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Problems of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Buber 1

NAM-IN LEEDepartment of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, NW, South Korea

After the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900/1901,2

Hus-serl was engaged throughout the remainder of his life with the phe-nomenology of intersubjectivity. He was fully conscious of itssignicance to the entire system of transcendental phenomenologyand left many works dealing with this problem. However, his phe-nomenology of intersubjectivity has been sharply criticized by manyinterpreters. Among these critics are not only the phenomenologistsafter Husserl, but the advocates of philosophy of dialog or the criticalsocial theory. Since the phenomenology of intersubjectivity has signi-cant meaning for the whole system of phenomenology, some wouldnot hesitate to draw the conclusion that the whole attempt of Hus-serl’s phenomenology has failed.

I believe that many of the arguments of Husserl’s critics are not onthe mark because, in criticizing Husserl, they do not make a clear dis-tinction between the different problems of intersubjectivity. More thananything else, philosophy deals with the most abstract of problems, sothe rst step to be taken is to make a clear distinction among the dif-

ferent problems concerning a subject. This is particularly true for thephenomenology of intersubjectivity. In this respect, I agree with MaxScheler on the following insight: ‘‘The principle error till now that hasbeen committed in the research on the problem of intersubjectivity isthe fact that the different problems concerning intersubjectivity havenot been clearly distinguished.’’ 3 In this context, Scheler differentiatesthe following problems concerning the other person: (1) the problemof the essential relationship between the individuals and society in gen-eral; (2) the epistemological problem concerning the validity of posit-ing the existence of the other; (3) the problem concerning the origin of the other consciousness in general, that is, the transcendental psycho-logical problem of the knowledge of the other; (4) the problem of empirical psychology of the other; (5) the metaphysical problem of theother; and nally (6) the problem of value with regard to the other. 4

Husserl Studies 22: 137–160, 2006.DOI 10.1007/s10743-006-9007-6 Ó Springer 2006



Husserl seemed partly conscious of this fact as well. For example,he talks about ‘‘the confusingly involved problems of intersubjectivityand worldly Objectivity’’(Hua XVII, p. 250) 5 or about ‘‘the involved

set of transcendental problems concerning intersubjectivity’’ (HuaXVII, p. 245; Logic , p. 238) and attempts to make a distinctionamong the ontological, the transcendental-phenomenological and themetaphysical problems of intersubjectivity. However, one cannot ndwithin his phenomenology of intersubjectivity such a clear distinctionamong the various problems as is called for by Max Scheler. I believethat, if Husserl made clearer distinctions among the various problemsof intersubjecticity, his phenomenology would not have been so shar-ply criticized. In other words, one can say that some of the criticismsare caused by this lack of distinctions and, in this article I will at-tempt to reveal the presence of these types of criticisms. Althoughthere are many such criticisms, my discussion will be limited to The-unissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivityfrom the standpoint of M. Buber’s philosophy of dialog. 6 In order tofulll this purpose, I will rst delineate the main points of the criti-cism by the philosophy of dialog concerning Husserl’s phenomenol-ogy of intersubjectivity. Thereafter, in order to be able to lay a basisfor a critical assessment of this criticism, I will attempt to make aclear distinction among the various problems of phenomenology of intersubjecticity. Only those problems that are necessary for theassessment of the criticism of Husserl by the philosophy of dialog willbe dealt with. Finally, I will attempt to argue that these criticisms,under scrutiny, are misguided, because they are based on a lack of aclear distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity.

1. Criticisms of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivityby the Philosophy of Dialog

According to Theunissen, Husserl’s phenomenology is extremelyopposed to the philosophy of dialog and, more than any place else,one can nd this essential trait in his phenomenology of intersubjec-tivity. Since Husserl determines the absoluteness of transcendentalsubjectivity as ‘‘the absoluteness that means asociality,’’ 7 his phenom-enology of intersubjectivity cannot be successful. Emphasizing thispoint, Theunissen tells us that ‘‘its absoluteness [the absoluteness of the original ego] consists in its ‘solitude’ – admittedly a solitude that,because there is no I alongside of me, is also free of any longing forcommunity.’’ 8 Theunissen advocates the thesis that Husserl’s phenom-enology, determining the ego as a solitary being and totally free from

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any kind of desire for society, cannot avoid the fate of a solipsism.We know that, here, Theunissen echoes the same criticism of thosewho insist that, being conned to the analysis of the solipsistic ego

and, thus, not being able to solve the problem of intersubjectivity,Husserl’s phenomenology is nothing other than a solipsism.

Thereafter, on the basis of a ‘‘destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality,’’ 9 Theunissen attempts to deepenand widen his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectiv-ity. Needless to say that, in this context, the destruction alwayscontains two components, the criticism of the problematic philosophi-cal position, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the groundingof a more original philosophical position than the one criticized.Thus, through a destructive criticism of Husserl, Theunissen attemptsto construct a philosophical foundation for a dialogical philosophy as acounterpart to Husserl’s phenomenology.

Buber’s distinction between the primary words ‘‘I–Thou’’ and‘‘I–It’’ 10 provides the starting point for Theunissen’s destruction of Husserl’s phenomenology. Since his aim is undermining Husserl’sphenomenology, he attempts to clarify the distinction between the‘‘Thou’’ and the ‘‘It’’ with regard to Husserl’s concept of intentional-ity. In this context, he sometimes characterizes the sphere of the ‘‘It’’as ‘‘the sphere of subjectivity’’ that embraces ‘‘the acting subjecttogether with its [the subject’s] constituted world which is governedby it through its intentionality.’’ 11 Other times, with reference toGabriel Marcel, he characterizes the sphere of ‘‘It’’ as the ‘‘sphere of ‘having’’’ 12 that, according to him, means nothing other than ‘‘that of intentionality’’ 13 and stands out for its will to reign overall. Therefore,according to him, as the expression ‘‘transcendental-philosophical

model’’ implies, the intentionality that is the proper theme of tran-scendental phenomenology is understood as the moment which holdstogether the sphere of the ‘‘It’’. In contradistinction to the sphere of intentionality as the sphere of It, he determines the sphere of theThou as the dialogical sphere. This dialogical sphere is distinguishedas the ‘‘immediacy ‘between man and man’,’’ 14 ‘‘the mutuality of inner behavior’’ 15 as well as ‘‘the mutuality of acceptation, of affirma-tion and conrmation.’’ 16

