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Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Vol. 9, pp. 623-630, 1985. Ankh o International Inc . Printed in the U.S.A. 0149-7634/85 $3.00 + .00

A n i m a l C o g n i t i o n a s t h e P r a x i s t Vi e w s I t

R O B E R T E P S T E I N

Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies, 1! Ware Street, Cambridge, MA 02138and Department o f Psychology, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003

EPSTEIN, R.Animal cognition as the praxist views t. NE UR OS CI BIOB EH AV REV 9(4) 623-630, 1985.--The distinc-tion between psycho logy and praxics p rovides a clear answe r to the question o f animal cognition. As Griffin and othershave noted, the kinds of behavioral pheno men a that lead psycholog ists to speak of cognition in humans are also observ ed innonhu man animals, and therefore those w ho are convinced o f the legitimacy o f psycho logy should not hesitate to speak ofand to attemp t to stud y animal cognition. The be havior of organisms is also a legitimate subject ma tter, and praxics, thestudy o f behavior, has led to significant adv ances in ou r understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psych ologists tospeak o f cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attem pt by students of behavior to appropriate psy cholog y has been

misguided. G enerativity theory is an example of a formal the ory of behavior that has prov ed useful both in the engineeringof intelligent perform ances in no nhum an animals and in the prediction of intelligent performance s in humans.

Praxics Generativity theo ry Insight Behaviorism Cognition Problem solving

A N I M A L c o g n i t i o n a s th e p r a x i s t v i e w s i t i s t h e s u b j e c tma t te r o f ano th e r f ie ld . Tha t f ie ld is ca l ledpsychology, at e r m d e r i v e d f r o m t h e G r e e k"psyche," which or ig ina l lym e a n t " b r e a t h " a n d c a m e t o m e a n " s p i r i t " o r " m i n d . "Co g n i t i o n i s a l s o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f a r e c e n t, s o m e w h a ti n f o rm a l , a m a l g a m o f d i s c ip l i n e s c a l le d " c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e , "a n d i t h a s a ls o b e e n o f c o n c e r n t o s o m e r e s e a r c h e r s i n e t h o l -o g y, a n t h r o p o l o g y, s o c i o l o g y, a n d o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s .

P s y c h o l o g y is m i n d ' s h o m e , h o w e v e r , a n d f o r m o r e r e a-s o n s t h a n e t y m o l o g y. Y e t i n n o fi e ld h a s t h e s t u d y o f m i n db e e n m o r e s t r e n u o u s l y c h a l l e n g e d . H o w c a n t h i s b e ? H o wc o u l d t h e s t u d y o f m i n d h a v e b e e n c h a l l e n g e d i n t h e v e r yf ie ld tha t was e s tab l i shed to s tudy i t?

I n t hi s e s s a y I r e v i e w s o m e o f th e e v e n t s t h a t l e d m a n yp s y c h o l o g i s t s t o c h a l l e n g e a n d , i n d e e d , t o a t t e m p t t o fo r b i dt h e s t u d y o f m i n d . I c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s w e r em i s g u i d e d a n d t h a t t h e y w e r e d e s t r u c t i v e i n s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s.T h e f a c t t h a t p s y c h o l o g y c o n f e r e n c e s a r e s t il l c o n v e n e d w i t ht i tl e s li k e "T h e Q u e s t i o n o f A n i m a l Co g n i t i o n " - - t h e t i tl e o ft h e c o n f e r e n c e t h a t s e t th e o c c a s i o n f o r t h is p a p e r - - s h o w sh o w d e s t r u c t i v e t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s h a v e b e e n . T h e f a c t t h a tt h e w o r d " m i n d " h a s b e e n re p l a c ed b y a n a w k w a r d o n e w i t hthree sy l lab le s - - - tha t even menta l i s t s a re r e luc tan t to use thel a n gu a g e o f m e n t a l i s m - - s h o w s t h e p o w e r o f th e s e c h a l-lenges . The f ac t tha t Gr i f f in [23 ,24] , Roi tb la t [39] , Premacka n d W o o d r u f f [ 3 8] , G a l l u p [ 2 2] , a n d o t h e r s h a v e h a d t o l a b o ri n r e c e n t y e a r s t o c o n v i n c e t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s o f w h a t , i n e f-f e c t , i s o b v i o u s - - - a n d t h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n a t t a c k e d f o r d o i n gs o - - s u g g e s t s t h a t c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e s t u d y o f m i n d m a y h a v er e t a r d e d i t s a d v a n c e .

E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , c o n t r o v e r s y i n p s y c h o l o g y h a s i m -p e d e d t h e g r o w t h o f a n o t h e r d i s c ip l i n e, t h e s t u d y o f b e h a v -i o r. S o m e p s y c h o l o g i s t s , a s w e l l a s i n v e s t i g a t o r s i n o t h e rf i e l d s , h a v e n o t b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h m i n d b u t r a t h e r w i t hb e h a v i o r f o r i ts o w n s a k e . T h e y h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t hq u e s t i o n s s u c h a s : H o w i s t h e b e h a v i o r o f o rg a n i s m s , h u m a na n d o t h e r w i s e , d e t e r m i n e d b y g e n e s , n u t r it i o n , d r u g s , s l e e p

depr iva t ion , ope ran t and c la ss ica l condi t ion ing , mode l ing ,n e u r a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s , a n d s o o n ? I s b e h a v i o r p r e d i c t a b l e ,a n d , i f s o , w h a t p r i n c ip l e s d o w e n e e d t o p r e d i c t i t?

