book praticas de mediacao com grupos armados

8/6/2019 BOOK Praticas de Mediacao Com Grupos Armados

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Engaging with

armed groupsDilemmas & options or mediators

Mediation

Practice SerieS

ts Whfl

ob 2010

2


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The Centre or Humanitarian

Dialogue ( HD Centre ) is anindependent mediation organisation

dedicated to helping improve the

global response to armed conict.

It attempts to achieve this by

mediating between warring parties

and providing support to the

broader mediation community.

Copyright Henry Dunant Centre

or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010

Reproduction o all or part o this

publication may be authorised

only with written consent and

acknowledgement o the source.

The Mediation Practice Series is a project o the

Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre).We value the eedback o mediation practitioners

and researchers on the ormat and content o this

publication. I you have any suggestions or impro-

vement, please write to the editors, Luc Chounet-

Cambas and Katia Papagianni, at

[email protected]


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Engaging with armed groups

1

Foreword

th M

P Ss vvw

The Mediation Practice Series (MPS) was initiated in 2008 as

part o the HD Centres eorts to support the broader mediation

community. This series draws on eedback rom mediators who

tell us they and their teams oten rely upon networks and ad hoc

measures to assemble resources to support increasingly com-

plex processes. They work on the basis o their own experience

but lack insight into other peace processes. Their sta, both inthe feld and at their headquarters, also fnd themselves without

adequate reerence material, which hampers the improvement

o mediation practice.

Based on the shared view that mediators oten conront similar

dilemmas although mediation diers widely across peace

processes, the HD Centre has decided to produce a series o

decision-making tools that draw upon the comparative expe-

rience o track one mediation processes.

Each publication in the series will give readers a concise and

user-riendly overview o the relevant issues, key dilemmas and

challenges that mediators ace. It will also provide examples o

how these dilemmas were addressed in the past, with a view to

helping others prepare or the potential demands o ongoing and

upcoming mediation processes.


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Mediation Practice Series

2

Although these publications cannot replace practical experience,

it is our hope that they can contribute to a more systematic lear-

ning process. The orthcoming publications in this series will be

made reely available on the HD Centres website and will be

disseminated through our network and those o our partners.

Each publication is subject to a thorough peer review by practi-

tioners and support sta with expertise in the relevant topics.

Engaging with armed groups is the second publication in this

series. The author would like to thank the three anonymous peerreviewers or their helpul observations and suggestions. She

would also like to thank the ollowing individuals, whose comments

and advice she drew on in the preparation o this paper : Barney

Aako, Hiruy Amanuel, Luc Chounet-Cambas, David Gorman,

Romain Grandjean, Tom Gregg, Martin Grifths, Priscilla Hayner,

Nicholas Haysom, Theo Murphy, Katia Papagianni, David Petrasek,

Jonathan Powell, Kieran Prendergast and Francesc Vendrell. She

remains responsible or any errors the text may still contain.


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3

1. iu

2. Why gg ? Casestudy:TheFMLNandtheUNinElSalvador

Casestudy:DilemmasoftalkingtotheTaliban

3. eggm by whm?

Casestudy:PrivatemediatorsandtheGAM

in Aceh

4. iyg hllgs sks

Casestudy:Copingwithpre-conditions

on Hamas

Casestudy:TheICCandtheLRAinconictat the peace table

Casestudy:NorwayandtheLTTE

5. ops

Casestudy:EngagingtheMaoistsinNepal

6. cluss

Fuh g

5

78

13

14

15

18

20

23

28

29

31

35

38

Contents


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5

Engaging witharmed groupsDilemmas & options for mediators

iu

As mediators consider engagement with armed groups they

ace a variety o challenges and options including whether it is

wise to engage at all. This contribution to the Mediation Practice

Series addresses engagement by those working toward peace

processes which involve ormal interaction between leaders.

The ocus is on the dilemmas, challenges and risks involved in a

mediators early contacts with an armed group and subsequent

engagement as interlocutor, message-carrier, adviser and/or

acilitator all roles that may precede and accompany ormal

negotiation between parties to a conict.1

The armed groups considered are those whose rebellion orresistance explicitly challenges the authority o the state, rather

than the ull spectrum o non-state armed groups (which would

include criminal organisations and gangs, as well as paramilitary

actors accountable to the state). The ormer claim their violence

is rooted in legitimate sel-deence against the inringement o

their rights. Political in its origin i at times criminal in its conduct

armed action is pursued as a means to a political end. While

military pressure, or other actions by security orces, may be

1


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6

necessary to counter it, in almost all cases a lasting resolution to

the conict will depend on some orm o political accommodation

or agreement.

Even within this defnition, armed groups are characterised by

their great diversity as well as the varied degree o threat which

they represent to the state. Rebel orces organised as an army

and capable o holding territory (the Sudan Peoples Liberation

Army or the Peoples Liberation Army in Nepal) are distinct rom

broad political-military resistance movements such as Hamas and

Hezbollah (the ormer, o course, has controlled Gaza since it wonelections in 2006). Dierent again are smaller groups, such as the

Irish Republican Army (IRA), or the Basque separatist group ETA,

organised in cell structures to acilitate the planning o targeted

acts o violence but with links to political surrogates ; the broad

range o ethnic-based armed groups in Arica and Asia struggling

to assert control over populations, territory and/or resources ; or

interlinked groups such as Islamist militants active in Somalia and

Yemen, Aghanistan and Pakistan, in some instances with ties to

the international network o Al Qda.

Such diversity accentuates the need to be wary o over-

simplifcation or o relying too easily on general principles. With

this in mind, the ollowing fve sections address the arguments

or engagement with armed groups. They consider the question

o who should engage, the challenges and risks involved, and

the options available to mediators, beore oering some brie

conclusions. All acknowledge that the issue o engaging with a

specifc group will almost certainly turn on the particularities o

that group, the nature o its insurgency and the context in which

it operates.2


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7

Why gg ?

Mediators considering involvement in eorts to prevent, resolve

or mitigate the worst eects o armed conict must frst consider

whether to engage with a particular armed group and, i so, how

to do it eectively.

The intense period o peacemaking that accompanied the

unravelling o the Cold War was characterised by mediators

open engagement with non-state armed groups. Engagement

was acilitated by several actors : the relative coherence o thegroups and entities that had emerged to contest the Cold Wars

proxy conicts ; patterns o state sponsorship which ensured

that outside powers retained access and leverage over insurgent

orces ; a broad acceptance that it was the prerogative o

the UN Secretary-General or other

peacemakers to establish contact with

groups ormerly considered pariahs

but now acknowledged as potential

partners or peace ; and the relativeneglect o issues o accountability

which acilitated peace processes

even with actors such as the Khmer

Rouge. An additional actor enabling

engagement was the marked decline,

ater 1990, in opposition to intervention rooted in the rhetorical

deense o sovereignty. This was a consequence both o the loss

o such oppositions Soviet sponsor and the act that China and

other states sensitive on this issue were less vocal in this period

than either beore, or ater.

