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ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS

CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO

Coordenadoras

Vera Thorstensen

Luciana Maria de Oliveira

RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE APELAÇÃO:

Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional

Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio 1994 (GATT 1994)

Organizadora

Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin

Autores

Alessandra Deliberato Thoenen

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira

Carina Costa de Oliveira

Cynthia Kramer

Daniel Pezzutti Ribeiro Teixeira

Fabio Weinberg Crocco

Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini

Felipe de Andrade Krausz

Frederico Arana Meira

Jacqueline Spolador Lopes

João Henrique Ribeiro Roriz

José Guilherme Moreno Caiado

José Luiz Pimenta Júnior

Lucas da Silva Tasquetto

Vera Kanas

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INTRODUÇÃO

Análise do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio de 1994 (GATT 1994) e da jurisprudência

consolidada pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC

ACORDO GERAL SOBRE TARIFAS E COMÉRCIO (GATT 1994)

Artigo 1

Vera Kanas Grytz

Felipe de Andrade Krausz

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article I

General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment

1.1 With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation

or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with

respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities

in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in

paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any

contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded

immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all

other contracting parties.

1.2 The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not require the elimination of any preferences in

respect of import duties or charges which do not exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4 of this

Article and which fall within the following descriptions:

(a) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the territories listed in Annex A,

subject to the conditions set forth therein;

(b) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories which on July 1, 1939, were

connected by common sovereignty or relations of protection or suzerainty and which are

listed in Annexes B, C and D, subject to the conditions set forth therein;

(c) Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of America and the Republic of

Cuba;

(d) Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries listed in Annexes E and F.

1.3 The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences between the countries formerly a part of

the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24, 1923, provided such preferences are approved

under paragraph 5(1), of Article XXV which shall be applied in this respect in the light of paragraph 1

of Article XXIX.

1.4 The margin of preference on any product in respect of which a preference is permitted under

paragraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as a maximum margin of preference in the

appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall not exceed:

(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such Schedule, the difference

between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates provided for therein; if no

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preferential rate is provided for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this paragraph

be taken to be that in force on April 10, 1947, and, if no most-favoured-nation rate is

provided for, the margin shall not exceed the difference between the most-favoured-nation

and preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947;

(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the appropriate Schedule, the

difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates existing on April 10,

1947.

In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, the date of April 10, 1947, referred to in subparagraph

(a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo I

Tratamento Geral de Nação mais Favorecida

1.1 Qualquer vantagem, favor, imunidade ou privilégio concedido por uma parte contratante em relação

a um produto originário de ou destinado a qualquer outro país, será imediata e incondicionalmente

estendido ao produtor similar, originário do território de cada uma das outras partes contratantes ou

ao mesmo destinado, Êste dispositivo se refere aos direitos aduaneiros e encargos de tôda a natureza

que gravem a importação ou a exportação, ou a elas se relacionem, aos que recaiam sôbre as

transferências internacionais de fundos para pagamento de importações e exportações, digam

respeito ao método de arrecadação dêsses direitos e encargos ou ao conjunto de regulamentos ou

formalidades estabelecidos em conexão com a importação e exportação bem como aos assuntos

incluidos nos §§ 1 e 2 do art. III.

1.2 As disposições do parágrafo primeiro do presente artigo não importarão na eliminação de quaisquer

preferências com respeito a direitos aduaneiros ou encargos que não ultrapassem os limites fixados

no § 3 dêste artigo e que se enquadrem nas seguintes descrições:

(a) preferências em vigor exclusivamente entre dois ou mais dos territórios enumerados no

Anexo A, subordinadas às condições nele estipuladas;

(b) preferências em vigor exclusivamente entre dois ou mais territórios que, em 1 de julho de

1939, estavam sujeitos a uma soberania comum ou unidos por laços de proteção ou

suzerania, os quais são enumerados nos Anexos B, C e D, dentro das condições nos mesmos

estipulados;

(c) preferências em vigor exclusivamente entre os Estados Unidos da América e a República de

Cuba;

(d) preferências em vigor exclusivamente entre paises vizinhos mencionados nos Anexos E e F.

1.3 Quando não fôr fixada especificamente a margem máxima de preferência na correspondente lista

anexada a êste Acôrdo, a margem de preferência sôbre qualquer produto em relação ao qual seja

permitida uma, preferência, de conformidade com o § 2º do presente artigo, não poderá exceder:

(a) relativamente aos direitos ou encargos sôbre qualquer produto descrito nessa lista, a

diferença entre a taxa de nação mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial, que figuram na mesma

lista; se não houver estipulação da taxa preferencial, esta, para os fins de aplicação do

presente parágrafo, passará a ser a que estava em vigor em 10 de abril de 1947; se nenhuma

taxa de nação mais favorecida fôr fixada, a margem não ultra-passará a diferença, existente

em 10 de abril de 1947, entre a taxa aplicável à nação mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial;

(b) no tocante aos direitos ou encargos sôbre qualquer produto não descrito na lista

correspondente à diferença, existente em 10 de abril de 1947, entre a taxa aplicável à nação

mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial.

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No caso das partes contratantes mencionadas no Anexo G, a data de 10 de abril de 1947, citada nas alineas (a) e

(b) do presente parágrafo, será substituida pelas respectivas datas indicadas nesse anexo.

Footnote 1: The authentic text erroneously reads “subparagraph 5(a)”.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Na versão original do GATT em português, publicada pela Lei 313/1948, a tradução do parágrafo 3 está

incorreta. Dessa forma, a tradução adequada do texto original deve compreender as disposições tal como são

apresentadas, sugerindo-se a seguinte redação “As disposições do parágrafo 1 não se aplicarão às preferências

entre os países que anteriormente foram parte do Império Otomano e dele se separaram em 24 de julho de 1923,

desde que tais preferências sejam aprovadas nos termos do parágrafo 5, do Artigo XXV, que deverá ser aplicado

de acordo com o parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXIX.”

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo I do GATT

1. Artigo I

A interpretação do Artigo I do GATT pelos Painéis e pelo Órgão de Apelação foi construída com base nos

seguintes elementos:

(a) Objeto e finalidade (Object and purpose);

(b) Âmbito de aplicação (Scope of application);

(c) Ordem de exame (Order of examination);

(d) Qualquer vantagem, favor, privilégio ou imunidade concedida por qualquer País Membro (any advantage,

favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member):

(i) Geral (General); e

(ii) Atribuição de quotas tarifárias (Allocation of tariff quotas).

(e) Produtos similares (like products);

(f) Qualquer produto originário ou destinado para outro país (any product originating in or destined for another

country); e

(g) Será outorgada imediata e incondicionalmente (shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally).

a) “Objeto e finalidade”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry

(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japão e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R,

para. 84

Nesse caso o Órgão de Apelação aponta que o objeto e a finalidade do Artigo I do GATT são plenamente

identificáveis como mandamento para aplicação do princípio da não discriminação no tratamento destinado

aos produtos similares importados, ao mesmo tempo em que também pretende ser incentivo para que haja

continuidade nas concessões tarifárias negociadas, e sua consequente generalização entre todos os Países

Membros.

Para. 84. “The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our interpretation. That object and purpose is to prohibit

discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibition of

discrimination in Article I:1 also serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to

all other Members on an MFN basis.”

b) “Âmbito de aplicação”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry

(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japão e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R,

para. 78

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Nesse caso o Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu que a cobertura da cláusula da nação mais favorecida, tal como

estipulada pelo Artigo I do GATT, não é limitada apenas ao seu âmbito normativo, como proibição que seria

tão somente destinada as medidas restritivas e discriminatórias assim identificadas unicamente através de

suas disposições legais. Na verdade, inexiste qualquer limitação para proibição de medidas discriminatórias,

sejam elas jurídicas ou na prática contrárias ao Artigo I do GATT (de jure ou de facto, respectivamente).