A d v a n c e s i n t h e s t u d y o f b e h a v i o r h a v e b e e n s i g n i f ic a n ti n m a n y d o m a i n s o f s t u d y. I n p a r t ic u l a r , a d v a n c e s i n w h a t Ica l l gene ra t iv i ty theory have shed l igh t on the o r ig ins o fs o m e o f th e b e h a v i o r s t h a t l e a d p s y c h o l o g i s t s t o m a k e i n f e r -e n c e s a b o u t m i n d .

I n s p i te o f r e a l a d v a n c e s i n b o t h t h e s t u d y o f m i n d a n d t h es t u d y o f b e h a v i o r , i n v e s t i g a t o r s i n e a c h d i s c i p li n e h a v es h o w n a n a l m o s t p a t h o l o g i c a l i n t o l e r a n c e o f t h e o t h e r d i s ci -p l i n e . W h y ?

I h a v e b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h i s q u e s t i o nb e c a u s e , a f e w y e a r s a g o , m y r e s e a r c h t h r u s t m e i n t o t h ev o r t e x o f a n i n t e n s e d e b a t e . T h o u g h i t b e g a n 4 0 y e a r s b e f o r eI was bo rn , the in tens i ty o f the c r i t ic i sms leve led aga ins t m yw o r k s o m e t i m e s m a d e m e f e e l a s i f I w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r th ee n t i r e c o n t r o v e r s y. I t b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t t o m et o h a v e d o n e w i t h th i s c o n t r o v e r s y b e c a u s e , w h e n I w a s n ' tr e e n a c t i n g o l d d e b a t e s , I s e e m e d t o b e m a k i n g s i g n i f i c a n td iscove r ie s abo ut the o r ig ins o f in te l ligen t behavior. As thed a t a a c c u m u l a t e d a n d a t h e o r y b e g a n t o t a k e s h a p e , t h e w o r ks e e m e d m o r e a n d m o r e t o j u s t i fyitself. So w h y, I a s k e d , w a sI s p e n d i n g s o m u c h t i m e a t t a c k i n g c o g n i t i v i s t s ? A n d w h y,e spec ia l ly, d id I have to spen d an y t ime a t a l l jus t i fy ing thes t u d y o f b e h a v i o r ?

I a m h a p p y t o r e p o r t t h a t I h a v e n o w r e s o l v e d t h e s e q u e s -t i o n s c o m p l e t e l y - - a t l e a s t t o m y o w n s a t i s f a c t i o n . We a r ea l l unwi t t ing p laye r s , I now be l ieve , in a cur ious d rama tha tmad e i t s debu t in 1905 and tha t has been p lay ing mo re or le ssc o n t i n u o u s l y e v e r s i n c e . T h e s t a g e h a d b e e n s e t l o n g a g o . A si s o ft e n t h e c a s e o n Br o a d w a y, t h e s t a r s o f t h e f'w st p e r f o r m -a n c e s w e r e c h a r i s m a t i c ; s t a n d - i n s a n d r e p l a c e m e n t s w e r eo f t e n m e r e t e c h n i c i a n s . T h e p l o t w a s a b s u r d .

ACT ONE: THE PROHIBITIONAGAINSTMIND

A g e n e t i c i st m a k e s h i s w a y t h r o u g h t h e a u g u s t h a l l s o f t h e

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Zoology Building at his university. He stops at the office ofthe chairperson and demands an audience with her. He tellsher that genetics has a lot to contribute to zoology and thathe wants an office and laboratory space in her department.She is surprised but intrigued by his.style, his enthusiasm,and the force of his arguments. He tells her that problems ofclassification in zoology could be handled in a more sophisti-cated and objective way by genetics and, indeed, that theproper s u b j e c t m a t t e rof zoology is genes. The ch airperso n ison her guard. Finally, the geneticist tells her that he insistson assuming the chairmanship of the Zoology Departmentimmediately. She throws him out of her office.

I offer an exegesis: The geneticist, our protagonist, was apathetic figure. He was sincere in his mission, but he was notin good touch with reality. He may have been right, but rightis never enough. He made some progress, if only briefly, inhis attempt to depose a foreign monarch, but he was destinedto fail. The monarch was merely a symbol of the larger in-stitution, and institutions resist radical change; at best, theyjust grow old. The drama was a tragedy, because theprotago nist was, in effect, killed. Zoolog y survived, fr ee tostumble forward in its own way, with or without genetics.Reality triumphed.

Psychology was not so fortunate. The plot started out thesame~and it would surely have had the same ending---butthen, like in T h e P u r p le R o s e o f C a i r owhen one of the char-acters jumped off the movie screen, the story ground to ahalt halfway through Act Two.

P s y c h o l o g y

Since its earliest history, long before formal departmentsexisted, psycholo gy had always been, as the Oxford Eng l i shDic t iona ry recorded, "Th e science of the nature, functions,and phenomena of the human soul or mind," or, as Boring[2] stated, the study of "the generalized, human, normal,adult mind " (p. x). Wo lff and Ha rtley had defined it so in the1700s, following a tradition of inquiry that can be traced tothe ancient Greeks. The In'st formal investigations were allconcerned with mind: those of Fechner, Wundt, James, Eb-binghaus, Mueller, and so on. E ven Morgan 's Canon, whichwas later misinterpreted by the behaviorists as a condemna-tion of the study o f mind, was a prescription for simplicity inthe study of mind [8].

