capítulo do meu livro

8/10/2019 Captulo do meu livro

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a: G-d save, G-d protect our Emperor, our country, (Gott Erhalte, Gott Beschtze Unsern Kaiser, Unser Land ) were the first words of a laudatory anthem toFranz Joseph I. It was a modified version of the original laudatory hymn composed in 1797 by Lorenz Leopold Haschka who wrote the lyrics, and JosephHaydn who composed the melody. It is known also as the Kaiserhymne (Emperor's Hymn), and its melody is still Germanys anthem with changed wording.

World War I scene: the British troops fighting the German Army in trenches

UNSERN KAISUNSER LAND

a


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R

THE GREAT WAR AS THE PRELUDE TOWORLD WAR II

8 C H A P

T E R

THIS PART OFFERS A BRIEF BACKGROUND tothe events that caused the First World War (WWI)and how they influenced two other very impor-tant historical conjunctures for understanding

this book: (a) the catastrophic Paris Peace Conference (readin Chapter 9) and the humiliating peace treaties that wereforced upon the defeated nations which, in turn, openedthe hellish door for Adolf Hitlers emergence, and (b) thesimilarly ill-conceived formation of the First Czecho-SlovakRepublic, a poorly designed piece of political engineering

that the victorious Allies let the Czechs execute withoutunderstanding that it would form a new ethnic caldron in-side Central Europe that later helped Hitler initiate WorldWar II (WWII).

We are not going to discuss here in detail the historical and mili-tary context of World War I (a.k.a. Great War) and what happenedduring those dreadful years (19141918). That subject clearly per-tains to another book on European history. Nevertheless, the Cen-tral Powers(Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Ottoman Empire)defeat in late 1918 strongly influenced Europes geopolitical re-

design, including the forming of the First Czecho-Slovak Repub-lic, later resulting in Germanys military aggressiveness, Hitlersemergence as the Fatherlands Savior, and, on a smaller scale, inthe Slovakian autonomy struggle and its outcome, when the First

2000 YRS OF PREJUDICEThe Jewish optimism[in Austr ia-Hunga ry]

about the war causing a remission of antisemitism turned out to be pathetically naive and short lived. The trust that the military in general gave to Jews seemsto have aroused the distrust of non-Jewsoutside the army. Gentiles accused

Jews of acting as spies for Russians... Bruce F. Pauley (see bibliography)


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140 THUNDER ROARED WILDLY OVER THE TATRAS: THE HOLOCAUST IN SLOVAKIA (VOLUME 1)

Austria-Hungary (later the Ottoman Empireb too) also decided to help Bulgaria, in case of amilitary threat from any of the Entente coun-tries. On the other hand, Russia had a similararrangement with Serbia (see chart below).

The reader can imagine the complexity ofall these diplomatic arrangements, each hav-ing its own singularities and clauses. But in es-sence, the general idea was that if any of thosecountries would be attacked or threatened byany member of the opposite alliance, the oth-ers would have to come to its rescue or, in cer-tain situations, would have to remain neutral.In theory, said the military pundits who con-ceived this intricate web of legal documents,such alliances and treaties would function andthe fear of an all-out war would keep Europe peaceful forever 2.

Even so, Germany remained in a very vul-nerable strategic position, surrounded by po-tential enemies on most sides of its borders.In 1905 a master plan3:c was envisioned anddeveloped by the German General Staff, seek-

ing to defeat all of Germanys enemies in rapidsuccession, should an all-out war materialize.Since the General Staff estimated that Russiawould take about five to s ix weeks to mobilize,the plan called for an initial surprise attackagainst France, aiming to win that war quickly,b: The Ottoman Empire was a large assembly of territories in todaysMiddle East and around the Mediterranean shores, ruled by the Turks. At

its apogee (1856-1878) it included todays Armenia, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait,Lebanon, Israel, Greece, Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, also parts of theArabian Peninsula, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Romania, and, ofcourse, all Turkey.c: This plan was designated the " Schlieffen Plan ," named after Alfred vonSchlieffen, the German Chief of Staff who conceived it.

Czechoslovak Republic was destroyed by thediligent work of Nazi Germany and its obse-quious Slovak underlings. This chapter there-fore exists for good reason: to comment on thecritical interwar period and its impact on themain issue of this book theShoah .

WORLD WAR ONE IN A NUTSHELL:

THE ALLIANCES THATWOULD END ALL WARS

In 1871, after the Franco-Prussian war1 (inwhich the French armies were defeated by thePrussians), France allied with Russia. The idea

behind such an unusuala military arrangementwas that if war came again, the German Em-pire that in January 1871 resulted from theunification of all the German states and prin-cipalities would have to fight on two veryample and distant fronts, in the east againstRussia, and in the west against France.

In 1904, France signed a similar agreementwith England. In 1907, the three states signed atreaty, forming what became known as the Tri-ple Entente (or Entente in a simplified form).Well before, in 1882, Germany allied herselfwith other two central powers Austria-Hun-gary and Italy forming the Triple Alliance.a: This arrangement was indeed strange, given that Kaiser Wilhelm II ofGermany and Princess Alexandra, wife of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II,were cousins.

Scene from the Battle of Kniggrtz (Franco-Prussian War) depictingParis surrendering to the Prussians; Prussias prime minister vonBismarck suggested to shell Paris in order to ensure the citys quick

surrender and render pointless all French efforts to free the city. artist: Georg Ble ibtreu.

Chart showing the alliances and treaties signed between the EuropeanPowers after France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. The idea was tocreate a geopolitical situation which would keep Europe peacefull forever;

instead i t lead to WWI.


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CHAPTER 8 THE GR EAT WAR AS THE PRELUDE TO WOR LD WAR I I 141

which would allow Germany close the Westernfront and move its divisions to fight againstRussia. An attack launched directly against theFrench frontier would become a long war of at-trition as it later proved to be anyway sincethat front had been heavily fortified ever sincethe Franco-Prussian war. The logical militarycourse was to go round it, through Belgium alow, flat terrain executing a classic militaryclamp operation.

The Trigger: Attempt at SarajevoI cannot avoid comparing the outbreak of

WWI with a very similar and very amusingscene in Charlie Chaplins The Gold Rush

movie. In it, the villain a huge brute triesto punch Charlie but our hero ducks and thebully instead hits another enormous bystanderbehind Chaplin. This big man tries to punchthe villain back but instead he hits another fel-low close by. Pretty soon the entire saloonspatrons are bashing away, hitting their oppo-nents with whatever weapons come to hand chairs, bottles, pans, and so on. In the middleof this pandemonium, Charlie walks out from

the saloon, unharmed, in his characteristicstroll, twirling his famous walking-stick.So was it with WWI. The bully was Austria-

Hungary, the small opponent, Serbia. And thesaloon... well, the saloon was Europe and lat-er almost the entire world. Sadly, no countrywalked out from that mess revolving its stick.Instead, almost 20 million people died (closeto 10 million military personnel in battles), 21million were wounded and 4.5 million soldierswere given as missing in action. And it all be-gan because an insignificant and small Davidpounded a gigantic Goliath.

On June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, Gavrilo Prin-cip, a Bosnian Serb student and nationalist,shot and killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand heir-apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife Sophie.

Princip was a member of Young Bosnia andthe Black Hand ( rna Ruka) soci-

eties, groups whose aims included the unifica-tion of the South Slavs and independence fromAustria-Hungary. The assassination in Sara- jevo set into motion a series of fast-moving

On Sunday, June 28, ArchdukeFranz Ferdinand and his wifeSophia arrived in Sarajevo bytrain. In the motorcade that fol-lowed, they sit in the second car.The cars top was rolled backin order to allow the crowdsa good view of the occupants.At around 10 oclock, when thesix-car procession passed thecentral police station, a cer-tain Nedeljko abrinovia hurled ahand grenade at the archdukes car. The bomb havingmissed the Archdukes car, abrinovi and his conspirator

companions, including Gavrilo Princip, were unable attackagain because of the heavy policing and the crowds sur-rounding the motorcade. They succeeded in escaping fromthe scene of the attack.

It was beginning to look like the assassination would fail.However, Franz Ferdinand decided to go to the hospital andvisit the victims of abrinovis bomb. Princip had goneto a nearby shop for a butty (snack), apparently giving up,when he spotted Ferdinands car as it drove past, havingtaken a wrong turn.

After realizing the mistake, the driver put his foot on thebrake, and began to back up. In doing so he moved slowlypast the waiting Princip. The assassin stepped forward,drew his gun, and at a distance of about five feet, fired

several times into the car. Franz Ferdinand was hit in theneck and Sophia in the abdomen. Sophia, who later wasfound to be carrying a baby at the time of her death, diedinstantly. Ferdinand, who in disbelief of her death insistedthat she wake up, passed out within five minutes and diedsoon after.

Princip tried to kill himself by ingesting cyanide, and thenwith his gun, but he vomited the poison (which abrinovihad also done, leading the police to believe the group hadbeen deceived and bought a much weaker poison), and thegun was wrestled from his hand before he had a chance tofire another shot. Having been too young at the time ofthe assassination (19 years old) to face the death penalty,Princip received the maximum sentence of twenty years inprison, where he was held in severe conditions. He was in-carcerated in Theresienstadts (now Terezn) prison, dyingthree years later of tuberculosis and malnutrition.

a: abrinovi was a member of the nationalist Young Bosniamovement, and one of a group of seven conspirators who intended toassassinate Franz Ferdinand during his announced visit to Sarajevo.