Para. 78. In approaching this question, we observe first that the words of Article I:1 do not restrict its scope

only to cases in which the failure to accord an “advantage” to like products of all other Members appears on the

face of the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the measure. Neither the words “de

jure” nor “de facto” appear in Article I:1. Nevertheless, we observe that Article I:1 does not cover only “in law”,

or de jure, discrimination. As several GATT panel reports confirmed, Article I:1 covers also “in fact”, or de

facto, discrimination. (2) Like the Panel, we cannot accept Canada's argument that Article I:1 does not apply to

measures which, on their face, are “origin-neutral” (3).

c) “Ordem de exame”

Relatório do Painel no litígio Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia -

Autos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Japão, EUA e Japão, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,

WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, para. 14.138

Neste Relatório o Painel estrutura a ordem de exame das medidas potencialmente discriminatórias adotadas

em face aos produtos similares importados, quando submetidas à apreciação pelo DSB. Primeiramente, fica

estabelecido que a análise das medidas deve ser realizada sob a ótica das vantagens previstas no próprio

Artigo I do GATT. Se os benefícios tarifários e aduaneiros restarem classificados como tais vantagens,

caberá ao Painel (ou ao Órgão de Apelação) decidir se esses mesmos benefícios são oferecidos a todos os

produtos importados similares e se sua concessão é realizada de maneira incondicional.

Para. 14.138. The Appellate Body, in Bananas III, confirmed that to establish a violation of Article I, there

must be an advantage, of the type covered by Article I and which is not accorded unconditionally to all “like

products” of all WTO Members. Following this analysis, we shall first examine whether the tax and customs

duty benefits are advantages of the types covered by Article I. Second, we shall decide whether the advantages

are offered (i) to all like products and (ii) unconditionally.”

Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain

Products from China (US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)), Demandante: China,

WT/DS379/R, para. 14.166

Neste Relatório o Painel retoma os posicionamentos estabelecido em Indonesia - Certain Measures

Affecting the Automobile Industry e EC - Bananas, quais sejam uma vantagem tal como definida pelas

disposições do Artigo I do GATT e sua extensão, incondicional ou não, para os produtos similares dos

outros Países Membros, consolidando os elementos a serem analisados durante o exame de conformidade

de uma medida em relação as disposições presentes ao Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 14.166. “By its terms, three elements must be demonstrated to establish a violation of Article I:1: there

must be an “advantage”, (of the type covered by that provision) which is not accorded to all “like products” of

all WTO Members, “unconditionally” (4).

d) “Qualquer vantagem, favor, privilégio ou imunidade concedida por qualquer Membro”

(i) Geral

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry

(Canada - Autos), Demandantes: Japão e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R,

para. 79

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Nesse Relatório o Órgão de Apelação ressalta o caráter abrangente da proibição contra medidas

discriminatórias, destacando a inclusão da totalidade das vantagens concedidas para quaisquer produtos dentro

das disposições previstas no Artigo I do GATT. Nesse diapasão, cabe destacar que tais vantagens para os seus

respectivos produtos devem ser estendidas para quaisquer outros produtos similares, originários de todos os

Países Membros, de forma imediata e incondicional. Nota-se, portanto, o caráter eminentemente amplo e

inclusivo das disposições do Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 79. “We note next that Article I:1 requires that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by

any Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and

unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members.”

(emphasis added) The words of Article I:1 refer not to some advantages granted “with respect to” the subjects

that fall within the defined scope of the Article, but to “any advantage”; not to some products, but to “any

product ”; and not to like products from some other Members, but to like products originating in or destined for

“all other “ Members.”

(ii) Atribuição de quotas tarifárias

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico e

EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 206

Nesse caso o Órgão de Apelação, em concordância com a decisão anterior do Painel, aponta que quotas

tarifárias que resultam em vantagens, mas que apresentem requisitos discriminatórios para sua extensão

imediata às importações de produtos similares de outros Membros, são proibidas pelo Artigo I:1 do GATT.

Para. 206. “On the first issue, the Panel found that the procedural and administrative requirements of the

activity function rules for importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas differ from, and go

significantly beyond, those required for importing traditional ACP bananas. This is a factual finding. Also, a

broad definition has been given to the term “advantage” in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by the panel in United

States - Non-Rubber Footwear (5). It may well be that there are considerations of EC competition policy at the

basis of the activity function rules. This, however, does not legitimize the activity function rules to the extent

that these rules discriminate among like products originating from different Members. For these reasons, we

agree with the Panel that the activity function rules are an “advantage” granted to bananas imported from

traditional ACP States, and not to bananas imported from other Members, within the meaning of Article I:1.

Therefore, we uphold the Panel's finding that the activity function rules are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the

GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Painel em European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/MEX, para. 7.239

Nesse caso o Painel recorda que o Artigo I:1 do GATT não permite que os Países Membros concedam

tratamentos diferenciados nos diversos procedimentos relativos à importação de produtos, de modo que a

discriminação entre origens pudesse ser equilibrada através de diferentes concessões mais ou menos

favoráveis a depender do procedimento e da origem do produto.

Para. 7.239. “The requirement to match EC import licences with BFA export certificates means that those BFA

banana suppliers who are initial holders of export certificates enjoy a commercial advantage compared to

banana suppliers from other third countries (6). We note that it is not possible to ascertain how many of the

initial BFA export certificate holders are BFA banana producers or to what extent the tariff quota rent share that

accrues to initial holders of BFA export certificates is passed on to the producers of BFA bananas in a way to

create more favourable competitive opportunities for bananas of BFA origin. However, we also note that the

possibility does exist to pass on tariff quota rent to BFA banana producers in such a way, whereas there is no

such possibility in respect of non-BFA third-country banana producers. Thus, the EC's requirement affects the

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competitive relationship between bananas of non-BFA third-country origin and bananas of BFA origin. It is

certainly true that Article I of GATT is concerned with the treatment of foreign products originating from

different foreign sources rather than with the treatment of the suppliers of these products. In this respect, we

note that the transfer of tariff quota rents which would normally accrue to initial holders of EC import licences

to initial holders of BFA export certificates does occur when bananas originating in Colombia, Costa Rica and

Nicaragua are, at some point, traded to the EC. Therefore, in our view, the requirement to match EC import

licences with BFA export certificates and thus the commercial value of export certificates are linked to the

product at issue as required under Article I. In practice, from the perspective of EC importers who are Category

A or C operators, bananas of non-BFA third country origin appear to be more profitable than bananas of BFA

origin. This is confirmed by the fact that EC import licences for non-BFA third-country bananas and Category B

licences for BFA bananas are typically oversubscribed in the first round of licence allocations, while Category

A and C licences for BFA bananas are usually exhausted only in the second round of the quarterly licence

allocation procedure. The EC argues that the fact that licences allowing the importation of non-BFA bananas at

in-quota tariff rates are usually exhausted in the first round amounts to an advantage for bananas of

Complainants' origin. While we do not endorse the EC's view, even if this were to constitute an advantage, we

note “that Article I:1 does not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedure against a less

favourable treatment under others” (7).

e) “Produtos similares”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry

(Indonesia - Autos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Japão, EUA e Japão, WT/DS54/R,

WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, para. 14.141

Nesse caso o Órgão de Apelação, ao confrontar-se com a questão de similaridade entre produtos nacionais e

importados, realiza uma análise sobre as especificidades dos produtos em pauta, tendo como parâmetros os

argumentos sobre as suas características específicas tal como apresentados pelos Membros envolvidos em

uma controvérsia. Para o Órgão de Apelação resta patente que se os produtos nacionais não forem

singulares, quando tanto eles quanto os produtos estrangeiros compartilham o mesmo segmento de mercado,

sem diferenças relevantes no consumo, e sem evidencias que afastem a presunção de similaridade

evidenciada durante os procedimentos de solução da controvérsia, o produto importado será considerado

como similar ao produto nacional.

