283

Index

Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade, ADC. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Declaratory Action of Constitutionality

Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por Omissão, ADIn por Omissão. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission

Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, ADIn. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Direct Action of Unconstitutionality

accommodation pattern of inter-branch interaction. See Brazil, inter-branch interactions in

Administración Nacional de Seguridad Social, ANSES. See Social Security Administration, Argentina

Alfonsín, Raúl, 39, 45, 73–4, 84, 131–3, 141–2

amparo, 42n19, 149Arantes, Rogério Bastos, 10n14, 53n59,

178n42, 182n57, 193n1Argentina

bank freezes, 2–3, 46, 47, 72cases concerning economic policy. See Court

cases, Argentinacivil service, 49civil society, 41Codes. See Codes, ArgentinaConstitution of 1853, 41, 42, 126constitutional reform. See Argentina, legal

transitionDecrees. See Decrees, Argentinaeconomic collapse 1989, 45, 143economic collapse 2001, 40, 46, 149economic transition, 44–50

civil service and labor reform, 49–50economic context, 45–6opening the economy and

privatization, 48social security reform, 48, 140

stabilization plans and monetary policy, 46–7

Austral Plan, 46, 132, 141Bonex Plan, 47n40, 144Convertibility Plan (peso), 47, 146

tax and fiscal reform, 49inter-branch interactions in, 5, 32, 121–2,

123–33, 139–52, 195–6Court character thesis, 133–9, 142–3,

145–6, 148–9, 151–2, 195–6elected branch compliance and retaliation,

130–1, 232–3; See also Court cases, Argentina

patterns ofconfrontation, 8, 131, 133, 140–3,

146–52Court submission, 8, 131, 137, 142,

143–52Supreme Court approaches to decision-

making, 128–30, 224–31deferential, 129, 131, 135, 145, 153pragmatic, 130principled, 129self-protective, 130

Supreme Court selective assertiveness, 121, 127–8, 222–3

judicial centralization in, 70–3appeals as tactic of, 70–1laws facilitating, 72need for, 70Supreme Court as participant, 72–3

judicialization of economic governance, 50labor reform, 49labor unions, 49Laws. See Laws, Argentinalegal transition, 39–44

constitutional reform, 39, 41–3, 74, 83–4social and economic rights, 42

inclusion on agenda of rule of law issues, 39–41

increasing concern with rights, 41judicial reform, 43judicialization, 43–4

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information

Index284

military trials, 39, 40Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo), 42piqueteros, 40political parties. See Peronist Party; Radical

Partypoliticization of the Supreme Court.

See Supreme Court, Argentina, politicization of

Social Security Administration. See Social Security Administration, Argentina

Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental, ADPF. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Argumentation of Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept

bank freeze, 1–3in Argentina, 2–3, 46, 47, 72in Brazil, 1–2, 59

Baum, Lawrence, 14n22, 20Bianchi, Alberto, 73, 73n15, 79, 91n60,

148n45, 151, 152Brazil

bank freeze, 1–2, 59cases concerning economic policy. See Court

cases, Brazilcivil society, 51Constitution of 1988, 52–4, 53n56, 59n71,

60, 63, 98, 98n12, 155, 170, 178, 178n41, 181

Constitutional Amendments. See Constitutional Amendments, Brazil

constitutional reform. See Brazil, legal transition

economic transition, 57–63civil service reform, 62economic context, 57–8opening the economy and

privatization, 60social security reform, 60–1stabilization plans, 58–60, 182–3

Collor, Plans I and II, 59Cruzado Plan, 59Real Plan, 57–8, 59

tax and fiscal reform, 61–2, 99n17, 177–81

inter-branch interactions in, 5, 32, 156–70, 176–88, 196

Court character thesis, 170–6, 181–2, 187–8, 190, 196

elected branch compliance and retaliation, 168, 260–1; See also Court cases, Brazil

patterns ofaccommodation, 8, 157, 159–61,

168–70, 177–88Supreme Court approaches to

decision-making, 166–7, 251–9deferential, 167pragmatic, 166, 189principled, 166, 176self-protective, 166support-building, 167