Theunissen points out that, in order to be able to comprehend thesphere of Thou properly, we should not let ourselves be guided by thetranscendental-philosophical model of intentionality. He adds that,however, it is not easy for us to be entirely free from this model.According to him, even Buber himself was not totally free from thiskind of danger and attempted to determine ‘‘the Thou in the sameway as the It: as what is intended, as the noematic object, now,

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admittedly, not of the I–It, but of the I–Thou.’’ 17 In this context, herefers to the beginning part of Buber’s I and Thou : ‘‘To man theworld is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. The atti-

tude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of theprimary words which he speaks.’’ 18 So long as the Thou is compre-hended as the noematic correlate of the attitude, the essential featureof it is totally concealed. Theunissen calls the Thou, that is, the noe-matic correlate of the attitude as ‘‘the individual Thou in an impropersense.’’ 19 Therefore, the next step of the destruction of the transcen-dental-philosophical model of intentionality is in the destruction of this individual Thou that should make it possible to bring to light theThou that lies behind that Thou. What matters here is ‘‘the individualThou in a proper sense that is utterly unstable.’’ 20 The individualThou in a proper sense is not something that appears to us as anobject, but something that escapes the objectication. Thus, it meanssomething that does not appear and, for this sense, can be callednothing. In this context, Buber writes: ‘‘But when Thou is spoken,there is no thing. Thou has no bounds. When Thou is spoken, thespeaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing.’’ 21

With the discovery of the Thou in a proper sense, the destructionof the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality is notcompletely carried out. With respect to the possibility of discoveringthe Thou that lies deeply concealed even behind the Thou in a propersense, it should be noted that I happen to meet the individual Thouin two senses, though neither I nor the Thou are able to cause thismeeting. My meeting with the Thou is neither my achievement noryours, but exclusively something that has been presented from some-where, that is to say, a gift or a grace. The experience of meeting

Thou means, at the same time, the experience of him who presents uswith this meeting, that is to say, the experience of ‘‘the Thou who,owing to his everlasting presence to me, must be constant, that is,eternal for me.’’ 22 According to Theunissen, in this context, the Eter-nal Thou means God who remains an Eternal Mystery to the humanunderstanding, because the human being cannot know, but can only‘‘vaguely feel’’ or ‘‘glimpse’’ (ahnen) 23 him. In this context, Buberwrites: ‘‘Of course God is the ‘wholly Other’; but He is also whollythe Same, the wholly Present. Of course, He is the Mysterium Trem-endum that appears and overthrows; but He is also the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I.’’ 24 Thus, with a completedestruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionalitywhich enables us to experience the Eternal Thou or God as aMystery, the philosophy of dialog culminates in a negative theology.

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2. Various Problems of Intersubjectivity

In order to lay the ground for an assessment of the criticisms of

Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity by the philosophy of dialog, I will attempt to make a clear distinction between the variousproblems of intersubjectivity. In this article, I will distinguish only thefollowing three problems of intersubjectivity that directly bear on ourcritical assessment of the criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity by the philosophy of dialog: the ontological, the tran-scendental-phenomenological and the metaphysical problem of inter-subjectivity. Other problems of intersubjectivity that have no directbearing on our discussion below, such as the empirically scienticproblem or the problem of value of intersubjectivity, will not bedealt with.

2.1. The Ontological Problem of Intersubjectivity

In the natural attitude, I experience the other in various ways. I canexperience the other as my family, my colleague, a student, a teacher,a seller, a member of the country or even as a world citizen. In thiscase, I experience the other as a person. However, I can experiencethe other in a totally different way. In the scientic attitude, I canexperience the other not as a person, but as a mere scientic objectthat is present among many other objects.

In the natural attitude, I can either describe the givenness of theother as a fact or I can attempt to explain the causal relationshipbetween facts. In this way, we can ground various empirical scienceswhich concern the other, e.g. sociology, history, anthropology or psy-

chology. Furthermore, in the eidetic attitude, I can try to bring tolight the essential structure of the facts concerning the other and thusground an ontology of the givenness of the other as a philosophicaldiscipline.

We can nd various attempts by Husserl to ground the ontology of the givenness of the other. A typical example is the text that has beenpublished by Iso Kern as Appendix XVIII in Volume XIII of Husser-liana and bears the title: ‘‘The Givenness of the Concrete SocialObjects and Products, and the Clarication of the Concepts Relatedto It. Social Ontology and Descriptive Sociology’’ (Hua XIII, p. 98). 25

In this text, Husserl attempts to project social ontology as a system-atic ontology of social givenness. It is a well known fact that theontology of nature, for example, pure geometry, pure theory of num-ber or the pure theory of motion, signies the apriori science for theempirical sciences of nature. In a similar way, according to Husserl,

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social ontology signies the apriori sciences for the empirical sciencesof the other. The rst requirement in founding an empirical science of social givenness as a science is social ontology.

There are a great number of tasks for social ontology. As repeat-edly attempted by Husserl, one of the most important tasks of socialontology is to clarify the general structure of the givenness of theother. For the purpose of clarifying it, Husserl grapples with twophilosophical positions concerning this problem: Benno Erdmann’stheory of inference by analogy, 26 on the one side, and Theodor Lipp’stheory of empathy, 27 on the other side. Erdmann holds that the wayof gaining access to the mental state of the other person cannot becalled an experience, but only a kind of inference that, mediated bythe bodily expressions, is carried out analogically. Correspondingly,he characterizes the mental state of the other which is accessible byanalogical inference not as ‘‘an immediately given fact, but a hypothe-sis, a more probable one, because it can be veried by us at everymoment’’ ( Erdmann , p. 45, cited in Hua XIII, p. 36). According tothis theory, it is in principle impossible for us to have an experienceof the other’s mental state; the best we can do is to build a hypothesisabout them. Contrary to this position, Lipps holds that there is noway of gaining access to the mental state of the other, because theother, as it is supposed to be experienced by me, is nothing otherthan the product of a mental process called ‘‘duplication of myself’’(die Vervielfa ltigung meiner selbst) ( Lipps , p. 36, cited in Hua XIII,p. 73). According to him, this process of duplication of myself is re-leased by certain sense-perceptions of the body of the other and car-ried out ‘‘instinctively’’ ( Lipps , p. 36, cited in Hua XIII, p. 73).Thereby different sense-perceptions motivate different ways of dupli-

cation of myself. Lipps calls this process of duplication of myself ‘‘empathy.’’According to Husserl, neither Erdmann nor Lipps grasp the essence

of the givenness of the other. For the other that I meet everyday isneither a mere hypothesis nor a mere duplication of myself, but theother as he/she is experienced by me. In this context, Husserl main-tains that the experience of the other is not a kind of direct experi-ence like the perception of things, but a kind of indirect experiencethat is mediated by the experience of the body of the other. Husserlnames the indirect experience ‘‘presentiation’’ (Vergegenwa rtigung)(Hua XIII, p. 30) which should be distinguished from the presencing(Gegenwa rtigung) that is the direct experience of an object. Of course,except for the experience of the other person, there are many otherforms of presentiation such as remembering, expecting, picturing,fantasizing, etc. Husserl uses the term ‘‘empathy’’ (die Einfu hlung) in

