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The attack of Hill 192 by the 1st Bn, 38thInfantry (2nd Jivision), Ju l 11, 1944 byLt Col . T. Mildren, Inf. Command andStaff College. 1946-47.

This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSASDOCUMENT NO. -2253.2 COPY NO. 1

1o Form 16013 Mar 51

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MONO GRAPH

COM1VVMND A'ND STAFF COLLiGFORT i1VNWORJTH

KANSAS

School of Combined ArmsRegular Course

1946-1947

THE ATTACK OF HILL 192"'.BY THE (

1st BATTALION, 38th INFANTRY (2nd DIVISIONJULY 11, 1944

(NO ANDY CAMPAIGN)(Personal Experience of a Battalion Commander)

TYPE OF-OPERATION DESCRIBED: BATTALION IN THlE ATTACK

Lieutenant Colonel Frank T. Mildren, Infantry


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - 1Bibliography -- - - - - - - - - - 2Introduction - - - - - - - 3

Geographical Features - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4Planning the Attack on Hil l 192 and th e Rear

Area Rehearsals and Training - - - - - - - - 5,6,7Artillery Preparations and Initial Setback in

A Company's Sector - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8Successful Advances by C Company and Commitment

of Reserve Company - -- - - - - - - - - - - - 9Capture of the Objective -- - - - - - - -- - - - - 10Conclusion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -11,12,13Lessons - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14


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BIBLIOGRAPHY\

Combat s cWorld Wa'r I

ofa? he' 2rd Intfa f~ Division inii Ly . . . I

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V Corps Operations in the ETO

Field Order No . 10, V Corps, 4 July, 1944

Translation of a letter taken from the body ofGefr. Helmut Kasiacka,Regt,

10 Co, III Bn, 9 PrchtGerman 3rd Prcht Division.

---translated by V Corps.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to cover the attack of the1st Battalion, 38th Infantry (2nd Division) on Hill 192, July 11,1944, during the Normandy Campaign in Europe. In addition to thetactical importance of this attack -- the capture of a terrainfeature that dominated the Omaha Beach area and the city of St Lo-this monograph will emphasize two important factors involved inthe operation. First, it will bring out special training neededwith the Infantry - Tank - Artillery - Engineer team in order tosuccessfully launch an attack'in hedgerow country against a strongdefensive position. Second, it will bring out the detailed plan-ning used in this case and its resultant factors.

For orientation purposes a brief resume of events leading upto the attack of Hill 192 are listed below. (See Map A)

After the 1st and 29th Divisions had stormed ashore at OmahaBeach on June 6, 1944 in history's largest amphibious operations,the 2nd Infantry Division, also part of V Corps, landed on June 7,and took over the central sector of the beachhead area. After tendays of hard fighting among th e hedgerows against elements of threeGerman Divisions, the V Corps slowly advanced until th e forwardline on June 16 was as shown on Map A. At this time th e U. S. XIXCorps took over the area to the West of the 2nd Division. The 29thInfantry Division passed to the control of the XIS Corps.

During the period 16 June - 1 July large scale attacks weremade by XIX Corps toward St Lo. On the V Corps front portions ofthe 2nd Division attempted to take Hill 192, but the German ThirdParachute Division had oeen brought from th e Brittany Peninsulaand was firmly entrenched on the hill, so our attack was repulsed.For th e remainder of June only limited objective attacks were madeby V Corps to straighten our l ines. Buildup of First Army in thebeachhead continued during this period.


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GEOG APHJW L' EATURE~hS

The terrain immediately north of Hill 192 is typical of th eentire Normandy beachhead area. The f ields are crisscrossed with.hedgerows that mark the boundaries of cultivated areas. Althoughthe distance between hedgerows varies, the average distance inthe vicinity of Hill 192 is about seventy five yards. From OmahaBeach to Hill 192 the ground is fairly flat and made up of smallorchards and farmland. The Cerisy Forest, west of Balleroy, pro-vides the only large sized concealment area but this was capturedby V Corps before .the Germans could utilize it. Two small rivers,th e Aure and th e Elle ru n generally from East to West through thebeachhead area while the large Vire River runs North from St Loto Isigny.

Hill 192, the dominating natural terrain feature in the beach-head area, is two miles East of St Lo on the St - Bayeux highway.(See Map B). It is about sixteen miles South of Omaha Beach and on

clear days the Beach and interening terrain can be observed fromHill 192. The hill itself is about 1000 yards wide and about 1200'yards long, and is completely covered on the North side with hedge-rows. Most of the South side is completely covered by thick woodsthat contain very few trails.

