As Fases do ajustamento macroeconómico• 1910-1926: Instabilidade política e militar• 1926-1939: Reformas de Salazar • 1939-1944: Excedentes na BP• 1945-1958: Substituição de importações• 1959-1973: Abertura e crescimento acelerado• 1974-1985: Stop and go• 1986-1994: Liberalização com apoio externo• 1994-1999: Ajustamento para o euro • 1995-2007: Bonanza• 2008-2013: Sudden-stop e bailout

Transição: Mudança de Regime

As Fases do Ajustamento Macroeconómico

• 1976-85: Stop and go

- Restrições à mobilidade do capital

- Política monetária e política cambial

• 1986-92: Liberalização com apoio externo

- Liberalização progressiva dos movimentos de capital

- Fase de forte entrada de capitais

- Política monetária ou política cambial

- Apreciação do escudo

• 1992-94: Crise no SME

• 1995-2007: Endividamento externo (bonanza)

Governos Constitucionais

• 1985-1987: X Governo: PSD (C. Silva)• 1987-1991: XI Governo: PSD (C. Silva)• 1991-1995: XII Governo: PSD (C. Silva)• 1995-1999: XIII Governo: PS (Guterres)• 1999-2002: XIV Governo: PS (Guterres)• 2002-2004: XV Governo: PSD+CDS (Durão Barroso)• 2004-2005: XVI Governo: PSD+CDS (Santana Lopes)• 2005-2009: XV Governo: PS (Sócrates)• 2009-2011: XVI Governo: PS (Sócrates)• 2011-2015: XiX Governo: PSD+CDS (Passos Coelho)• 2015: XX Governo: PSD+CDS (Passos Coelho)• 2015-2019: XXI Governo: PS (Costa)

Enquadramento institucional

Portugal joining the club

- Progressive trade openness

- Labour mobility in part of the EU + Restrictions, namely vis-à-vis third countries

- Financial liberalization: internal + external (convertibility in 1992)

- Nominal stability (with an independent central bank and a flexible euro)

- Sounder Fiscal Policies (the stability and growth pact).

- Improved market regulating institutions (regulation and supervision)

- Market legitimizing institutions (social and economic cohesion).

- Policy trends (the Washington Consensus): Reordering public expenditure priorities,reform of the public administration, simplification, deregulation, privatization, etc.

Fiscal Discipline The Maastricht Treaty (1992) saw the fundamental and deep causes of inflation as being not monetary, but fiscal.

A country with high nominal debt will lobby for high inflation once in the union (because inflation destroys the real value of the government’s debt).

The Maastricht rules say that government debts and deficits cannot be above certain reference levels.

The Stability and Growth Pact In 1997 at Amsterdam, the EU adopted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP):• Medium-term budgetary objective of positions close to balance or in surplus• Financial penalties on counties that fail to correct situations of “excessive”

deficits promptly enough

Fiscal Discipline The Maastricht Treaty saw the fundamental and deep causes of inflation as being not monetary, but fiscal.

The other two Maastricht rules are openly aimed at constraining fiscal policy. The rules say that government debts and deficits cannot be above certain reference levels (although the treaty allows some exceptions).

These levels were chosen somewhat arbitrarily: a deficit level of 3% of GDP and a debt level of 60% of GDP.

O PEC

• Não envolve perda de soberania fiscal • Os governos simplesmente apenas aceitam

sofrer as consequências das suas acções• Como as competências orçamentais são nos

Estados Membros, a CE emite os pareceres, mas a palavra final pertence ao Conselho

Regras de decisão

Em Economia, eficiência significa não desperdiçar recursos

• No contexto da EU, eficiência passou a ser entendida como capacidade para agir

• Em que medida os sucessivos alargamentos têm criado dificuldades ao processo de decisão?

9

2001 : Aviso Prévio à Irlanda

2002: a CE propõe aviso prévio a Portugal, que o CM não emite

2002: Declaração de défice excessivo a Portugal. A CE propõe aviso prévio à Alemanha, que o CM não emite

2003: Declaração de défice excessivo à Alemanha; Aviso Prévio à França; Declaração de défice excessivo à França

2003: A França e a Alemanha não seguiram as recomendações. A Comissão recomenda mais medidas, e o ECOFIN decidiu suspender a aplicação do PEC.