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order to distinguish the experience of the other as a form of presenti-ation from its other forms. It is the further task of social ontology tobring to light the concrete essential structure of empathetic presentia-

tion in comparison with other forms of presentiation.

2.2. The Transcendental-phenomenological Problem of Intersubjectivity

2.2.1. The Transcendental Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and theProblem of Motivation

From about 1905, after the transcendental turn in his phenomenol-ogy, the transcendental phenomenological problem, that is, the prob-lem of the condition of the possibility for the constitution of objects,signied for Husserl his most important task. In this context, the phe-nomenology of intersubjectivity is no exception; in this case also,more than anyplace else, he engaged himself with the transcendentalphenomenological problem, that is, the problem of the condition of the possibility for the constitution of the other. Husserl formulatesthis problem in a more concrete way as follows: ‘‘How is it possiblethat in a pure consciousness, in a certain form of its experiences, anexperience of foreign experiences and the subject of those experiencescan emerge and along with that an experiential knowledge of anotherstream of consciousness?’’ (Hua XIII, p. 29)

Before I deal with the transcendental phenomenological problem of the other, I would like to clarify the relationship between this prob-lem and the ontological problem of the other discussed above. Itshould be noted that the transcendental phenomenological research of the other cannot be launched if I have not experienced the other andif I don’t know the ontological structure of the givenness of the other.

The ontological structure of the givenness of the other offers the guid-ing thread (Leitfaden) for transcendental phenomenological researchinto it; if the ontological structure of the givenness of the other is notrst known, transcendental research into it is not only impossible, butalso meaningless. Thus, the ontological research necessarily precedesthe transcendental-phenomenological one. Corresponding to the rightorder of research, in section 43 of Cartesian Meditations 28 where thetranscendental phenomenological research into the intersubjectivitybegins, Husserl deals with ‘‘the noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the other as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory of theexperience of someone else’’ (Hua I, p. 122; CM , p. 90). With respectto the signicance of the ontological research for the transcendental-phenomenological one, he writes thereafter in section 59 as follows:‘‘Starting from the experiential world given beforehand as existentand (with the shift to the eidetic attitude) from any experiential world

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whatever, conceived as given beforehand as existent, we exercisedtranscendental reduction – that is: we went back to the transcendentalego, who constitutes within himself givenness-beforehand and

all modes of subsequent givenness [...].’’ (Hua I, pp. 163–164; CM ,p. 136)

As already mentioned, the other can be experienced or given in var-ious ways. Since each of these various ways of givenness of the othercan provide a transcendental clue for transcendental phenomenologi-cal research, it is possible to develop as many types of transcendentalphenomenology of the other as there are ways of givenness of theother. In this context, Husserl tells us: ‘‘First of all, my ‘transcenden-tal clue’ is the experienced Other, given to me in straightforward con-sciousness and as I immerse myself in examining the noematic-onticcontent belonging to him. [...] By its remarkableness and multiplicity,that content already indicates the manysidedness and difficulty of thephenomenological task.’’ (Hua I, p. 122–123; CM , pp. 90–91) In thisarticle, I cannot develop all the possible types of transcendental phe-nomenology of the other. Instead, taking the above discussed empa-thetic presentiation as a transcendental clue for the transcendentalphenomenological research, I will briey sketch the tasks of the tran-scendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Since the general ontological structure of the givenness of the otheris the empathetic presentiation, the transcendental question concern-ing the constitution of the other can be formulated as follows: Whatis the condition of the possibility for the empathetic presentiation? Inthis context, the condition of the possibility for constitution meansthe motivation for constitution. Accordingly, Husserl formulates thetranscendental phenomenological problem of the other in general as

follows: ‘‘How can appresentation of another original sphere,29

andthereby the sense ‘someone else,’ be motivated in my original sphereand, in fact, motivated as experience – as the word ‘appresentation’(making intended as co-present) already indicates? (Hua I, p. 139;CM , p. 109) Thus, transcendental phenomenology deals with theproblem: ‘‘How does the motivation [for the experience of the other]run.’’ (Hua I, 140; CM , p. 110)

However, the transcendental-phenomenological question concerningthe constitution of the other is not yet determined concretely. In thiscontext, one should note that transcendental phenomenology isdivided into static and genetic phenomenology. Correspondinglytranscendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity is divided into thestatic and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In order todetermine the tasks of static and of genetic phenomenology of

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that perception possible. These kinds of intentionality comprise notonly the intentionality of the perception of the house from the frontalside, but also the intentionality of the horizon in which the house is

embedded, the intentionality of the world, the intentionality of thewill to perceive the house, or the intentionality of the previous per-ception of houses similar to that house. The genesis of the perceptionof the house is not possible without these intentionalities. It is thetask of the genetic phenomenology to clarify all the various kinds of intentionality that play the role of genetic foundation for the variouskinds of constitution.

The distinction between static and genetic phenomenology comes tolight more sharply, if we take into account some basic differences be-tween them. Let me briey deal with them.

1. Static phenomenology could be dened as a kind of normativephenomenology, since it aims to clarify the foundation of validitythat plays the role of the norm or the ideal to which I have toappeal in order to justify the validity of constitution. In contrast tostatic phenomenology, genetic phenomenology could be dened asa kind of factual phenomenology that attempts to clarify ‘‘the

whole concrete nexus in which each particular consciousnessstands, along with its intentional object as intentional’’ (Hua XVII,p. 316; Logic , p. 316).