Hedgerows on Hill 192 are about 3-4 feet high with a thicknessof about 2-3 feet at th e base. Most are filled with large rocksand covered with thorny bushes and vines. After the attack of June16 the 2nd Division was firmly entrenched near the North base ofthis hill with th e 9th Parachute Regiment of th e German 3rd Para-chute Division holding Hill 192 and the territory on either side.


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P ,\INING TEL ATTACK (See Map ,

During the period 1-10 July plans were made for-the capture ofHill 192. Aerial photos showed us that the enemy had certainlytransformed the hill into a major strong point. Deep communicationtrenches were observed behind most of th e larger hedgerows, but dueto good camouflage and well concealed positions the exact locationsof firing points, machine gun and mortar positions, and anti-tankpositions could not be determined. We found out after the hill'scapture that some german dugouts were as deep as twelve feet withunderground passageways to concealed, firing positions within thehedgerows. The firing slits from these firing positions werecovered by vines growing out of the hedgerows. Machine guns werelocated under hedgerows at junctions in order to cover all possibleapproaches.

For th e first few days of th e ten day period preceding theattack, my battalion, which was selected to make the frontal attackon Hill 192, was placed in the line opposite the hill proper inorder to become familiar with the terrain. While there we dug largeholes in the hedgerows at various intervals leaving only a thin shellon the enemy side. This was done in order to enable our supportingtanks to easily break through during the attack. Tank units at thistime were having large steel prongs welded to the front of each tankin order to make the job of breaking through hedgerows much easier.

During this period every patrol sent out to try and find gapsin the enemy position was badly shot up and the same thing happenedto patrols from other battalions on our flanks. This was not onlydue to the fact th e enemy was excellent at counter patrolling butdue to our fai lure to apply th e principles of scouting and patrol-l ing.

After th e battalion had become familiar with th e terrain andhad dug partial holes in th e hedgerows it was pulled out of the lineand moved to a rear area where rehearsals were scheduled and final


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The rehearsals emphasized close coordination between the artil-lery and squad teams composed of one squad, three engineers, and amedium tank. Some teams also contained light machine gun squadsand each infantry squad contained one BAR and one sub-machine gun.During these rehearsals a plan was worked out whereby the teams wouldadvance under cover of our artillery fire with th e rifle squad in awedge formation protecting the tank while the tank gave close firesupport to the infantry squad. Communication between these twoelements was obtained by a telephone attached on the rear of thetank. Also on the back of the tank was stored a large quantity ofexplosives and satchel charges - - the plan being that when the teamencountered a thick hedgerow that could not be readily breeched bythe prongs on the tank, the engineers would emplace the charges onthe hedgerow, then the entire team would back up a short distancewhile the hole was blown. It will be brought out later that thisproved very disastrous to the tanks.

V Corps order for the attack provided for artillery supportfrom the 3rd Armored Division, two battalions of artillery from the1st Infantry Division, Corps Artillery, two Tank Destroyer battalions,two companies of 4.2 mortars, and th e 741st Tank Battalion. Air sup-port provided for planned missions in addition to armed reconnaissanceand call missions.

The Division plan of attack called for demonstrations on frontsadjacent to Hill 192. Part of the 23rd Infantry was to attack on theleft of the hill, the 2nd Battalion 38th Infantry to attack on theright while my battalion was to attack the hill frontally on a 600yard front. The objective would not only give us control of Hill192 but also the St Lo - Berigny highway.

My plan of attack called for Company A on th e left with fivetank-infantry-engineer teams in the assault (essentially two platoonsforward, one back). - 0 Company on th e right was to attack in a column


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cular to the front - each zone being assigned a color designation.Lines parallel to th e front were drawn on th e map each fifty yardsfrom our lines to the objective and a number assigned each of thesezones. Prominent and distinctive points or areas in the zona ofaction were assigned letters. Maps containing this fire plan wereissued down to and including platoon leaders.

The overall plan called for 'the artillery barrage to roll for-ward in fifty yard increments with certain artillery units firingon targets of opportunity on call of forward units. With this planpart of the artillery could be moved back in a colored zone to sup-port any uni t held up, or it could be advanced faster in one zonethan in an adjacent one if the situation so warranted.