Para. 14.141. “We have found in our discussion of like products under Article III:2 that certain imported motor

vehicles are like the National Car (8). The same considerations justify a finding that such imported vehicles can

be considered like National Cars imported from Korea for the purpose of Article I. We also consider that parts

and components imported from the complainants are like imports from Korea. Indonesia concedes that some

parts and components are exactly the same for all cars. As to the parts and components which arguably are

specific to the National Car, Indonesia does not contest that they can be produced by the complainants’

companies. This fact confirms that the parts and components imported for use in the National Car are not

unique. As before, we note in addition that the criteria for benefitting from reduced customs duties and taxes are

not based on any factor which may affect per se the physical characteristics of those cars and parts and

components, or their end uses. In this regard, we note that past panels interpreting Article I have found that a

legislation itself may violate that provision if it could lead in principle to less favourable treatment of the same

products.” (9)

Relatório do Painel no litígio Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia -

Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panamá, WT/DS366/R, para. 7.356

Nesta decisão o Painel reconhece que medidas que possuem como critério de incidência para sua aplicação a

origem dos produtos, são contrárias às disposições do Artigo I do GATT, ainda que tal distinção entre os

produtos similares somente pudesse ser realizada hipoteticamente. Observa-se que a cláusula da nação mais

favorecida compreende obrigações para com Países Membros que ainda não produzem o produto similar

sujeito às medidas, mas que caso começassem a produzi-los, estes estariam sujeitos a distinções

discriminatórias unicamente por causa de sua origem.

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Para. 7.356. “The Appellate Body has previously recognized the possibility of using hypothetical imports to

determine whether a measure violates Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. (10) Under the advance import

declaration and legalization requirements, the distinction between products is based on the circulation and points

of departure of textile, apparel and footwear products prior to the products' arrival in Colombia. In particular,

since Panama does not currently produce any of these products for export to Colombia, but in light of the fact

that the Panel views it as proper to consider Panama's claim, hypothetical imports from Panama or the CFZ are

appropriate for consideration. An advance import declaration, advance payment of customs duties and taxes,

and special rules concerning legalization would be required simply because of the products' origin. In the

Panel's view, the hypothetical origin-based distinction that would arise if Panama were to produce the subject

goods and export those goods to Colombia is sufficient for the Panel to proceed in considering Panama's claim

under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Painel em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China (US -

Poultry (China)), Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.423-7.429

Nesse caso o Painel discorre sobre a questão da comparação entre produtos nacionais e importados e sua

consequente similaridade. A problemática central é se a comparação entre produtos vis-à-vis deveria ser

hipotética, considerando apenas se a origem é o fator discriminatório na aplicação de medidas restritivas na

importação. O Painel ressalta que esta análise deve ser feita para cada caso individualmente, a fim de

apurarem-se as suas especificidades particulares, determinantes na definição de similaridade entre produtos.

Para. 7.423. “The Panel notes that Article I:1 requires a comparison between like products originating from one

country vis-à-vis products originating from a WTO Member. The products to be compared in this dispute are the

products at issue – poultry products as defined by the PPIA originating from China vis-à-vis poultry products

originating in the territory of other WTO Members which have been deemed equivalent by the FSIS. China

argues that the Panel should follow a hypothetical like product analysis as several panels have done when

confronted with origin-based discrimination (11), while the United States argues that the Panel should rely on

the approach of the panel in the EC – Asbestos dispute because it dealt with the issue of “likeness” in the context

of products with different safety levels.”(12)

Para. 7.424. “The concept of like product has been abundantly interpreted in the prior decisions of panels and

the Appellate Body. Whatever the provision at issue, the Appellate Body has explained that a like product

analysis must always be done on a case-by-case basis.” (13)

Para. 7.425. “The traditional approach for determining “likeness” has, in the main, consisted of employing four

general criteria: (14) “(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii)

consumers' tastes and habits – more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions and behaviour – in respect

of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products.” (15)

Para. 7.426. “A different approach used by panels and the Appellate Body to determine the likeness of the

products has been to assume – hypothetically – that two like products exist in the market place when one of two

situations arises: first cases concerning origin-based discrimination, and second, cases where it was not possible

to make the like product comparison because of – for example – a ban on imports.” (16)

Para. 7.427. “The panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products (17) recalled the relevant WTO

jurisprudence which supports a hypothetical like product analysis where a difference in treatment between

domestic and imported products is based exclusively on the products' origin. In these cases, the complainant did

not need to identify specific domestic and imported products and establish their likeness in terms of the

traditional criteria in order to make a prima facie case of “likeness”. Instead, when origin is the sole criterion

distinguishing the products, it has been sufficient for a complainant to demonstrate that there can or will be

domestic and imported products that are “like”. (18) For example, the panels in Argentina – Hides and Leather

and Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports found in the context of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, that

“where a Member draws an origin-based distinction in respect of internal taxes, a comparison of specific

products is not required and, consequently, it is not necessary to examine the various likeness criteria.” (19) We

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also note that panels have found that foreign origin cannot serve as a basis for a determination that imported

products are “unlike” domestic ones.” (20)

Para. 7.428. “The panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry applied a hypothetical like product analysis in respect of

products originating from Panama and other WTO Members in the context of Article I:1. The measure at issue

affected products coming from Panama into Colombia, whether originating or not in Panama. Panama did not

appear to produce goods for export to Colombia, but nevertheless the Panel considered Panama's claim. Based

on the above jurisprudence under Article III of the GATT 1994 (21), the panel adopted a hypothetical likeness

approach on the premise of an origin-based distinction that would arise if Panama were to produce the subject

goods and export them to Colombia. (22) The panel considered that if Panama were to produce textiles, apparel

and footwear, goods originating in Panama would be “like products” to those originating in other countries.”

(23)

Para. 7.429. “We note that the United States has argued that the differing safety levels of poultry from China

vis-à-vis other WTO Members may have an impact on the like products analysis. (24) However, the

United States did not provide specific evidence relating to different safety levels between poultry products from

China and other WTO Members. Therefore, we see no reason not to proceed with the “hypothetical” like

products analysis and base our determination on whether the products alleged to be “like” are distinguished

solely because of their origin.”

f) “Qualquer produto originário ou destinado para outro país”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico e

EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190

Nessa disputa o Órgão de Apelação ressalta a essência do princípio da não discriminação, qual seja a origem

dos produtos não poder ser característica que os submeta a quaisquer medidas discriminatórias. Produtos

similares devem ser tratados de forma igual, independentemente de sua origem. Dessa forma, até mesmo o

tratamento doméstico dispensado aos produtos similares, em determinados países, não pode ser considerado,

por outro Membro, como fundamento para tratamento discriminatório na importação destes mesmos

produtos, uma vez que a distinção na concessão de vantagens seria um critério preponderantemente baseado

em origem de produtos.

Para. 190. “The issue here is not whether the European Communities is correct in stating that two separate

import regimes exist for bananas, but whether the existence of two, or more, separate EC import regimes is of

any relevance for the application of the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex

1A agreements. The essence of the non-discrimination obligations is that like products should be treated

equally, irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all bananas are like products, the non-

discrimination provisions apply to all imports of bananas, irrespective of whether and how a Member

categorizes or subdivides these imports for administrative or other reasons. If, by choosing a different legal basis

for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of

the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from different Members, the object and

purpose of the non-discrimination provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to

circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements, if these

provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by that Member.”

g) “Será outorgada imediata e incondicionalmente”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry

(Indonesia - Autos), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Japão, EUA e Japão, WT/DS54/R,

WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, paras. 14.145-14.147

Nesse relatório o Órgão de Apelação observa que as vantagens concedidas a um produto importado devem

ser igualmente estendidas, ou seja, concedidas aos produtos similares de outras origens imediata e

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incondicionalmente. Dessa forma, não é permitido suspender ou mesmo proibir a aplicação de vantagens

aos produtos similares em face de qualquer condição, inclusive estabelecer objeções originárias de relações

contratuais de âmbito privado, o que também seria inconsistente com o escopo e as disposições do Artigo I

do GATT.