2. The concept of the original plays a signicant role not only in sta-tic phenomenology, but also in genetic phenomenology. However,the concrete meaning of the concept is different in each. The con-cept of the original is understood in static phenomenology fromthe standpoint of the validity-foundation relationship, whereas it isunderstood in genetic phenomenology from the standpoint of thegenesis-foundation relationship. For this reason, the foundationalrelation between two kinds of intentionality could be different instatic and genetic phenomenology. For example, in static phenome-nology, the intentionality of a clear perception of an object is thefoundation for the intentionality of a vague feeling of the sameobject, since from the standpoint of the validity foundation, theformer is more original than the latter. However, the latter couldbe the foundation for the former in genetic phenomenology. This

is due to the fact that, in the genetic order, the vague feeling of anobject could be more original than a clear perception of the sameobject, since I could have the former rst and, then, the latterafterwards.

3. The I, as a reecting ego, has an absolute priority against theothers in static phenomenology. This is due to the fact that, from

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the perspective of the foundation of validity, the most originalrealm for a reecting ego is the self-consciousness of the same ego,since the self-consciousness is the one that is experienced most

immediately by the reecting ego. In genetic phenomenology, how-ever, the I does not have an absolute priority against the others,since the genetic constitution that is carried out by the I is depen-dent on the others in many respects.

4. Since foundation in static phenomenology is the foundation of validity and only objectifying acts could be the bearers of validity,static phenomenology deals only with objectifying acts or non-objectifying acts that are based on objectifying acts. In contrast tostatic phenomenology, genetic phenomenology deals not only withobjectifying acts, but also with non-objectifying acts, since everykind of intentionality could play a role in the genetic foundation of a constitution.

The general distinction between static and genetic phenomenologyenables us to understand more sharply the distinction between the sta-tic and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In what fol-lows, conning my discussion to the transcendental phenomenology of

intersubjectivity that has the general structure of empathetic presentia-tion as the transcendental clue, I will try to make a clear distinctionbetween the static and the genetic phenomenologies of intersubjectivityand clarify the main tasks for both of them. Let me rst deal with thetask for the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

2.2.3. The Static Phenomenology of IntersubjectivityThe static phenomenology of intersubjectivity aims to clarify themotivation for the empathetic presentiation from the standpoint of the foundation of validity. In this case, the motivation for the empa-thetic presentiation means concretely the foundation for the justica-tion of the validity of the positing contained in the empatheticpresentiation, namely the positing that the other is experienced by me.In the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the validity of posit-ing that the other is experienced by me is something incomprehensibleand needs explanation.

Since the validity of the positing of the existence of the other is

something incomprehensible and needs an explanation, the rstmethodical step to be taken is to exclude that validity from the the-matic area and to go back to the more original realm on the basis of which I can justify that validity. This methodical procedure can becalled the static dismantling of the constitution (der statische Abbauder Konstitution) of the other. The validity of the positing of the exis-

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tence of the other is something that I share with other persons, so theexclusion of that validity means, at the same time, the exclusion of allmy intentionalities through which I can be inuenced by them. The

main point of this exclusion is that, as a responsible person, thereecting ego should make the nal decision concerning the validityof the positing of the existence of the other for himself/herself withouttaking the opinion of the other persons uncritically. The exclusion inthis context is needed, since, as a reecting ego, I should take respon-sibility for all the validity-claims that I make. Of course, the reectingego might consult the other persons concerning any validity-claim,but he/she should make the nal decision for himself/herself. There-fore the exclusion in this context has nothing to do with solipsism.Not only I, but also all the other egos should do the same thing tobecome a responsible subject.

Through this methodical procedure, it is possible for every reect-ing subject to secure ‘‘the total nexus of that actual and potentialintentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiarownness’’ (Hua I, p. 124; CM , p. 93). Husserl calls this region of in-tentionalities the ‘‘primordial sphere’’ (Hua I, p. 169; CM, p. 142) of the reecting ego. The primordial sphere is just the foundation for the justication of the validity of the positing that the other is experi-enced by me as the other. After we go back to the primordial sphere,we have to clarify the various kinds of intentionalities that can befound in it and function as the motivations for the justication of theincomprehensible validity in the positing of the existence of the other.In this context, the following points should be noted.

1. In my primordial sphere, I can nd a primordial world that is validonly for me. My primordial world should not be confused with theobjective world that is valid not only for me, but also for otherpersons. The objective world has already been excluded.

2. I nd in my primordial world many things. However, these thingsare not homogeneous and among them there is one that standsout, my body. My body is ‘‘the only Object ‘in’ which I ‘rule andgovern’ immediately, governing particularly in each of its ‘organs’’’(Hua I, p. 128; CM , p. 97). For this reason, I can justify the valid-ity of the positing that I experience my body not merely as a thing,

but as a living body that is connected with my mind and, with it,makes a person. Thus, in my primordial world, I can justify thepositing of a thing as my body and myself as a person.

3. In my primordial world, there is a thing that resembles my body.In this case, due to the resemblance between the thing and mybody, I can justify that I could conceive it as a living body and as

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a person like me. Thus, the resemblance between my body and thebody of the other turns out to be the validity-foundation on theground of which I can justify that I conceive a thing as a living

body of the other and, further, the other as a person like me.

The static phenomenological analysis of the empathetic presentia-tion makes it possible for us to justify the fact that I could experiencethe other as a person. 34 It should be noted that, corresponding to themain characteristics of static phenomenology discussed above, staticphenomenology of intersubjectivity has the following features: 1. Itdeals only with the various kinds of objectifying intentionality relatedto the empathetic presentiation. 2. The reecting I has an absolutepriority against the other subjectivities in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

2.2.4. The Genetic Phenomenology of IntersubjectivityIt is the task of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity toclarify the motivations for the empathetic presentiation from thestandpoint of transcendental genesis. Therefore the transcendentalquestion about the genetic motivation for the empathetic presentia-

tion can be formulated as follows: What kinds of intentionality moti-vate the genesis of the positing that the other is experienced by me?The genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity aims at explaining thegenetic motivations on the ground of which the positing of the exis-tence of the other has been generated. In the genetic phenomenologyof intersubjectivity, the genesis, not the validity, as in the static phe-nomenology, of the positing of the existence of the other is somethingincomprehensible and needs an explanation.