But, in 1905, in his P r i m e r o f P h y s io l o g i c al P s y c h o l o g y[29], the English psychologist, William McDougall, chal-lenged the traditional definition of psychology. As he laterwrote [451:

Up to the end of the last century and beyond it, psycholo-gists did in the main concentrate their attention upon theintrospectively observable facts, unduly neglecting the factsof human action or behaviour, and ignoring the need for someadequate theory of behaviour and of character . . . This neg-lect is implied in the definition of psych olog y comm only ac-cepted at that time, namely, the "scienc e of consci ousne ss" . . ( p . 5 4 ) .

The possibility of a new science was in their air aroundthe turn of the century, as McDougail [45] noted. In the1800s, the philosopher John Stuart Mill [35], had proposedthe establishment of a "science of the formation of charac-ter," which he labeled "ethology" (modern ethology is notrelated). Somewhat later, the L ondon physician, Charles A.Mercier [33], proposed that a science o f behavior be estab-

lished, called "praxiology." The French philosopher Es-pinas [19,20] made similar proposals. In biology, twozoologists, Parker and Haswell [37], laid some of the foun-dations of modern behavioral biology in a textbook theypublished in 1897; there, they redefined "et holo gy" as "therelation of the organism to its environment."

But McDougall [45], the first of our two protagonists,took a different approach:

.. it seemed to me that both Mill and Mercier were in error:that what was needed was not a new science of behaviourunder a new Greek name, but rather a r e f o rm o f p s y c h o l o g y[italics adde d], consis ting of greate r attention to the facts o fbehaviour or conduct . . . . I gave expression to this view inmy first book, by proposing to define psychology as the pos-itive science of conduct. I further defended this reform in myIn t roduc t ion to Soc i a l Psycho logy(1908) [30]. And in 1912 1published my little book entitled Psycho logy, t he S tudy q fB e h a v i o r [31]. (pp. 57-58)

Enter, stage right, an even more luminous star: JohnBroadus Watson. In 1913, Watson turned the quest for a

science of behavior into a m o v e m e n t in psychology. Like allgood movements, its name even had an - i sm attached to it:behav io r i sm. Note that behaviorism was nota name for thestudy of behavior; nor was it the name for a branch of phi-losophy. I t w a s t h e n a m e o f a m o v e m e n t t o c h a n g e p s y c h o l-ogy. Watson's seminal works on the subject~for example,"Ps ychol ogy as the Behaviorist Views It" [43] and Psycho l -o g y f r o m t h e S t a n d p o i n t o f a B e h a vi o r i st[44]---wereprescriptions for such change

Watson [43] stated the case even more extremely thanMcDougall had. Not only was psychology to adopt a newsubject matter, but its old subject matter was n o w f i w b i d d e n :

The time seems to have come when psychology must discardall reference to consciousness, when it need no longer delude

itself into thinking that it is making mental states the objectof observation. We have becom e so enmeshed in speculativequestions concerning the elements of mind [and] the natureof conscious co nt en t. ., that I, as an experimental student,feel that something is wrong with our premises . . . . I be-lieve we can write a psychology, define it as [the science ofbehavior], and nev er go back upon our def'mition: never usethe terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, in-trospec tively verifiable, imagery, and the like . . . . (pp.1 6 3 - 1 6 6 )

Following the scenario we developed earlier, Watsonshould now have been thrown out o f someone' s office. But,instead, in 1915, just two yea rs after his seminal paper onbehaviorism, he was elected President o f the American Psy-chological Association. (A few years later, he was indeedthrown out of Johns Hopkins University and, in effect, out ofacademe, but on a matter of moral turpitude.)

Wats on was an extre mely visible and influential man. Hisstriking personal appearance, his flamboyant personal style,and his forceful writing made him succeed where otherswould have failed. The Ze i tge i s t helped: Watson promisedthat the new psychology would lead to many practical appli-cations, and, as I have already mentioned, the possibility of ascience of behavior was in the air.

Other psychologists took up Watson's cry, or at leastsome variation on it. Skinner, Kuo, Hull, Meyer, Toiman,Guthrie, Hunter, Lashley, Schneirta, Lehrman, and othersfought the behaviorist battle. Like the Japanese holdouts


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found on some South Pacific islands years after the end ofWorld War II, some are still fighting.

But the war was lost long ago. Less than three percent ofthe membership of the APA identifies itself openly with thebehavioristic tradition, and that percentage is declining. TheA PA M o n i t o rruns nearly 100 advertisements a year for aca-demic positions in the stud y of cognition and only one or twoa year for positions in the study of behavior. Behaviorallaboratories tend to be small-scale affairs these days, andsome have shut down for lack of funding. Post-doctoralpositions are rare. As things stand today, a behavioristicflag-waver would hardly be elected president of the APA.

Though the behavioristic movement was influential forabout three decades, the study of mind held its own, and, inthe 1950s, with the advent o f computers and the alliancesthat were formed between psychologists, linguists, computerscientists, and philosophers, the study of mind began toflourish as it never had before.

And so, it seems to me, it should be. Behaviorism--as amovement in psyc holo gy-- was an aberration.

ACT TWO: THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR

It is unfortunate that the scientific study of behavior waslaunched with an ism. An effort to establish new programsand departments would surely have been more successful inthe long run than the movement to redirect existing depart-ments. But behaviorism, as a movement, was more than auseless exercise. Its primary mission, the appropriation ofpsychology, was not achieved, but it made at least threemajor contributions.

First, it convinc ed many people that the study of behavi orq u a behavior was a legitimate enterprise, and, indeed, scoresof behavioral laboratories were established right under theskeptical eyes of traditional psychologists.