AlQdasattacksontheUnitedStatesinSeptember2001com -

plicated the environment or peacemaking. Individual states and

multilateral organisations dramatically increased their propensity

to label or legally proscribe armed groups as terrorist organi-

sations. States directly challenged by armed groups drew on

international condemnation o terrorism to boost the legitimacy

2

I cannot think o an armed

group with which I would

not engage with in principle,

although many in practice.

Martin Griths,

Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue


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8

The FMLN andthe UN in El SalvadorIn November 1989 the largest oensive o the civil war betweenthe broadly Marxist-Leninist Farabundo Mart National Libera-tion Front (FMLN) and the Government o El Salvador revealeda military stalemate that orced the parties into UN-mediatednegotiations. Tese were acilitated by earlier contacts the UN had

established with the FMLN through a highly capable individualwho represented the organisation on human rights issues. Heencouraged discussion with FMLN commanders in the margins oa meeting o the non-aligned movement held in Harare in 1988. Inurther consultations UN ocials oered assurances to the FMLNo the Secretary-Generals impartiality as a mediator, and distinc-tion rom the UN Security Council.

Te United States did not question the UNs contacts with theFMLN but subsequently raised concern that the mediator, Alvarode Soto, was partial to it. He countered by encouraging the US tomeet with the FMLN itsel. In time it did. A US Congressman andthe US Ambassador travelled to a guerrilla camp within El Salva-dor beore the conicts end, and the US Ambassador to the UNquietly attended a meeting with the FMLNs General Commandduring the nal stages o negotiations held in New York in late1991. Te US put important pressure on the Salvadoran Govern-

ment to accept the peace agreement and became a rm supportero its implementation.


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9

o their eorts to quash them. The question o engagement grew

more controversial, even as globalisation and a ready access to

the media ensured that, at an operational level, armed groups and

their representatives have never been easier to fnd or contact.

Arguments or engagement today are rooted in principle and

pragmatism. They can be broadly summarised as ollows :

Thepersistenceofarmedconictandabeliefthatggg

m gups s h p ms bg

, not least because military options against insurgentson their own rarely succeed in creating conditions that will

oster sustainable peace.3 Despite an overall trend toward a

reduction o violence since the end o the Cold War, there

were 36 active armed conicts in 2009, all o them involving

the state and one or more non-state armed groups a rise o

nearly one quarter since the early 2000s.4

The imperative top ll ppuls m -

ug vl. Even in circumstances in which engagementmay not lead to a resolution, it can address human rights and

other humanitarian concerns, secure a presence in a conict

zone to monitor humanitarian conditions, and save lives.

Theneedtoensure thatthosearmedactors (or theirrepre-

sentatives) who have had primary roles in pursuing the conict

and have the capacity to reach or undermine agreements

that will acilitate its end, are included in processes towards

peace and are present at the peace table. Armed groups may

represent sizeable constituencies ; when they have grievances,

and the ability to sustain armed action, they will have the ability

to spl y slm m whh hy l u.

Anopportunitytodevelop hl mmu to

an armed group. This has various benefts, even in circums-

tances in which a peace process seems remote. A channel

may prove useul to deuse a crisis or emergency, or address


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10

You can talk to terrorists,

but you dont have to agree

with them.Jonathan Powell, ormer Chie o Sta

to UK Prime Minister ony Blair

an issue such as a kidnapping, with discretion. I maintained

by a third party rather than a government it also oers the

possibility o deniability. Over time such a channel might be

activated or the pre-negotiation o terms or meetings between

the parties.

Ameans to acquireg usg o the armed

group and its motives and capacities or engagement. Greater

understanding will provide the basis or analysis o the

challenges and risks specifc to engagement with each

particular group. It may also allow the mediator to identiy thegroups interests as opposed to its public platorms and thus

the issues on which the group and government might fnd

common ground.

Theopportunity bul us with the armed group. The

mediator may be able to encourage the group to reect on

entrenched positions and/or prevent its immersion in a logic

that is a consequence o its isolation and pursuit o armed

struggle. Such trust may allow themediator to build an armed groups

py g, both in

advance o, and in parallel to, peace

talks something that even govern-

ments will admit can contribute to the

quality o any resulting agreement.

Yet engagement is not easy. There may be no such thing as a

bad conversation, as was observed within a 2009 workshop held

at theU.S. Institute ofPeaceonthe subjectofmediationwith

proscribed groups.5 However, any conversation with an armed

group is laden with implications. Reasons gg there-

ore cannot be dismissed lightly.6 Dierent potential mediators will

have dierent legal and political red lines, but the most common

arguments against engagement revolve around the ollowing :


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11

That m ggm wll hv mp upon the

behaviour o a group that is bent on violence and determined

to maintain positions o implacable hostility to its enemies. This

is a proposition that requires serious consideration. However,

engagement need not constitute appeasement. There is no

need to agree with an armed group and there are other benefts

to be gained rom exploratory contacts.

Thatanyformofggm wh hs wh us vl

hllg s pw sks sghg hm

wll h h lgmy with their own constituentsand on the international stage. This line o thinking received

reinforcementinaJune2010rulingoftheU.S.SupremeCourt

which upheld the constitutionality o a ederal law that makes

it a crime to provide material support defned to include

expert advice or assistance, training and services and

embracing the advocacy or human rights or peace to those

identifed as oreign terrorist groups.7

Conversely,thatm gvms my hpps h ggm wh m gups,

whether through proxies or directly. It is difcult or govern-

ments to justiy talks with those who are killing their citizens.

It is also embarrassing, or worse, i the existence o talks

emerges ater a government has denied them. A government

will not want to be perceived to be rewarding an armed group

or its past violence, or give it perverse incentives or carrying

on killing.

Thatw s b slu. A number o governments

have drawn encouragement rom what has been termed the

Sri Lanka option : a tough military response, the reusal to

countenance a political solution, and instead a conscious

decision to wage war to destroy an armed group. As the

International Crisis Group has argued, the model sets a

dangerous precedent, not only or its violation o the most

basic laws o war, but also or its ailure to address most


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drivers o Sri Lankas conict, and its contribution to new

sources o resentment.8

Thatsome armedgroups such as theLordsResistance

Army (LRA) inUganda, orDemocratic Liberation Forces of

Rwanda (FDLR) in the eastern Democratic Republic o Congo

(DRC) disregard human rights and employ practices against

civilian populations which mediators may fnd busv

u. However, there are many conicts in which

state actors are also culpable o human rights violations (as

was clearly the case in Sri Lanka), and curbing, or halting,such practices must be the priority. For a mediator, it is pro-

bably neither possible nor useul to quantiy acceptable or

unacceptable levels o violations that might open the way

to, or preclude, engagement.

Thatarmedgroupsfactorinthepossibilityofinternationalen-

gagement and may either s m sll

mvg ws w p accordingly. Frequently

cited examples o this include the Kosovo Liberation Army in1998-1999 and rebel movements in Darur whose attitudes to

the 2006 negotiations in Abuja (and in some instances since

then) were arguably conditioned by their varying expectations

o the benefts that could accrue to them rom international

engagement.