Due to the incomprehensibility of the genesis of positing of theexistence of the other, one should rst exclude that positing from thethematic area and go back to the more original realm that makes pos-sible the genesis, not the justication of the validity, of the empa-thetic. In this case, the more original realm could also be called theprimordial sphere, since the empathetic presentiation of the other can-not be carried out without the primordial sphere as it genetic founda-tion. We could call it the genetic primordial sphere. 35

The genetic primoridal sphere contains various factors that make

possible the genesis of the empathetic presentiation. For example, thegenetic primordial sphere of an adult contains the habitual system of the empathetic presentiation that has been built by him/her in thepast. When an ego encounters the other, it activates this habitualsystem and carries out the act of empathetic presentiation. The staticprimordial sphere does not contain the habitual system of empathetic

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presentiation. In this context, one should note that the genetic pri-mordial sphere is totally different from the static one. That makes upthe basic difference between the static and the genetic phenomenology

of intersubjectivity. Let me summarize some basic differences betweenthe static primordial sphere and the genetic one. 36

1. In contrast to the static primordial sphere that is valid only for thereecting ego, the genetic primordial sphere is a realm that is struc-tured intersubjectively. Nobody could carry out the empatheticpresentiation of the other without communication with other subjectivities. In this sense, subjectivity is always intersubjectivity, 37 asHusserl writes in a later manuscript from 1931: ‘‘Nothing absolutecan be free from a universal co-existence, it is a non-sense thatsomething is and, at the same time, does stand in connection withno other thing, it is a non-sense that it is alone. Not only am I nosolus ipse, nothing absolute that we could think about is solus ipse.It is absolutely a non-sense.’’ (Hua XV, p. 371) Or ‘‘I cannot bewhat I am without the others who are for me; these others cannotbe without me. The intentional being of being implicated is thenecessity of the transcendental coexistence.’’ (Hua XV, p. 370)

From the perspective of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjec-tivity, there is no primordial sphere that is not inuenced by othersubjectivities. Therefore, the empathetic presentiation carried outby a subjectivity has always an intersubjective character.

2. Various kinds of objectifying intentionality that could be found inthe genetic primordial sphere could play the role of motivation forthe genesis of the empathetic presentiation. They could include theintentionality that posits a thing as my body and myself as a per-son, the intentionality that posits the resemblance between thebody of the other person and my body. However, one should notconfuse them with the intentionalities that play the role of thefoundation for the justication of the empathetic presentiation instatic phenomenology, since they have intersubjective characters,whereas it is not the case with the latter.

3. In contrast to the static primordial sphere, the genetic primordialone contains not only the objectifying intentionalities, but also thevarious kinds of non-objectifying intentionalities such as willing,

feeling, drive etc. This is due to the fact that the empathetic presen-tiation could be motivated by these non-objectifying intentional-ities. For example, the empathetic presentiation could be motivatedby the will in various ways. There are many such willings, forexample, the will to learn from the other, the will to inform theother, the will to love the other, etc. All these willings that are

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aimed at contacting the other persons can be called social willings.However, these willings are not the nal genetic motivations forthe empathetic presentiation. They are genetically motivated by the

intentionalities of the social drives and instincts38

as the geneticroots of the social willings.

It is the task of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity toclarify all the factors that could be found in the genetic primordialsphere and play the role of the genetic foundation for the empatheticpresentiation. Above I have dealt with only some of them, but thereare many other factors that should be claried in this respect. Forexample, one has to clarify the historical aspect of the genetic primor-dial sphere. In this context, it should be noted that the genetic pri-mordial sphere is an historical product. The historical aspect of thegenetic primordial sphere implies that the empathetic presentiationcarried out by an individual is historically conditioned. From the per-spective of the genetic phenomenology, the empathetic presentiation isalways carried out in a historical tradition. The way the empatheticpresentiation is carried out by an individual varies from cultural tra-dition to cultural tradition. 39

2.3. The Metaphysical Problem of Intersubjectivity

In Ideas I , with respect to the essential character of his phenomenol-ogy, Husserl writes: ‘‘If ‘positivism’ is tantamount to an absolutelyunprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the ‘positive’, that is to say,on what can be seized upon originaliter, then we are the genuine posi-tivists.’’ (Hua III/1, p. 45; Ideas I , p. 39) Due to the ‘‘positivistic’’character that Husserl attributes to his phenomenology, one might getthe impression that his phenomenology is antimetaphysical, and hasnothing to do with metaphysics. However, in this context, it shouldbe mentioned that phenomenology excludes only the groundless meta-physics of the past, and not metaphysics in general. Needless to saythat it is one of the most important tasks of phenomenology to prop-erly deal with metaphysical problems such as the problem of Being initself, the facticity of the transcendental life, the death, the fate, thehistory or the teleology of the transcendental genesis.

In his later phenomenology, Husserl grapples with metaphysicalproblems with increasing intensity and attempts to found a true meta-physics. Thereby transcendental phenomenology builds the so-calledspringboard to a true metaphysics that Husserl calls a ‘‘transcendental-phenomenologically founded metaphysics’’ (Manuscript B II 2, p. 23)or ‘‘a transcendental ‘metaphysics’’’ (Hua I, p. 171; CM , p. 144). It is

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an important task of Husserl’s phenomenology to rebuild a true meta-physics in place of the traditional one that has been decapitated by thephysicalistic positivism of the twentieth century. Phenomenological

metaphysics can be called the highlight of transcendental phenomenol-ogy. Just for this reason, according to ‘‘The Plan of ‘the System of Phe-nomenological Philosophy’ of Edmund Husserl’’ (Hua XV, p. XXXVI)sketched by Eugen Fink in 1931, ‘‘The Outlines of a PhenomenologicalMetaphysics’’ should be dealt with as the last step of a pure phenome-nology. Below, conning my discussion to the problem of transcenden-tal idealism, I would like to briey sketch some metaphysical problemsof intersubjectivity.