Franz Ferdinand'sAssassination June 28, 1914

G a v r i l o

P r i n c i p ' s m u g s h o t

Onslaught in Sarajevo. :Petit Journal


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might have been one of themost humiliating clauses,Serbia was required to ad-mit misbehavior by its offi-cers (preamble of the Aus-trian ultimatum) and allowAustro-Hungarian authori-ties to participate in theinvestigation in Serbia (de-mand number 6). All demands had to be agreedto within 48 hours or Austria-Hungary wouldwithdraw its ambassador. Sir Edward Greyc,the British Foreign Secretary, commented toCount Albert Mensdorff-Poilly, Austrias Am-bassador in London at that time, that he hadnever before seen one State address to anotherindependent State a document of so formidable acharacter 6.

With Russias words of support, Serbia wrotea response to Austria, conciliatory in tone, as-senting on two demands (numbers 8 and 10),and partially accepting another six but reject-ing the remaining two7 (numbers 5 and 6d).Concurrently, Belgrade mobilized for war, buteven so, issued its response on July 25, withinthe 48-hour time limit.

The telegram with theSerbian reply reached Ger-manys Kaiser Wilhelm IIon July 28. After readingthe document he wrotecomments on it, from astance that was a completereversal to his previous oneof ordering the mobiliza-tion of the German Armyand accepting the terms ofthe Austrian ultimatum as aprelude to war. In his notehe commented: A brilliantsolution and in barely 48hours! This is more than

c: Grey played a key, but ineffective role in the crisis leading to theoutbreak of World War I. His attempts to mediate the dispute betweenAustria-Hungary and Serbia came to nothing mainly because ofGermans perfunctory response. He also failed to clearly communicate toGermany that a breach of the treaty not merely to respect but to protectthe neutrality of Belgium of which both Britain and Germany weresignatories would cause Britain to declare war on Germany. In a way,Grey was the Chamberlain of WWI, a pacifist afraid of confronting the

Central Powers.d: 5. Accept in Serbia representatives of the Austro-HungarianGovernment for the suppression of subversive movements and 6.Bring to trial all accessories to the Archduke's assassination and allowAustro-Hungarian delegates (law enforcement officers) to take part inthe investigations.

events that eventually esca-lated into full-scale war4.

Grabbing the opportuni-ty presented by the prince-heirs murder, the Austro-Hungarian governmentdecided to settle a long-standing score with Serbia,which for many years had

struggled with the Habsburgs and joined forc-es with other Pan-Slavic irredentists Croats,Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians.

Despite the seriousness of the incident, Em-peror Franz Josef was reluctant to create a warsituation. Count Leopold von Berchtold, at that

time the Austro-Hungarian Minister of ForeignAffairs, persuaded the hesitating monarch toissue Serbia with an unacceptable ultimatum,mainly by arguing that Russia would not cometo Serbias aida. This would effectively becomethe first step towards a full-scale war.

Following a Ministerial Council meeting(July 7) at which Minister Bertholds sugges-tion was approved, the Austrian governmentissued a ultimatum to Serbia, containing alengthy list of demands,clearly not possible fora sovereign state to fullymeet, unless it was willingto lose its international re-spect. In it, Vienna accusedSerbia of conspiring againstthe Empire and implied thatBelgrade was implicated inthe Sarajevo eventsb. Thisultimatum was presented

to the Serbian governmenton July 23.The demands were tough5.

They centered around theinvestigation and arrest ofthe Serbian Military conspirators fingered bythe assassins, the destruction of terrorist in-frastructure and means of propaganda, andmaking Serbia promise to go back on track andbecome a good neighbor again. Also, and thisa: All major European powers of that period feared Russia, given that

the Tsar had an army of six million soldiers that could be mobilized veryquickly.b: As it turned out later, the Serbian General Staff was involved inthe assassination given that one of its prominent members, DragutinDimitrijevi, was also the leader of the Black Hand who ordered Principto assassinate the Archduke.

C o u n t

L e o p o

l d v o n

B e r c h

t o l d

S i r E d w a r

d G r e y

Kaiser Franz Joseph around 1914.


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on Serbia. That bold step set in motion titanicforces that soon involved most major powersin Europe in a war that would kill millions andcompletely destroy the Habsburg Monarchy(as well as the German Reich) whose honor

Franz Joseph so candidly promised to protect.

The Diabolical Domino EffectThe events of late July and during the fatidic

month of August 1914 are a classic example ofone thing leading to another, and it wasntme who shot first. On the next page table onecan see the mad timeline of what followed theAustrian declaration of war.

Thus by the end of August all the major Eu-

ropean powers were engaged in battling eachother, but these battles were not much morethen local skirmishes between limited mili-tary forces. In September, however, the situ-

could have been expected. A great moral victory for Vienna... but with it every pretext for war falls to the ground 8.

Unknown to the Kaiser, Austro-Hungarianministers and generals had already convincedthe 84-year-old Franz Joseph to sign a declara-tion of war against Serbiaa. That was the trig-ger for the domino effect that followed (readthe The Diabolical Domino Effect topic).Within weeks, all the major European pow-ers were at war because of overlapping agree-ments for collective defense and, as seen, thecomplex nature of the alliances in effect.

Hence, after weeks of mounting tension,diplomatic comings and goings and militarymobilizations, Austria-Hungary declared wara: Count Berchtold was a militarist and a kind of Rasputin to Franz Josef.It was he, who disregarding Serbias largely compliant reply, persuadedthe old man to declare war.

Austria declares war on Serbia July 28, 1914On July 29, 1914, readers of all major newspapers in the

Austro-Hungarian Empire would read Franz Jose s emotion-ally charged proclamation (see below newspaper clip). Thetext began as follows9:

To My Peoples! (in German: An meine Vlker!) It was my fervent wish to consecrate the years that, by the graceof God, still remain to me, to the works of peace and to protect my peoples from the heavy sacrif ices and burdens of war. Providence, inits wisdom, has otherwise decreed. The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me, in the defense of the honor of my Monarchy, forthe protection of its dignity and its pos ition as a power, for the security of its possessions , to grasp the sword after long years of peace 10.

The war declaration telegram sent by Count Leopold vonBerchtold to Nikola Pai (read Pashitch), Serbian PrimeMinister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, read as follows:

Vienna, 28 July 1914, in the afternoonThe Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfac- tory manner the note of July 23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hun- garian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Governmentare themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rightsand interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward instate of war with Serbia 11.Signed:The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold.


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ber 9 when, heavily beaten, the German forcesstarted to retreat.

The First Battle of the Marne was a key vic-tory for the Allies because it ended Germanshopes of defeating France quickly. It also be-came a turning point in this senseless war.

ation changed drastically. Most French armieswere stationed near the Marne River (east ofParis) and the French High Command planneda major battle. Later, this combat became tobe known as the First Battle of the Marne. Itbegan on September 6 and ended on Septem-

WWI Domino Effect 12:a How the events evolved throughout the first month

Date (1914) Country Occurrence

July 28EUROPE

Austria-Hungary

Russia

The Great War begins declares war on Serbia and its army bombards Belgrade.

Tsar Nicholas II orders a partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.July 29 Russia orders full mobilization.

July 31 Germany enjoins Russia to stop mobilizing. Russia says mobilization is against Austria-Hungary only.

August 1

GermanyFranceItalyOttoman Empire

declares war on Russia and mobilizes.orders general mobilization.declares her neutrality.signs a secret alliance treaty with Germany in order to secure the Turks neutrality.

August 2 GermanyBelgium

invades and occupies Luxembourg.refuses permission for the German troops to cross its territory.

August 3

GermanyBritain

declares war on France and invades Belgium to outflank the French army.Britain protests over the violation of a Belgian neutrality that was guaranteed bytreaty; the German Chancellor replies that the latter is just a chiffon de papier (ascrap of paper).

August 4

Britain

GermanyUnited States

declares war on Germany for violating Belgian neutrality. Australia; Canada, NewZealand and South Africa, as British possessions, are compelled to go to war too.declares war on Belgium.President Woodrow Wilson declares a policy of US neutrality;. America would enterthe war in 1917 only.

August 5 MontenegroOttoman Empiredeclares war on Austria-Hungary.closes the Dardanelles.

August 5-16 Germany besieges and then captures the fortresses of Lige, in Belgium.

August 6 Austria-HungarySerbiadeclares war on Russia.declares war on Germany.

August 7 Britain The British Expeditionary Force arr ives in France.

August 9 Montenegro declares war on Germany. August 11 France declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12 France and Britain declare war on Austria-Hungary. At the Battle of Haelen Belgian troops repulse theGermans.

August 14-24 Germany Battle of the Frontiers. The Germans obtain a victory against the British Expedition-ary Force and Frances Fifth Army.

August 16-19 Serbia defeats the Austro-Hungarians at the Battle of Cer, this being the Ententes firstvictory in WWI.

August 17 Russia Russian Army enters East Prussia. Battle of Stallupnen.

August 20 Germany occupies Brussels.

August 22 Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

August 23 Japan declares war on Germany. August 23-30 Germany Battle of Tannenberg: the Russian Army suffers a heavy defeat by the Germans.

August 26 France and Britain British and French forces invade Togoland, a German protectorate in West Africa.