Second, it created an almost fanatical concern with ob-jectivit y in psycholo gy proper. Ktilpe [27] had criticized thecognitive research of his day in part because it was difficultto replicate, but modern experiments on cognition are usu-ally easy to replicate and elegantly designed. Methodolog-ically, at least, every psychologist became a behaviorist [1].

And third, the movement itself evolved into a school ofphilosophy, which is today the proper referent of the word"behaviorism." One of the foremost philosophers in theworld, W. V. Quine, considers himself a member of thisschool, as do Skinner, Day, and other prominent psycholo-gists.

That be havior is a legitimate subject matter is undeniable.Even cognitive scientists do not deny it (they do object toattacks on their field, as indeed they should). But Watson putthe study of behavior on a steep and thorny road. The studyof behavior, which some now call p r a x i c s [7]---a blend of"physics" and " ' p r a x i s , " the Greek word for "behavior"--has not yet seen its day for a rather mundane reason: It wasestablished in the wrong academic department.

Act Two, the formation of a comprehensive, naturalisticscience of the behavior o f organisms, has been in limbo for along time. Rather than continue the advance, we act out oldbattles. The old actors replace themselves with trustedgraduate students, who bring new vigor to the roles. "Thestudy of mind is objectionable be ca us e. .. " "The study ofbehavior is the true subject matter of psyche-oiogybe ca us e. .. " "We deserve space and resources in yourfield because . . .'" The students merely complete the sen-tences.

Because pra xists have tried to function in psyc holog y de-

partments, they have had relatively little contact with scien-tists in kindred fields: behavioral genetics, ecology, ethol-ogy, evolutionary biology, and those areas of physiology andanatomy that are concerned with behavior. Praxics pro-grams, if indeed such programs finally evolve, should in-clude scientists from these fields and others. The behavio r oforganisms is probably the most complicated subject matterscience has ever considered. A comprehensive science ofbehavior must consider all o f the variables of which behavioris a function: genes, conditioning, drugs, neurophysioiogyand anatomy, sleep deprivation, physical trauma, modeling,and so on.

At a retirement dinner a few years ago, Skinner proposeda unique solution to the mind-body problem (caught as theyare in the middle of Act Two, psychologists are, sad to say,still concer ned with this problem). On one side o f a long stripof cloth he had attached various symbols for spirit or mind:the Greek letter psi, the Star of David, the Cross, and theCrescent. On the other side he had attached symbols forbody: the brain, the heart, and, he said, " cour tesy of theAlka Seltzer Company," the stomach. His solution was totwist one end of the strip 180 degrees and then to attac h thetwo ends. He now had a one-sided figure, a M6bius Strip. Atlast, mind and body were one.

I propose a more realistic, yet equally simple, solution tothe mind-body problem: t w o d e p a r t m e n t s .

I have presented elsewhere a variety of arguments fordrawing a distinction between behaviorism and the study ofbehavior and for separating praxics from psychology [7]. Tosummarize, behaviorism should be distinguished from thestudy of behavior because: (a) No laborator y science shouldbe constrained by a formal school of philosophy. The rangeof variables and topics that behavioral psychologists haveinvestigated has been limited unn ecessari ly by the ism. (b)Praxics laboratories should be open to nonbehaviorists. Onecan discover interesting things about the determinants o f be-havior no matter what one's opinion are about feelings,mind, or free will. (c) Confusion between the sc ience and theism in the public eye has cost the science credibility andfunding. The ism is, understandably, unattractive to Ameri-cans, but the science makes none of the unattractive asser-tions of the ism. Moreover, millions of people have bene-fitted substantially from contributions the science has madeto pharmacology, medicine, therapy, education, business,and industry. Appreciation for the science may finally comewhen it is distinguished from the ism.

Praxics must go free of psychol ogy because: (a) Psychol-ogy has a terrible public image, which is largely deserv ed. (b)"Ps ycho logy " is an inappropriate name for the study of be-havior. (c) The concept of mind and the interest people havein it are in no danger of disappearing. (d) The takeover at-tempt was inappropriate to begin with, and the debate hasaccompli shed nothing . (e) A split will likely mean new re-sources for both parties. (f) The establishment of an inde-pendent science of behavior will allow behavioral psycholo-gists to realign themselves with the biological sciences. (g)The new sc ience will also mean the fulfillment o f a dreammany biologists have shared: the creation of a comprehen-sive behavioral biology. (h) The new science would provideenormous benefits to society.

GENERATIVITY THEORY

My own research has led in recent years to what I callgenerativity theoryma formal theory of the determinants ofongoing behavior. Traditional theories of behavior--often


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called "learning theories"--have dealt with either the ac-quisition or the maintenance of behavior. Theories of acqui-sition have dealt with the manner in which new behavior istaught, for example, by classical conditioning, operant con-ditioning, or modeling. Theories of maintenance have dealtwith how previously established behavior is maintained overtime, for example, by various schedules of reinforcement.

Theories of this kind were criticized by K6hler,Chomsky, and others on the grounds that a great deal ofbehavior is "generative" or "productive." Virtually everysenten ce we write or speak is new. Whe n we solve problems ,draw, dance, or cook a new dish, we behave as we neverhave before. Indeed, when you look at behavior closelyenough, you find that organisms n e v e r do the same thingtwice. The most salient characteristic o f behavior outside o fthe laboratory is that it is ever changing and ever novel.Theories of acquisition or maintenance cannot dealadequately with ongoing behavior in the natural environ-ment.

The very concept of the operant belies both the fluidityand novelty of ongoing behavior, as Skinner himself has oc-casionally noted (e.g., Skinner, quoted in Evans [21], pp.20--21; Skinner [40,41]). After all, in order for you to rein-force some response, it must first appear. B u t w h e r e d o e s t h ef i r s t r e s p o n s e c o m e f r o m ? T h econcept of the operant shedsno light.