Third parties who advocate engagement with rebel and resistance

groups do so on the basis that the risks arising rom engaging

armed groups are outweighed by the prospects o achieving

an end to the armed conict. Their engagement is nevertheless

predicated on a number o dierent assumptions. Some most

critically that the armed group has an interest in a substantive

exchange with an external actor will be quickly tested. The

validity o others that the armed group will actually negotiate

(that is, articulate demands that lend themselves to rational,

or at least reasoned, debate) ; or that the armed group can be

encouraged to moderate its behaviour and demands, and through


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13

Dilemmas otalking to the TalibanBy mid-2010, talking about talking to the aliban had becomecommonplace as doubts about the success o US-led counter-insurgency eorts mounted. But dierences regarding what shouldbe talked about, who should do the talking, how it should relate tothe military logic o international engagement in Aghanistan and abroader process o regional reconciliation, remained rie. Since late2001, when the aliban were driven rom power and established asae-haven in Pakistan, they had neither been engaged in ormalpolitical terms nor developed a coherent set o political demands.

Yet individual contacts rom the Aghan Government and by othersincluding representatives o Saudi Arabia, the UN, the ICRC andNGOs (in addition to Pakistan) had multiplied.

Challenges to the initiation o a political process stem rom a lacko consensus on its objective. Persistent corruption continues to bea source o conict. Distrust and dierences on policy are presentwithin, and between, the Aghan Government, the aliban, the

United States, and critical regional actors such as Pakistan, India,Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia. Issues that divide them include :opposition to engagement with the aliban by non-PashtunAghans ; a combination o intensied military pressure rom theUS and wavering support o its NAO allies, aecting the alibanscalculations o when to engage and how seriously ; the continuingpresence o aliban leaders on the UN sanctions list ; Pakistansrole ; and the whole question o pre-conditions. Te aliban wantsanctions lists lifed, prisoners released and Western troops out ;

the US and Saudi Arabia insist that the aliban should break all tiesto Al Qda. Tese issues could conceivably be addressed withinnegotiations, but not in advance o them.

Te situation calls or a graduated approach to sustained engage-ment with the aliban and other insurgent groups, i not by theUS then by others trusted by the US, the Aghan Government andthe aliban. In the absence o clarity on a desired end state orAghanistan (or the process to reach it) more limited goals could

include improved understanding o the aliban and deepeningengagement on humanitarian issues.


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14

international exposure as well as expertise become more

amenable to pursuing its goals by peaceul means will only be

ascertained in the course o an engagement.9

The complexity o these issues demands a clear-eyed assessment

o the mediators own capacity and comparative advantages ;

careul analysis o the armed group (including its motives in con-

templating engagement with an external actor) ; the challenges

and risks involved in engaging it ; and a detailed understanding

o the varied options to do so. As Aghanistan demonstrates, the

options beore a potential mediator may be limited.

eggm by whm ?

The United Nations, regional organisations, individual states

and private mediators engage with rebel and resistance groups

with dierent capacities, visibility and leverage.10 Their work may

complement the channels that governments themselves maintain

to armed groups they publicly hold to be pariahs (as was the case

oftheUKGovernmentandtheIRA).Inothercaseseithernosuch

channels exist, or domestic political sensitivities regarding talking

to terrorists prohibit their utilisation or substantive or sustained

engagement. In these cases, third party intermediaries will be

required to establish contact between two or more parties and

help explore whether conditions or a negotiation exist.

The asymmetry o conict involving a government and one omore non-state armed groups as well as a state-centric inter-

national system have an impact on questions o which mediators

may be best placed to engage with amed groups. This is parti-

cularly evident in the early stages o a process. The prolieration

o terrorist lists maintained by individual states and multilateral

organisations represents one set o constraints or engagement

(this is not to deny positive impacts in some cases, including

the pressure under which armed groups have been placed

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Private mediatorsand the GAM in AcehTe HD Centres involvement in Aceh dated back to late 1999 andits early ocus on the prevention o humanitarian crises in theprovince. It conducted initial meetings with representatives othe Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Malaysia and Sweden, whileconsulting key stakeholders in Jakarta and Aceh. Te GAM was

reluctant to meet ace-to-ace with representatives o the Govern-ment o Indonesia, but a rst meeting eventually took place inearly 2000 (Te GAM was assured by the HD Centre that it wasnot ormally talking to the Government, but just discussinghumanitarian issues). Te ensuing negotiations broke down vemonths afer the signing o a Cessation o Hostilities Agreement(COHA) in December 2002, but had contributed to substantiveshifs on the part o the GAM. Perhaps none was more signicantthan the GAMs recognition o the Government o Indonesia and

acceptance that autonomy could be implemented in the COHA.

Te GAM had welcomed the legitimacy which internationalinvolvement in its peace process, through the HD Centre, oered(even as the Indonesian Government had accepted the HD Centreonly because its private status minimised the same legitimacy).However, it never hid its interest in a more high prole acili-tator. Te second engagement on Aceh was given impetus bothby Indonesias rst direct elections or president in 2004, andthe devastating tsunami that struck that December. Facilitatedby Martti Ahtisaari and the Crisis Management Initiative, talksheld in Helsinki began in early 2005. Te GAM welcomed bothAhtisaari, as a ormer President o Finland, and the access to theEuropean Union he brought to the process. Upon Ahtisaarisrecommendation, it also accepted capacity-building romSwitzerland. In these circumstances, the GAM dropped itsdemand or Acehnese independence, perhaps the critical element

in allowing a peace agreement to be concluded in August 2005.


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to abandon the military struggle). The lists impose no uniorm

limit on contacts with listed groups or individuals. However, as

isdiscussedbelow,UScitizensorthosewhocomeunderUS

jurisdiction (including non-US nationals)may beprosecuted if

they provide unds or other material support which can be

construed to include mediation to

groupsidentiedbytheUSGovern -

ment as terrorist. Meanwhile, even

those mediators who do not ear

prosecution may fnd the question

o their engagement with an armedgroup inhibited by the existence

and incoherence o the proscription

regimes.11

States, and multilateral bodies com-

posed o states, have a bias towards

power and in-built sympathies towards

other states that long pre-date the

existence o terrorist lists. They tendto assume that use o orce by a non-

state actor is illegitimate (particularly

i, like India or Russia, they have active

conicts within their borders). They will

understand that many governments

will reuse to engage directly with

insurgent groups unless the latter frst agree either to abandon

the armed struggle, or at least to a cessation o hostilities.

Non-state armed actors, meanwhile, struggle to gain access to

the ora in which their conicts will be discussed (such as the

UN Security Council) and differwidely in their familiarity with

the norms and practices o international diplomacy.

As a variety o mediators may be involved in a given peace

process over a number o years, this places emphasis on

the importance o sequencing. Dierent mediators will have

dierent advantages at dierent stages o a peace process.

Dierent kinds o

mediation suggest dierent

kinds o institutions ;

some require the resourcesand leverage that only

governments or multi-

lateral institutions

can bring to bear, while

in others powerlessness

can be an asset, a basis

or condence and trust

building.Nicholas Haysom, Executive Oce o the

UN Secretary-General


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Similarly, questions o precedent and concerns about terrorism

carry widely diering weight in dierent political contexts.