In Ideas I , formulating the basic thesis of phenomenological-tran-scendental idealism, Husserl tells us that the transcendental ego ‘‘nulla‘re’ indiget ad existendum’’ (‘‘that the transcendental ego, in order toexist, needs ‘nothing’’’) (Hua III/1, p. 104; Ideas I , 110). According tothis thesis, the transcendental ego, as the rst Being in itself, is theground of Being of the constituted world and, for its existence, needs‘nothing’, that is, neither the world nor the things in it. At the begin-ning stage of the static phenomenological analysis, the transcendentalego was conceived as a quasi-solipsistic one. A testimony to this factis ‘‘the illusion of a solipsism’’ (Hua I, p. 176; CM , p. 150) which willbe discussed in more detail below. However, through further phenom-enological analyses, both static and genetic, it could be revealed thatthere is no solipsistic ego. Corresponding to this discovery, the basicthesis of the phenomenological-transcendental idealism should bereformulated as follows: ‘‘The intrinsically rst being, the being thatprecedes and bears every worldly Objectivity, is transcendental inter-subjectivity: the universe of monads, which effects its communion in

various forms.’’(Hua I, p. 182; CM , p. 156)With the reformulation of the basic thesis of the phenomenologicaltranscendental idealism in his later phenomenology, Husserl attemptsto deepen and widen the idea of the totality of the monads. Forexample, the totality of the transcendental monads was conceived asincluding not only the monads of human beings, but also those of animals, plants and, even inorganic nature. 40 The deepening and wid-ening of the idea of the totality of the monads has caused the revela-tion of various new aspects of phenomenological-transcendentalidealism. At the same time, there arose various metaphysical problemsof intersubjectivity such as the following:

1. What is the relationship among the totality of the monads, theindividual monads and their constituted worlds?

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2. Are the totality of the monads and the individual monads mortalor immortal?

3. Is there a historicity or a teleology of the individual monads and

also of the totality of these monads?4. Is there God as the creator and preserver of the totality of the

monads?

3. Buberian Criticism of Husserl’s Phenomenology of IntersubjectivityReassessed

In his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, The-unissen overlooks the fact that Husserl deals not with one, but withvarious problems of intersubjectivity that should be clearly distin-guished from one another. For example, Theunissen tells us that‘‘Husserl is interested in intersubjectivity simply in connection withthe question concerning subjectivity and the world constituted init.’’ 41 From this statement, it is obvious that some assumptions aboutthe essential character of Husserl’s phenomenology have been madeby him. For example, he assumes that, for Husserl, who is interested

only in the transcendental-phenomenological problem of intersubjec-tivity, it would in principle be impossible to deal with the problems of intersubjectivity brought to light by the dialogical-philosophicaldestruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentional-ity. Furthermore, by ignoring the distinction between the static andthe genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, he assumes that thereis only one form of transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectiv-ity. Regarding these assumptions, which arise from lacking a clear

distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity, his criti-cisms of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be onthe mark. This matter will be discussed in more detail below.

In his criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenology as a solipsism, heoverlooks the distinction between the static and the genetic phenome-nology of intersubjectivity. This confusion does not allow him to fullygrasp the true meaning of the static phenomenology of intersubjectiv-ity. As mentioned before, the task of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity consists in the clarication of the foundation for the justication of the validity of the positing that the other is experi-enced by me as the other person. In order to fulll this task, thereecting ego must go back to his primordial sphere which can func-tion as the foundation for the justication of that validity. Since thisprimordial sphere is a realm that is valid only for the reecting ego,this methodical procedure might awaken the impression that Husserl’s

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phenomenology is a solipsistic one that ignores the intersubjectivedimension. Husserl even openly admits that his static phenomenologyof intersubjectivity may cause ‘‘the illusion of a solipsism’’(Hua I,

p. 176; CM , p. 150). However, this illusion is only the result of thefact that, in order to be responsible for all the validity-claims, thereecting ego should exclude all the inuences of the other subjectson him and go back to the static primordial sphere that is valid onlyfor him/her. It should be noted that this imperative of the static phe-nomenology holds not only for me, but also for everybody who hasto justify any kind of validity-claim and, for this reason, is able tobuild or take part in a society of research. This reference to the soci-ety of research can make the illusion of solipsism disappear. The sta-tic phenomenology of intersubjectivity has nothing to do with theposition that Husserl’s transcendental ego must be a solipsistic onethat has no desire for society and whose absoluteness means ‘‘anabsoluteness as an asocial’’.

It should be noted that, in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it is impossible for us even to observe the illusion of a solip-sism. In other words, the illusion of a solipsism has no place in thegenetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As discussed above, thegenetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity reveals that the geneticprimordial sphere is intersubjectively structured. For this reason, anytranscendental ego is inuenced by other transcendental egos and, atthe same time, has an inuence on them. From the standpoint of agenetic phenomenology, there cannot be a pure solipsistic ego. Firstof all, the existence of the social intentionalities that work incessantlyin the process of genetic constitution means that every transcendentalsubjectivity has various kinds of desire for other egos and for society.

In this respect, in an unpublished manuscript, Husserl depicts thegenetic constitution of the Life-World as follows: ‘‘However, as wealready know, it is constituted as a world for the society of this ego,as a world that has in itself human beings and, at the same time, isthe world for them. In his primitive instinct, every individual ego hashis entire development not as a solipsistic one, but as a developmentof the entire human being, as the development of whole transcenden-tal societies, the development of whole transcendental subjects.Implicitly, the ego bears all the others who can appear to him and alltheir works, the whole world as humanized, as a cultural world.’’(Manuscript A VI 34, p. 37)

Neither the static nor the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectiv-ity can be determined as a solipsism. The criticism of Husserl’s phe-nomenology of intersubjectivity as a solipsism has been caused partlyby the fact that Husserl did not make a clear distinction between the

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static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I believe thatHusserl was fully conscious of this fact. In this context, he tells usthat ‘‘if one has grasped the essential meaning of my description, one

would have raised the objection of solipsism not as an objectionagainst the phenomenological idealism, but only as an objectionagainst the imperfect character of my description’’ (Hua V, p. 151,translation mine).

Now, I would like to focus on Theunissen’s destructive criticism of Husserl’s transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. Theun-issen’s criticism results from lacking a clear distinction among the var-ious problems of intersubjecitivity. His criticism of Husserl’sphenomenology of intersubjectivity that it can deal only with thesphere of the It but is unable to touch upon the sphere of the Thou,results from confusing the ontological with the transcendental-phe-nomenological problem of intersubjectivity. The other as an It as wellas a Thou is a fact that can be given to us in the natural attitude andit is the task of the phenomenological ontology of intersubjectivity toclarify the essential structure of the other as the It as well as the otheras Thou. Without qualication, phenomenology admits that, accord-ing to the way I make contact with the other, I can experience him/her as an It or as a Thou. Phenomenology is not, as Theunisseninsists, a philosophy that is governed by the will to rule and, there-fore, admits the other only as an It. Like Buber, Husserl acknowl-edges that, in the dialogical sphere which stands for the immediacybetween persons, the other can appear to us as a Thou. In this sense,he writes: ‘‘Thereby, the other souls appear to me in a totally differ-ent way as things. Things appear to me as mere objects, the souls ap-pear to me as persons who address me or whom I address, as my

lovers or those who love me. I don’t live isolated, I live, with them, acommon and united life.’’ (Hua XIII, p. 92) In fact, in a later manu-script from 1930s, Husserl attempts to analyze ‘‘the socieity of the Iand the Thou’’ (die ‘‘Ich-Du-Gemeinschaft’’) (Hua XV, p. 476). Of course, it is an important task of an ontological phenomenology of the other to determine properly the concept of the ‘‘immediacy’’ thatTheunissen talks about to characterize the givenness of the other as aThou.