August 28 Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

August 30 New Zealand occupies German Samoa (later Western Samoa).a: source: Wikipedia - Timeline of World War I.


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ones to embrace enthusiastically the libertiesgranted to them by Joseph IIs Tolerance Pat-ent and later on by Franz Joseph. These Jewswere the most educated, often quite wealthy,with a sizeable number of them carrying uni-versity degrees or technical professions, whichseparated them from the unskilled and unedu-cated gentile majority. For these Jews, the mostlogical step for social acceptance was assimila-tion. The first step they took was to changetheir appearance, dressing like the gentry oftheir time. In Hungary, for example, they wentas far as changing their surnames to Hun-garian sounding family names. Most of themchanged their given names also, which werestill too Yiddish (Izidor, Izsk, Jakab, Moritz,etc). In contrast to their Galician and Bukovinabrethrens outsider look, if one were to crosswith these so-called reform Jews on the streetsof Vienna, Prague or Budapest it would havebeen hard to differentiate them from the gen-tile crowd.

Thus, it should not come as surprise that themajority of Jews in the Austro-Hungarian do-mains eagerly embraced the call for the arms.Maybe with less intensity but with the sameattitude, Germanys Jewry also professed thesame feelings towards the Vaterland . For theassimilationist Jews in Austria, Hungary andGermany the war became their big chanceto complete their integration into their sur-rounding society. The Central Powers victorywould be their victory against centuries-longantisemitism.

Furthermore, the war was regarded as achance to disprove one of the oldest antisemiticallegations, namely that the Jews were cow-ards. Die Wahrheit (The Truth), the organ ofassimilated Viennese Jews, wrote:the worstenemies of Jews... would be shamed into silenceby the long lines of Jews volunteering for service in the Austro-Hungarian army 13. A Jewishmonthly newsletter expressed similar views,adding a nationalistic tone to its editorial:

In this hour of danger we consider ourselves to

be fully entitled citizens... We want to thank theKaiser with the blood of our children and withour possessions for making us free... After thiswar, with all its horrors, there cannot be any more

The German army halted its retreat near theAisne River. From there, the Germans and theAllies fought a series of battles known as theRace to the Sea. Germany was trying to seizeports on the English Channel seeking to cut offvital supply lines between France and Britain.But the Allies stopped the Germans in the FirstBattle of Ypres in Belgium, which lasted frommid October until mid November. By late No-vember 1914, the war along the Western Frontreached a deadlock as neither side gainedmuch ground. From there on, both belligerentsides tried to conquer strategic terrains. Not-withstanding the sacrifice of lives of millionssoldiers on both sides, those battles had nosuccess. This deadlock lasted nearly three andhalf years, until Germany, Austria, the Otto-man Empire and Hungary capitulated.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIANJEWS IN WORLD WAR I

It is a quite well known fact that the Germanspeaking and Hungarian Jews were the first

French WWI motivational propaganda poster; the text reads:A last endeavor and we will get him (the German eagle)


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an-Magyar monarchs.They felt much moreaffiliated to the Slavsand their culture thento the German ethos,and they were strug-gling for their inde-pendence from Aus-tria and Hungary. Forthem the war becamean opportunity toweaken if not de-stroy the Austriansand Germans and theirPan-German policies.As history tells, it wasonly Tom Masarykand his friendly atti-tude towards the Jewsthat saved both Jewishcommunities from therage and vindictive-ness of the Czech andSlovak commoners.But these restrainedgrievances explodedlater, during the trag-ic Holocaust years.

Prof. Pauley mentions thatfor the first months of the fighting, Jewish hopesthat the war would inaugurate a new and far moreamicable era of Christian-Jewish relations seemedrealistic... Moreover, the Jews hope of refutingantisemitic charges about their alleged cowardiceseemed to be realized during the war 16.

Jews enlisted everywhere in large propor-tions to the gentile population (see sidebar)and were much commanded by the senior of-ficers for their bravery under fire.

Nevertheless, according toPauley,...the Jewish optimism[in Austro-Hungary] about the war causing aremission of antisemitism turned

out to be pathetically nave andshort lived. The trust that the military in general gave to Jews seemsto have aroused the distrust of non-

antisemitic agitation in Austria... We will be ableto claim full equality 14. Besides the assimilationist trends just men-

tioned, there was another reason maybe evenmore distinguished then the first one for theAustro-Hungarian Jews eagerness to supportand join that unfortunate war.

It is a well-documented fact that the greatmajority of Jews living in Austria-Hungaryduring the early twentieth century veneratedthe aging Franz-Joseph. According to MarshaRozenblit, professor of history at the Univer-sity of Maryland, Habsburg Jewry developedsuch a fervent loyalty

...not only because it protected them from

antisemitism, rampant in certain sections of society, but perhaps more importantly because it al- lowed them to develop what she terms a tripartiteidentity, i.e., an identity that combined politicalloyalty to the state, affiliation with a major culture of the region (predominantly, but not exclu- sively, German) and a strong sense of separateJewish ethnicity 15.Still according to Rosenblit, the Austrian

half of the Dual Monarchy was especially re-ceptive to this tripartite identity since it was

a political construct not a nation, making it veryeasy for the Jews to adumbrate staunch Austrianloyalty without having to adopt any particularnational identity . On the other hand, the Mag- yar elite was less receptive to this tripartiteidentity, and Jews were increasingly pressuredto link the three dimensions of their identityinto one Hungarian national identity, some-thing that, as commented, they adopted withextraordinary rapidity.

When war broke out, the Jewish popula-tion of Austria-Hungary mobilized physically,economically and emotionally on behalf of itshome state. And it remained mobilized untilthe dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy fouryears later.

It is easy to perceive thatsuch infrangible loyalty to theHabsburg House and affiliationwith the German culture creat-ed a difficult-to-resolve dichot-

omy, both for Bohemian andSlovakian Jews. Both Czech andSlovak Gentiles bitterly resent-ed the brutal rule of the Austri-

Hate well before Hitler: German antisemitic post card comparing a Russian Jew with a lice, 1914; the text reads Greetings fromRussian Poland.

Jewish participationin WWIOverall, Jewish participa-

tion in the Great War was verysignificant. Out of the 65 millionmen who fought on all fronts,

1,500,000 were Jews (2.3%). The Unit ed S tate s ha d 250,00 0Jewish troops a, 10,000 of thembeing officers. Britain 10,000 with1,300 officers. France 55,000including 14 Jewish generals.Germany with a Jewish populationof 600,000 Jews had 100,000Jewish soldiers with 2,000 of-ficers . 35,000 German Jews wonmedals including 2,000 pilots,among them Jacob Wolf theoldest German pilot (48 years old).

Aust ria -Hungary had 320,000including eight generals. Russiahad approximately 500,000 Jews

serving. The Jewish military deathtoll was estimated at 120,000, 8%of the Jewish fighting contingent.2,000 officers b. 35,000 GermanJews won medals including 2,000pilots, among them Jacob Wolfthe oldest German pilot (48 yearsold). Austria-Hungary had 320,000including eight generals. Russiahad approximately 500,000 Jewsserving. The Jewish military deathtoll was estimated at 120,000, 8%of the Jewish fighting contingent.

a: Roughly 5.7% of the soldiers wereJewish, although during that period Jewsmade up only 3.3% of the overall American

population.b: Even so, in 1916 Jews were accused ofevading active service despite the fact thatapproximately 100,000 Jews served in theGerman army, 12% more then the countrysaverage ratio of non-Jewish servicemen.


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were so bitterly op-posed to it and thefurther existence ofAustria-Hungary, it isnecessary to analyzethe foreign policy ofthe Central Powersduring that period.The Germans spreadscares about the dan-gers of Pan-Slavismonly in order to con-ceal the real dangerto Europe of Pan-Ger-manism19.

By the 1860s, Prus-sia and the Austrian Empire were the two mostpowerful nations dominated by German-speak-ing elites. Both sought to expand their influ-ence and territory. The Austrian Empire wasa multi-ethnic state where Germans did nothave an absolute numerical majority. The cre-ation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867)was one result of the growing nationalism ofother ethnicities. And, as already commented,for decades regions like Bohemia, Croatia, Ru-

thenia, Slovakia and Serbia witnessed nation-alistic controversies, uprisings and attempts ofautonomy.

On the other hand, Prussia, under Otto vonBismarcka, would ride on the coat-tails of na-tionalism to unite all of modern-day Germa-ny. The German Empire the so-called Sec-ond Reich was created in 1871 following theproclamation of Emperor Wilhelm I as head ofa union of German-speaking states. Different-ly from Austria, Prussia and the myriad of the

a: Otto von Bismarck, was a German statesman who unified the plethoraof German feudalistic states into a powerful German Empire underPrussian leadership.

Jews outside the army. Gentiles accused Jews ofacting as spies for Russians 17.The most serious accusation one of the

usual paradoxes of the Christian perceptionof the Jews wrongdoings was that the Jewsacted as spies for tsarist Russia.

When the huge contingents of refugees fromthe Eastern front reached Austro-Hungarianlands, among whom about 400,000 were verypoor Jews from Galicia and Bukovina, theantisemitic wave intensified. Jewish militarypersonnel began to be accused of all kinds ofmisdoings, from avoiding dangerous militaryposts (preferring much safer sanitary func-tions far from the front line), to stealing from

military warehouses, selling goods on theblack market and becoming profiteers.By the wars end, Jews were being charged

of undermining the home front and causing thedefeat of the Central Powers. In mid-June 1918,the German Peoples Assembly (DeutscherVolkstag ) denounced the Jews as war profi-teers, holding them responsible for the foodshortages. One of its members even called for apogrom as a way to heal the crumbling state18.