U ns : The UN Secretary-General and Security

Council have dierent roles and responsibilities with regard to

peacemaking.TheUNSecretary-Generalengagesinmedia -

tion and good ofces whose legitimacy and impartiality are

rootedintheUNCharter.Thesecharacteristicscontributeto

thefactthatUNmediationremainsattractivetomanyarmed

groups (others will question a Secretary-Generals ability to

act independently o powerul states on the Security Council).State actors may shy away from the UN out of concern

or issues o sovereignty and/or the difculties inherent in

involvingtheUNinacondentialprocess.Inacasesuchas

Nepal,however,discreetpoliticalworkenabledUNofcialsto

engage early with an insurgent group. In other circumstances,

such as the eastern Democratic Republic o Congo, they have

been called upon to acilitate complex talks between states

and a variety o armed groups.

rgl gss : Regional and sub-regional orga-

nisations have the advantages o proximity to the conict as

well as knowledge o, and sometimes leverage over, conict

parties. However, their engagements may be subject to pressure

rom their larger member states ; limited by issues o mandate

and/or capacity ; or distorted by the sponsorship o some

armed groups by one, or more, o

their members (sponsorship o an

armed group by a neighbouring

state is all too common and can

render that group a tool o the

oreign policy o its patron, and

thus a orce or regional, as well as

local, instability).

States, and multilateral

bodies composed o states,

have a bias towards

power and sympathies

towards other states that

pre-date the existence o

terrorist lists.


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18

ivul ss :IndividualstatemediatorsfromtheUnited

States to prominent regional actors such as Nigeria, South

Arica, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and

Qatar are able to wield relative power and inuence over

conict parties. However, their own interests in a conicts

outcome, or concerns with the issue o terrorism, may inhibit

their engagement with armed groups. In Europe, peacemaking

has ourished in two states Norway and Switzerland that

arenotmembersoftheEuropeanUnionandarethereforenot

conditioned by its listing o terrorist entities.

Pv ms : Independent international mediators

include both private organisations and prestigious individuals.

Although weak mediators, to the extent that they have to

borrow leverage rom others, private mediators engage with

armed groups with particular advantages. They are small,

exible and independent, and can engage early (and with

discretion) with groups others might consider pariahs, or not

yet meriting attention. Their involvement is inherently less threa-

tening to a government than that o an ofcial actor, and carrieswith it the important attribute o deniability. However, they can

also be dismissed rom a process with no great political cost

and will need to link up to ofcial actors as mediation advances.

iyg hllgs sks

For a mediator or acilitator decisions regarding whether, and how,to engage will be rooted in detailed analysis o the armed group as

well as the broader context within which it is active. Is the struggle

to take part in (or take over) the national government, secession,

or or control o territory and resources within existing borders ? Is

the composition o the group determined by ethnicity, or in religious

terms ? To what extent are structures o command and control

identifable and accessible ? (In some cases, as in Aceh, this may

involve relations between feld commanders and a more distant,

4


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19

perhaps even exiled, leadership). Does the mediator understand

a groups constituency and support base, the role played by

women within the armed group, and its economic sustenance and/

or interaction with the diaspora ? (This is a critical issue in contexts

as diverse as Somalia and Sri Lanka). What are the groups

relations to other actors (sustainers and spoilers) active inside the

conict system and beyond it ? Is there an outside state or states

supporting/controlling the armed group ? Particular attention will

need to be paid to the strategic choices the group may be acing.

Where does armed action ft in to a groups broader goals ? What

calculations will be involved in abandoning the military aspects oits struggle ? What costs will it incur by engaging in talks ?

Among the numerous issues that are likely to present themselves

as hllgs, the ollowing stand out :

ilus s-mkg : A mediators task will

be greatly acilitated i his or her prospective interlocutor is an

eective armed group, with good command and control and

clear procedures o political decision-making (as the FMLN inEl Salvador) or a charismatic leader with recognised authority

(such as John Garang o the Sudanese Peoples Liberation

Army, or indeed Gerry Adams o Sinn Fein). However, this

will requently not be the case. A

mediator should thereore consider

i he or she is able to develop an

understanding o decision-making

processes within the armed group

and the extent to which interlocu-

tors are legitimate representatives

o its leadership. Do those at the

negotiating table have authority, or at least report directly

to those who do ? (This was a concern regarding the Lords

Resistance Army team present at the negotiations in Juba,

or example).

Do those at the negotiation

table have authority, or at

least report directly to whosewho do ?


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20

Coping with pre-conditions on HamasHamas decision to take part in legislative elections or the Pales-tinian Authority in early 2006 represented a historic shif as wellas an end to its suicide bombing campaign. Its victory took theWest by surprise and initiated a period o economic and politicalisolation intensied by Israels blockade o the Gaza strip aferthe collapse o the unity Government in June 2007 that has haddisastrous economic and humanitarian consequences and jeopar-dised eorts towards peace.

Te Quartet o the European Union, Russia, the UN and the USconditioned uture assistance to a Palestinian Government uponthat Governments commitment to the principles o nonviolence,recognition o Israel, and acceptance o previous agreements andobligations.12 Tese conditions were unacceptable to Hamas. TeQuartet introduced no explicit pre-conditions on contacts withHamas (and Russia has always maintained them), but both theUS and the EU list Hamas as a terrorist group. While the EU list

does not proscribe contacts (only unding), afer Hamas electoralvictory in 2006 the European Council took the political decisionto isolate Hamas urther by cutting contact with it. In deerenceto pressure rom the US, and in stark contrast to a traditionaldisposition to engage with any party deemed necessary or peace,the UN Secretary-General restricted political contact by the UNSpecial Coordinator or the Middle East Peace Process with Hamas.However, contact was allowed at the working level.

Since 2006, engagement with Hamas has remained in limbo.Te Quartet position and that o the United States within it is unchanged (and Hamas is still there). A variety o mediatorsand/or would be mediators rom the West including Norwayand Switzerland, ormer diplomats and NGOs have pursuedcontact and opened channels to Hamas leadership in Gaza andDamascus. Regional mediators, including both urkey and Egypt,remain involved. Yet while the red lines o the major internationalplayers still hold, and without eective channels back to the

United States and/or Israel, orward movement remains a distantprospect.


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Fgm : Fragmented groups, those groups without

a recognised leader or command structure, present obvious

challenges, not least because as in the case o the multiple

rebel movements in Darur one group may claim greater

legitimacy than others and seek to veto participation.

Fragmentation complicates the issue o regular access by

the mediator as well as decision-making, and can invalidate

theprospectofaceasere.Unsuccessfulattemptstounify

the groups in Darur point to a need or alternative processes

(such as the 2010 initiative to engage civil society) and

a unifcation eort that combines support rom a major powerwith detailed contextual knowledge o the various move-

ments internal dynamics.