Para. 14.145. “Indeed, it appears that the design and structure of the June 1996 car programme is such as to

allow situations where another Member’s like product to a National Car imported by PT PTN from Korea will

be subject to much higher duties and sales taxes than those imposed on such National Cars. For example,

customs duties as high as 200% can be imposed on finished motor vehicles while an imported National Car

benefits from a 0% customs duty. No taxes are imposed on a National Car while an imported like motor vehicle

from another Member would be subject to a 35% sales tax. The distinction as to whether one product is subject

to 0 % duty and the other one is subject to 200% duty or whether one product is subject to 0% sales tax and the

other one is subject to a 35% sales tax, depends on whether or not PT TPN had made a “deal” with that

exporting company to produce that National Car, and is covered by the authorization of June 1996 with

specifications that correspond to those of the Kia car produced only in Korea. In the GATT/WTO, the right of

Members cannot be made dependent upon, conditional on or even affected by, any private contractual

obligations in place. (25) The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I:1

which provides that tax and customs duty benefits accorded to products of one Member (here on Korean

products) be accorded to imported like products from other Members “immediately and unconditionally”. (26)

Para. 14.146. “We note also that under the February 1996 car programme the granting of customs duty benefits

to parts and components is conditional to their being used in the assembly in Indonesia of a National Car. The

granting of tax benefits is conditional and limited to the only Pioneer company producing National Cars. And

there is also a third condition for these benefits: the meeting of certain local content targets. Indeed under all

these car programmes, customs duty and tax benefits are conditional on achieving a certain local content value

for the finished car. The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I:1 which

provides that tax and customs duty advantages accorded to products of one Member (here on Korean products)

be accorded to imported like products from other Members “immediately and unconditionally.”

Para. 14.147. “For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996 car programme which

introduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based on various

conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February 1996 car programme which

also introduce discrimination between imports in the allocation of customs duty benefits based on various

conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves, are inconsistent with the provisions of

Article I of GATT.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry

(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japão e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R,

paras. 81-82

Nesse Relatório o Órgão de Apelação destaca a influência e a penetração da cláusula da nação mais

favorecida para além do Artigo I do GATT, com ocorrência sistemática em outras disposições do Quadro

Normativo da OMC, notadamente com reflexos diretos nas demais provisões do GATT.

Para. 81. “Thus, from both the text of the measure and the Panel's conclusions about the practical operation of

the measure, it is apparent to us that “[w]ith respect to customs duties…imposed on or in connection with

importation…,” Canada has granted an “advantage” to some products from some Members that Canada has not

“accorded immediately and unconditionally” to “like” products “originating in or destined for the territories of

all other Members.” (emphasis added) And this, we conclude, is not consistent with Canada's obligations under

Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.”

Para 82. “The context of Article I:1 within the GATT 1994 supports this conclusion. Apart from Article I:1,

several “MFN-type” clauses dealing with varied matters are contained in the GATT 1994. (27) The very

existence of these other clauses demonstrates the pervasive character of the MFN principle of non-

discrimination.”

11

Relatório do Painel no litígio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada -

Autos), Demandantes: Japão e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/R e WT/DS142/R, paras. 10.22–10.25

Nesse caso o Painel discorre sobre certos elementos presentes no Artigo I do GATT. Para o Painel, não é

possível identificar se uma vantagem foi estendida incondicionalmente sem um exame de possíveis

discriminações entre produtos similares de Países Membros diferentes. Sobre essa faceta do Artigo I do

GATT, é necessário destacar que a extensão incondicional de vantagens é obrigação dos Membros da

OMC, não sendo possível sua relativização em face da situação ou conduta de outros Membros. Contudo, o

Painel também destaca que condições impostas, quando não relacionadas aos produtos em si e a sua origem,

não são necessariamente contrárias ao Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 10.22. “As explained below, we believe that this interpretation of Japan does not accord with the ordinary

meaning of the term “unconditionally” in Article I:1 in its context and in light of the object and purpose of

Article I:1. In our view, whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is accorded “unconditionally”

cannot be determined independently of an examination of whether it involves discrimination between like

products of different countries.”

Para. 10.23. “Article I:1 requires that, if a Member grants any advantage to any product originating in the

territory of any other country, such advantage must be accorded “immediately and unconditionally” to the like

product originating in the territories of all other Members. We agree with Japan that the ordinary meaning of

“unconditionally” is “not subject to conditions”. However, in our view Japan misinterprets the meaning of the

word “unconditionally” in the context in which it appears in Article I:1. The word “unconditionally” in Article

I:1 does not pertain to the granting of an advantage per se, but to the obligation to accord to the like products of

all Members an advantage which has been granted to any product originating in any country. The purpose of

Article I:1 is to ensure unconditional MFN treatment. In this context, we consider that the obligation to accord

“unconditionally” to third countries which are WTO Members an advantage which has been granted to any

other country means that the extension of that advantage may not be made subject to conditions with respect to

the situation or conduct of those countries. This means that an advantage granted to the product of any country

must be accorded to the like product of all WTO Members without discrimination as to origin.”

Para. 10.24. “In this respect, it appears to us that there is an important distinction to be made between, on the

one hand, the issue of whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is subject to conditions, and, on

the other, whether an advantage, once it has been granted to the product of any country, is accorded

“unconditionally” to the like product of all other Members. An advantage can be granted subject to conditions

without necessarily implying that it is not accorded “unconditionally” to the like product of other Members.

More specifically, the fact that conditions attached to such an advantage are not related to the imported product

itself does not necessarily imply that such conditions are discriminatory with respect to the origin of imported

products. We therefore do not believe that, as argued by Japan, the word “unconditionally” in Article I:1 must

be interpreted to mean that making an advantage conditional on criteria not related to the imported product itself

is per se inconsistent with Article I:1, irrespective of whether and how such criteria relate to the origin of the

imported products.”

Para. 10.25. “We thus find that Japan's argument is unsupported by the text of Article I:1. We also consider that

there is no support for this argument in the GATT and WTO reports cited by Japan. A review of these reports

shows that they were concerned with measures that were found to be inconsistent with Article I:1 not because

they involved the application of conditions that were not related to the imported product but because they

involved conditions that entailed different treatment of imported products depending upon their origin.”

Relatório do Painel em Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia - Ports of

Entry), Demandante: Panamá, WT/DS366/R, para. 7.366

Nesse Relatório o Painel reitera o posicionamento estabelecido em Canada – Auto quanto à proibição de

discriminação da concessão de vantagens quanto à origem dos produtos. Nesse escopo, a legislação

aduaneira, mesmo que com objetivo de evitar ilícitos, fica proibida de aplicar normas distintas com base na

12

origem dos produtos importados.

Para. 7.366. “With respect to Colombia's view that it may condition its customs procedures on the need to

control and verify imported merchandise from Panama and to avoid circumvention of such laws and regulation

through under-invoicing, fraud and smuggling, without violating Article I:1, the Panel reiterates the view

expressed in Canada – Autos (28) that conditions attached to an advantage granted in connection with the

importation of a product will violate Article I:1 when such conditions discriminate with respect to the origin of

products. As such, in the Panel's view, Article I:1 prohibits Members from addressing such concerns through the

use of customs rules that are applied on the basis of origin.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry

(Colombia - Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panamá, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, paras. 83-84

Nessa decisão o Órgão de Apelação aponta que, apesar do caráter expansivo da cláusula da nação mais

favorecida, existem diversas exceções às disposições do Artigo I previstas no próprio GATT, como os

Artigos XX, XXI e XXIV.