Thus, when the war was over the Jews hadlearned a bitter lesson again, namely that thecenturies-old hate indoctrination of the Aus-tro-German and Hungarian gentry would notlet antisemitism cease or even lessen just be-cause the Jews were willing to offer their bloodto show loyalty to the ruling governments.

THE SLAVIC SIDE OF THEGREAT WAR

It is not within the remit of this book to dis-cuss the details of the political plots and playsthat took place before WWI. Suffice to say thatboth Germany and Austria feared the Russianbear and its huge well-equipped army, butmore so, they feared the growing ethnic unrestin the Austro-Hungarian territories where sev-eral ethnic minorities were people of Slavic de-scent, who eagerly embraced Pan-Slavism andwere all fighting for some form of autonomyfrom the Habsburgs.

Pan-Germanism and Czech FearsNevertheless, in order to understand fully

what was at stake in WWI and why the Slavs

Emperor Wilhelm I, first King of unified Germany and Otto vom Bismarck

Pan-Germanism andPan-SlavismPan-Germanism 31 (in German

Pangermanismus or Alld eutscheBewegung ) was a poli tical m ove-ment of the 19 th century aimingfor unity of the German-speakingpeoples of Europe. It was the earlypredecessor of Hitlers expansion-ist militarism.

Pan-Slavism (in Slovak andCroatian Panslavizma/u ) was amovement in the mid 19 th centuryaimed at the unity of all the Slavicpeoples. The main focus was inthe Balkans where South Slavs hadbeen ruled for centuries by the twogreat empires, Austria-Hungaryand the Ottomans. Both theRussian Empire and its successor,the Soviet Union, also used it as apolitical maneuvering tool.


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Trojans (Austria) according to their conve-nience.

It was also due mainly toMagyar inf luencethat all Czech attempts to weaken German in-fluence in Austria were frustrated. When hewished to placate the Czechs, Franz Josephpromised them, on various occasions, to becrowned King of Bohemia. But he never car-ried out his promises. In this he was guidednot only by considerations of dynastic inter-est, but also by the advice of theMagyars 21:a.

The Czechs saw clearly what was in storefor them, should the Ger-man plans for a Great Ger-many materialize. And it did

not take much speculating toperceive how the Germanswould handle their Slav subjects. Authors such as Tre-itschkeb openly declared thatthe Slavs should be subju- gated and the Czechs, as themost courageous and therefore the most dangerous ofthem, crushed 22.

The Slavs always opposedbitterly the encroachmentsof Pan-Germanism, and sawin it their chief enemy. Af-ter the 1848 revolutions, theCzech revolutionary leaderPalackyc believed in a strongAustria as a federation of

nations to counterbalance Pan-Germanism,and hoped that the Habsburgs were willing togrant independence to the Czechs and Slovaks.

The greatest appraisal mistake the Czechsmade was in 1866, when they thought Austriawould cease to be the bulwark of Pan-Ger-manism, and, as Palacky did, believed Viennawould do justice to her subject Slavs and thusbecome a protection against Germany. It istrue that Austria did cease to be the head ofa: In 1918, Vladimir Nosek was Secretary to the Czecho-Slovak Legationin London and one of the first historians to write several books about thefirst Republic's struggles to deal with the conflicts between Prague andthe ethnical groups incorporated by the PPC in its territory.b: Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke (1834 1896) was a nationalist

German historian and antisemitic political writer during the time of theSecond Reich. His antisemitic opinions were expressed in his book Wortber unser Judenthum [A Word about our Jewry]. He also conceived theslogan, later used by the Nazis, The Jews are our Disgrace.c: Frantiek Palacky (17981876) was a Czech historian, nationalist, andpolitician.

then united German fiefdoms had a relativelyhomogeneous population of Germans and Ger-man speaking ethnics20.

As Nosek wrote, the claims of the Germans tonational unity, at first legitimate, turned dan-gerous when the Germans began to promotethe Grossdeutschland concept advocated byBismarck an imperialistic idea entailing thesubduing of the whole of Central Europe, in-cluding the annexation of Austria and the sub- jugation of some 80 million Slavs.

The Habsburgs also as-pired to become the headsof such an extensive em-

pire, but quite soon it be-came obvious that Austriawas internally weak, in con-stant struggle with its non-German ethnics. HenceforthPrussia, being the largest ofthe German states, becameAustrias rival. This contestended in 1866, when Bis-marcks perspicacious diplo-

macy turned the rivalry intoa great friendship, with thesigning of several mutual aidtreaties. A year later, Aus-tria, feeling its weakness andimpotence in the face of for-eign ethnic unrest (read alsoabout the 1848-1849 revolu-tions in Chapters 3 and 4), decided to let theMagyars deal with their own Slavic and Latin(Romanian) populations quarrels. This wasone of the main motives underscoring theDual-Monarchy Agreement (Ausgleich ) withHungary. Thus, the Slavs and Rumanians Bo-hemia was not perceived as a Slav nation andtherefore remained under Austrian rule cameunder Magyar tyranny.

The Magyars realized from the beginningof the Second Reich the importance of anunderstanding between themselves and the

Prussians, and they directed their foreign pol-icy accordingly. Although under Austrian rule,Budapest played a double-sided policy, as thesaying goes pleasing Greeks (Germany) and

The photos caption reads The Satan;the footer carries Treitschkes motto

The Jews are our Disgrace


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WWII. In a 1899 issue of theRevue de Paris hewrote on The Future of Austria, declaring:

The Austrian Germans wish to see Austria subordinated to German policy, and with the help of

a subordinated Austria, the sphere of German political and economic activity would extend fromHamburg to Asia Minor 24.

Nosek makes a strong point when he asserted

...to offer any proofs that the present war[WWI] was deliberately planned and provoked by the Gov- ernments of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest seems tome superfluous. Who can today have any doubtthat Austria willfully provoked the war in a maddesire to crush Serbia? Who can doubt that Austria for a long time entertained imperialist ambitionswith respect to the Balkans, which were supportedby Berlin, while Berlin itsel f wished to use Austriaas a bridge to the East 25?

So here we have the political elements andreasons why World War I started. Prince Li-chnowskya, for example, frankly admitted thatthe murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was amere pretext for Vienna to attack Serbia. Whatthe Austrian Imperial House really wanted wasto settle old scores, becoming a willful accom-plice in Germanys plan for territorial expan-sion.

THE CzECHS FIGHT FORINdEPENdENCE AlONGWORLD WAR I

From the late 1840s, Czech policy had butone ultimate aim: the re-establishment of theancient Kingdom of Bohemia and the full inde-pendence for the Czecho-Slovak nation. Fromthe very beginning of their political activ-ity Czech politicians resisted the Pan-Germanscheme for Central Europe. They preacheddemocratic values, namely liberty and equal-ity for all nations. They also advocated a fed-eration of the non-German ethnic nations froma: Karl Max, Frst von Lichnowsky, 6th Prince Lichnowsky (1860-1928).Lichnowsky became German Ambassador to the Austro-Hungarian

Empire in 1902, and later the Imperial German Ambassador in GreatBritain (1912-1914). During the July crisis of 1914, Lichnowsky was theonly German diplomat who raised objections to Germanys efforts toprovoke an Austro-Serbian war, arguing that Britain would intervene in acontinental war. On July 25, 1914, he implored the German government toaccept an offer of British mediation in the Austro-Serbian dispute.

the Pan-German Confederation, but instead ofbecoming a bulwark against Prussia, she be-came her faithful ally and obedient tool. TheCzechs also failed to grasp the subtle plansof Bismarck who in a short time succeeded inconverting Austria into Germanys bridge tothe East.

A year later Palacky gave up his illusions ofthe possibility of a just Austria when he sawthat she had abandoned the Slavs entirely toGerman-Magyar hegemony. Exasperated bythe Dual-Monarchy Agreement with Hungary,which the Czechs never recognized, he declared:

I have already said that I do not cherish anyhopes of the preservation of Austria, especiallysince the Germans and Magyars made it the homeof their racial despotism... The question thereforeas to what will happen to the Slavs hitherto living in Austria is not without significance. Withoutattempting to prophesy future events, which fora mortal man it is difficult to foreshadow, I maysay from my inner conviction that the Czechs asa nation, if they fell under the subjection of eitherRussia or Prussia, would never rest, contented...They would regard the Prussians as their deadlyenemies on account of their Germanizing rage 23.

So the German hegemonic plans of conquer-ing territories to the East were evident in thelate 1800s, and modern Czech politicians sawclearly what could be coming. For example, Dr.

Karel Kram, a Czech nationalist politician,foresaw with remarkable perspicacity the situ-ation that lead to WWI and 15 years later to

Karel Kram (1860-1937)Czech politician and leader of the Young Czech party in

Aust ria -Hungary and lat er o f th e Na tionalDemocratic Party in Czechoslovakia. A

liberal nationalist with close ties to thepolitical elite in Prague and Vienna,Kram pursued a policy of coopera-tion with the Austrian state as thebest means of achieving Czechnational goals before WWI, evenas he favored closer ties betweenthe Czechs and the Russian Empire(he was married to a Russian

aristocrat). Formerly a close associ-ate of T. G. Masaryk, Kram and

Masaryk were barely on speakingterms by 1914. Kram was Czecho-

Slovakias first prime minister. Later, hedrifted to the right, even flirting with the

Czechoslovak fascists.