Skinner [41] acknowledged that ongoing behavior wasfluid and probabilistic, but he believed that the probab ility ofongoing behavior could not be assessed directly. He offeredthe construct "response strength" as a substitute forprobability and then made what has long been regarded ashis greatest contribution to the study of behavior: Hesuggested that the ra te at which an organism repeats someresponse could be used as a measure o f the strength of thatresponse. Science, he said, must always have some "recur-ring unit" with which to work. In this case the unit was theresponse; its rate was a measure of its strength, and strength,in turn, was at least related to probability.

Generativity theory, in contrast, allows us to estimateprobability directly and, indeed, to predict alay number o fbehaviors continuously in time in novel environments. Thetheory may be summarized briefly as follows: Previouslyestablished behaviors manifest themselves in new situationsto produce new behaviors; I call this assertion the principleof novelty. The process by which old behaviors become newones is called t r ansfo rma t ion , and the equations that predictsuch changes are called t r ansfo rma t ion func t ions .

At present, the theory utilizes four such functions, eachof which represents some known behavioral phenomenonthat has been studied empirically: reinforcement, extinction,resurgence, and automatic chaining. In other words, unlikemany theories of mind, generativity theory does not r efer toany constructs and does not make use of any metaphors.

Each o f the equations is linear, of the form of Bush andMosteller's [4] linear operator model of learning. The fourmay be considered simple principles of covariation (cf.[26,42]) in which the fh'st two describe changes in theprobability of some behavior as a function of consequentialevents in the environment. The others describe changes inthe probability of some behavior as a function of the occur-rence of other behaviors emitted by the organism.

That is to say, at any point in time the probability of somebehavior may increase o r decrease as a function of an eventin the environment. For example, you press the "orangesoda" button on the soda machine, and nothing happens.

The probability of pressing it again is decreased. Theprobability of some behavior m ay also increase or decreaseas a function of an event in an organism's own behavior. Forexample, as the probability of pressing the orange soda but-ton decreases, other behaviors that have been effectiveunder similar conditions in the past become more likely:pressing another button, calling for helping, kicking the ma-chine, and so on. According to the theory, all four of thesephenomena occur simultaneously and continuously with allpossible behaviors that can occur in a given environment.

I will illustrate the theory in two ways: first, by giving averbal account of the emergence of a complex, novel per-formance in a pigeon, and second, by showing how theequations have been used to predict ongoing, novel behaviorin human subjects.

" Ins igh t " i n t he P igeon

Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza, and Rubin [15] showed that pi-geons with appropriate training histories could solve one ofKfhler's classic box-and-banana problems in an insightfulmanner the In'st time they were confronted with it. In the testsituation, a pigeon was faced with a small facsimile of abanana, pecks to which had been previously reinforced withfood. The banana was out of reach of the bird, and jumpingand flying toward it had previously been extinguished. Alsoin the chamber was a small box. At first each subject lookedconfused: It stretched repeatedly toward the banana, mo-tioned toward the box, turned in circles beneath the banana,and so on. Then, quite suddenly, it began to push the boxtoward the banana. Each subject stopped pushing when thebox was beneath the banana, quickly climbed on the box.and pecked the banana.

To analyze a performance of this sort one must do twothings: First, one must assess the contribution that previ-ously established behaviors made to the emergence of thenew sequence. With pig ~n s, one can do this by varying thetraining histories of different birds and then placing them inthe test situation. By doing so, we showed that the novelperformances varied in orderly ways with respect to thetraining histories. Deficient training histories produced defi-cient, yet orderly performances [15].

The more difficult task is to determine the transformationprinciples: How, moment-to-moment in time. are the old be-haviors transformed into the new performance?

I shall offer a verbal account of the performance as itunfolds, but the account is unsatisfactory. Generativitytheory holds that the kinds of processes I will describeoperate continuously and simultaneously. A verbal accountcannot do justice to s uch complexity.

Mul t ip l e con t ro l li ng s t imul i .The pigeon's apparent con-fusion would seem to be the r esult of multiple controllingstimuli. T hat is, in training, the stimulus box-a lone (wi th asmall green target available at ground level) had come tocontrol pushing movements toward the box, because, withthe box present and the banana absent, pushing the box hadproduced food. The stimulus box-unde r-banana had come tocontrol stretching toward and pecking the banana, because,in the absence of the green target, climbing onto the box andpecking the banana had produoed food. In the test, neitherstimulus was present, but a compound or intermediatestimulus was: The green spot was absent, the banana andbox were present, and the banana was not o ver the box. Thesituation therefore resembled two situations to which thebird had been e xposed during training. It is as if the green


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A N I M A L C O G N I T I O N 627

spo t (o f the f ir s t tra in ing scenar io ) had be en m oved ju s t ou to f the b i rd ' s v iew and the ban ana (o f the secon d t ra in ings c e n a r io ) h a d b e e n s h i ft e d a w a y f r o m t h e b o x .

W h e n a n o rg a n i s m i s c o n f r o n t e d s i mu l t a n e o u sl y w i t h t w os t imu l i ( say, bo th red and g reen a re i l lumina ted on a s top -l igh t ) tha t con t ro l s epara te responses (p res s ing the b rakepeda l and p res s ing the acce le ra to r peda l , respec t ive ly ) , o rwi th a s t imu lus in te rmed ia te be tween the two s t imu l i , bo threspon ses t end to occu r, in rough a l t e rna t ion [5 ,34] . H ence ,the p igeon s t re tched toward the banana , o r i en ted toward theb o x , l o o k e d b a c k t o w a r d t h e b a n a n a , a n d s o o n .