Para. 83. “The drafters also wrote various exceptions to the MFN principle into the GATT 1947 which remain

in the GATT 1994. (29) Canada invoked one such exception before the Panel, relating to customs unions and

free trade areas under Article XXIV. This justification was rejected by the Panel, and the Panel's findings on

Article XXIV were not appealed by Canada. Canada has invoked no other provision of the GATT 1994, or of

any other covered agreement, that would justify the inconsistency of the import duty exemption with Article I:1

of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 84. “The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our interpretation. That object and purpose is to

prohibit discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibition of

discrimination in Article I:1 also serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended

to all other Members on an MFN basis.”

Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Import measures on certain products from the

European Communities (US - Certain EC Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS165/R,

para. 6.54

Nesse caso o Painel identifica diferenciação na regulamentação entre produtos domésticos e similares

importados, cujo exclusivo substrato para tal distinção é a origem destes produtos, independentemente de

suas características próprias. Tal diferenciação é discriminatória e, portanto, contrária ao Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 6.54. “We find that the 3 March additional bonding requirements violated the most-favoured-nation

clause of Article I (30) of GATT, as it was applicable only to imports from the European Communities,

although identical products from other WTO Members were not the subject of such an additional bonding

requirements. The regulatory distinction (whether an additional bonding requirement is needed) was not based

on any characteristic of the product but depended exclusively on the origin of the product and targeted

exclusively some imports from the European Communities. (31)

Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to

Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/R, paras. 7.59-7.60

Nesse Relatório o Painel reconhece que a incondicionalidade da extensão das vantagens acordadas para

produtos similares podem relacionar-se a condições de compensações comerciais. Entretanto, o Artigo I do

GATT tem uma abrangência superior à questão de exigência de compensações, que justamente coaduna-se

com o sentido usual de incondicionalmente, qual seja, sem limitação ou sujeição a quaisquer condições.

Para. 7.59. “In the Panel's view, moreover, the term “unconditionally” in Article I:1 has a broader meaning than

simply that of not requiring compensation. While the Panel acknowledges the European Communities' argument

13

that conditionality in the context of traditional MFN clauses in bilateral treaties may relate to conditions of trade

compensation for receiving MFN treatment, the Panel does not consider this to be the full meaning of

“unconditionally” under Article I:1. Rather, the Panel sees no reason not to give that term its ordinary meaning

under Article I:1, that is, “not limited by or subject to any conditions”. (32)

Para. 7.60. “Because the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are accorded only on the condition

that the receiving countries are experiencing a certain gravity of drug problems, these tariff preferences are not

accorded “unconditionally” to the like products originating in all other WTO Members, as required by

Article I:1. The Panel therefore finds that the tariff advantages under the Drug Arrangements are not consistent

with Article I:1 of GATT 1994.”

III. Comentários

O Artigo I do GATT dispõe sobre um dos pilares fundamentais para o sistema multilateral de comércio, qual

seja o princípio ou cláusula da nação mais favorecida (“most favoured nation”). Estabelece o artigo em

referência vedação à discriminação quando da concessão de quaisquer vantagens e benefícios a determinados

produtos de certa origem, importando na exigência de imediata extensão destas vantagens para outros produtos

similares originários ou destinados a todos os demais Membros da OMC. Prestigia-se, assim, a equidade no

trato das relações comerciais internacionais, com a disseminação de condições congruentes de competição entre

os diversos países, característica indissociável da configuração do multilateralismo atual.

Tais disposições positivam a obrigação jurídica de manutenção da concorrência entre produtos similares,

independentemente de sua origem ou destino, na medida em que ingerências discriminatórias de política

comercial, quando instituídas pelos Membros, são proibidas. Exige-se, assim, que a cada Membro sejam

concedidas as vantagens como se fossem as mais benéficas, concomitante igual expansão de tais benefícios

negociados aos demais Membros da OMC. Estabelece-se uma implicação automática e direta das concessões

bilaterais, que se tornam coletivas, uma vez que todos os Membros, mesmo que não tenham participado

diretamente das negociações, adquirem as mesmas vantagens acordadas por aqueles que as negociaram.

As disposições do Artigo I do GATT fazem referência à medida que constitua vantagem, favor, imunidade ou

privilégio (“advantage, favour, privilege or immunity”), o que representa, de modo geral, as possibilidades de

atuação dos Países Membros no âmbito do comércio internacional. Intentou-se dimensionar a incidência do

princípio da não discriminação para todas as vantagens acordadas, com obviedade extrapolando qualquer

condicionante relacionada à concessão da medida em si. Mostra-se inequívoco o destaque à objetiva limitação

proibitiva de violações à cláusula da nação mais favorecida consubstanciada neste Artigo.

Nesse sentido, em Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, o Órgão de Apelação

posicionou-se decisivamente sobre a extensão do princípio da não discriminação sob a égide do Artigo I do

GATT, que extrapola qualquer restrição originária de eventual distinção “de jure” ou “de facto”, aplicáveis a

uma medida que seja contestada. Em verdade, tal distinção não está presente no Artigo I do GATT, exatamente

pelo almejo a uma efetiva proibição contra a discriminação para além do âmbito puramente normativo e a

priori, propriamente abrangendo os efeitos provenientes da adoção de uma medida (i.e. muitas vezes o

tratamento discriminatório somente pode ser verificado quando da análise da aplicação efetiva da medida, uma

vez que seus efeitos concretos não poderiam ser depreendidos unicamente pela apreciação de suas disposições

legais em abstrato).

Identifica o Órgão de Apelação que concedida medida que implique em qualquer vantagem para certos

produtos, esta deve ser estendida, imediata e incondicionalmente, para todos os outros Membros, sob pena de

consequente infração ao Artigo I:1 do GATT. Portanto, a demonstração da existência desses três elementos,

uma vantagem conferida ao produto oriundo de certa origem, não estendida a todos os produtos similares dos

demais membros da OMC, ou com imposição de condições para tanto, caracteriza violação dos preceitos do

Artigo I:1 do GATT, conforme também destacado pelo Órgão de Apelação em US - Anti-Dumping and

Countervailing Duties (China).

14

O Órgão de Apelação reafirmou, em EC - Bananas, seu entendimento sobre a caracterização de violação ao

Artigo I do GATT, quando da análise de caso concreto sujeito ao Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC.

Assim sendo, para que se estabeleça uma violação à cláusula de nação mais favorecida, deverá existir uma

vantagem, do tipo compreendido pelo Artigo I do GATT, e que não é concedida incondicionalmente, de forma

generalizada para todos os Membros da OMC. A apreciação pelos Painéis e pelo Órgão de Apelação em cada

caso seguirá essa avaliação segmentada em etapas.

O Órgão de Apelação esclarece, em Canada – Auto, sobre a finalidade intrínseca que subjaz à cláusula da nação

mais favorecida, e que também seria consequência de sua incidência. Trata-se do estímulo que o Artigo I:1 do

GATT providencia para a concessão de novos benefícios, por consubstanciarem vantagens a serem estendidas,

indiscriminadamente, a todos os Membros, multilateralizando as negociações automaticamente.

As observações do Painel em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China,

fundamentadas na anterior decisão de outro Painel, em India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, são

essenciais para uma compreensão adequada dos termos dispostos no Artigo I do GATT, fundamentalmente para

abordagem apropriada de qualquer caso concreto. Nesse sentido, determinou o Painel que serão consideradas

medidas relacionadas à importação, tal como prescrito no Artigo I o GATT, as que inteiramente relacionarem-se

ao processo de importação, mas também àquelas relacionadas aos demais aspectos referentes ou que impliquem

em consequências na importação em si.

