pol operação condor 1

7/30/2019 Pol Operao Condor 1

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NCL1S~ ED>w~ %sAJ~?t KDEPARTMENT OF STATEWI%hin#t~n. 0C. 20520 1O

A The Secretary -FROM : ARA - Harry W. Shlaudeman ~JkARA . Monthly Report (July)The "Third World War" and South America

The m ilitary regimes of the southern cone of SouthAmerica see themselves as embattled:-- on one sideby international Marxism and-itsterrorist exponents, and-- on the other by the hostility of the uncDm prehendinqindustrial democracies misled by M arxist propaganda.

In r6sponse they are banding together in what may `v ellI I become a political bloc.pf some cohesiveness. But, more~S significantly, they are joining forces to ersadicate "subversion",I !la word which increasingly translai~es into non-violent dissentA from the left and center left. The security forces of thesouthern cone-- now coordinate intelligence activities closely;

-- operate in the territory of on e anather's countries .1in pursuit of "subvei-sives";--haveestablishedOperationCondor to find and kill*terrorists of the "Revolutionary Coordinating Com mittee"in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is coopera-~ ting short of murder operations.

This siege m entality shading into paranoia is peihapsiIhe natural result of the convu lsions of recent years in whichthe societies of Chile, Uruguay and A rgentina have been badly~haken by assault from the extreme left. But the military-leaders, despite r~ear decimation of the M arxist left in Chileand Uruguay. along with accelerating progress toward that goalin Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the w ar mustgo on. Some talk of the "Third World War", with the countriesof the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civiliza-Lion. /XGDS-2WARNING NOTICE: SENSITflt INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHO DS -INVOLVED . DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF' INFORNATION CONTROLLED.BY ORIGINATOR. -~

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orism every bit asjustified as Israeli- actions against Palestinianterrorists; an d

of their war oh terrorism reflects a double standard.of this men tality., internally, is to

political

roader implications f~ tig and for future trendghemisnbe;~ are dt~turbing. The mae of bloc-dy counter-ism b y these recirtes Tfl7~it~ns ~ ~oir increasing isolat_onest and the opening of deep ideological divisionscountries of the hemisphere. An outbreak of PLO -typeism on a w orldw5de scale 1W resiponse is cflSO a p cssib~lty.aL dem ocracies would be the battlefield.er attemots for the firsto focus on lonri a n dangers of a right-wing blo~. -

policy recoz~i:nc1ations are: - v--~ --- .

asize ub- aifferences b~twsen the sxconnt~4c's at C~St onnortunmtv.A- A- - -

n -` ,`-~--

To oppose rhetorical exagcetations of the -!ThirdATorld~WarI typo.

intoour cognibive un=verse through systematicexchanges.

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Security Cooperation is a FactThere is extensive cooperetich between the security!intelligence opetations of six governments: Argentina~Brazil. Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Utuguay. Their.intelligence services hold form al meetings to plan"Operation Condor." It will inc2ude ext~nsive FBI-type- exchanges of information on sha6y characters. Thereare plans for a special comm unications network. Thesedetails are still secret, but b road security cooperationiS not. Qflficials in Paraguay and Argentina have toldus that they find it necessary to coo perate with eachother and their neighbors ag ainst internationally-fundedterrorists and "subversives.'The probleg&b ~as with the definiticit of "subversion"never the most precise of terms. One report-sr .vr.i tcsthat subversion "has crown to include nearlranyone Wioenposes gov~rnn'~nt policy~" In countries where everyoneknows that subv~rsives can wind up dead or tortured,

educated people have an understandable concern aboutthe bound ar=es of dissent. The concern doubles when -there is a chance ot~ersecution by roreign policeacting on indirect, unknos-m information. Numerous - --* Urugucyan refugees hAve b een murdered in Arqenbina, -and there~ are w= ctesoreact accusations that Areentine . -.police are doing their Urucuavan colleagues a favor.These accusations are -at least credible,whether ornot they are exact.The Naturo of the Left-Extreme Threat: : A tfThird f~orlcT War"?

- Urugucyan Fo reign Minister Slanco -- one of. the--brighter and, normally steadier memb ers of the group --was the first to describe the campaign against terroristsas a "Third World War." The description is interestingfor -- two reasons:

-- It justifies harsh and st


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threat is not imac-rinary. It may be exaggirated.