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released. A similar fate also met the wife ofanother Czech leader, Dr. Edvard Bene, whoescaped abroad in the autumn of 1915, becom-ing secretary general of the Czechoslovak Na-tional Council and Masaryks close collabora-tor.

Unreal as it might sound, the Austrians pre-ceded Hitler in the conceiving of concentra-tion and forced labor camps, as well as in thebarbarism with which they treated their pris-oners.

Over 20,000 innocent Czechs men, womenand children were confined in Austrian intern-ment camps. Common citizens would be sim-ply seized from their homes and placed in those

camps on the ground that their political opinionswere dangerous to the existence of Austria.One inmate reported:Such prisoners were led away from their homeshandcuffed and in chains. They included women,girls and old gray-haired men. They were conveyed from their homes to internment camps in filthycattle trucks and were cruelly ill-treated. On oneoccasion forty-three Czechs, who were being conveyed to a camp of internment, were killed on theway by a Honvd a (Hungarian home militia) de- tachment, which was escorting them to their placeof imprisonment. The conditions under which theCzechs were interned at the Talerhof Camp, nearGraz, were absolutely outrageous. They were beaten and tortured on their way there. Immediatelyafter their arrival many were tied to stakes andkept thus day and night in absolutely indescrib- able sanitary conditions. Their guards murderedmany. When the thermometer showed zero degreesof frost, old men, women and girl s were left to sleepin the open air, and mortality increased amongstthem to a frightful extent 27:b.

TOm G. mASARyk,THE FOUNdING FATHER OFCzECHOSlOvAkIA

Since they could not think of revolting, theCzechs and Slovaks tried to paralyze Austriaspower in every other possible way. Czechbanks and other institutions, for example, re-a: In German: Landwehr . Later, during WWII, the Honvd militaryorganization became a Nazi collaborator that led Jews to the death trainsdeporting them to Auschwitz.b: The readers should recall that Nosek wrote his account in 1915-1918, sohe absolutely had no idea about the similar barbarism which would later beperpetuated by the Nazis and the Hungarian fascists.

Central Europe as a barrier against the Ger-man Second Reichs expansion.

Austro-Hungarian brutality and terrorAustria-Hungary declared war not only on

her enemies outside her borders, but also onher internal enemies, specifically on her ownSlav subjects. From the very first day of war,state terrorism reigned supreme in Bohemia,where the Austrian Government behaved as ifthe Bohemians were their enemies. Nosak tellsus that

...three political parties (including MasaryksRealist Party) were dis- solved and their organssuppressed. Fully three- quarters of all Czech journals and all Slovak journals were suspended.Political leaders were arrested, imprisoned, andsome of them even sentenced to death. Manyleaders have been impris-

oned as hostages in case an insurrection shouldbreak out. Over 20,000 Czech civilians have been

interned merely for being politically suspect, andabout 5,000 were hanged in an arbitrary way bymilitary tribunals, since juries had been abolishedby an imperial decree 26. The most important perhaps was the case

of the already mentioned moderate Dr. KarelKram. Kram was arrested in May 1915,charged with high treason and for leading theYoung Czechs. Four of his other colleagueswere arrested too. They were all sentenced todeath, although no substantial proof was pro-duced against them. Subsequently, however,the sentences were commuted to long termsof imprisonment. After the general amnesty of July 1917, when Austria was already losing thewar and Franz Josephs son Karl I had takenthe throne, they were released.

Professor Masaryk, who escaped abroad in1915, was sentenced to death in absentia inDecember 1916. Unable to reach him, the Aus-trians avenged themselves by imprisoning

his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk, persecutinghis wife Charlotte and forcing his son Jn to join the Austro-Hungarian Army. Only afteran energetic press campaign abroad was Alice

Czechs: a vocationfor freedom anddemocracy

From the seventh century until

1526 the Czechs enjoyed rela-tive autonomy and crowned theirown kings, who ruled over theBohemian territory. The Czechsrebelled against the Habsburgs in1618 the beginning of the Thirty

Years War and lost comp lete lytheir autonomy, being reduced tothe same status of all the othernations under Habsburg domi-nance (see Chapter 11).


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Political activity inside the Historical Landsand Slovak territories was of course out of thequestion due mainly to the above mentionedabsolute reign of terror. Some of the leadingCzech newspapers were suspended soon after

the outbreak of thewar. The few Slovakpapers published inHungary were sup-pressed at the sametime. Hundreds ofprominent politicianswere imprisoned byMay 1917.

The effect of allthese persecutionswas that the major-ity of Czechs and Slo-vaks came to desirefull independencefrom Austria-Hun-gary. The commonfeeling was that Aus-tria was doomed, andthat the only way toprevent the ten mil-lion Czecho-Slovaksfrom being exploitedagain in the interestsof German imperial-

ism was to secure complete independence.Masaryk and his two very close associates Bene and tefnik would lead the way.

The Czecho-Slovaks AbroadThe first public speeches advocating the for-

mation of a common state for the Slovaks andCzechs were made abroad, in France, Englandand in the United States. When the war brokeout, Czechs and Czechoslovakist-leaning Slo-vaks all over the world felt it was their dutyto prove that their place was on the side ofthe Allies. In Great Britain, France and Rus-sia they volunteered to fight for the EntenteForces, while in the United States, where someone and a half million Czechs and Slovakslived, they counteracted German propaganda

fused to subscribe to war loans. The function-ing newspapers published official reports withreluctance, and between the lines stressednews unfavorable to Austria. Czech and Slovakpeasants refused to give up provisions, accel-erating the economicand financial ruin ofAustria.

Perhaps the mostimportant assistancethe Czechs renderedto the Allies was theirrefusal to fight forAustria. In Septem-ber 1914 the 8th CzechRegiment refused togo to the front, untilthreatened by Germantroops. The 11th CzechRegiment of Piek re-fused to march againstSerbia and was deci-mated. A similar fatebefell the 13th and 72nd Slovak Regiments.

Out of 70,000 pris-

oners taken by Ser-bia during the firstmonths of the war,35,000 were Czechs.Only 3,000 of themsurvived and vol-untarily joined theCzecho-Slovak army in France. Besides, over300,000 Czecho-Slovaks surrendered volun-tarily to Russia whom they regarded as theirliberator. Unfortunately the Tsars rgime didnot show much understanding of their aspira-tions. They were scattered over Siberia, cut offfrom the outer world, and often abandoned tothe ill treatment of German and Magyar offi-cers.

So, the immediate effect of the war and theterror that followed was the unity of the wholeCzecho-Slovak nation. Professor Masaryk andDr. Bene having escaped abroad Masarykto London and Bene to Geneva formed a

Czecho-Slovak Government in exile and, later,the Czechoslovak National Council that wasrecognized by the Allies as the trustee andrepresentative of the Czecho-Slovak nation.

President Tom G M asaryk in the late 1920s.


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opportunity came for tit for tat (at the ParisPeace Conference, see next chapter) the Frenchdid not hesitate to destroy their traditional en-emies, favoring the Austro-Hungarian ethnicminorities.

Masaryks good ac-ceptance in the U.S.began with his mar-riage his wife, neCharlotte Garrigue,was the daughter ofa wealthy Danishimmigrant, RudolphGarrigue, who ran asuccessful insurancebusiness in Ameri-ca. The couple met in 1876 in Leipzig, whereCharlotte was studying music. They marriedshortly after and went to live for a brief pe-riod in the U.S. It was through his father-in-laws relations that Masaryk met an extremelywealthy and influential industrialist, CharlesCrane, with whom he established a very closefriendship. Crane became a large financialdonor to Masaryk and financed, on a large

scale, the then Czech and Slovakian resistanceagainst the Habsburg Monarchy in the U.S.A.Crane also financed the election campaign ofThomas Woodrow Wilson, elected AmericanPresident in 1913. Crane became his counselorin the White House. Thus, Masaryk establisheda very effective Czech lobby with the new ad-ministration.

Another important personality in the web ofCzech-American connections built by Masaryk

was Emanuel Viktor Voska. Born in Kutn Hora(Kuttenberg in German, today in the Czech Re-public), he emigrated to America in 1894. Anexpert stone-sculptor, he became a construc-tion entrepreneur, quickly attaining consider-able wealth. Voska was also politically very ac-tive, an intimate of Charles Crane, and workedextensively with Czech militant Associationsin America and the Wilson Government. Dur-ing both world wars he was engaged in spying.

In 1902 he became acquainted with Masaryk.In 1910 and 1912 he invited Masaryk and or-ganized, at his own expense, exclusive lecturetours in the U.S. at which considerable sums of

and revealed German plots intended to weakenAmerican assistance to the Allies.

In the fall of 1914, around the outbreak ofhostilities, Masaryk made several trips to neu-tral countries. While in Geneva, he was warnedthat the Austrian authorities, which recentlyhad imprisoned a number of Czech politicians,might arrest him. He decided to stay abroadand join the pro-independence movement ofCzech and Slovak emigrants that he soon led.