Supreme Court selective assertiveness, 164–5, 247–50

judicial centralization in, 95–100appeals as tactics of, 96–7concentrating authority in the

STF, 100need for, 95–6Supreme Court as participant, 100

judicialization of economic governance, 63, 155–6

Laws. See Laws, Brazillegal transition, 50–6

constitutional reform, 52–4, 98–9, 178reform to economic order articles,

53–4, 60inclusion on agenda of rule of law

issues, 51increasing concern with rights, 51–2judicial reform, 54–6, 99, 104n36judicialization, 56

lower courts, 98n14Office of the Federal Prosecutor, 54n64,

147n43party system fragmentation, 110–12, 175political parties. See Worker’s Party, Brazil;

Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

professionalization of the Supreme Court. See Supreme Court, Brazil (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF), professionalization of

Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB), 111

Brinks, Daniel, 34, 96n7, 193n1, 200, 208, 208n20

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 57–8, 60Carrió, Alejandro, 42, 144, 144n30, 145n36Cavallo, Domingo, 46, 47Chavez, Rebecca, 74n17, 88n47, 193n1,

197, 200Codes, Argentina

Argentina (cont.)

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information

Index 285

Civil and Commercial Procedural Code, 71, 72

Codes, Brazil Civil Code, 99

Collor de Mello, Fernando, 2, 51, 59, 60compliance with judicial decisions, 19–21

measuring, 19theories of, 20

communications, 20external actors, 20legitimacy, 20normative, 20

CONADEP. See National Commission on Disappeared Persons

confrontation pattern of inter-branch interactions. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in

Constitutional Amendments, Brazil No. 12, 62No. 19, civil service reform, 63No. 20, social security reform, 61No. 3, constitutionality and fiscal reform,

55, 99, 177, 178, 179No. 41, pension reform, 61No. 45, judical reform, 99No. 45, judicial reform, 55

constitutional reform. See Argentina, legal transition; Brazil, legal transition

constitutions. See Argentina, Constitution of 1853; Brazil, Constitution of 1988

Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira, CPMF. See Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions; Court cases, Brazil

corralito. See Argentina, bank freezesCorte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, CSJN.

See Supreme Court, ArgentinaCourt cases, Argentina, 123–7, 139–52,

216–33Guida, Liliana contra Poder Ejecutivo

Nacional, 146–52, 206–7, 220, 222, 226

Peralta, Luis Arcenio y otro contra Nación Argentina, 124, 143–6, 217, 222, 224

Porcelli, Luis A. contra Banco de la Nación Argentina, 132–3

Rolón Zappa, Victor contra Estado Nacional, 124, 140–3, 216, 223, 230, 232–3

Tobar, Leonidas contra Ministerio de Defensa – Contaduría General del Ejército, 125, 146–52, 206–7, 221, 223, 229, 232–3

Court cases, Brazil, 158–64, 176–88, 234–61CPMF, ADIns 1497 and 2031, 160, 169,

177–82, 242, 248, 249, 256, 260–1FGTS, RE 22855, 161, 169, 182–8, 207,

240, 249, 257, 260–1IPMF, ADIns 926 and 939, 159, 169,

177–82, 237, 259, 260–1Court character, 21, 66, 201

four features of, 27–8, 87in Argentina. See Supreme Court, Argentina,

political character ofin Brazil. See Supreme Court, Brazil,

statesman character ofinstitutional cohesion, 28perceived legitimacy, 27professional profile, 27stability, 27thesis, 3, 22–3, 30–3, 35, 122, 133–4,

137–9, 156, 170, 189, 193, 196–7Court crafting, 23–7, 69, 194–5, 201–3

in Argentina. See Supreme Court Argentina, politicization of

in Brazil. See Supreme Court, Brazil, professionalization of

strategic explanations, 25, 78theories of judicial appointment, 25–6theory of, 26–7, 69–70, 78–9, 94, 118,

199–200path dependency in, 26, 83, 108

Court submission pattern of interaction. See Argentina, inter-branch interaction in

CPMF tax case. See Court cases, Brazilcurrency plans. See Argentina, economic

transition; Brazil, economic transition

Dahl, Robert, 12, 19De la Rúa, Fernando, 2, 40, 45, 85, 148Declaratory Action of Constitutionality.