S us : Deciding when, and where, to inorm

a government o early engagement with an armed group within

its territory will be a delicate matter (except in circumstances,

suchas theUNfound inColombia from19992002,when

engagement with rebel groups is directly solicited by the

Government). Are there other states (neighbours or regionalpowers) whose consent or support or engagement will be

required ? (As Norway secured rom India during its involvement

in Sri Lanka). I so, at what point to inorm them and how ?

In cases with a particularly weak state actor such as the

Transitional Federal Government in Somalia concerns about

its ragility impact directly upon decisions regarding whether to

engage with the armed resistance (Al Shabaab in this instance).

Gg us : Winning the trust o an armed group may be

a slow and difcult process, but is an essential element o a

third partys involvement. Broad cultural and/or religious di-

erences between the mediator and the armed group may

constitute particular challenges. Anti-terrorist rhetoric, the per-

ceived hostility o the West toward Islam, the invasion o Iraq

and continuing conict in the Middle East all, or example,

may hinder engagement with Islamist groups by Western

mediators conditioned or perceived to be conditioned - by a


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22

secular and internationalist approach. (The peace jirga held in

Aghanistan in June 2010 concluded with a call or help rom

Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey).

P-s : Rigid pre-conditions may not be an obstacle

in the early phases o engagement (pre-negotiation), but will

become so as parties move into talks about talks. Frequently

such conditions whether they are or an end to violence,

a ceasefre, recognition o an occupying power, or the

renouncing o secessionist goals touch upon either the

armed groups primary source o leverage upon the process(its arms), or the core issue in contention. It should not surprise

a potential mediator, or the armed groups adversary, that the

group in question will not be prepared to concede such issues

at the beginning o a process.

abs l ls g : A lack o clarity

on what is wanted rom a political process by the armed group,

or the reiteration o maximalist but impossible goals (such as

Al Qdas demands or the establishment o a new caliphate)both present obstacles to negotiations. Such obstacles need

not necessarily preclude other orms

o engagement that might help shit

an armed groups positions, or reach

out to afliates o the group in ques-

tion with more localised concerns

(such as Al Shabaab). However, in

practice, the perception that there is

nothing to talk about with an armed

group represents one o the most

requent deterrents to engagement.

cmp : The presence, or interest, o other potential

mediators can complicate engagement with an armed group

and overcrowd the mediation. In some cases such as Darur

at dierent moments it has not been just the rebels who do

the orum shopping. There have been external actors, some

You can negotiate

with someone who has a

political agenda. Te LRA

does not have one.Salva Kiir, First-Vice President o Sudan,

President o the Government o Southern

Sudan13


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23

The ICC and theLRA in confict at the

peace tableFor many years the international community neglected the conictbetween the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), led by the enigmaticJoseph Kony, and the Government o Uganda with devastatingconsequences or the people o Northern Uganda. Peacemakingwas pursued by the Ugandan politician Betty Bigombe, whoreceived discreet support rom the UN and a number o states. Hereorts ended in early 2005. By then, at the request o the Ugandan

Government, the International Criminal Court had initiated aninvestigation into the situation. In July 2005, ICC judges issuedsealed warrants or the arrest o Kony and our LRA commanders.Tey were unveiled in October that year.

A new peace process began in mid-2006 in Juba, at the instigationo the Government o Southern Sudan, acilitated by its Vice-President, Riek Machar, and actively supported by UN envoy,

ormer President Joachim Chissano o Mozambique. Tis processrepresented a conrontation between two dierent orms oengagement with an armed group : one driven by peace and theother by justice. Te parties reached agreement on the text o acomprehensive peace agreement, but the ICC arrest warrants hungheavily over them as Kony, and the other indicted commanders,reused to attend ormal talks in Juba. Te LRA was insteadrepresented by exiled Acholi in the diaspora and others whoseability to speak or Kony was never ully validated.

Konys reusal to sign the peace agreement ended the process.Te experience demonstrated the challenges o a peace processin which personal incentives cannot be oered. Te agreementproposed Ugandan criminal justice processes as an alternativeto the ICC. However, with Konys rejection o the deal andrenewed military activity by the LRA, regional and internationalactors increasingly saw the LRA not as a legitimate political orce,but as an armed band led by war criminals. In his nal brieng

to the Security Council in mid-2009, Chissano recommended atwo-pronged strategy involving military action against the LRAas well as negotiations.


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24

perceived as hostile, pursuing engagement with rebels in ways

that have suggested that they have been shopping too

(as some rebel groups have complained). Coordination o the

various third parties may be possible. I not, hard choices

regarding how to develop complementary roles, or even

whether to persist in a mediation eort, may have to be taken.

Mgg fly : Confdentiality is oten a condi-

tion or engagement with an armed group or reasons o both

security and political sensitivity, particularly in the early stages

o a process. A government may also be reluctant to have itknown that it has opened a channel to an armed group or that

it has involved an external actor to do so. (Both were the case

during the HD Centres acilitation o talks between the

Spanish Government and ETA between 2005 and 2007,

details o which the parties subsequently leaked to the press).

Maintaining confdentiality can be a challenge but moving into

a public process can be difcult too, especially in situations

in which a governments contacts with an armed group are

contested by its political opposition and/or public opinion.

Quss lus : Mediators may fnd an armed group

reluctant to countenance the involvement o others it ears may

dilute its inuence. The presence o a wide array o civil society

and other stakeholders in negotiations is rarely practical, but

a mediator can encourage a group to consider other orms

o consultation. The mediator can also undertake them him

or hersel i the parties are unable to do so. Gender may be

a particular challenge, not least because the great majority o

leaders o armed groups are men. As trust is built, the mediator

can inquire about the role o women and emphasise the

importance o addressing gender issues in a peace process.

aubly : New demands or accountability or non-

state actors as well as state representatives - derive rom the

evolution o the international legal ramework since the end

o the Cold War. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and


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25

anumberofadhoctribunalshavebeenestablished.TheUN

Secretary-GeneralintroducedguidelinesforUNmediatorsthat

rule out their encouragement, or endorsement, o agreements

that provide amnesties or those guilty o war crimes, crimes

against humanity, genocide and gross human rights violations.14

Otherinstitutions,suchastheEU,havealsogenerallyfollowed

a policy o shunning amnesty or serious international crimes,

in line with ICC obligations. These developments represent

normative progress towards peace and justice, but, with

amnesty a critical bargaining chip, they bring added respon-

sibilities and challenges to those mediating between armedactors responsible or human rights abuses and atrocities.

Engagement also involves at least fve areas o real sk. Two relate

to impacts on the armed group : the risk o its legitimation, and the

unoreseen operational impacts that engagement may trigger.

A urther three involve possible consequences or the mediator

or mediating organisation. Security is an obvious risk, but legal

liability is now another. The third is the more nebulous question

o partiality, which can have consequences or the mediatorscontinuing engagement in a particular conict and, more generally,

or the proessional reputation o his or her organisation.