On his trips Masaryk always sought to in-fluence political and intellectual leaders aswell as sympathetic governments about the justness of the Czecho-Slovak cause and thesupport he needed to reach his ultimate goal

the forming of an independent CzechoslovakState. Among the countries Masaryk visitedwere Italy, France, and England. He finally de-cided to settle in London. In October 1915, hewas appointed lecturer at the newly foundedSchool of Slavonic Studies at Kings College,University of London.

Abroad, among the migrs, theCzecho-Slovak independence was an explicitaim as early as in 1915. Bakke mentions that,

...in October that year, Czech and Slovak outland- er associations at a meeting in Cleveland, Ohio(see later), advocated a Czecho-Slovak federation.In November, Czech exiles in Paris declared an independent Czechoslovak state as their goal. Later,the mentioned Czechoslovak National Councilwas founded there, which coordinated the effortsin Europe. Masaryk, tefnik and Bene were itsleading figures 28. However, the First Czecho-Slovak Republic

came into being due mainly to two very impor-tant factors: (a) Masaryks skilful and diligentdiplomatic work, mostly alongside AmericanSlovaks and Czechs and President WoodrowWilson, and (b) French sympathy for the causesof the oppressed Austro-Hungarian minorities,mainly the Czechs who they perceived as anintelligent and laborious folk, a feeling thatwas amplified by the great respect tefnikenjoyed among the French military and intel-lectual circles. Besides, the French abhorredthe Germansa as they had been beaten severaltimes by them on the battlefield. So when thea: Originally the French derogatorily nickname the Germans les boches ,meaning "dumbbells" because they perceived them as intellectuallyunderskilled to understand the French languages intricacies and beauties.It could also mean "pigheaded' or "numbskull." The word's ethimologicalroot originates from caboche , meaning idiot or imbecile.

C h a r l o

t t e

G . M

a s a r y k


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Cleveland Agreement. It should have beenclear from the beginning to all who signedthis accord that the state they were conceivingwould have to accept being a nation of Czecho-slovaks and not of Czechs and Slovaks sepa-

rated by their differences30. They should haveworked out the conditions for resolving theirmain asymmetries, mainly those of religiousand cultural natures. Instead they only for-mulated the political entity, an issue on whichthey were in full agreement of the details.

Bakke stresses the fact that neither this doc-ument nor the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918(see page 158) mention a Czechoslovak State,an element that later would become one of the

major diverging points between the Slovak au-tonomists and the Czechoslovak governmentformed in October 1918. According to Bakke,

the declaration of the Czech Foreign Committeeof November 14th, 1915, which was the first publicdemand for Czechoslovak statehood by the independence movement abroad, kept referring exclu- sively to the Czech nation despite the co-signature of the secretary and chairman of the SlovakLeague. The Committee stated that the Czech nation would no longer be silenced, that having lost faith in the viability of Austria-Hungary it no longer recognized it, and that the Czech nat ion wouldstrive for an independent Czechoslovak state 31. After tefnik, a Slovak hero, joined the

Committee (December 1915), the Czech anglebecame less prominent and the common goalsof both the Czechs and Slovaks became its of-ficial policy. In February 1916, the Czech For-eign Committee was turned into the NationalCommittee of the Czech lands and shortly after

renamed as the Czechoslovak National Council(eskoslovensk nrodn rada ).Soon after the Cleveland Agreement had

been published in international newspapers,Masaryk issued a proclamation in which heclearly acknowledged the wish of all Czechsand Slovaks to break their ties with Austria-Hungary and fight for an independent state.Some extracts, mentioned in Nosek, are thefollowing:

"We come before the political public at a momentwhen the retreat of the victorious Russian army isexploited against Russia and her Allies. We takethe side of the struggling Slav nations and their

money were collected for Masaryks campaignfor the Czecho-Slovak independence.

In June 1914, Voska came to Prague to seeMasaryk and other Czech politicians to con-sult them about the events of a possible war.On his return trip he traveled through London.There he gave an officer of the English SecretService Masaryks detailed report concerningthe political situation in Austria-Hungary. Af-ter Voskas return to America, he worked onadvancing the Association of Czech-American Journalists. He organized actions for the sup-port of the Czech resistance against the Aus-tro-Hungarian Monarchy and financed it de-

cisively from his own resources and throughdonations from other associates.This synthetic formulation was possibly a

major mistake made by the signatories of the

On October 22, 1915, in the Bohemian National Hall on

Broadway Street, members of the Slovak League (formedin 1907) and the Czech National Alliance (formed in 1914)signed the so-called Cleveland Agreement, in which theypledged to cooperate for the common goal of independentstatehood for the Czechs and Slovaks. It was the SlovakLeague that summoned this meeting, having invited theCzechs to join ita.

This agreement called for the formation of a federalstate of Czechs and Slovaks, and the lack of reference to aCzechoslovak nation was conspicuous. The main points ofthis document were29:

Independence : of the Historical Lands and Slovakianterritory;

Federation : A union of the Czech and Slovak nationsin a federative alliance of states with full nationalautonomy for Slovakia; Slovakia would have its ownparliament, its own state government, its own abso-lute cultural freedom, (thus Slovak would becomethe official state language in Slovak territory), andits own financial and political government;

Voting power : General, secret and direct; Form of government : A personal union with a dem-

ocratic form of state, similar to the British politicalsystem.

Amendments : This agreement could be amendedonly with the approval of both parties (Czechs and

Slovaks).a: This episode shows that in the early 1910s, the Slovaks living inAmerica were eager to join the Czechs in the forming of a commonfederation. Father Hlinka and his udks were unable to grasp theimportance of such cooperation and instead, from the beginning,opposed sincere alliance with the Czechs. Whatever todays revisionisthistorians write about how badly the future Prague governmenttreated the Slovak nation, the fact of the matter is that Hlinka andhis group always tried to destabilize the newly formed, healthydemocracy conceived and lead by Masaryk and his collaborators.

The Cleveland AgreementOctober 22, 1915


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Turkish and Bulgarian Allies for a cause which isunjust and doomed 32.

The road to IndependenceAs commented, the second most important

factor leading to the formation of a Czech-Slovak independent statewas French sympathy forthe causes of the oppressedAustro-Hungarian minori-ties, mainly the Czechs andSlovaks.

Therefore, the first politi-cal success of the Czecho-slovak National Council was

the Allies Note (composedmainly by the French) toPresident Wilson, dated Jan-uary 10, 1917. In this Note, inwhich the Allies for the firsttime stated publicly and ex-plicitly their war aims, theydeclared that these included...the reorganization of Europe,

guaranteed by a stable settlement, based upon the principle of nationality, upon the right which all

peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoy- ment of full security and free economic develop- ment, and also upon territorial agreements and international arrangements so framed as to guaranteeland and sea frontiers against unjust attacks; therestitution of provinces or territories formerly torn from the Allies by force or contrary to the wishes oftheir inhabitants; the liberation of Italians, Slavs,Rumanians and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domi- nation; the liberation of the peoples who now liebeneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks, andthe expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire,which has proved itself so radically alien to West- ern civilization33.

The greatest success of the CzechoslovakNational Council, however, was formal rec-ognition by France of the formation of an au-tonomous Czecho-Slovak army in France withthe National Council at its head. The Presidentof the French Republic Raymond Poincar, theFrench Premier Georges Clemenceau, and For-eign Secretary Stephen Pichon signed the fulltext of this historic document, dated December19, 1917.

By this act France recognized that theCzecho-Slovaks had a right to form an army

Allies without regard to which party will be victorious, simply because the Allies' cause is just...The Czech nation made an alliance with Hungaryand the Austrian Germans by a free election of aHabsburg to the throne of the kingdom of Bohe-

mia in 1526; but the dynasty created through asystematic centralization andGermanization a unitary ab- solutist state, thus violatingtheir treaty guaranteeing theindependence of the Bohemi- an State within and without...Under these circumstances theCzech nationa cannot continueto keep silence. That is why theCzech and Slovak emigrants

abroad deem it their duty toinform foreign opinion aboutthe true situation of Bohemia,to interpret the aspirations ofthe Czecho-Slovak nation tothe Allied statesmen, politicians and journalists, and todefend the Czecho-Slovak program...The Czech parties have hitherto striven for the independence of their nation

inside Austria-Hungary. The course that this frat- ricidal war has taken and the ruthless violence ofVienna make it necessary for all of us to strive forindependence without regard to Austria-Hungary.We are struggling for an absolutely independentCzecho-Slovak State... and the Czech nation hascome to the conclusion that it must take its destinyinto its own hands...Today there is no doubt that Austria-Hungarywrongly used the assassination at Sarajevo as a pretext against Serbia. Vienna and Budapest did

not hesitate to use forged documents manufac- tured by their own embassy agains t the Yugoslavs,and in this policy of deceit Vienna and Budapesthave persisted during this war. To this deceit theyhave now added revengeful spitefulness and cru- elty truly barbarian against the non-Germans andnon-Magyars...Germany shares the guilt with Austria-Hungary;it was in Germans power and it was her duty towards civilization and humanity to prevent thewar and not to take advantage of the imperialist

lust of Vienna and Budapest...[so, in short,] Aus- tria-Hungary and Germany are fighting with theira: (A.C.) Possibly this was a freudian slip, but Masaryk made a big mistakeby referring to the Czech nation instead of the nation of Czechs andSlovaks.