See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract; See also Constitutional Amendments, Brazil, No. 3

Decrees, Argentina Decree of Necessity and Urgency 1819, 150Decree of Necessity and Urgency 2196,

141–2Decree of Necessity and Urgency 290, 146–8Decree of Necessity and Urgency 36, 144Decree of Necessity and Urgency 430,

147, 149Decree of Necessity and Urgency 896,

149–50

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information

Index286

Decrees of Necessity and Urgency (Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia, DNUs), 47n41, 145n36

Direct Action of Unconstitutionality. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract

Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract

Domingo, Pilar, 25, 37n4, 37n2, 40, 44n29, 67, 78

Duhalde, Eduardo, 1, 2–3, 40, 46, 74, 85, 149

economic reform, 38elected branch compliance. See compliance

with judicial decisionselected branch retaliation. See retaliation

against judicial decisionsEpstein, Lee, 16, 17, 24, 24n45, 29, 29n58,

137, 138, 174, 175n37, 197

Faro de Castro, Marcus, 10n14, 56n68, 99, 163n15

FGTS, RE 22855. See Court cases, BrazilFinkel, Jodi, 19n36, 20, 25, 37, 42, 42n18,

42n17, 42n16, 42n15, 43n25, 43n24, 43n22, 68, 74n17, 81, 85n42, 193n1

Gargarella, Roberto, 10n14, 18, 20, 37n4, 79, 144, 145, 146, 209

Gelli, María Angélica, 132n19Gibson, James L., 20Gillman, Howard, 16, 17n31, 197, 199Ginsburg, Tom, 5, 17, 17n31, 29, 67, 68,

68n4, 137, 138, 174, 193n1, 197, 204, 204n16

Guida, Liliana contra Poder Ejecutivo Nacional. See Court cases, Argentina

Helmke, Gretchen, 6, 10, 18, 24n44, 34, 42n19, 42n15, 74n17, 81, 83, 85, 129, 132, 193n1, 197, 200

high court decision-making. See judicial decision-making

Hilbink, Elisabeth, 5, 6, 16n30, 24, 34, 68, 193n1, 197n3, 200, 200n10, 201, 202

Hirschl, Ran, 37n4, 68, 193n1

Imposto Provisório sobre Movimentação Financeira, IPMF. See Provisional Tax on Financial Transactions; Court cases, Brazil

informal institutions, 33–4, 200–1inter-branch interactions, 1–3, 7, 23, 197–9

Court character account of. See Court character, thesis

in Argentina. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in

in Brazil. See Brazil, inter-branch interactions in

patterns of, 4, 11, 30, 32, 121accommodation, 8confrontation, 8Court domination, 8, 9Court submission, 8, 148

strategic explanation of, 28–30, 33, 174–6based on Court-society relations, 29–30,

138–9, 175based on political divisions, 29, 137–8

inter-branch relations. See inter-branch interactions

IPMF tax case. See Court cases, Brazil

judicial activism, 11n17judicial appointments, 202–3

in Argentina. See Supreme Court, Argentina, politicization of

in Brazil. See Supreme Court, Brazil, professionalization of

in Chile, 202in Colombia, 202in Costa Rica, 203in Mexico, 202theories of, 24–5theory of court crafting. See Court crafting,

theory ofjudicial assertiveness, 6, 192, 197–9

definition of, 11measuring, 11–12selective assertiveness, 4, 164

judicial behavior. See judicial decision-making

judicial centralization, 23n42, 67, 194in Argentina. See Argentina, judicial

centralizationin Brazil. See Brazil, judicial centralization

judicial decision-making, 13, 197–9approaches to, 12–18, 128–9, 197

deferential, 17, 129pragmatic, 18, 129preference-driven, 16, 128principled, 15, 128self-protective, 16, 129support-building, 17, 129

theoretical models of, 14attitudinal, 16

Decrees, Argentina (cont.)