One day prior to the attack my battalion was moved back intoposition at the base of Hill 192 in preparation for the attack.After hearing of all th e fire support I was to receive I figuredthe battalion could almost walk up the hill without too much effort.I was due for quite a surprise, and found i greatly underestimatedthe ability of the German 3rd Parachute Di)vision.

K;


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THE ATTACK (See Map B)At 0430 on the day of attack, July 11, the entire battalion

was carefully and quietly moved out of its forward position and tothe rear about 200 yards. This was for the purpose of allowing theheavy artillery preparation to cover completely the enemy front--elements that had been only about 50 yards in front of our own lines.At 0500, preparatory fires of the artillery battalions, armored ar-tillery battalions, 4.2 mortars and our own 60 and 81 mm mortarscommenced ahd lasted for one hour, increasing the intensity untilthey were placing a terrific pounding on th e germans during th elast fifteen minutes.

At 0600 our Infantry-Tank-Engineer teams jumped off in th e attackand instantly received the heaviest german artillery and mortar bar-rage we had encountered to that date. Our casualties were heavy inCompany A on the left. Nevertheless we managed to overrun theirinitial positions which happened to be a covering shell. HoweverCompany A could not gain any ground against the main defensive posit ion.In spite of all the fire cover we could place in this sector, all move-ments by our units were met by intense and accurate small arms firethat came from positions within the hedgerows. We could not locatethose positions and could not see any germans.

Every attempt at a maneuver was met by intense machine gun andrifle fire plus the constant artillery and mortar fire. Due to th ecleverly concealed german positionswe could not direct artilleryor tank fire on any known emplacements; consequently we were merelyshooting "in the dark" at hedgerows in general. The two tanks onCompany A's extreme right were hit by Panzerfausts and the resultantexplosion of the explosives on the tanks completely blew th e turretsoff. Another of Company A's tanks h it a mine and a fourth receiveda direct artillery hit leaving only one tank with assault elementsof this company. Other tank crewmen behind the tanks that blew upsuddenly decided that area was no place for them, so we could not


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about half of its left platoon. The support platoon of this Com-pany was committed to the left and immediately ran into flankingfire from its left -- th e 23rd Infantry on our left had ru n intoas much if not more fire than we had, and consequently had not beenable to cross the line of departure for the first four hours. By0900 A Company was ineffective due to the heavy casualties. How-ever C Company on the right was more fortunate. It had initiallybeen held up by flanking fire from the german positions in frontof A Company, so th e company commander committed a support platoonwithhtanks to th e left while his main attack continued forward.The support platoon accomplished its mission by diverting theenemy fire away from the main C Company attack. This supportplatoon also managed to overrun several Berman positions, andby using the tanks with prongs to break through the hedgerowsit managed to bury the Germans in their strongpoints. At 0900C Company was about 200 yards in advance of A Company.

At this time, 0900, I gave orders to t Company, the reserve,to move up into the gap between A and C Companies and attack theGerman position in front of A Company from the flank.

Up until this time our scheduled air support had been post-poned due to a heavy fog, but then the sky began to clear so theplanes came over and started their bombing and strafing. A coupleof th e first planes to bomb missed their targets -- one bomb des-troying my aid station and another hitting in B Company area asthey were attempting to move inhto an initial position. This turnof events plus a lot of other confusion caused B Company to useup two hours trying to get into attack position.

When B Company finally got into position and started its attack,it was not in th e zone prescribed by me. The company had moved too

far to th e left; and was attacking through A Company and against thesame strong points that had caused the latter company so many


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particular zone.In the meantime C Company's attack was progressing slowly but

favorably and so was the 2nd Battalion on our right. B Companyadvanced against scattered resistance. By 1400 both companies hadreached the top of Hill 192 and commenced the difficult move throughthe heavy woods on the far side of the hill. Although the enemywithdrew rapidly and our advance was meeting only artillery andmortar fire, it took the rest of the afternoon to move down the hilland cut the St Lo - Berigny highway. This slow advance was due tothe condition of the woods which were reduced to piles of sticks

and rubbish by our artillery and mortar fire. Also, on our right,C Company had encountered many anti-personnel mines that werelocated in the few sunken roads that were available for our coveredapproach.

By late afternoon our positions were consolidated and thedigging - in process started. We did not receive an enemy counter-attack - - the germans being content to fire mortar and artilleryconcentrations on our newly won positions. As a'matter of fact,during daylight hours we could not move around on the forward slopeof Hill 192 because we were easily seen by the enemy, and each ofour visible movements was followed by a mortar barrage from thegermans.