Poster published in Great Britain, incitingCzechoslovak refugees to join the recently formed

Czech-Slovak Army in Exile, 1916; LoC


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menta (Vremennoye pravitestvo Rossi ) agreedto Masaryks plans and a so-called Czech Le-gion was formed. It originally numbered some4,000 men, who served with distinction in theBrusilov Offensive (see box) against the Ger-man Army, between June and July 1916. Fol-lowing a hasty retreat, the Czechs returnedto base and began recruiting from among theranks of those Czech and Slovak POWs thathad surrendered to the Russians, expandingtheir numbers to over 40,000.

After the formation of the Czecho-SlovakRepublic, Bene, a resolute socialist, becameits Foreign Affairs Minister. In that functionhe energetically worked to strengthen the re-publics ties with the Soviet Unionb. His sym-pathy for the Russians continued when he waselected president (1935) and he became Stalinspersonal friend. In 1937, during the so-calledTukhachevsky affair, it was Bene who, ina: Led by Leon Trotsky, a Russian Jew, and which would in the future

become the government of the Soviet Union under Lenin and later Stalin.b: (A.C.) Was Bene a Communist? Certainly not. He was a socialdemocrat who admired the progress reached by the Soviet Union duringits first years of existence. And for some personal reason, he also admiredStalin. This was the source of his efforts to strengthen Czechoslovakiasties with the Soviet government.

of their own, a right that appertains only toa sovereign and independent nation; that theCzecho-Slovaks had a right to fight on the sideof the Entente, and therefore were to be con-sidered as one of the Allies; and that the po-litical direction of the army be reserved to theCzecho-Slovak National Council, a right that isusually accorded only to the government of anindependent state.

In a covering letter, and addressed to Poin-car, Clemenceau declared:

France has always supported by all means inher power the national aspirations of the Czecho- Slovaks. The number of volunteers of this nationality who at the outbreak of the war enlisted to

fight under the French flag was considerable; thegaps created in their ranks prove unquestionablythe ardor with which they fought against our enemies 34...

The Heroic Army Without a CountryWhile in Geneva, on July 6, 1915, Masaryk

declared war against Austria-Hungary in thename of the still aspiring Czecho-Slovakia.Masaryk encouraged Czech and Slovak soldiersto desert. Sometimes entire units up to theregimental level deserted from the Austrian-Hungarian frontlines in Russia, the Balkansand Italy. Because of this, the Austrian courtscondemned Masaryk, Bene and some otherCzech and Slovak leaders for high treason,sentencing them to death in absentia . As men-tioned, in 1918, Emperor Karl, Franz Josephssuccessor, pardoned them.

After French recognition of the Czecho-Slovakarmy there followed full recognition of the Na-tional Council by the Allies. While the generalsecretariat (E. Bene) was actively working forthese concessions in the West, Masaryk, af-ter devoting his attention to educating publicopinion in Great Britain on the importance ofa free and democratic Czechoslovak State, de-cided in May, 1917 to go to Russia.

The Czech-Russian ConnectionAlready in 1916 Masaryk had begun lobby-

ing the Tsarist government to allow him toraise a full Czech army in Russia. After theforced abdication of the Tsar, in March of 1917,the newly formed Russian Provisional Govern-

The Brusilov Offensive June 1916The Brusilov Offensive

(Brusilovski proryv ) was the Rus-sian Empires greatest feat of armsduring World War I, and amongthe most lethal battles in worldhistory, in which a small army ofCzechs and Slovaks fought brave-ly. It was a major offensive againstthe armies of the Central Powerson the Eastern Front, launched on June 4, 1916, and lasting until lateSeptember 1916. It took place in

what today is Ukraine, in the general vicinity of the townsof Lviv, Kovel and Lutsk. The offensive was named after theRussian commander in charge of the Southwestern Front,Gen. Aleksei Brusilov.

The Germans and Austrians were badly defeated. Brusi-lovs operation achieved its original goal of forcing Ger-many to halt its attack on Verdun and transfer considerableforces to the East. It also broke the back of the Austro-Hungarian army, which suffered the majority of the casual-ties. The Austro-Hungarian army was never able to mounta successful attack alone after that. Instead, it had to relyon the German army for its military successes. In a way,this battle established the fate and demise of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

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of the greatest epics of history. It has filled us all withadmiration for the courage, persistence and self-controlof your countrymen, and shows what can be done to tri- umph over time, distance and lack of material resourcesby those holding the spirit of freedom in their hearts.

Your nation has rendered inestimable service to Russiaand to the Allies in their struggle to free the world fromdespotism. We shall never forget it 35.

There are hundreds of other heroic episodesof the Czech and Slovak soldiers who desertedand joined the Allied Forces. One can safelyassume that, besides the political efforts ofMasaryk, Bene and tefnik, the internationaladmiration that those soldiers elicited contrib-uted intensely to the goodwill of the Allies to

help the Czechs and Slovaks attain their inde-pendence.

The U.S. and Czechoslovak independence

In regard to the Great War, the UnitedStates originally pursued a policy of isolation-ism, avoiding conflict while trying to brokera peace. This neutrality resulted in increasedtensions with both Berlin and London. Al-

though President Wilson was unsuccessful inhis attempts to negotiate a truce, neverthe-less he repeatedly warned the Germans thatthe U.S. would not tolerate unrestricted sub-marine warfareb in the Atlantic, in violationof international law and U.S. ideas of humanrights. The Germans perceived the warnings asthreats without major consequences and keptsinking American and British merchant ships

b: As early as in 1915, a German U-boat sank the British liner Lusitania.Even so, President Wilson balked.

good faith, handed Stalin a document forgedby the Nazis which contained an accountabout a group of senior Russian army officerswho supposedly were planning a coup to killthe Russian leadera. All these demonstrationsof friendship resulted in the mutual defenseagreement between Czechoslovakia and theSoviet Union, which, as will be seen, did notwork when in 1938 Czechoslovakia was invad-ed by Hitlers army (see Chapter 16).

In Russia, Masaryk succeeded in uniting andstrengthening all the Czecho-Slovak forces andin organizing a regular army of the many thou-sands of Czecho-Slovak prisoners there. Beforethe October 1917 Revolution these efforts of

the National Council and the Czech prisoners,who were always eager to fight for the Allies,were rendered immensely difficult by the ob-stacles inherent to the geographical conditionsof Russia and by obstructions placed in theirway by the Tsars rgime.

Freedom WarriorsThe courage of the Czecho-Slovak forces onthe Eastern front, fighting alongside the Alliesmainly in Siberia, became legendary. This epi-sode does not belong to this book, but it can besynthesized by the following telegram, sent toMasaryk by the British Prime Minister LloydGeorge:

On behalf of the British War Cabinet I send you ourheartiest congratulations on the striking successes wonby the Czecho-Slovak forces against the armies of Ger-

man and Austrian troops in Siberia. The story of the ad- ventures and triumphs of this small army is, indeed, one

a: It was this document that in 1937 started a military crisis that resultedin the so called "Great Purges" inside the Red Army.

America enters WWI cartoon, 1917; John Bull Magazine; artist: Frank Holl and

Strange way of establishing the future Republic An i nteresti ng episode: by t he e nd o f t he G reat War, the F rench

General Maurice Janin,Commander-in-Chiefof the Allied troops inSiberia, ordered theCzecho-Slovak Legionto kidnap Admiral

Alek sandr Ko lcha k,leader of the anti-Bol-shevik resistance (White

Army), and hand himover to the Bolsheviks atIrkutsk, in exchange forone-third of the bullionof the Russian Imperial Treasury which was under Kolchaks control. TheLegion obliged a and this bullion became the first national treasury of thenewly created state of Czecho-Slovakia.

a: Ironically, one of the commanders of this action was the Czech Col. Rajola Gajda whoduring WWII became a staunch Nazi collaborator. Kolchak was sentenced to death by theSoviet Revolutionary Government and executed in February 1920.

Gen. Maurice Janin and Adm. Alexandr Kolchak


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Czecho-Slovaks there, but also produced newpolitical results.

On June 19, aided by Voska and Crane,Masaryk met Wilson for the first time at theWhite House. He explained to the Presidenthis views about the developments in Eu-rope and presented his plans for forming theCzecho-Slovak Republic and government. Wil-son said later that he was very impressed byMasaryks ideas and democratic notions.

Masaryk himself describes this first meetingin his book Svetov Revoluce :

I begun my personal relations with President Wil- son relatively late. I arrived in Washington on May9, 1918, and met Wilson for the first time on June

19, the invitation being conveyed by Mr. CharlesR. Crane. In all my political campaigns abroad ithas been my method to try to influence statesmenthrough public declarations, articles, and inter- views. And before I saw the President, I spoke with people with whom he was in contact and who hada certain influence on him37. President Wilson had two main objections to

the creation of Czecho-Slovakia: (a) that theCzechs had not provided any convincing evi-dence that they were mature enough for self-

government, and (b) that the Czech populationnumbered only 6.7 millionb, which was notsubstantial enough to exert a decisive influ-ence over the countrys ethnic German popu-lation of 3.5 millionc.

To dispel Wilsons first objection, Masaryktold him about the Siberian Czech legion,which the President accepted at face value.To resolve Wilsons second doubt, Masarykconceived the notion of the Czecho-Slovak

peopled

. Adding over two million Slovaks andfive hundred thousand Ruthenians living un-der Magyar dominance, the number of Slavsseeking independence from Vienna grew closeto 10 million, about three quarters of the Slavpopulation that would form the first Republic.