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information

Index 287

legal, 15strategic, 17, 137–9

judicial empowerment theories of, 67–8

credible commitment, 67governance, 67hegemonic preservation, 68insurance, 67power consolidation, 67–8

judicial independence, 22, 181–2judicial power, 19–20judicial reform

in Argentina. See Argentina, legal transitionin Brazil. See Brazil, legal transition

judicial strategy, 67Court crafting. See Court craftingjudicial centralization. See judicial

centralizationjudicialization of economic governance, 4,

38–9, 120–1, 194, 203–8in Argentina. See Argentina, judicialization

of economic governancein Brazil. See Brazil, judicialization of

economic governancejudicialization of politics, 2, 18, 26, 66, 192

in Argentina. See Argentina, legal transitionin Brazil. See Brazil, legal transition

Kagan, Robert A., 17n31Kingstone, Peter, 36, 57, 59Kirchner, Néstor, 40, 76, 78, 86

law and economics, 203–8law and development movement, 203–4

Laws, Argentina Educators’ Statute (Law 14.473), 140Integrated Pension System Law (Law

24.241), 48Law of Economic Emergency (Law 23.697),

47Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Law 25.152),

49Law of Pension Solidarity (Law 24.463), 48,

72, 218Law of Public Emergency (Law 25.561), 47Law of State Reform (Law 23.696), 48, 217Law of Zero Deficit (Law 25.453), 49,

149–50New System of Retirements and Pensions

(Law 18.037), 140, 218Laws, Brazil

Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Complementary Law 101), 62, 246

Law of the ADIn and ADC (Law 9.868), 55, 98, 100

Law of the ADPF (Law 9.882), 55, 98Rita Camata Law (Complementary Law

77), 177, 178, 236legal transition, 37–8, 205Levitsky, Steven, 24n44, 34, 49n44, 200,

200n11lower courts, 70n5, 95n5Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 51, 58, 102

Menem, Carlos, 40, 45, 47, 48, 74, 85“automatic majority”, 88, 125,

128, 145Miller, Jonathan, 123n4, 140n26, 145n36,

145n33Ministério Público, MP. See Brazil, Office of

the Federal Prosecutor

National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP), 39, 41

National Judicial Council, Brazil (Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ), 99

Neves, Tancredo, 51, 52Nino, Carlos Santiago, 10n14, 18, 39, 39n6,

77, 146

O’Donnell, Guillermo, 34, 36, 41, 42, 126n5, 205, 206n18

Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB. See Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

Pellet Lastra, Arturo, 50, 74, 81–2, 88n47, 141, 142, 146

Peralta, Luis Arcenio y otro contra Nación Argentina. See Court cases, Argentina

Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal, 25Peronist Party, Argentina, 42, 49n44, 50n46piqueteros, 40politicization of high courts. See Supreme

Court, ArgentinaPorcelli, Luis A. contra Banco de la Nación

Argentina. See Court cases, Argentinaprofessionalization of high courts.

See Supreme Court, BrazilProvisional Contribution on Financial

Transactions (Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira, CPMF), 62

Provisional Tax on Financial Transactions (Imposto Provisório sobre Movimentação Financeira, IPMF), 61, 177

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information

Index288

Radical Party, Argentina, 42retaliation against judicial decisions, 21–2

institutional, 21policy, 21

Rolón Zappa, Victor contra Estado Nacional. See Court cases, Argentina

Rosenn, Keith S., 14n21, 37, 41, 51, 51n47, 53, 53n58, 57, 59, 102, 105n40

Santiago, Alfonso, 44, 48, 90, 127, 141, 142, 144, 145n36, 146

Sarney, José, 52Shapiro, Martin M., 14n22, 37n4, 67,

193n1Smulovitz, Catalina, 17, 18, 41, 44n29, 47Social Security Administration, Argentina