One musL admire his -personal courage. -y objective standards, the terrorists haveaccomolishm ents over the years: -

At one time or oth~- urban and ruralguerrlilas have created severe problemsfor al-most every South American government, --including those where dem ocracy is still

e provokeri repressixm reactions.including torture and quasi-governmentaldeath squads. (The guerrillas typicall~'claimed to welcome renression, but we wonderif they really like what they got~)still pose a serious threat in Arcentzna

and -- arguably -- a lesser problem in twoor three oth~ countries. VThere is a tertor-oriented "Revo lut~onarv -Coordinating Junta" posstm1y headquarteredin Paris, which is both a counterpart of anan incentive for cooneration between governitenbsv

ertheless, lt is also true that, bro?G;Th~ 7 This is true even in -one minds of studious . -Che Guev ara' z romantic fiasco crushed

for rural revolution. Allende' s tall is t~kAn-electoralcannot work. Urbati guerrillas collapseor in.- -aros. The intter represented a high-water mark.ProbThly the military believe that torturecrack this structure.

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There is still a znajorcarnpaigr. in Argentina.ilitary tb pull up their socks and win.e precedents to guide them, and the terroristsno handy refuge in neighboring countries. -What w ill remain is a chain of gov ernments, startedse origin was in battle aqainstIt is important to their ego, their

World War. At best, when Argentina stabilizes,nce them that they have already won. ~warriors will net 14ke this. They already snickerhen there is a real military campaign goingThey accuse, us of applauding the defeat of terrorismEntebbe but not in- Montevideo. Cur differingpercent~ons of the threat are raIsing susoiaons about

These gov ernments -are reactive: they derived theirlegitimacy fThm ` reaction against- terrorism.remism, instability~ and (as they see it)Thus, "anti-Marxism' xs a mo-cal and ooltxcal -- -

There is also an - ideolorry that is mor~p ositivsrr--z -chat Ci national dare>; ;~-eriu.- -- The vision of nation has bean as otfcctvein South America as it was in Europe. (it mayyet turn out to be as destructive; this pap~r- * looks only brie t17 at the potential for conflictsbetween Latin nations and blocs 2 Militaryestablishments, traditional protectors ofboundaries and national integrty, are in-a position to profit from the new nationalism.

-- Economic developm ent is a pressing need and- a public demand. Disciolined military estab-lishments can work with technocrats to produceeconomic development. in the countt:.es weare considering, the military us always the * -- strongest national institution -- sornetims

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d~G~MiED-6--- - aThos h one It has, typically, -saved h ns trot civilian chaos.

Nation al rtalisn is therefore real med icine,.to flios ten r dv left or rioht -wingTo this extent, milii-~ry ~7flflr can find a

National developmentalism has obvious andpar-illels to National Socialism. Opponentsmilitary regimes call them fascist. It is anpejbrative, the more so because it can beo be t~chnically accurate. But it is a pejorarve.an fascist is not primarily to-his economic VICW S. * -In. practice, the military regimes tend t~ bethat characterize.

Local political institutuoss are (reasonably).considered to have b een a failure, and it issuquested that `~democracv doesn't work for us.Leaders want to build mo re efficient insti-fru&% ns,to organize their oo ni~Ufirt~ entirely differer-Etly.- Yet there is, a-c sonic level & cor0ciousness, -an accep~ance that dem ocracy is the idealeventually to be sought.

-- Mo other institution is allowed to challenqemilitary powdr, v et political -carties andcourts often exist and pertain some validfunctions. BrazilTh toothless parliamant,- - - for example, does cautiously articulate -*- public opinion and prov ide a dormant alter-native to m ilitary rule.-- Insecure, repre ssive goverrr-onts neverthelessallow substantial `democratic" treedoms, -including varying degrees or rree-aom ofexpression. The ambiente is more like -Washington than Moscow. You can buy a goodnewspaper, a pair of denaden~iy~flnIY~orlblue jeans, a girlie magazIne, or a modernpainting.