The concept of the Czecho-Slovak people wasborn during the conversations that lead to the sign-b: This number accounts only for the Czechs living in Bohemia andMoravia.c: As history tells us, in this instance Wilson was absolutely right, giventhat the 3.5 million Sudeten Germans were the main cause or at least

Hitlers excuse for the dismantling of the first Czechoslovak Republic.d: This perception was probably the core for forming the notion ofCzechoslovakism which later turned to be the time bomb that fueledHlinkas nationalistic and autonomist campaign and later created thesocio-political conditions for Tiso to accept Hitlers offer to declareSlovakias independence.

transporting badly needed supplies to GreatBritain and France.

A simple but ill-fatedepisode precipitated Amer-

icas entry into the war the famed Zimmermanntelegrama, written by Ar-thur Zimmermann, StateSecretary for Foreign Af-fairs of the German Empire,

in which the Germans tried to enlist Mexico astheir ally.

The British intercepted the coded telegramand deciphered it. After the British govern-

ment revealed the telegrams terms to theUnited States, President Wilson, who had wonreelection on his keeping the country out ofthe war, published the captured telegram as away of building support for U.S. entry into thewar. After German submarines sank seven U.S.merchant ships and following the publicationof the Zimmermann telegram, Wilson calledfor war on Germany36, which the U.S. Congressdeclared on April 6, 1917. War against Austria-Hungary was not declared until December 7,1917.

The first message, addressed by Masaryk di-rectly to President Wilson, arrived in Wash-ington in December 1917. Masaryk sent a tele-gram from Kiev after he heard that the UnitedStates had declared war on Austria-Hungary.He was convinced that Americas full partici-pation in the war against the Central Powerswas the logical conclusion of the wars devel-opment. In this message, Masaryk wished thebest to the American troops in Europe and re-assured Wilson about the justness of the Al-lies cause.

Masaryk visited the United States again inMay 1918. He was accorded a splendid recep-tion in Chicago where some 200,000 Czech andSlovaks, as well as various Allied representa-tives, greeted him. His presence in the United

States not only stimulated recruitment amonga: In January of 1917, British cryptographers deciphered a telegram fromGerman Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann to the German Minister toMexico, von Eckhardt, offering United States territory to Mexico in returnfor joining the German cause.

A r t

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dations for a peace treaty with the CentralPowers.

In keeping with his spirit and ideas, onSeptember 21st, Masaryk led a delegation ofrepresentatives of the Oppressed Nations ofAustria-Hungary to visit President Wilson.Masaryk was the speaker for the delegation.He placed before Wilson resolutions contain-ing documented evidence that a minority ofGermans and Magyars had illegally ruled thevast majority of inhabitants of Austria-Hunga-ry. He demanded the dissolution of the DualMonarchy and the creation of an organizationof Free Nations. He then introduced the del-egates individually, who represented a popu-lation of more than 30,000,000 inhabitants ofthe Austro-Hungarian Empire, all from non-German and non-Magyar ethnic backgrounds.

Six days later President Wilson announced

his program to form the League of Nations andclaimed the interests of the smallest nation areas sacrosanct as the interests of the largest 41. Allthis led to the mass meeting of the Oppressed

ing of the famous Pittsburgh Agreement (see boxabove). That document was also the likely influencebehind President Wilsons willingness to sponsorthe forming of the First Czechoslovak Republic.

In any case, on May 29th, as reported in theNew Yorksky Dennik , the government of theUnited States declared publicly that itrecog- nized the demands of the Czechoslovaks and Yu-

goslavs and all other nations which have beensubjugated into slavery by Austria-Hungaryand it completely agreed with their efforts. Thenewspaper also announced that this procla-mation had been cabled all over the world. Sonow the United States was officially support-ing the Czechoslovak concept. The next day,May 30th, Masaryk arrived in Pittsburgh38.

Masaryk met Wilson again in September1918. The war was approaching its end and

Masaryk discussed with the president his con-cept of European reconstruction after the warended, and how it fitted into Wilsons famous14 Points Program40 that established the foun-

The Pittsburgh Agreement May 30, 1918In the history of the Czech and Slovak struggle for au-

tonomy and independence there certainly is no more contro-versial and elusive document then the so-called PittsburghAgreement, a.k.a. the Pittsburgh Pact or the Pittsburgh Con-vention.

Representatives of Slovak and Czech organizations in theUnited States, including the Slovak League, the Czech Na-tional Alliance and the Union of Czech Catholics, concludedthe Pittsburgh Agreement. It was signed on May 30, 1918by delegates of all those organizations and by Masaryk. Thesignatories identified themselves collectively as Repre-sentatives of Slovak and Czech organizations in the UnitedStates (Predstavitelia slovenskh a eskh organizaci voSpojench Sttoch ). Masaryk signed it as the chairman of theCzecho-Slovak National Council ( predseda esko-Slovenskej

Narodnej Radu ). His signature is the first at the right side ofthe document.Contrary to what some authors claim, this document was

written in the Slovak language rather then Czech, possiblybecause Masaryk was born in southern Moravia practicallyon the borders of the future Slovak State and spoke Slovakianfluently - this being the reason why he was trusted by theSlovaks39.

The agreement endorsed a program for the struggle fora common state of Czecho-Slovakia and consented that thenew state would be a democratic republic in which Slovakiawould have its own administration, legislature and courts. Itcontained six clauses:

Union of territories : The political program providesfor the union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent

State composed of the Czech and Slovak territories. Autonomy for Slovakia : Slovakia to have its own ad-

ministration, Diet (parliament) and courts. Cultural freedom : Slovak to become the official lan-

guage in schools, administration and in public life ingeneral.

Democratic design : The Czecho-Slovak State to be aRepublic and its constitution to be democratic.

Cooperation between the two peoples : Coopera-tion between the Czechs and Slovaks in the UnitedStates to be amplified and regulated, according to theneeds and the situation.

Future Provisions : The detailed regulations for the

establishment of the Czecho-Slovak state were left tothe liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal rep-resentatives.

Once more, as happened with the Cleveland Agreement,the signatories did not consider it important to include claus-es which would touch on and deal with the main differencesbetween Czechs and Slovaks, namely religion and culture.

As commented in other chapters following this one, theagreement signed in Pittsburgh became an element of con-stant bickering between the future Czechoslovak govern-ment and Slovak autonomists. The main reason for this se-rious discord was that neither Masaryk nor Bene fulfilledwhat had been agreed upon in its item one (autonomy forSlovakia).


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1921 Masaryk would have declared: There isno Slovak nation; it is only a Hungarian inven- tion43. Of course, by then one has to accountfor the Hungarians strong resentment aboutwhat happened at the Paris Peace Conferenceand their countrys mutilation that followed.Hlinka and severaludks b also expressed sim-ilar reservations, clearly because Prague neverconsented to what has been established in thatdocumentc.

b: (A.C.) A member of the Slovak Peoples Party was called a "udk "(after udov Strana , the Peoples Party). The plural " udci " denoted theparty as a whole. Throughout this book I will be using the AnglicizedLudks form, both for the plural of this word, and also for its collectiveform.c: Clearly, Masaryks and Bene biographies are sullied by thissingle event. Throughout the first Republic, the non-compliance of

the autonomy clause for the Slovaks was a constant source of frictionbetween Prague and the udks . Both statesmen felt that the Slovaks werenot ripe for self-government inside a federalist arrangement of states.They extended this belief to the Sudeten Germans and Ruthenes. It wasa great misjudgment on their part and cost the existence of the republicthat both so cherished

Nations at Independence Hall in Philadelphiaon October 26th.

The second historic marker commemoratingMasaryks efforts for establishing independentnation-states stands near this shrine to Ameri-can freedom and democracy. At this gathering,the Mid-European Union proclaimed, underMasaryks leadership, the Declaration of Com-mon Aims, a declaration of independence forthese nations42.

The representatives of the following nationssigned the Declaration of Common Aims:

1. Czecho-Slovaks2. Albanians3. Armenians

4. Unredeemed Greeks5. Italian irredentists6. Lithuanians7. Poles8. Romanians9. Ruthenians

10. Ukrainians11. Yugoslavs12. ZionistsMasaryks efforts to grant freedom and in-

dependence to the people repressed by theHapsburgs at that point extended far beyondthe borders of the Historical Lands and Slova-kia. It was probably this extraordinary mansbiggest day of joy and glory.

A month later the sanguinary WWI ended,on October 27, when Vienna conceded defeat.

A day later after securing the acquiescenceof the Austrian military authorities, the PragueNational Committee declared national inde-pendence (see Chapter 10). At last, Masaryksefforts for an independent Czecho-SlovakState had succeeded. The Czechs could finallydiscover where their home-nation was. Re-grettably, lightning and thunder continued topound the Tatrasa, taking the Slovaks another74 years to constitute their independent demo-cratic state.

Lack of trust in the Czechs intentionsThe Slovaks and especially theMagyars al-

ways doubted and distrusted Masaryks honestyin signing the Pittsburgh Agreement. Accord-ing to historian Istvn Borsody, for example, ina: (A.C.) I am making here reference to the first words that open theSlovak anthem (Nad Tatrou sa blska hromy divo bij )

Pittsburgh Agreements signature; Masaryk sits in the center.

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