(ANSES), 72stare decisis, 66, 70Staton, Jeffrey, 17, 20, 30, 138–9, 175, 192,

193n1, 202Superior Tribunal de Justiça. See Superior

Tribunal of Justice, BrazilSuperior Tribunal of Justice, Brazil (Superior

Tribunal de Justiça, STJ), 55, 99Supreme Court, Argentina (Corte Suprema de

Justicia de la Nación, CSJN), 2–3, 8, 31, 70–4

approaches to decision-making in economic policy cases. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in, Supreme Court approaches to decision-making

arbitrary ruling doctrine (sentencia arbitraria), 73

assertiveness in economic policy cases. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in, Supreme Court selective assertiveness

case load, 44impeachment, 74, 75, 84–6, 149, 151–2institutional importance doctrine (gravedad

institucional), 72inter-branch interactions. See Argentina,

inter-branch interactionsper saltum, 73political character of, 31, 87–91, 133–9,

142–3, 145–6, 148–9, 151–2, 207institutional instability, 87, 145, 151lower perceived legitimacy, 87–9, 142,

146, 148, 152weaker institutional cohesion, 89–91,

142, 149collegiality, 90consensus on role, 89leadership, 90procedural continuity, 90

weaker professional profile, 87, 145politicization of, 26, 31, 69, 70, 73–8, 81–3,

87–91, 134, 194–5Court crafting theory of, 78–87

formal institutional influences on, 83–4historical institutional influence on, 81–3partisan politics influences on, 84–6

manipulation of size and membership, 73–6

need for, 79–80weakening professional profile, 76–8

requirements to become justice, 83selective assertiveness. See Argentina, inter-

branch interactions insize, 75, 81–2

Supreme Court, Brazil (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF), 1–2, 8, 31, 55, 93–119

approaches to decision-making in economic policy cases. See Brazil, inter-branch interactions in, Supreme Court approaches to decision-making

assertiveness in economic policy cases. See Brazil, interbranch interactions in, Supreme Court selective assertiveness

case load, 55, 56, 96–7, 162impeachment, 110inter-branch interactions. See Brazil, inter-

branch interactionsjudicial review, 55–6, 95judicial review, abstract

Argumentation of Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept (Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental, ADPF), 55, 98

Declaratory Action of Constitutionality (Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade, ADC), 99

Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, ADIn), 55, 56, 98

Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission (Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por Omissão, ADIn por Omissão), 98

legalist and consequentialist justices, 113, 114, 171–2, 187, 190

professionalization of, 26, 33, 94, 100–3, 171, 195

Court crafting, theory of, 94, 104, 106–12

formal rules, 109–10historical institutional influences, 106–9

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information

Index 289

party system fragmentation, 110–12, 175

maintaining size and composition, 101need for, 104–6strengthening professional profile,

101–3, 107requirements to become justice, 109selective assertiveness. See Brazil,

inter-branch interactions, Supreme Court selective assertiveness

size, 106, 109statesman character of, 5, 31–3, 112–17,

170–6, 181–2, 187–8, 207institutional stability, 112–13justices’ professional qualifications,

112–13perceived legitimacy, 113–14, 176strong institutional cohesion, 114–17

collegiality, 115consensus on role, 114leadership, 115procedural continuity, 116

súmula vinculante, 55, 99

Supremo Tribunal Federal. See Supreme Court, Brazil

Taylor, Matthew, 10n14, 19n33, 34, 37n4, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 61n76, 62, 63, 63n84, 95, 96n7, 97, 98n16, 106, 112, 116, 162, 164, 174n35, 193n1, 198n4, 199

Tobar, Leonidas contra Ministerio de Defensa – Contaduría General del Ejército. See Court cases, Argentina

Trochev, Alexei, 5, 20, 21, 24, 25, 68, 78, 193n1

Vanberg, Georg, 20, 29, 138, 175, 193n1, 197Vilhena Vieira, Oscar, 52, 53, 95n5, 98n14,

98n12, 99n18, 177, 178n42, 179, 182n57

Whittington, Keith, 16, 67, 68, 199Workers’ Party, Brazil, Partido dos

Trabalhadores (PT), 51, 103

Zakaria, Fareed, 37n2, 126n5, 205

www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information