifos meus)

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• “The Great Depression and the Great Recession thus were both caused by policies deriving from nostalgia for the world of the Enlightenment. Drawing on theories from the eighteenth century, hard-headed policy makers either assumed or tried to recreate the idealized conditions of Hume and Smith. These policy makers ignored both the growth of economies of scale in modern economies and the work of behavioral economists who have shown that people do not behave as homo economicus. The results of their efforts in the 1920s and in recent decades was to produce the new economy of the earlier period and the goldilocks economy of the later one that turned into booms and busts. Was it inevitable that these economic expansions would end badly?” (Temin 2010: 7, grifos meus)


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• “Nothing lasts forever, and prosperity generated a desire for more independent financial dealings. Economic turmoil in the 1970s hastened the transition, and the Washington Consensus arose in the 1980s. The Glass-Steagall Act was repealed, and the SEC became more relaxed. Americans urged the rest of the world to follow suit and deregulate both domestic and foreign capital movements. The distribution of income widened, the size of the financial sector rose, and there began to be a string of small-scale (at least to the United States) financial crises.” (Temin 2010: 14, grifos meus)


Crise global e mudança tecnológica

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• “The current crisis is not an accidental event in the financial system. It is a historically recurrent phenomenon endogenous to the market system. It results from the way technological revolutions are assimilated. Such major collapses signal the need for a structural shift in the forces guiding growth and innovation from financial to production capital and to the return of an active state. If history is a guide, a global golden age may lie ahead”. (Perez 2010: 1, grifos meus)


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• “All bubbles are about greed and herd behaviour regulation tries to avoid their worst excesses, but some bubbles are also about the installation of technological revolutions and making overall paradigm shifts. The crash of 1929 and the twin collapses of 2000 and 2007-8 are of this type. Recovery from the consequences of those bubbles requires major institutional innovation to enable the real economy to flourish. The basis for making those statements is the evidence of regular historical patterns of diffusion and assimilation of technological revolutions in the economy and society.” (Perez 2010: 1, grifos meus)


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• “There have been five technological revolutions in 240 years: [1771, 1829, 1875, 1908] in 1971, Intel’s microprocessor launched our current age of information technology and telecommunications. This information era is only half way through its diffusion path. If history is a guide, it has twenty to thirty years of deployment ahead, while serving as a platform for innovation in all the other sectors and for opening new radical paths in production and lifestyles.” (Perez 2010: 1, grifos meus)


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• “The next revolution is likely to bring the age of biotech, bioelectronics, nanotech and new materials, in some combination, depending on unpredictable scientific breakthroughs that may open low-cost and all-pervasive innovation trajectories. Each of these revolutions drives a great surge of development and shapes growth for half a century or more.” (Perez 2010: 1)


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• “Due to the natural resistance and difficulty in assimilating such changes, each great surge goes through two different periods. The first half sets up the infrastructure and lets the markets pick the winners; the second half reaps the full economic and social potential. Each of these periods takes about 20 to 30 years. The Installation Period is a time of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’, a battle of the new paradigm against the old, when investment is concentrated in the new technologies, both to install the new industries and infrastructures and to modernise all the mature industries..” (Perez 2010: 2, grifos meus)


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• “During Installation, investment is led by financial capital, which funds the technological transformation and, in the excitement, also intensifies its casino-type activities until it decouples from the real economy building a major asset inflation boom that ends in a catastrophic collapse. That “gilded age” prosperity is characterised by income polarisation and by the changing fortunes and rankings of companies, industries, regions and countries .” (Perez 2010: 2, grifos meus)


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• “The Deployment Period that follows is what historically has been considered a “golden age” i.e. the great British leap (with the Industrial Revolution), the Victorian Boom, the Belle Époque and the post WWII boom. Such prosperous epochs are unleashed by the policies that overcome the post-collapse recessions. They are a time of widespread application of the new paradigm for innovation and growth across the whole economy and of spreading the social benefits much more widely while, at least partially, reversing the income polarisation of the Installation Period.” (Perez 2010: 2, grifos meus)


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• “Investment is led by production capital, usually favoured by government policies and supported by a more regulated financial system. This period ends with the maturity of the technological revolution and its paradigm, the exhaustion of their potential for further innovation or productivity increases and the saturation of markets. All that sets the conditions for financial capital to look for other outlets, among which are the loans to faraway countries and the funding of new –potentially revolutionary – technologies.” (Perez 2010: 2, grifos meus)


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• “This separation and the fact that technical change occurs by revolutions are at the root of the pendular patterns of capitalism from Installation to Deployment and back. When a technological revolution reaches maturity production capital becomes conservative. Financial capital then breaks loose, backs the new entrepreneurs, dismantles as much as it can of the institutional framework, overinvests in the new infrastructure and also uses the new technologies to innovate in instruments for financial speculation.” (Perez 2010: 3, grifos meus)


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• “When the resulting bubble collapses, the state needs to come back actively to regulate finance and favour the new and renewed production capital, which can then lead the expansion using the installed potential for growth and innovation. That is the moment we are experiencing now.” (Perez 2010: 3)


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• “The last time around, the policies applied included a wide set of changes on the national and international levels. Among the latter were the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF, the World Bank and the role of the US dollar as standard), followed by NATO, the Marshall Plan and the “Cold War”. These shaped the direction of innovation in military and much of capital goods.” (Perez 2010: 5, grifos meus)


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• “Nationally, the Keynesian demand management mechanisms were applied together with the Welfare State, which performed income redistribution through taxation and turned the majority of the working population into mass consumers. The automobile, the State funded road networks and universal electricity made it possible to use cheap land outside the cities to mass produce suburban homes and accelerate the demand for electrical appliances and refrigerated and frozen foods. Mortgage support extended home-ownership further and further down the income scale, unemployment insurance guaranteed that instalment payments would be continued in recessions and counting on pensions encouraged people to spend their monthly income without much saving.” (Perez 2010: 5, grifos meus)


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• “In my view, the current opportunity space for a global positive-sum game involves three interdependent elements: ICT, “green” and full global development. (…) Those three forces defining the opportunity space are interdependent. Information and communications technologies (ICTs) serve as facilitators and externalities for all. Full globalisation provides the market volume growth and “green” provides the direction of innovation.” (Perez 2010: 6, grifos meus)

Para falar com o professor:

• São Bernardo, sala 322, Bloco Delta, 2as-feiras e 6as-feiras, das 13-15h (é só chegar).

• Atendimentos fora desses horários, combinar por email com o professor: [email protected]

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relações internacionais e globalização · a crise de 2008: um brevíssimo vocabulário 9...

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