Since the other as an It or as a Thou has its ontological structure,it is denitely possible to make a transcendental-philosophical investi-gation concerning him/her. This can be carried out in a static and agenetic way. In this case, the other as an It or as a Thou can provideus the transcendental clue with respect to which we can inquire intothe condition of the possibility for its givenness. Through this kind of investigation, it would be possible for us to reveal various kinds of

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intentionality that function as the motivations for the experience of the other as an It or as a Thou. We can do the transcendentalresearch not only of the Thou in an improper sense, but also of the

Thou in a proper sense, as well as the Thou as a Mystery or God.Needless to say that, in this context, intentionality as the motivationfor the experience of the other in various forms should not, as Theun-issen believes, be identied with the will to rule. 42 Of course, the willto rule is a kind of intentionality, but there are many other forms of intentionality that cannot be categorized as a will to rule, i.e., the atti-tude in which I meet the other as an individual Thou. Another exam-ple is the vague feeling (die Ahnung) with which I meet the EternalThou or God as a Mystery. This would be a kind of intentionality inthe wider sense. In this context, it should be noted that, in Husserl’slater phenomenology, the concept of intentionality in his Logical Investigations or Ideas I , as ‘‘the property of referring to somethingobjective’’ that can be found in a group of experience, has been chan-ged to a great measure. 43

In his destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality that enabled Theunissen to nd out gradually threekinds of the Thou, he assumes that, being conned to the research of the sphere of the It, phenomenology is, in principle, unable to clarifythe structure of the Thou in the above three senses. Contrary to thisassumption, it has been shown earlier that the Thou in these threesenses can be the theme of the phenomenological ontology of theother as well as of the transcendental phenomenology of the other. Inthis context, I would like to emphasize that the individual Thou in aproper sense and the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery are impor-tant themes of the phenomenological metaphysics of the other. It

should be noted that the totality of the transcendental subjectivity orof the transcendental World, as a bearing ground for the constitutedworld, can be determined as a world that is not yet objectied and,for this reason, can be dened as nothing. Therefore, Husserl’s tran-scendental subjectivity turns out to be something that is similar toTheunissen’s individual Thou in a proper sense, although the term‘‘Thou’’ is never used.

Furthermore, in Husserl’s phenomenology, the idea of the totalityof monads is closely related to the idea of God. God means for Hus-serl the nal ground of the Being of the totality of monads and corre-sponds to Buber’s Eternal Thou. Thus, nally, the transcendentalphenomenology of intersubjectivity ends in a theology, as it is thecase with Buber’s philosophy of dialog. In this sense, Husserl charac-terizes transcendental phenomenology as ‘‘a way to God withoutconfession of faith’’ (Manuscript E III 10, p. 18). The process of

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gradual development of the ontology of intersubjectivity, then, thetranscendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity and, nally, itsmetaphysics formally corresponds to the process of Theunissen’s

destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentional-ity. Deepening the transcendental phenomenology of the other into itsmetaphysics, Husserl also attempts to carry out a destruction of themodel of intentionality developed in Logical Investigations or Ideas I,a destruction similar to that which was striven for in the philosophyof dialog.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this was presented at a Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy at SUNY at Buffalo, N.Y. (October 4, 1999), at a Colloquium orga-nized by the Hong Kong Society for Phenomenology (February 16, 2000), and atthe 31st Annual Meeting of the Husserl-Circle in Seattle, Washington (June 21– 24, 2000). I thank Professors K.-K. Cho, C. F. Cheung and B. Hopkins for theirkind invitations to the colloquiums and the meeting.

2. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations , tr. J. N. Findlay. 2 vols. London: Routl-edge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

3. M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie , in: M. Scheler, Gesammelte Werke ,vol. 7, Bern: Francke, 1973, p. 211. (translation mine)4. M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, pp. 211–228.5. E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic , tr. D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1978, p. 243. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbre-viation Logic .

6. M. Theunissen, Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977; M. Theunissen, The Other. Studies in theSocial Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, tr. C. Macann, Cam-bridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1984. In this article, the German original and the

English translation will respectively be referred to with the abbreviation Theunis-sen-G and Theunissen. In some passages, I have slightly modied the Englishtranslation.

7. Theunissen-G, p. 23; Theunissen, p. 21.8. Theunissen-G, p. 23; Theunissen, p. 21.9. Theunissen-G , p. 278; Theunissen , p. 291.

10. M. Buber, I and Thou , tr. R. G. Smith, Edinburgh: T&T, 1994. In this article,this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Buber .

11. Theunissen-G , p. 261; Theunissen , p. 273.12. Theunissen-G , p. 261; Theunissen , p. 272.

13. Theunissen-G , p. 261; Theunissen , p. 273.14. Theunissen-G , p. 262; Theunissen , p. 274.15. Theunissen-G , p. 264; Theunissen , p. 276.16. Theunissen-G , p. 264; Theunissen , p. 276.17. Theunissen-G , p. 279; Theunissen , p. 292.18. Buber , p. 15, cf. Theunissen-G , p. 278; Theunissen , p. 291.19. Theunissen-G , p. 343.

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20. Theunissen-G , p. 343.21. Buber , p. 17.22. Theunissen-G , p. 343. (translation mine)23. Buber , p. 50, Theunissen-G , p. 346.24. Buber , p. 104.25. In this article, Husserl’s works published in the Husserliana series will be referred

to with the abbreviation Hua and the number of the volume.26. B. Erdmann, Wissenschaftliche Hypothesen u ¨ ber Leib und Seele , Ko ln: Dumon-

Schauberg, 1907. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbrevia-tion Erdmann . Husserl deals with Erdmann’s theory of inference by analogy inHua XIII, pp. 36–38.