Changing dynamics. This a l t e rna t ion was uns tab le , s incene i ther behav io r was success fu l . Moreover, in t ra in ing , theb i rd l e a r n e d n o t t o j u mp o r f l y t o w a r d t h e b a n a n a w h e n t h eb a n a n a w a s a l o n e in t h e c h a m b e r a n d o u t o f r e ac h . T h u s ,s t r e t c h i n g t o w a r d t h e b a n a n a s h o u l d h a v e w e a k e n e d mo r erap id ly than behav io r wi th respec t to the box . Wi th in sec-o n d s , t h e b i r d s h o u l d h a v e c o me t o f a c e t h e b o x mo r e a n dmore d i rec t ly, wh ich indeed i t d id . I t was now faced wi thbox-ahme, a lmos t p rec i se ly the s t imu lus tha t con t ro l l ed push -ing , and the b i rd began to push .

"'Functional generalization." W h y t h e b i r d p u s h e dt o w a r d t h e b a n a n a i s a mo r e c o mp l i c a t e d ma t t e r , d e a l t w i t hin de ta i l e l sewhere [9, 11, 15 ] . Oth er expe r im en ts sugges tt h a t t h e s u b j e c t p u s h e d t o w a r d t h e b a n a n a n o t b e c a u s e t h eb a n a n a r e s e mb l e d t h e t r a i n i n g t arg e t b u t b e c a u s e p e c k i n g t h eb a n a n a h a d b e e n r e i n f o r c e d ; th a t i s , b e c a u s e t h e b a n a n a w a s" i m p o r t a n t . " T h e s p r e a d o f ef f e c t f r o m t h e t r a i ni n g t a rg e t t othe banana i s remin i scen t o f wha t some ca l l func t iona l gen -eral izat ion [3].

Automatic" chaining. I t i s o f t en the case tha t ou r ownbehav io r genera tes s t imu l i tha t con t ro l o ther behav io rs ; ino t h e r w o r d s , t h a t o n e b e h a v i o r c h a n g e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a to ther behav io rs wi l l occu r. S imp ly tu rn ing one ' s head maybr ing in to v iew a reminder no te pos ted on a wal l , an ap -p r o a c h i n g t ig e r, o r a c a n d y b a r, a n d r e l e v a n t b e h a v i o r ma ythen fo l low. The b i rd s topped push ing the box in the r igh tp lace becau se , as i t pushed , i t a r ranged fo r i t s e l f c lo se r andc l o s e r a p p r o x i ma t i o n s t obox-under-banana, prec i se ly thes t imu lus tha t con t ro l l ed c l imb ing and peck ing . Inde ed , som es u b j e c t s c l i mb e d a n d s t r e t c h e d t o w a r d t h e b a n a n a p r e ma -t u r e l y : t h e y i mme d i a t e l y d i s mo u n t e d , p u s h e d f u r t h e r, a n dc l imbed aga in .

Resllrgence

O t h e r, mo r e c o mp l i c a t e d p e r f o r ma n c e s , r e q u i r e o t h e rp r inc ip les . An espec ia l ly u se fu l one i s theprinciple of re-surgent'e: When, under given conditions, a response that hasrecently been effective is no longer effective, other responsesthat were effective in the past under similar conditions tendto recur [6 , 12 , 25 , 28 , 36]. Thus, when a doorknob that hasa l w a y s t u r n e d e a s i l y w il l n o t t u rn , ma n y o t h e r b e h a v i o r s t h a th a v e g o t t e n o n e t h r o u g h d o o r s t e n d t o r e c u r : O n e t u r n sharder, pu l l s up o r pushe s down o n the knob , k icks the doo r,s h o u t s f o r h e lp , a n d s o o n . M a n y o f t he a p p a r e n t l y " s p o n -t a n e o u s " p e r f o r ma n c e s w e h a v e s t u d i e d c a n b e a c c o u n t e dfo r by th i s s imp le p r inc ip le , and i t wou ld appear to havema ny o th er poss ib le app l i ca t ions in the in te rp re ta t ion o f c l in-i c a l p h e n o me n a , f o r a g i n g b e h a v i o r, a p p a r e n t e x p e r i me n t a la n o ma l i e s , p r o b l e m s o l v i n g , a n d b e h a v i o r u n d e r c e r t a i nsched ules of rein forc em ent [12, 16 , 17].

R e s u rg e n c e i s, i n e f f e c t, t h e c o n v e r s e o f a u t o ma t i c c h a i n -ing: A decrease i n t he p r o b a b i l i t y o f o n e b e h a v i o r p r o d u c e sa n i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r o b a b i l i ty o f o n e o r m o r e o t h e r b e h a v i o r s .

lnterconnection

T h e n o v e l p e r f o r ma n c e g e n e r a t e d i n t h e " i n s i g h t " e x p e r -i me n t w a s t h e r e s u l t o f th e s p o n t a n e o u s i n t e r c o nn e c t i o n o ft w o r e p e r t o i r e s o f b e h a v i o r w h i c h h a d b e e n e s t a b li s h e ds e p a r a t el y. I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n i s o n e o f o n l y f o u r b e h a v i o r a lp h e n o m e n a t h a t ma y u l t ima t e l y a c c o u n t f o r a ll i n s t a nc e s o f

nove l behav io r [14] . Eps te in [11 ] charac te r i zes the in te rcon -nec t ion p rocess as fo l lows :