Lgmy : The act that engagement with an armed group

involves a degree o recognition that the group is a valid

interlocutor is perhaps the primary political objection raised

by many governments. Yet the only recognition explicitly

given by a mediator is that the armed group is responsible

or violence and ending violence thereore means engaging

with it. The sensitivity o legitimising

an armed group has been inated

by the war on terror and its atten-

dant proscription regimes. Even in

this environment, dierent media-

tors may be able to engage with

dierent levels o visibility and

resonance (a ormal representative

Te sensitivity o legitimising

an armed group has been

infated by the war on terror

and its attendant proscription

regimes.


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26

oftheUNSecretary-GeneralorSpecialEnvoyoftheUnited

States has dierent connotations than a diplomat rom a small

state,morejuniorUNofcialorarepresentativeofanNGO).

More regular engagement with a wide variety o armed groups

would help shit the argument away rom the question o tal-

king to terrorists to the more substantive issue o what it will

be possible to talk to them about.

Us mps : Mediators embark on engagement

with armed groups with large gaps in their knowledge o

them and no control over a wide range o variables that mayimpact upon their behaviour. It is thereore not surprising that,

on occasion, their engagement has unoreseen and undesirable

impacts (o course, in other instances unoreseen impacts

including encouraging greater exibility on the part o the

armed group than was expected may also be desirable).

These may involve contribution to a spike in violence as rebel

groups seek to increase military leverage over the political

process. They also could include provocation o internal debates

that reinorce hardliners, contributing to the splintering ogroups, and/or acilitating a process that advances little in

political terms but provides cover or the group to re-arm and

re-position itsel or a new military oensive.

Suy : Mediators interested in engaging with armed groups

involved in hot phases o armed conict, or living clandestinely,

are initiating an activity with obvious security risks both or

themselves and their interlocutors. Dierent organisations will

have dierent security protocols and conditions, but will need

to calculate what constitutes an acceptable level o risk or

their sta, as well as the responsibility they may be assuming

or the travel and security o their interlocutors. Crossing inter-

national borders presents obvious challenges with regard to

visas and border security, and will generally require assistance

rom the states concerned. Threats to non-state groups include

security orces which may not be aware that a confdential

political process is underway or o the movements requiredto acilitate it.


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27

Lgl ssus : Mediators ace legal risks in two broad areas.

The frst relates to the post 9/11 counter-terrorist legislation

upheldbytheUSSupremeCourtinJune2010.Abroaddeni-

tion o material support (to include expert advice, assistance,

services and personnel) opens up the possibility o prosecution

or a wide range o activities consistent with engagement with

anorganisationdesignatedasterroristbytheUSGovernment,

or with one that the individual concerned knows has engaged,

or still engages, in terrorist activity. The material support statute

isbroadinitsjurisdiction,applyingtoUScitizensandresidents,

but also tonon-US individuals brought intoor found in theUnitedStatesafteranoffenseoccurs.15 A related issue is that,

through engaging with armed groups, mediators are oten

dealing with actors who have been

involved in major crimes. It is logical

that prosecutors (including the ICC)

may one day try to subpna

mediators. Mediators may be asked

to testiy, or to provide various kinds

o inormation in relation to thearmed group (such as cell phone

numbers, structure and hierarchy).

Alternatively, deense counsel might

ask or inormation i a member o

the armed group is charged and

the mediator is deemed likely to

have inormation relevant to the

case. In neither circumstance have

mediators so ar aced legal consequences, but with nothing in

the law to provide protection, the vulnerability is real.16 Looking

ahead, there may be grounds or arguing that mediators, like

lawyers, might rely on the privileged nature o their conversa-

tions with armed groups as a bar to a subpoena or demand

or disclosure.

Ply : Mediators who work to develop the trust o armed

groups risk being perceived as, or actually becoming, partial totheir cause. This is in part a structural issue, in that mediators

Mediators interested in

engaging with armed

groups involved in hot

phases o armed confict,or living clandestinely, are

initiating an activity with

obvious security risks,

both or themselves and

their interlocutors.


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28

Norway and the LTTEAs acilitator o the peace process between the Government oSri Lanka and the Liberation igers o amil Eelam (LE), theGovernment o Norway struggled to counter the asymmetrybetween the parties. Te violence o the methods pursued by theLE, in particular their mastery o suicide bombing and assassi-nation o prominent political gures, led them to be excoriated bythe international community as well as by the Sinhala-dominatedSri Lankan Government. Tey were also included on the US list

o oreign terrorist organisations rom 1997.

Many hours spent with the LE by Norways special envoy, ErikSolheim, built their trust in Norway. A ceasere was agreed in 2002.However, as progress stalled rom mid-2003, the Norwegians cameunder increasing criticism or what was perceived as their partialitytoward the igers. Over time they lost the condence o the SriLankan Government. Norway regretted that other internationalactors were reluctant to engage with the LE because o the oppor-

tunity lost to develop mutual understanding. It argued against theEUs listing o the LE as a terrorist group in 2006 on the groundsthat it would damage the peace process (EU monitors within themission established to monitor the ceasere were withdrawn romthe country afer the LE indicated that it no longer consideredthem to be neutral).

Overall, the proscription o the LE had mixed eects. Te post9/11 climate had arguably helped bring the igers to the table ; italso drew attention to their oreign unding, allowing space ormoderate diaspora amils to engage in a helpul ashion. However,it complicated the involvement o a Co-Chair group o donors (theEuropean Union, Japan, Norway and the United States) which wasestablished in 2003. Despite Norways eorts, the other membersbias against a conict party they primarily identied as terroristproved counter-productive (a notable example was the exclusiono the LE rom a donor conerence held in Washington 2003)

and uelled dierences between them.


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29

who assume the role o a channel to the armed group are

likely to develop a nuanced understanding o its grievances and

demands. They may be called upon to explain them to ofcial

actors who do not engage with the armed groups themselves

and can thereore risk appearing as their spokespersons.

Beyond maintaining scrupulous attention to their own honesty

as a broker and seeking to illustrate to the state party that

they are not partial to the armed groups cause mediators

can encourage other actors to meet with an armed group to

hear rom its representatives directly.

ops

A mediator has a wide variety o options available as he or she

considers engagement. These will vary according to the nature

o the armed group in question, as well as the context within

which it is operating. Some groups have quasi-diplomatic repre-

sentation abroad and are relatively straightorward to contact.

Others operate clandestinely, or only in remote, dangerous and

shiting locations and are much more difcult to engage. In some

caseshumanitarianactors,orUNpeacekeepers,haveoperational

contacts with members o armed groups in ulfllment o their

mandates. However, they may not be in a position to advise,

or acilitate, the development o political engagement in case

it compromises their own work. In other, less internationalised,

contexts a mediator may be working in greater isolation, with

his or her team tightly limited to interaction with group andgovernment representatives.

In most, but not all, cases mediation will involve three distinct

steps. These include establishing a confdential channel to

exchange messages and inormation, and to build trust ;

beginning negotiations, perhaps still in secret talks, and esta-

blishing the idea o compromise in order to allow the parties

to articulate their real, achievable goals ; and a public process

5


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30

towards a lasting agreement, requently involving an increasingly

broad and complex array o other actors. At dierent moments,

the varied options or engagement will include :

il s : Initial contacts with an armed group take

a wide variety o orms. In some contexts a group may reach

outtoamediatordirectly.(TheUNisapproachedbyarmed

groups with some regularity, requently in circumstances in

which it knows that its involvement would be unacceptable to

the government concerned). In others, external actors have

approached armed actors through intermediaries. These mightinclude local journalists, human rights activists or religious

leaders, as well as political actors or members o civil society

who may have local level contacts with the group concerned.