Em outra contribuição dos Relatórios de EC - Bananas para entendimento do Artigo I do GATT, o Painel fixou

o sentido de “vantagens” com precisão, como sendo aquele ato que acarreta oportunidades competitivas mais

favoráveis ou que afeta a relação comercial de produtos de origens diferentes. Retiram-se restrições na

abordagem dos resultados de medidas adotadas pelos países, para além de distorções pontuais no fluxo do

comércio, efetivamente se analisando as deformidades provocadas ao instituir-se uma medida contrária ao

Artigo I do GATT. Tal visão coaduna-se, assim, com a posição adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação desde Canada

- Auto, ou seja, a valorização da grande amplitude da incidência da disposição legal “qualquer vantagem” (“any

advantage”).

Ressalta o Painel, em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, que o Artigo

I:1 do GATT demanda que seja realizada uma comparação vis-à-vis entre produtos importados de certas origens

em relação à produtos similares importados provenientes de outras origens, sendo estas todos os Membros da

OMC. Nesse sentido, o Painel em Colombia - Ports of Entry utilizou-se de uma comparação hipotética entre

produtos similares das demais origens, uma vez que a análise dos produtos em concreto não foi possível.

Estabeleceu-se, consequentemente, a possibilidade de uma esfera de atuação para os Painéis ou Órgão de

Apelação que extrapola a limitação aos dados apresentados pelos Membros, podendo ser a medida submetida a

uma ponderação que considere danos futuros, em sincronia, portanto, com as disposições do Artigo I do GATT.

A expansão “imediata e incondicional” das vantagens concedidas também necessitou de uma abordagem para

ter seu conteúdo propriamente definido. Em Canada - Auto prevaleceu o posicionamento de que uma vantagem

na acepção do Artigo I do GATT somente poderá ser considerada como incondicionalmente concedida através

de um levantamento sobre a ocorrência, ou não, de discriminação entre produtos similares em diversas origens.

Dessa forma, conforme também reforçado em United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the

European Communities, a concessão de vantagem diz respeito não somente a ela em si, mas que essa seja,

indiscriminadamente, e não sujeita a quaisquer condições, proporcionadas aos produtos originados de qualquer

Membro.

A obrigação de não discriminação em relação às diferentes origens emana justamente do escopo do Artigo I:1,

garantidor do tratamento pleno da cláusula de nação mais favorecida, em que toda vantagem concedida ao

produto de qualquer país deve ser concedida ao produto similar de todos os Países Membros da OMC,

independentemente de sua situação ou conduta. Similarmente, em Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions

on Ports of Entry, confirmou-se que a imposição de condições para uma vantagem concedida em conexão com a

importação de um produto em relação à origem destes é proibida.

15

Apesar de indisputável importância sistêmica, algumas exceções são defesas quando da adoção de certas

medidas pelos Membros da OMC, ao princípio da nação mais favorecida. Tais ressalvas garantem o afastamento

legal e autorizado do Artigo I do GATT nos casos de direitos antidumping e compensatórios, tráfego fronteiriço

e uniões aduaneiras, waivers para tratamento tarifário preferencial para Países Menos Desenvolvidos, a enabling

clause (cláusula de habilitação) e mesmo as exceções gerais do Artigo XX do GATT.

De tais exceções cabe tecer comentários adicionais sobre a enabling clause, que merece especial cautela. Para

tanto, o Órgão de Apelação determinou, confirmando decisão anterior do Painel em EC - Tariff Preferences, por

pacificar o entendimento de que a enabling clause é uma exceção ao Artigo I. Isso porque a função da enabling

clause é justamente permitir a adoção de medidas que proporcionem tratamento diferencial e mais favorável a

alguns Membros em desenvolvimento, sem extensão imediata e incondicional aos demais membros da OMC, o

que, fora do âmbito especial da enabling clause, consistiria em patente desrespeito às disposições do Artigo I do

GATT.

Todavia, o Órgão de Apelação também declarou que a regra consubstanciada no Artigo I:1 do GATT continua

vigente e aplicável nas hipóteses de enabling clause. Dessa forma, o estudo da consistência de uma medida deve

passar primeiramente pelo crivo do Artigo I do GATT e constatada infração ao dispositivo em referência deverá

proceder-se com a análise da enabling clause como justificativa legal para tanto, uma vez que incorpora uma

regra mais específica, que prevalece quando em conflito.

Sobre a não discriminação no tratamento preferencial, declarou-se também, com coerência, que o parágrafo 2(d)

não constitui exceção ao parágrafo 2(a) da enabling clause, uma vez que se reconhece a existência da

subcategoria de países menos desenvolvidos dentro do grupo de países subdesenvolvidos, que podem receber,

dada sua natureza especial, certas vantagens tarifárias independentemente de sua extensão automática aos

demais Membros beneficiados. Ainda, dos parágrafos 3(a) e 3(c) se depreende que não há necessidade de que as

preferências tarifárias sejam proporcionadas igualmente, exatamente pelas necessidades objetivamente

diferentes de cada subconjunto de países subdesenvolvidos, ressalvando-se que existe a impossibilidade

proibitiva de que tais condições resultem em gravame injustificado para os demais Membros da OMC.

Finalmente, é levantada a questão do ônus de prova em relação aos fatos que sejam necessários para indicar a

incompatibilidade da medida em relação ao Artigo I do GATT e a enabling clause. Para o Órgão de Apelação,

devido a importância dessa relação probatória, o encargo será majoritariamente do Membro demandado,

cabendo, entretanto, ao Membro demandante que indique quais provisões da enabling clause estão,

teoricamente, sendo descumpridas.

Depreende-se dos presentes comentários que os Painéis e, principalmente, o Órgão de Apelação, foram

responsáveis pela instituição de precedentes específicos para determinação do significado, objetivo e do

processo de análise sobre medidas impostas pelos Membros em relação às disposições do Artigo I do GATT, o

que propiciou uma uniformização da abordagem deste tema perante o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da

OMC. Ainda, é possível averiguar que em diversos casos em que foi levantada a questão de violação ao Artigo I

do GATT, não houve uma abordagem substancial da questão, seja por sucesso nas fases de consulta, falha de

argumentação das partes, ou pelo recurso à economia judicial pelo Painel ou Órgão de Apelação, consequências

representativas do caráter universal do princípio da não discriminação e da cláusula de nação mais favorecida e

sua disseminação no multilateralismo atual, reflexo do disposto no Artigo I do GATT.

FOOTNOTES:

Footnote 2: We note, though, that the measures examined in those reports differed from the measure in this case. Two of those reports

dealt with “like” product issues: panel report, Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135, adopted 11 June 1981, BISD

28S/102; panel report, Canada/Japan – Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, L/6470, adopted 19 July 1989,

BISD 36S/167. In this case, as we have noted, there is no dispute that the motor vehicles subject to the import duty exemption are “like”

products. Furthermore, two other reports dealt with measures which, on their face, discriminated on a strict “origin” basis, so that, at any

given time, either every product, or no product, of a particular origin was accorded an advantage. See panel report, Belgian Family

Allowances, G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD 1S/59; panel report, European Economic Community – Imports of Beef from

16

Canada, L/5099, adopted 10 March 1981, BISD 28S/92. In this case, motor vehicles imported into Canada are not disadvantaged in that

same sense.”

Footnote 3: Panel Report, para. 10.40.

Footnote 4: Panel Report on Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.138, citing to Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III.

Footnote 5: Adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.9.

Footnote 6: Whereas the framework agreement provides that the signatory countries are authorized to issue export licences for seventy

percent of their allocations, which licences are to be presented in order to obtain import licences of Category A and C for import into the

Community, in conditions which may improve the regularity and stability of commercial transactions and guarantee the absence of any

discriminatory treatment among operators” (emphasis added). Recital 8 of Regulation 478/95.