In te rconnec t ion i s l ike ly when mu l t ip le behav io rs a re madeava i l ab le , e i the r th rough resu rg ence o f p rev ious re in fo rcedb e h a v i o r s d u r i n g e x t i n c t i o n . . , o r b y mu l t i p l e c o n t r o l l i n gs t imu l i . . . . M u l t ip l e b e h a v i o r s ma y c o m b i n e t o p r o d u c enew sequences [18 ], behav io rs tha t ha ve new func t ions [18 ],o r b e h a v i o r s t h a t h a v e n e w t o p o g r a p h i es . I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n sc o me a b o u t m o me n t - t o - mo m e n t i n ti me t h r o u g h a v a r i e t y o fp r o c e s s e s , a n y a n d a ll o f w h i c h m a y b e o p e r a t i n g s i mu l t a -neous ly. One impor tan t p rocess i s au tomat ic cha in ing : Oneb e h a v i o r c h a n g e s t h e e n v i r o n m e n t o r t h e o r i e n ta t i o n o f t h eo rg a n i s m a n d h e n c e p r o d u c e s s ti mu l i t h a t ma k e o t h e r b e h a v -io rs more o r l es s l ike ly. When topograph ies a re compat ib le ,

b l e n d s ma y a p p e a r, a s o n e s e e s i n v e r b a l b e h a v i o r o r p a i n t-i ng . T h e d y n a mi c s c a n b e e x t r e me l y c o m p l i c a t e d a s b e h a v -io rs a re s imu l taneo us ly wax ing o r wan ing in s t reng th , resu rg -ing , p roduc ing new s t imu l i , and so on . (p . 132 )

As fo rmal theo ry, genera t iv i ty theo ry i s no t , s t r i c t lyspeak ing , a theo ry o f in te rconnec t ion . Ra ther, i t i s a theo ryabou t ho w the p robab i l i t i e s o f mu l t ip le behav io rs changeover t ime . The no t ion tha t d i s t inc t and separa te behav io rsb e c o m e i n t e r c o n n e c te d d o e s n o t d o ju s t i c e t o t h e c o n t i n u o u sand p robab i l i s t i c na tu re o f behav io r. Gen era t iv i ty theo ryp red ic t s con t inuous and p robab i l i s t i c changes in behav io r,wh ich one m igh t thenlabelpost hoc as in te rconnec t ions , bu tthe l abe l wou ld on ly t r iv ia l i ze the dynamics . The secondexample wi l l make th i s c lea re r.

The Two-String Problem

Eps te in [10 ] repo r ted a rep l i ca t ion o f M aie r ' s [32 ] c las s ict w o - s t r i n g p r o b l e m, a l s o k n o w n a s t h e p e n d u l u m p r o b l e m.Th i r ty underg radua te s tuden t s se rved as sub jec t s . They wereshown two long s t r ings hang ing f rom a h igh ce i l ing 4 .8 mapar t and in s t ruc ted to t i e the ends o f the s t r ings toge ther.O n e o f t w o s ma l l o b j e c t s w a s a l s o p o i n t e d o u t t o t h e m,wh ich , they were to ld , they cou ld u se to as s i s t them in con -nec t ing the s t r ings . H a l f the sub jec t s wer e show n a smal l ,heav y b lack cy l inder abou t the s i ze o f pack o f c igare t t es ; i thad a smal l meta l hook a t one end (Ob jec t 1 ) . The o thersub jec t s saw the same b lack cy l inder wi th a long (39 cm)b lack rod ex tend ing f rom i t , to wh ich was a t t ached a l a rgehook (Ob jec t 5 ) .

T h e t w o s t ri n g s w e r e f a r e n o u g h a p a r t s o t h a t b o t h c o u l dno t be reached a t the same t ime . Ex tend ing one s t r ing as fa ra s p o s s i b le t o w a r d t h e o t h e r a n d t h e n e x t e n d i n g o n e ' s r e a c hwi th e i the r o f the ob jec t s wou ld a l so no t succeed ; e ven Ob-jec t 5 was no t long enough to reach the o ther s t r ing . Thep rob lem cou ld be so lved by a t t ach ing e i ther ob jec t to ones t r ing , swing ing i t fo rcefu l ly, re t r i ev ing the o th er s t r ing andpu l l ing i t a s fa r as poss ib le toward the swing ing s tr ing , ca tch -ing the swinging s t r ing , and then, f inal ly, a t taching the twostrings .

Befo re conduc t ing the exper im en t , we aske d 148 s tuden t swho w ere no t subsequ en t ly invo lved in the exper im en t to te l l


6/8

628 EPSTEIN

90 OBJECT CONNECTS STRNGS

. JT

5 0 / ~ . . . . ~

Pt- .. s

f / 1 ". . . "

REACHES Wl0 " - - " ~ ' = - - ~ . . . . . . .

T IM E - -

FIG. I. A probability profile generated by the transformation func-tions described in the text, shown for five behaviors relevant toMaier's [32] two-string problem. The prof'de was generated with

parameters for the short object (Object 1), which produced rapidsolutions to the problem and no irrelevant reaching. Note thatpulling one string to the other decreases steadily in probability andthat other behaviors increase in probability in an orderly sequence.Tying the object to the string makes swinging more likely, which, inturn, makes connecting the strings more likely.

us how they might use the two objects. Eighty percent of the71 students who were shown Object 1 said they would use itas a weight ("paperweight," "pendulum weight," and soon), and none suggested using it to extend his or her reach.Similarly, more than 80 percent of the 77 students who wereshown Object 5 said they would use it to extend their roach("back scratcher," "pull curtains," and so on), and nonesuggested using it as a weight. We therefore predicted thatObject 1 would lead to more rapid solutions than would Ob-ject 5, because the latter would presumably produce at-tempts to solve the problem by reaching.