2004: Aviso Prévio não emitido à Italia

2004: Declaração de défice excessivo à Holanda, a pedido da Holanda; Declaração de défice excessivo à Grécia e a 6 dos novos EM.

A CE levou o ECOFIN ao Tribunal Europeu e em 2004 o Tribunal decidiu que o ECFIN tinha violado a lei, mas apenas no fraseamento da decisão, pois o pacto não pode ser suspenso

Em 2005 o PEC é revisto:

- o PEC anterior estabelecia calendários precisos para a aplicação de sanções.

- o Novo PEC é mais flexível, pois a sanção passa a depender do prazo concedido pelo Conselho.

- A aplicação do pacto passa a ser uma questão de negociação

História de um falhanço

Problemas do PEC

Conflito entre soberania e credibilidade :

- Sanções automáticos ou impostas pela CE (que não é eleita) violariam o princípio da democracia.

- Deixar as decisões com os políticos (Conselho) mantém a democracia

- Mas os políticos não gostam de colocar-se mutuamente em cheque.

- O PEC não foi levado a sério, afetando o funcionamento de União

Soft contraints

• During this episode, pressures for reform were weak

The fiscal convergence criteria have been widely ignored. This figure shows the number of times that each of the original 12 members of the Eurozone have violated the 3% of GDP government deficit limit since joining the Eurozone.

Breaking of Fiscal Rules

Fiscal developments

-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

19

72

19

75

19

78

19

81

19

84

19

87

19

90

19

93

19

96

19

99

20

02

20

05

Ciclo económico na União EuropeiaCiclo económico em Portugal

O ciclo económico de 1995-2005 foi peculiar

Na segunda metade dos anos 90:

-Forte descida das

taxas de juro

- Disponibilidade de

Crédito

- Expectativas

favoráveis

- Expansão na EU15

…a procura interna aumentou, apoiada no endividamento dos particulares

Conjuntura

2. Pre-Bailout period

• Fiscal: the 3% deficit was achieved in 1999, validating the EMU accession • Cyclical effects

• The government debt remained well below 60%, thanks to favourable snow ball effect.

-6.0

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

Nominal Bond-Yields

Implicit nominal interest rate

Nominal GDP Growth

-5.2

-4.7

-3.7

-4.4

-3.0 -3.2

-4.8

-3.3

-4.4

-6.2 -6.2

-4.3

-3.0

-3.8

-7.0

-6.0

-5.0

-4.0

-3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Government budget (% of GDP)

Balance of General Government excuding interest (adjusted for the cyclical component, % of GDP)

Structural Balance of General Government excuding interest (adjusted for the cyclical component, % of GDP)

Fiscal stance

• From 2000 to 2005 the cyclically adjusted balance declined from -1.3% to -3.1%

• Portugal breached the 3% threshold of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) every year (since EMU’s inception) except in 1999, despite EDP.

58.3 59.5

55.2 51.8 51.0 50.3

53.4 56.2

58.7 62.0

67.4 69.2 68.4

71.7

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Government debt (% of GDP)

After EMU entry, government debt started increasing again Despite the EDP, debt increased from 50% of GDP to 62% in 2004 (violating the threshold) and then to 66.4% in 2005.

Government debt

PPPs and SOEsIn Plus: • A significant amount of government investment was

masked through PPPs or in the accounts of SOES not included in the government sector perimeter.

• This means that the government debt in the national accounts was underestimating the liabilities of the government sector.

• Only after 2008 ex post corrections were made for the government debt to reflect its effective position.

Fiscal developments 1995-2005• Government primary expenditures had

been increasing steadily as a percentage of GDP: 37.1 in 1995, 44.1% in 2005.

• In 2005, the new government started implementing a fiscal adjustment and managed to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3% in 2008, having achieved improvements in the fiscal adjustment deficit along 2005-2007. Still, this was not enough to avoid the increase in government debt, that reached 71.7% in 2008.

• Being part of (protected by) EMU further anaesthetised Portugal’s capacity to implement reforms.

• The SGP had been perceived as an external constraint rather than a desirable policy constraint.

• Reactive rather than pro-active budgetary policy stance.

• This can be inferred from the successive updates of the stability programmes and from the frequent one-off measures(in some years by up to 2% of GDP) to reduce the deficit.