Footnote 7: “The Panel ... considered that Article I:1 does not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedure against

a less favourable treatment under others. If such a balancing were accepted, it would entitle a contracting party to derogate from the

most-favoured nation obligation in one case, in respect of one contracting party, on the ground that it accords more favourable treatment

in some other case in respect of another contracting party. In the view of the Panel, such an interpretation of the most-favoured-nation

obligation of Article I:1 would defeat the very purpose underlying the unconditionality of that obligation”. Panel Report on “United

States - Denial of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Nonrubber Footwear from Brazil”, adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128,

151, para. 6.10. Likewise, in the context of Article III a panel found that “an element of more favourable treatment would only be

relevant if it would always accompany and offset an element of differential treatment causing less favourable treatment.” Panel Report

on “United States - Section 377 of the TariffAct of 1930”, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, 388, para. 5.16.

Footnote 8: We refer to our discussions in paragraphs 14.110 and 14.111 where we found that given that the Timor, Escort, 306, Optima

and Corolla models are in the same market segments, there would not appear to be any relevant differences in respect of consumers'

tastes and habits sufficient to render these products unlike. In our view, this evidence is also sufficient to establish a presumption of

likeness between the Timor, Corolla, Escort, 306 and Optima for purposes of Article I of GATT. Since Indonesia has submitted no

evidence or argument to rebut the presumption of likeness for purposes of Article I of GATT, we find that at least these imported motor

vehicles are like the National Car for purposes of Article I of GATT.

Footnote 9: See for instance the Panel Report on United States - Denial of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Non-rubber Footwear

from Brazil, adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.12.

Footnote 10: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, pp. 20-21; see also Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.113.

Footnote 11: China's first written submission, para. 89.

Footnote 12: United States' first written submission, para. 98.

Footnote 13: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.

Footnote 14: Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 21, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 113 and, in particular, fn. 46; Panel

Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.8 (where the approach set forth in the Border Tax Adjustment case was adopted in a dispute concerning

Article III:4 of the GATT 1994).

Footnote 15: The fourth criterion, tariff classification, was not mentioned by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, but was

included by subsequent panels (e.g., GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2; GATT Panel Report, Japan –

Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6; and Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.8; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II,

pp. 21-22, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 114.

Footnote 16: Panel Report, Canada – Periodicals, paras. 5.22-5.23 upheld by the Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, p. 12.

Footnote 17: Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.1446.

Footnote 18: Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.113; Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, paras. 11.168 -11.170; Panel

Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.74; Panel Report, India – Autos, paras. 7.174-7.176.

Footnote 19: Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, footnote 246 to para. 6.164.

Footnote 20: Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II), para. 8.133.

Footnote 21: The panel referred to the Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, pp. 20-21; Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para.

14.113. Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, footnote 648 to para. 7.356.

Footnote 22: Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.356.

Footnote 23: Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.357.

Footnote 24: United States' first written submission, para. 98.

Footnote 25: For instance in the FIRA case, the Panel rejected Canada’s argument that the situation under examination was the

consequence of a private contract with an investor: “5.6 The Panel carefully examined the Canadian view that the purchase undertakings

should be considered as private contractual obligations of particular foreign investors vis-à-vis the Canadian government. The Panel

recognized that investors might have an economic advantage in assuming purchase undertakings, taking into account the other conditions

under which the investment was permitted. The Panel felt, however, that even if this were so, private contractual obligations entered into

by investors should not adversely affect the rights which contracting parties, including contracting parties not involved in the dispute,

possess under Article III:4 of the General Agreement and which they can exercise on behalf of their exporters.” See FIRA, op. cit, para.

5.6.

Footnote 26: See Working Party Report on the Accession of Hungary, BISD 20S/34 adopted on 30 July 1973.

Footnote 27: These relate to such matters as internal mixing requirements (Article III:7); cinema films (Article IV(b)); transit of goods

(Article V:2, 5, 6); marks of origin (Article IX:1); quantitative restrictions (Article XIII:1); measures to assist economic development

(Article XVIII:20); and measures for goods in short supply (Article XX(j)).

Footnote 28: Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.23.

Footnote 29: Such as in Articles XX (general exceptions), XXI (security exceptions) and XXIV (customs unions and free trade areas).

Footnote 30: Article I:1 of GATT reads as follows: “With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection

with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of

levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect

to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party

17

to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product

originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”

Footnote 31: Panel Report on Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (“Indonesia – Automobiles”), adopted on

23 July 1998, WT/DS54,55,59, 64/R, para.14.147: “For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996 car programme

which introduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based on various conditions and

other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February 1996 car programme which also introduced discrimination between

imports in the allocation of customs duty benefits based on various conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves, are

inconsistent with the provisions of Article I of GATT.”

Footnote 32: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 3465.

18

Artigo II

Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini

Frederico Arana Meira

Jacqueline Spolador Lopes

José Luiz Pimenta Júnior

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article II

Schedules of Concessions

2.1 (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties

treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate

Schedule annexed to this Agreement.

(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are

the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the

territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications

set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set

forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or

charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those

imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be

imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.

(c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party which are

the products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment upon

importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation into

such territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule,

be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part

II of that Schedule. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of

any kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the

date of this Agreement or those directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by

legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. Nothing in this Article shall

prevent any contracting party from maintaining its requirements existing on the date of this

Agreement as to the eligibility of goods for entry at preferential rates of duty.

2.2 Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on the

importation of any product:

(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of

paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article

from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part;

(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of Article

VI;

(c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered.

2.3 No contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of converting currencies so

as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to

this Agreement.

2.4 If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a monopoly of the

importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, such

19

monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that Schedule or as otherwise agreed between the parties

which initially negotiated the concession, operate so as to afford protection on the average in excess of

the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule. The provisions of this paragraph shall not limit

the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to domestic producers permitted by other

provisions of this Agreement.

2.5 If any contracting party considers that a product is not receiving from another contracting party the

treatment which the first contracting party believes to have been contemplated by a concession

provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall bring the matter directly

to the attention of the other contracting party. If the latter agrees that the treatment contemplated was

that claimed by the first contracting party, but declares that such treatment cannot be accorded because

a court or other proper authority has ruled to the effect that the product involved cannot be classified

under the tariff laws of such contracting party so as to permit the treatment contemplated in this

Agreement, the two contracting parties, together with any other contracting parties substantially

interested, shall enter promptly into further negotiations with a view to a compensatory adjustment of

the matter.

2.6 (a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules relating to contracting parties

members of the International Monetary Fund, and margins of preference in specific duties

and charges maintained by such contracting parties, are expressed in the appropriate

currency at the par value accepted or provisionally recognized by the Fund at the date of this

Agreement. Accordingly, in case this par value is reduced consistently with the Articles of

Agreement of the International Monetary Fund by more than twenty per centum, such

specific duties and charges and margins of preference may be adjusted to take account of

such reduction; provided that the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., the contracting parties

acting jointly as provided for in Article XXV) concur that such adjustments will not impair

the value of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in this

Agreement, due account being taken of all factors which may influence the need for, or

urgency of, such adjustments.

(b) Similar provisions shall apply to any contracting party not a member of the Fund, as from the

date on which such contracting party becomes a member of the Fund or enters into a special

exchange agreement in pursuance of Article XV.

2.7 The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this

Agreement.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo II

Listas de Concessões

2.1 (a) Cada Parte Contratante concederá às outras Partes Contratantes, em matéria comercial,

tratamento não menos favorável do que o previsto na parte apropriada da lista

correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo.

(b) Os produtos das Partes Contratantes, ao entrarem no território de outra Parte Contratante,

ficarão isentos dos direitos aduaneiros ordinários que ultrapassarem os direitos fixados na

Parte I da lista das concessões feitas por esta Parte Contratante, observados os termos,

condições ou requisitos constantes da mesma lista. Esses produtos também ficarão isentos

dos direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza, exigidos por ocasião da importação ou que

com a mesma se relacionem, e que ultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data do

presente Acordo ou os que, como consequência direta e obrigatória da legislação vigente no

país importador, na referida data, tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente.