Two observers monitored nine behaviors continuously.The behaviors were selected and defined to make them asdiscriminable as possible. The observers listened throughearphones to a common tape that allowed them to syn-chronize their observations in 15 sec intervals.

Results. As predicted, solutions occurred much moresmoothly and rapidly with the short object. The averagesolution time with Object I was 2.75 rain, and all of thesubjects sol ved the problem within the 15 min allotted. Only11 of the 15 subjects in the other group solved the problemwithin the allotted time. Allowing those who failed solutiontimes o f 15 men, the aver age solution time with Object 5 was7.25 min.

The data also suggested that the latter group performedpoorly because, as predicted, Object 5 produced irrelevantrenches. Reaching was observed 15 times with the long ob-ject and not once with Object 1. The probability of reachingwith Object 5 within 30 sec of having picked it up or havingtied it to a string was 0.21. In most oth er respect s, transi-tional Wohabilities were nearly equal for the two groups.

Film segments and transitional probabifity data suggestedmany examples of resurgence, automatic chaining, and soon. F or example, many subjects appeared to set the object inmotion "accidentally" just before they swung it forcefully,

7

o

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2 5

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:30

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AP

" OBJECT /

CONNECTS STRNGS / ,~. _."

PULLS ONE STRINGTO ANOTHER SWINGS t i / " /] TI ESOBJ ECT OSTRING \ ~ l /

REACHES WITH\ ~ / ~l~, - . . ;N'7 \o ~ ' Z E c ~ - ' ~ , f ~ _ / . . . . . . ." - . Y " .

B

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. . . . " % " '" . . . . . . .


7/8

ANIMAL COGNITION 629

"resurgence," and "automatic chaining," and they aretherefore so labeled. Ho wever, four basic functions of thissort might have been selec ted merely on theoretical grounds,since they describe four basic relationships between eventsin behavior and the env ironment.

In the e quations below , yn is the probability of behavior y

at cycle n of the algorithm, y' , is the probability of behavi ory' at cycle n of the algorithm, is a cons tant for extinction (itdetermines the rate at which the probability of behavior ydecreases over cycles of the algorithm), a is a constant forreinfor cement (it determ ines the rate at which the probabilityof behavior y increases over cycles of the algorithm as aresult of certain envir onmen tal events), and X~.~, is the con-stant of interaction between behaviors y and y'.

(1) Extinction:(2) Reinforcement:(3) Resurgence:

(4) AutomaticChaining:

Y. + n = Yn - yn*EYn+~ = Y,+(I -- y.)*afor h~.,., < 0 and y'. - y' . _ ~ < 0,y, + ~ = y. + (i - y.)*(-X,.,) *y'.for X~..,., > 0 and Y'n - Y'n - t > 0,Y, + I = Yn + (I -- Yn)* ~ . y y ' * Y ' n

Figure 1 shows a portion of the probability profile gener-ated by these equations for the two-string problem. Sincereinforcers were not present ed (which is typical of situationswe label "problems"), the value of a was 0, and thereforeequation 2 did not contribute to the outcome. Initial proba-bilities were dete rmined by data, e was estimated (the same was used for all of the behaviors), and each of the h' s wa sestimated.

Remarkably, the model generated a solution to the two-string problem (Fig. 1). Moreover, the pattern of overlappi ngprobabilities generated by the equations resembles the fre-quency data obtained with actual subjects (Fig. 2).

AdvancesGenerativity theory has led to several advances: First, it

has allowed us to e nginee r complicate d, intelligent perform-

ances in simple organisms. For example, Epstein andMedalie [16] reported a solution to a stick-ty pe problem with apigeon, and E pstein [1 l] reported a solution to the box-and-banan a problem by the interconnection of three repertoires.Moreover, Epstein [13] reported the solution to an evenmore complicated proble m (involving the open ing of a door)by the interconnec tion of four repertoires of behavior in apigeon.

Second, it has led to a formal, empirically -based model ofongoing behavior. An d third, the model has proved reason-ably succe ssful in predicting ongoing, intelligent perform-ances in human subjects .

ACT THREE: TWO DEPARTMENTS

In 1983, with Paul T. Andronis and T. V. Layng of TheUnive rsity of Chicago, I helped found a society whose pur -pose is to establish a new, inte rdisciplinary science devotedto the study of behavior. The Praxics Society is growing,and, at this writing, faculty members at three universitieshave expr essed inte rest in establishing programs in praxicsat their universities. Among other projects, the Society isworking to establish a Science-like journal called Praxics,which will serve the nee ds of the many scientists---in evolu-tionary biology, behavior analysis, behavioral genetics,ethology, ecology, neurophysiology, comparative psychol-ogy, and so on-- who are concerned with the determinants ofbehavior.

With luck, we may soon reach Act Three of the peculiarand rather belabored drama that McDougall and Watson ini-tiated more than seventy years ago. A science of behaviorwill finally come to life, and psychology will be free of itsintruders.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article was prepared while the author was in residence atThe Neurosciences Institute of the Neurosciences Research Pro-gram, New York. T. Carterette, K. Stine hour and D. Waissmanprovided invaluable help in the two-string experiment. Inquiriesabout The Praxics Society should be sent to Dr. Paul Andronis, ThePraxics Society, 10226 South Arte sian, Chicago, IL 60642.

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epstein 1985 cognição

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