In some instances, the intermediaries develop into trusted

partners in the mediation, in others the mediator (and inter-

mediary) may fnd a sustained relationship too complex to

maintain. Beyond the contacts themselves, early encounters

with an armed group provide an opportunity or the mediator

and armed group to explore the motivations and capacities othe other. The armed group may be vetting the mediator no

less deliberately than the mediator is trying to build his or her

understanding o the armed group.

Pxs, s ms, k w : In some

contexts it is possible to identiy ormal or inormal proxies

through whom engagement can be pursued. In Northern

Ireland, the British Government had long maintained a conf-

dential channel to the IRA, but engaged in direct negotiations

with Sinn Fein (which also represented the Republican

movementinthetalkschairedbyformerUSSenatorGeorge

Mitchell). This was acilitated by the authority wielded by Sinn

Feins leaders, sympathy or the IRA among the Irish diaspora

andincertainquartersintheUS,andtheBritishGovernments

realisation o the benefts o strengthening Republicanisms

political expression. (It stands in contrast to policies adopted

by the Spanish Government, which banned ETAs political


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31

Engaging

the Maoists in NepalNepals peace process was led and driven by Nepalis, althoughheavily conditioned by the inuence o India. However, it alsoinvolved external actors who oered support to dialogue andnegotiation. Tese included the HD Centre (2000 2006); theUnited Nations, which provided good oces rom 2003, andwhose presence grew in 2005 into an Oce o the UN High Com-missioner or Human Rights and, rom 2007, a special political

mission, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN); theCarter Center (2004 2006); and a Swiss special adviser on peace-building rom mid-2005.

All pursued initial contacts with the Communist Party o Nepal(Maoist) through a Nepali human rights activist and national peaceacilitator. Once trust was established, external actors ound theMaoists open to engagement and eager to learn rom experienceelsewhere. Tey particularly welcomed the early attention rom

the HD Centre and the involvement o the UN or the legitimacythey saw it giving their struggle. External engagement, althoughsubordinate to national initiatives and decision-making, helpedpromote acceptance o dialogue in Nepal. It also prepared the wayor UNMINs assumption o responsibilities or the monitoring oarms and armies, as well as support to the electoral process.

Elections held in April 2008 propelled the Maoists into governmentas the largest party in Nepals new Constituent Assembly. Tis was asurprise or many o the external actors involved (including India)and challenging in legal terms or the United States, which hadincluded the Maoists on its terrorist exclusion list since 2003. TeUS Ambassador was precluded rom direct meetings with Maoists,but was able to secure a waiver that allowed US ocials to meet withMaoists holding public oce. She also took measures to ensure thatthe US did not knowingly provide Maoists with material support.As this could be construed to include tea and coee, breakast

meetings were held at the residence o the Norwegian ambassador.


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32

surrogateBatasuna,andencourageditsinclusionontheEUs

terrorist list). Other orms o proxy engagement include insider

mediators individuals with the capacity to mediate among

dierent actions within the conict parties or track two

actors, who may meet quietly with delegates or associates

o an armed group in advance o, and in parallel to, a more

ormal process. In some circumstances (Burundi, or example)

extended contacts by NGOs contributed to the decision o

an armed group to engage in a ormal peace process.

cpy-bulg : Negotiations are necessarily high-risk,and their chances o success are improved by a level o sel-

confdence on the part o the parties. This is particularly true

o armed groups, or whom capacity-building and training

can be critical. They need to be comortable with the process

o negotiation, but also have know-

ledge o the issues to be negotiated

(such as cease-fres), and their impli-

cations. Addressing root causes will

almost always have constitutionaldimensions. A mediator or acilitator

can provide texts and materials or

the parties consideration, or bring in

experts on human rights, autonomy

or other issues. However, sustained

capacity-building (through meetings,

workshops, acilitated dialogues and

other methods) is requently best

perormed by other actors and, at

times, in locations other than that o

the conict theatre. In Sri Lanka, or

example, Bergho Peace Support and

Switzerland, working at the request o the Norwegian acilitator,

were both involved in eorts to strengthen the capacity o the

major conict stakeholders. In the Basque Country, the South

Arican lawyer Brian Currin has worked with Batasuna to

encourage its transition to the pursuit o its goals throughpurely political and democratic means.

Negotiations are

necessarily high-risk, and

their chances o success

are improved by a level

o selcondence on the

part o the parties.

Tis is particularly true o

armed groups, or whom

capacity-building and

training can be critical.


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33

Hum ggm : There are dierences and

tensions, but also similarities and synergies, between political

and humanitarian mediation. Humanitarian mediation can

open doors to armed groups not yet prepared to contemplate

a political process. It can also create common ground on the

basis o universal humanitarian norms (since 2008, or example,

theHDCentre and the UNsOfce for theCoordinationof

Humanitarian Aairs have held a series o workshops or

Darurs opposition movements to address issues such as

sae humanitarian access, the protection o civilians and the

rights o internally displaced persons). In a best case scenario,agreements reached can directly contribute to the alleviation

o suering whilst also building confdence in negotiation as a

means to resolve dierences. However, humanitarian mediation

carries with it inherent risks. These include that humanitarian

principles will be subordinated to political ends, or that an

armed group will embark on a humanitarian process but

either stall on commitments it undertakes within it and/or delay

embarking on political engagement.

Pll m gs : Mediators aspire

to the acilitation and support o negotiations aimed at the

political settlement o armed conict. Such negotiations will be

most eective when a mediator is entrusted with a clear lead o

the mediation process, while the parties, o course, determine

the negotiations substantive outcome. But clearly a mediators

role may vary greatly, according to the trust and confdence he

or she has been able to develop with representatives o the

conict parties in the pre-negotiation phase ; the support sought

by conict party principals ; and his or her own perception o

the best needs o the process. In all cases the parity in status

o the conict parties will be delicate. It will generally be best to

hold talks outside the state in conict, even though the logistics

involved in acilitating the travel and security o representatives

o the rebel group are likely to be demanding.


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34

th pl -lsg : During 2010 a gradual process

ofreformwithinUNsanctions regimes,aswellasrequests

rom the Aghan Government, contributed to the de-listing

o some ormer Taliban ofcials, and

others associated with the Taliban

and Al Qda, rom the consolidated

sanctions list established in 1999 pur-

suant to Security Council resolution

1267. Looking ahead, more attention

could be given to the use o listing

and de-listing mechanisms as incen-tives to dialogue. This would require a

shit away rom the conception o the

terrorist lists in purely punitive terms

as well as the introduction o practical

steps to improve the transparency o

designation processes. In particular,

clear criteria and procedures or periodic review and de-listing,

that take into account the evolution o conict dynamics and

actors, would need to be developed.17

Pullg u : Among the options or engagement is disen-

gagement pulling out. Inevitably an option o last resort,

a credible threat o withdrawal is nevertheless a source o

considerable leverage (conversely a mediator who will never

leave may undermine the integrity o a mediation process).