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CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the battalion tooka very important Corps and Division objective, and in so doingeliminated the last ground position from which the germans could-observe our beach operations. Also the terrain dominating St Lofrom the East was now in our hands thus aiding the XIX Corps in itsattack on the city. One hundred twenty-seven prisoners were cap-tured by the two attacking battalions, and although we had no ac-curate count of enemy dead due to th e fact many were buried in theirdugouts, G-2 estimates placed the German 9th Parachute Regiment asnon-effective due to casualties inflicted by the 2nd Division in July.

The points which are subject to criticism are:1. The practice of placing satchel charges and other ex-

plosives on the tanks proved to be disastrous. One panzerfaustblast and th e turret of a tank was blown completely off, th e tankcaught fire and all crew members were either killed or injured.

P. The battalion and company attack plans were too detailed/and thus too complicated. Naturally a detailed attack plan willdetract from oflexibility, and that happened very noticeably in thisattack. We had included plans even for rifle squads, and when thosesquads suffered heavy casualties - - we had lost 194 men in thisattack - - then the plan disintegrated. This lack of flexibility

- -thewas probably induced by my overconfidence inxoutcorde of the attack.I thought with all the fire support I had that the attack would bean easy advance.

3. Our failure to learn more of th e german dispositionsprior to th e attack.was due to failure of our patrols to accomplishtheir missions. Basically this was simply our failure to apply theprinciples of scouting and patroll ing, and no doubt reflects on ourtraining procedures -- however it must be remembered we were greentroops up against a veteran enemy unit .


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the confusion caused by enemy shelling and our own air uhits drop-ping bombs in the B Company assembly ,area, I see no excuse for BCoimpany's failure to follow instructions.

5. There have been many arguments for and against theheavy amount of artillery shells fired in this attack. That pointcould be argued by both sides, and I'll admit 25,000 artillery shells,to say nothing of the amount of 4.2, 60, 81 mm mortar shells and theair bombs used in this small attack, seem excessive. Nevertheless,I doubt if the infantry elements could have advanced if we had notused this tremendous amount of artillery ammunition.

The effects of this heavy shelling were brought out in a per-sonal letter written to a friend by one of the Germans who helpeddefend Hill 192. The letter was taken off th e body of a Germankilled about three weeks after the attack of Hill 192 in a sub-sequent advance. It was translated by V Corps and copies sentto us. Here are some of th e excerpts from that letter;-

"Dear Struppel,For the third time I am trying to get in touch with

you by letter. Some time ago when I left.the 6th Group I arrived inW ittstock where I made my ten jumps. Then my Reg' t was stationedin Brittany near Brest. When the invasion started we moved out andmarched 30-40 kilometers daily, but only at night. During the dayAmerican fighter bombers controlled th e area. We were put in th eline East of St Lo. At that time our company strength was 170.

Then the 11 of July arrived and the most terrible day of mylife. At 0500 our Co. sector got such a dense hail of arty andmortar fire, that we knew a big attack was coming. In additionto that we could hear the rumblings of tanks. At 0530 the firingincreased and the tanks moved closer. The hedgerows helped us tohide somewhat from the tanks but they shot right through the rowsas through cake dough. At 1000 th e order came to withdraw as th e


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like me. When one hears for hours the whining, whistling andbursting of shells and the moaning and groaning of the wounded,one does not feel too well.

Our company had only 30 men left. In the meantime it wasreorganized to a certain extent. We are expecting a new attacksupported by tanks today or tomorrow.

I hope to hear from you soonyour ftiend,

Helmut"


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LESSONS

Some of th e lessons to be learned from this attack are:1. Tanks should not be used as a medium for carrying

explosives when those same tanks are subject to enemy fire.2. Any battalion attack plan should be flexible and

never detailed to the point whereby squads and platoons are toldwhat to do from th e battalion level. This seems fundamental, butth e attack on Hill 192 demonstrates that it can happen when over-confidence enters th e commanders thoughts and plans.

3. More emphasis in training should be placed onpractical application of present fundamentals in Scouting andPatrolling.

4. Confusion will generally be found prevalent duringa heavy attack by small units, consequently one should expectoperations not to progress as planned - - plans must be flexible.Generally confusion will prevail amongst both forces - the at-

tackers and the defenders - and the winner is usually the onewho is least confused.


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