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UKCL~MED-- These in 1 tary regime do not expect to lastforever There is no thought-of a-~Thousand-------Year Reich no oreterse of having arrived at- ultimate ar st s vle ruth.From the standno~nt of our policy, the mostimportant long-tern characterasdyc of these reGimese precisely that they ar~ reversible, in bo tnand 9ractice. They know it. But they do notabout it. -Political and sccl.alment lag. Long after left-wing threatssquashed, the regimes are still terrified of them. `pin-kos remains a central goal* threats and plots are ntscovered.istakes" are made by the torturers, who havety finding logical victims. Murder ~guadsharthiess people and petty thieves. When -held, the perverse electorate~hcwsdesire to put the military out of rower. Of fic~rssee the trend endingwith their-own bodies on the

No m ore elections for awnite.We d o not suggest that there is a hopelesslySince some of- these regimes arereally solid economic successes. Themay eventuallj trust civilians to succeedrovide an honorab le. e;-:it. So far, the

When an aiternative governmenteventually has to be found, it might be that theone available will be at th~ far left. -- - -re Also Leading Differences.

In discussing the general characteristics of -y regimes, we have made som ebroad generalizatxons. The followingorst distortions,m is important to be clearshall

countries do o F-ave in cotno r - er than what

The fron bur r casc~ are A genti a Chile..and

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* - Argentina. is the most interesting, both*--because.it is important and because the directions of the newregime are not clear.. ~re ~ gontires are politicallysophisticated like the r zi a ~, n inlukc theBrazilians, the Argentines lack social and evenmilitarV unity. To recover economicallyr they must* break the power of traditional structures, and especial-lv of the labor movement. There is a~o a genuinechallenge fronv left-wing terrorists and right-wingcounter-terror. The problem approaches civil-waraimenszons. We believe that the Brazilian. modelwill prevail. In the lQng run, thus, we think themilitary will win. Vid& la -- or his successor -- willhave m ore trouble with hard-line military officersand right-wing terror than with the left. * Forces- probably donnected to the - recjirn2 have already beenkilling exiles and priests, among others. -Chile has been the sub ject of s-a much action- - lately -that you probably do not i-teed to hear an'!more. The Chileans have smashed the Th~fL almost

as thoroughly as th-~ j~razIzant, hut the repr&ssb eapparabus is much w ore * unrestrained. There is noone at the top like Geisel who.even seems to wishto moderate human-rights abuses. The Santiagoregime provides the archatypa of the rcasonlngthat criticsm or tortij=e can acm e only fromirWernc~tiona1 ?4arxist piotbers. The m ilitaryseem particularly insecure and isolated, eve-n -with respeoL to the Chilean punt IC.- g~~uav is the third press n~ case (with - -*Argenr=na and Chile), Foreign X'inister Blanco wasthe first to talk about the "T hird World W ar," and--

he stiliS insists that the threat continucs highin his country. Given this picture, Uruguay i.~, -- -of course, eager to coop~rate with its neighbors- * in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike theChileans, the Uruguavans have maintained some -sense of proportion about human rights ana inter-national public opinion. Civilians are up frontin the governm ent, qve the m ilitary substantialsupport, and interact relatively well.

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* flICLASSIFIEDBrazil: We can and snould relate to Brazil. asan emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spot. YetI its 1964 "revolution" is the basic model for its -The biggest problem is that, despite re-arkab le successes, the Brazilian armed services stillcannot find a way to reIaAc- their hold on power. Onthe other hand, they are nor much w orried a bout it.een able to tan civilian talent for economicpurposes. The Left is smashed, but it is not clear* whether the President can controL the zeal of h issecurity forces. Attempts at nolitical distensThhave largely flopped. (The word carrfts both thenglish sense of "distending", or enlarging authorityfrom a narrow inil~rv base, and the French- sense of"relaxing ". Better than detente? ) Brazil, like theother large countries, doss see itself as & worldactor, and this inhibit~ extremism.Bolivia is an interesting case but nota hotproblem. This is the scene of one of the t1~eegenuine soc#.al revolutions in Latin As- -- whDzhmakes it all the more puzzling that Che G uevarathought he had a conLribution to make. Despite hisfailure, he left lasting worries. `The. Dolivians still

consider that Che' s ~izath makes them a tat-get of - -revenge for internat:onal terrorists. We cannotuite perceive the same menaCe; -- In Solivian terms, -the government is notably stable and econom icallysuccessful. It has been moderate on human rights.- Paraguay is m archina to the same tune -as itsneighbors but is a tulle behind ~- s is the kind orninetcenth-ceutury military reairo~ that looks good on -- the cartoon page. Paraguay, ho~ `-~ , ha-s eminentlysound reasons f or being backwa U a"~ is not in theleast apologetic. The Paragua-rnr


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~tLASSIFIEDA Political B at oW'* - ~4C~arrJe- p~flEioiW~v 3Yves ThCi5T hflTh~of a politica r inte ests aill be involved inways that are h r rica SLch a bloc isnot here vet, or c i-s iozation arelargely present:

-- The conviction that an international leftisc:threat amounts to a rrviorj,a i-;ar" and hence* requires an alliance.-- Highly comnat i & e philo sophies and- political- objectives in- other resnects.