Reasons or disengagement might include an overcrowding

o the mediation feld ; the mediators analysis that a process

is taking shape in which his or her continued involvement is

no longer required ; a loss o confdence in the mediator by

one, or more, o the conict parties ; or the mediators own

assessment that the peace process is being used by the

conict parties or purposes other than the pursuit o peace

(or example, re-arming or re-grouping or a new military

oensive). Though disengagement may be difcult, a mediator

should not fnd him or hersel in the position o needing to

sustain a ailing process more badly than the conict partiesthemselves.

More attention could be

given to the use o listing

and de-listing mechanisms

in particular clear

criteria and proceduresor periodic review and

de-listing as incentives

to dialogue.


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35

6 cluss

There are ew areas o a mediation in which so many variables

come into play as engaging with armed groups. A mediators

willingness and capacity to establish contacts and work with

armed groups will be a question o both art and opportunity.

An ability to do so may be rooted in the identity o the mediator

some will be more aected by concerns regarding engaging

with those perceived or listed as terrorists than others but will

also encompass other elements. These include the unpredictable

and, at times, opaque nature o the armed groups and theircapacity or, and interest in, engaging with external third parties,

as well as the positions and attitudes adopted by the state

actors concerned.

Engagement with armed groups carries with it a variety o

challenges and risks. Yet, when managed careully and responsibly,

its potential benefts ar outweigh the costs o not engaging

and letting the conict take its toll on civilian victims. The variety

o options or engagement militates against a rejection o initialcontacts solely because the maximum demands o a group are

unacceptable. At the point o initial contact what is relevant is not

so much what these end-stage demands might be, but whether

engagement may lead to a substantive exchange on the issues

at hand, opening the door to the possibility o uture peace.


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36

es

1 A number o the dilemmas, challenges and risks encountered by mediatorswho seek to engage with armed groups also apply to humanitarian actors and

organisations such as Geneva Call (dedicated to engaging non-state armed

groups towards their compliance with the norms o international humanitarian

and human rights law), whose work is not addressed within this publication.

2 This conclusion emerges strongly rom previous publications on this issue,

notably Robert Ricigliano (ed.), Choosing to engage : armed groups and

peace processes , Accord 16 (London : Conciliation Resources, 2005)

3 Interviewed by The Guardian in May 2008, Sir Hugh Orde, then head o the

Police Service in Northern Ireland, commented, I somebody can show me

any terrorism campaign where it has been policed out, Id be happy to read

about it, because I cant think o one. Vikram Dodd, Time to talk to al-Qaida,

senor police chie urges, The Guardian, 30 May, 2008

4 A little over a fth o 2009s armed conicts saw more than one rebel group

challenging the government. Lotte Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, Armed

Conicts, 1946-2009,Journal o Peace Research, 47/4, (2010)

5 Vronique Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups,

UnitedStatesInstituteforPeace,SpecialReport239,(Washington:2010)

6

See, or example, arguments put orward in John Bew et al., Talking to Ter-rorists : Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, (London :

Hurst and Company, 2009), and Mitchell B. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil : When

to talk to Terrorists, (E-book : Open Road Integrated Media, Brussels : 2010)

7 SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,Ruling77,DocketN08-1498,Holder,

Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., 21 June 2010

8 International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Crisis Group Asia Report

N191,(Brussels:2010)

9 On the question o assumptions see David Petrasek, Armed Groups and

Peace Processes Pondering and Planning Engagement, Background paper,Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue Asian Mediators Retreat, (Geneva : Centre

or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005)

10 The distinct role played by national mediators, and the real challenges and

risks they assume are not addressed within this paper. On this subject see, or

example, Simon Mason, Insider Mediators : Exploring Their Key Role in Inormal

Peace Processes, (Berlin : Bergho Foundation or Peace Support, 2009)


39/44


37

11 Oliver Wils and Vronique Dudouet, Challenges Facing PeacebuildersEngaging with Listed Groups, (Berlin, Bergho Conict Research and Bergho

Peace Support, 2010) ; Andy Carl, Viewpoint : Ending Civil Wars Just Got

Harder, accessed rom the BBC World Service website, 29 June 2010

12 Quartet Statement, London, 30 January 2006

13 Speaking at the International Peace Institute, New York, 22 September 2010

14UnitedNationsPressRelease,SG/SM/7257,Secretary-GeneralComments

on Guidelines Issued to Envoys, 10 December 1999

15UnitedStatesCode,Title18,2339B,Providingmaterialsupportorresources

to designated oreign terrorist organizations, (d) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.

16IntheUnitedStatesthemoreimmediateeffectispolitical;indeedthereare

several examples o individuals who have ailed to receive congressional

confrmation or political appointments because o their prior engagements

with designated terrorists.

17 See Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups, on possible

steps to reorm proscription regimes.


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38

Andy Carl, Viewpoint : Ending Civil Wars Just Got Harder,

accessed rom the BBC World Service website, 29 June 2010

Vronique Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed

Groups(Washington:UnitedStatesInstituteforPeaceSpecial

Report 239, 2010)

International Council on Human Rights Policy, Ends and Means :

human rights approaches to armed groups (Geneva : International

Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000)

Deborah Mancini-Grioli and Andr Picot,Humanitarian Negotiation :

A handbook or securing access, assistance, and protection

or civilians in armed confict (Geneva : Centre or Humanitarian

Dialogue, 2004)

Gerard McHugh and Manuel Bessier, Humanitarian Negotiations

with Armed Groups : A Manual or Practitioners and Guidelines

on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (New York :

UnitedNations,OfcefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,

2006)

David Petrasek, Armed Groups and Peace Processes

Pondering and Planning Engagement, Background paper,

Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue Asian Mediators Retreat

(Geneva : Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005)

Further reading


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39

Mitchell B. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil : When to talk to Terrorists

(E-book : Open Road Integrated Media, 2010)

Robert Ricigliano, (ed.), Choosing to engage : armed groups and

peace processes, Accord 16 (London : Conciliation Resources,

2005)

Oliver Wils and Vronique Dudouet, Challenges Facing Peace-

builders Engaging with Listed Groups (Berlin : Bergho Conict

Research and Bergho Peace Support, June 2010)


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ts Whfl

HDCentreSeniorAdviserandUnitedNationsliaisoninNewYork;SeniorFellowattheCenteronInternationalCooperation(CIC),NewYorkUniver-

sity ; Member o the Board o Trustees, Conciliation Resources ; Member

o the Advisory Board, Conict Prevention and Peace Forum ; Director o

Conict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Science Research Council,

helping UN ofcials access expertise on countries in conict or crisis,

20052008;UNDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,19952000.MsWhiteld

has published extensively on peacemaking and mediation. Her most re-

cent book is Friends Indeed ? The United Nations, Groups o Friends and

the Resolution o Confict,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,2007.


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book praticas de mediacao com grupos armados

Documents