27. Th. Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologie , Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909. In thisarticle, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Lipps . Husserl dealswith Lipps’ theory of empathy in Hua XIII, pp. 70–76.

28. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations , tr. D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nij-hoff, 1973. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation CM .

29. ‘‘The appresentation of another original sphere’’ is a kind of presentiation that iscalled empathy.

30. I have dealt with the problem of the distinction between static phenomenology andgenetic phenomenology in Nam-In Lee, Edmund Husserls Pha ¨ nomenologie der Insti-nkte , Dordrecht/Boston/Londong: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 17–30and Nam-In Lee, ‘‘Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Con-cept of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation ,’’ in: Husserl Studies18/3 (2002), pp. 165–183. The distinction between static phenomenology and genet-ic phenomenology as two different kinds of transcendental phenomenology is animportant topic and, at the same time, a very controversial issue in Husserl’s laterphenomenology after 1920s. One can nd Husserl’s attempts to make a distinctionbetween them in various texts and, rst of all, in the following texts: Hua XI, pp.336–345 (English translation: ‘‘Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method.’’Trans. by A. Steinbock, in Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pp. 135–142);Hua XIV, pp. 34–42 (English translation: ‘‘The Phenomenology of Monadic Indi-viduality and the Phenomenology of the General Possibilities and Compossibilitiesof Lived-Experiences: Static and Genetic Phenomenology.’’ Trans. by A. Steinbock,in Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pp. 143–152); Hua XV, 613–627. Seealso M. J. Larrabee, ‘‘Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology,’’ in: Man and World 9/2 (1976), pp. 163–174; D. Welton, The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Studyof the Threshold of Husserlian Phenomenology , The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983;D. Welton, ‘‘Structure and Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology,’’ in: Husserl:Expositions and Appraisals . By F. A. Elliston/P. Mc Cormick, Notre Dame: Univer-sity of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 54–69; A. Steinbock, Home and Beyond. Gener-ative Phenomenology after Husserl , Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995;A. Steinbock, ‘‘Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology: Translator’s Intro-duction to Two Essays,’’ in: Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pp. 127–134.

31. Compare Nam-In Lee, ‘‘Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-PhenomenologicalConcept of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation ,’’ in: Husserl Studies 18/3 (2002), pp. 170–172.

32. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenome-nological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenol-ogy, tr. F. Kersten, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1982. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Ideas I .

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33. The term ‘‘die Genesisfundierung’’ is my coinage. Even though Husserl does notuse the term, it is legitimate and even necessary to use it as a concept that is dis-tinguished from the ‘‘Geltungsfundierung. In fact, Husserl claims that ‘‘the gene-sis of the meaning of the higher level of being’’ (Hua XV, 615) is not an issue of the static phenomenology that aims to clarify the ‘‘Geltungsfundierung.’’ Thegenesis of every kind of meaning is the issue of the genetic phenomenology thataims to clarify the ‘‘Genesisfundierung.’’

34. The process of the justication for the experience of the other as a person couldbe understood, at the same time, as a process of the justication for the experi-ence of the other as a transcendental subjectivity, since there is a parallelism be-tween the person as a mundane subjectivity and the transcendental subjectivity.

35. I have dealt with the genetic primordial sphere in section 3: ‘‘The genetic-phe-nomenological concept of primordiality’’ of the article on ‘‘Static-Phenomenologi-cal and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserl’s FifthCartesian Meditation. ’’

36. I have dealt with the difference between them in Nam-In Lee, ‘‘Static-Phenome-nological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserl’sFifth Cartesian Meditation .’’ There I made a distinction between the pre-ideal ge-netic and the ideal genetic primordial sphere, but below I take into account onlythe pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere and compare it with the primordial sphereof the static phenomenology.

37. Cf. D. Zahavi, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivita ¨ t , Dordrecht/Bos-ton/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 53–70. Zahavi talks about ‘‘theintersubjective subjectivity’’ (die intersubjektive Subjektivita t).

38. In this context, Husserl talks about social instincts (‘‘soziale Instinkte,’’ Manu-script A V, p. 134) or intersubjective instincts (‘‘intersubjektive Instinkte,’’ Manu-script E III 9, p. 18).

39. With respect to the close relationship between history and genesis, Husserl writesas follows: ‘‘As something that has already been humanized, it [the world] ex-presses continually its previous genesis. Human being [...] is being in a continuallyliving history and being in the sedimentary history that, as such, always has anew historical face, from which the genesis has to be examined, to be ques-tioned.’’ (Als schon humanisierte dru ckt sie besta ndige fru here Genesis aus.Menschliches Dasein [...] ist Sein in besta ndiger lebendiger Geschichte und Sein insedimentiereter Geschichte, die als das ihr immer neues historisches Gesicht hat,dem die Genesis anzusehen, dem sie abzufragen ist.’’ (Hua XV, p. 391)

40. In a later manuscript, Husserl talks about ‘‘the endlessness of the layers of theanimate monads, of the monad of the animal, of the pre-animal’’(die Unend-lichkeit der Stufen von animalischen Monaden, der tierischen, der vortierischen)(Hua XV, p. 595). With respect to the monad of inorganic nature, he writes asfollows: ‘‘Nature before all kinds of organism, ‘nature before the genesis of theconsciousness’ means then reality before every kind of awakened consciousness,before all the appearance of nature in the real monads. It means that all the mo-nads were in the sleeping state, in the state of the ‘involution’.’’ (Natur vor allenOrganismen. ‘Natur vor dem Auftreten des Bewußtseins’ besagt dann Wir-klichkeit vor allem ‘wachen’ Bewußtsein, vor aller Natur-Erscheinung innerhalbder wirklichen Monaden. Es besagt, daß alle Monaden im Schlummerzustande, indem der ‘Involution’ sich befanden.’’) (Manuscript B II 2, p. 14). I have dealtwith this problem in Nam-In Lee, Edmund Husserls Pha ¨ nomenologie der Instinkte ,pp. 225–230.

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41. Theunissen-G , p. 257; Theunissen , p. 269.42. Theunissen identies Husserlian intentionality with the will to rule others. But

Husserl does not identify intentionality with the will to rule others. For him,there are various other kinds of intentionality that do not fall under the categoryof the will to rule others.

43. I have dealt with this problem in: Nam-In Lee, Edmund Husserls Pha ¨ nomenologieder Instinkte , pp. 31–37.

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intersubjetividade buber husserl ok impr

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