- -- Improved transpbrt and comm unication betweenneighboring countties. --which previously had* better links with the U.S. and Euro~ z thanwith each other.-- A suspicion that even tin U.S. has "lost itswijl" -bo stand fi_rp~ aaainst commun tsm becauseot Viet-14.ztm, detente, and social decay.* -~ - V-- Resentment of human-riatte criticism, whichis often taken as just- one more sign of thia7commic encirclement-- Exclusion by the m ilitary or the bivilian, -deinocrat~c inrerplay ~Thich helps to inaintal"a sense of proportion.

There are a f-ow inhibitions on formation ofa bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one.gely shaped the sense ofnation. With the exception of the Peru/Chile terision,however, bord,nr disputes ~are no longer an- o verridingfactor in the southern cone.

To predict a political bloc would still bespeculative. Coinmon sense could assert itself. Thereis plenty of it available in these countries and evensome mn cnej.r e on tbir at L trendtoward bloc th pressrt, c ~ a trouble-some.

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-~ $ f a. Bloc Does Form.In th'~ err> stages, we will be a "casual berie- -tficiary" (as one reporter puts it) for reasons thatare too obvious to need elaboration here. On the mainEast-West stage, right-wing regimes can hardly tilt* toward the Soviets and Cubans. The fact that we arean. apparent beneficiary can easily lull us into trouble,as has historically been the case in this hemisphere.

- But we would c-xnect a range of grcw~n g prcbm s.Sdm e are already with us. Internationally the Earingenerals look like cur guys. tt'o arc esrecially idea-titled with Chile. It cannot do us any goot. Europeans,certainly, hate Pinochet & Co; with a passion thatrubs oft on us.t4ore ~robleins are on the schedule:-- Human rights abuses, as von know, are creatingmore and m ore problems of conscience, lau~ aIm

dip lomac v. - - g-- Chile' s black-sime s-L~tus has already tmtde -trouble for its ecoaorn~c recovery. The farmerto the right thedrift goes in other countries-,- the more difficulties we can expdct in c-areconcm~o links with thorn.-- We V IOUL CL like to share with, say, the 13razilian~a DercepLio~z That we are. natural allies, -- * Brazilian participation in a right'~wing blocwould utake this unlikely. ---- Eventually, we could even see s~rious strainswith the democracies farther north. Orfila hastold us-that he thinks a confrontation 15possible. Uruguay and Venesuela have justbroken relations over as incident involvingpolitical asylum. A pvec~6nnt?

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!~SSIFIEDOver the h orizon, there is a chance of seriousworld-scale trouble. This is speculative but no 4.ongerridiculous. The ?evoluLiohary-~ - T hird ?orld Far~Till now, though we have tried to exercise amoderatino influence, we have not tsken a lan-cr-termstrategic view of the problems that a right-wing bloc -would create. Thus paper has tried. for a snarper focus.We shall have rare recommendations in months to como,but the follot,,~ rg are a f-air start: r31 Distirguish t&een_cou ntries with special --care. Itwe treat Lh& =t as a whole, we will be encour&LgIn~them to view themselves as an estattled bloc. In ourdealings with each count"" and in Congressional testimony,

we should for example, - rr-flect reccvnition ttat:--Argentina, with its virtual civil war, facesa problem m uch different from its -neiribbors.-- Uruguay, w ith its substantial retun-:" - sofmilitary/civilian interplay, is not com parableto cniiLc.-- Brazil has the ;-reight, sou&aistlcarion, and *world- perspective La share rang of our con--a _

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Our m ilitary-sales programs may also provide at.- - opportunity for distinction. Aid no longer providessignificant leverage. Thereis vast interest in overalleconomic relatIons -- but not much freadom of m ovciment.2) Tr to cot the politics and ideology cut ofhuman richtr


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UU~SIFIEDIn time, perhaps we can convince them that a ThirdWorld W ar is undesirable. `4

-A -ABA/PLC: DCPrope r/whtuersS/2/7G x-29192

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