20

(c) Os produtos enumerados na Parte II da lista relativa a qualquer das Partes Contratantes,

originários de território que, em virtude do Artigo I, goze do direito de tratamento

preferencial no tocante à importação, ao serem importados, estarão isentos no território

correspondente a essa lista, da parte que exceder dos direitos aduaneiros ordinários fixados

na Parte II dessa Lista. observados os termos, as condições ou requisitos constantes da

mesma. Esses produtos também ficarão isentos dos direitos ou encargos de qualquer

natureza, exigidos por ocasião da importação ou que com a mesma se relacionem, e que

ultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data do presente Acordo ou os que, como

consequência direta e obrigatória da legislação vigente na referida data, no país importador,

tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente. Nenhuma disposição do presente Artigo impedirá que

qualquer Parte Contratante mantenha exigências existentes na data do presente Acordo,

quanto às condições de entrada dos produtos sujeitos às taxas dos direitos preferenciais.

2.2 Nenhuma disposição do presente Artigo impedirá que, uma Parte Contratante, a qualquer tempo,

aplique no tocante à importação de qualquer produto:

(a) encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido, de conformidade como o disposto no

parágrafo 2 do Artigo III, sobre um produto nacional similar ou uma mercadoria com a qual

o produto importado tenha sido fabricado ou produzido no todo ou em parte;

(b) direitos destinados a contrabalançar ou a compensar o dumping quando, aplicados de

conformidade com o disposto no Artigo VI (33);

(c) taxas ou outros encargos que guardem proporção com os custos dos serviços prestados.

2.3 Nenhuma Parte Contratante modificará seu método de avaliação, para fins aduaneiros, ou de

conversão de moedas, de maneira a diminuir o valor das concessões constantes da lista

correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo.

2.4 Se uma das partes estabelecer, mantiver ou autorizar, de direito ou de fato, um monopólio da

importação de qualquer produto descrito na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, tal

monopólio, ressalvadas as disposições em contrário constantes dessa lista ou que, de outro modo,

tenham sido acordadas entre as partes que inicialmente negociaram a concessão, não deverá ter por

efeito assegurar proteção média superior àquela que é prevista nessa lista. As disposições do presente

parágrafo não limitarão o recurso das Partes Contratantes a qualquer forma de auxílio aos produtores

nacionais, permitida em outros dispositivos do presente Acordo.

2.5 Quando uma Parte Contratante considerar que um produto não está recebendo de uma outra Parte

Contratante tratamento que a primeira acredita ter sido atribuído por uma concessão constante da lista

correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, poderá levar a questão diretamente à consideração da outra

Parte Contratante. Se esta última concordar em que o tratamento reclamado é o que estava previsto,

mas declarar que tal tratamento não pode ser concedido por haver um tribunal ou outra autoridade

competente decidido que ao produto em questão não pode ser classificado, consoante a legislação

alfandegária respectiva, de modo a permitir o tratamento previsto no presente Acordo, as duas partes

constantes, juntamente com outras interessadas de modo substancial, iniciarão, o mais depressa

possível, novas negociações com o fim de alcançar um ajuste compensatório.

2.6 (a) Os direitos específicos e encargos incluídos nas listas relativas às Partes Contratantes que

sejam membros do Fundo Monetário Internacional e as margens de preferência nos direitos

específicos e encargos mantidos por essas Partes Contratantes são representados, nas moedas

respectivas, dentro da paridade aceita ou reconhecida provisoriamente pelo Fundo na data do

presente Acordo. Consequentemente, no caso de ser esse valor for reduzido, de

conformidade com as cláusulas estatutárias do Fundo Monetário Internacional em mais de

vinte por cento, tais direitos específicos e encargos e as margens de preferência podem ser

ajustados de forma a levar em consideração essa redução; desde que as Partes Contratantes

21

(isto é, as Partes Contratantes quando em ação conjunta, nos termos do Artigo XXV)

convenham em que esses ajustamentos não importem em diminuir o valor das concessões

constantes da lista respectiva ou de qualquer outra parte desse Acordo, levados em conta

todos os fatores que possam influir quanto à necessidade ou urgência de tais ajustamentos.

(b) A qualquer Parte Contratante que não seja membro do Fundo, serão aplicáveis disposições

análogas a partir da data em que a mesma passe a ser membro do Fundo ou conclua um

acordo especial de câmbio, na conformidade do que dispõe o Artigo XV.

2.7 As listas anexas ao presente Acordo passam a constituir parte integrante da Parte I do mesmo.

Footnote 33: A versão original da Lei 313 de 30/07/1948 estabelece erroneamente “... no Artigo IV”.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo II

1. Artigo II Geral

O DSB identificou a importância das concessões tarifárias seguirem os objetivos e propósitos do Acordo da

OMC e do GATT 94, no que se refere à segurança e previsibilidade.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chiken

Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/R, paras. 7.328 e 7.427

Para. 7.328. “In the Panel's view, the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-

term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule runs counter to

one of the objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994, namely that the security and

predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements must be preserved. Therefore, the

Panel concludes that an interpretation of the term “salted” in that concession to include the criterion of long-

term preservation could undermine the object and purpose of security and predictability, which lie at the heart of

both the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.427. “(…) the Panel recalls that a fundamental object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the

GATT 1994 is that the security and predictability of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements must

be preserved. In the Panel's view, a Member's unilateral intention regarding the meaning to be ascribed to a

concession that Member has made in the context of WTO multilateral trade negotiations cannot prevail over the

common intentions of all WTO Members as determined through an analysis undertaken pursuant to Articles 31

and 32 of the Vienna Convention.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen

Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/AB/R e WT/DS286/AB/R,

paras. 239 e 249

Para. 239. “Having said this, we caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the purported “object and

purpose” of specific provisions, paragraphs or subparagraphs of the WTO agreements, or tariff headings in

Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the whole. Even if, arguendo, one could rely

on the specific “object and purpose” of heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule in isolation, we would share the

Panel's view that “one Member's unilateral object and purpose for the conclusion of a tariff commitment cannot

form the basis” for an interpretation of that commitment, because interpretation in the light of Articles 31 and 32

of the Vienna Convention must focus on ascertaining the common intentions of the parties.”

22

Para. 249. “In the light of these considerations, we see no reason to disturb the Panel's finding, in paragraph

7.328 of the Panel Reports, that “the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-

term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule ... could

undermine the object and purpose of security and predictability, which [underlie] both the WTO Agreement and

the GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain

Information Technology Products (EC - IT Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R e

WT/DS377/R, para. 7.1327

Para. 7.1327. “On this basis, we consider that tariff concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted

in such a way to further the objectives of preserving and upholding the “security and predictability” of “the

reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other

trade barriers to trade”. This includes consideration of the general objective of the expansion of trade and the

substantial reduction of tariffs. However, a panel should take care not to disturb the balance of reciprocal and

mutually advantageous concessions negotiated by parties.”

2. Artigo II.1(a)

a) “Geral”

O Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu que as concessões devem ser consideradas no contexto do resultado de um

entendimento recíproco, conforme estabelecido na Convenção de Viena e em contraposição à visão unilateral

das expectativas de apenas uma das partes.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain Computer

Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R e WT/DS68/R,

paras. 8.23-8.24, 8.26-8.27 e 8.45

Para. 8.23. “The meaning of a particular expression in a tariff schedule cannot be determined in isolation from

its context. It has to be interpreted in the context of Article II of GATT 1994 - a provision that gives the

rationale for the specification of products and duty rates in tariff schedules in the first place: i.e., they constitute

a binding commitment arising out of a negotiation. It should be noted in this regard that the protection of

legitimate expectations in respect of tariff treatment of a bound item is one of the most important functions of

Article II. (…)”

Para. 8.24. “(…) Although Article II:5 is a provision for the special bilateral procedure regarding tariff

classification, not directly at issue in this case, the existence of this provision confirms that legitimate

expectations are a vital element in the interpretation of Article II and tariff schedules.”

Para. 8.26. “In our view, it may, as a matter of fact, be the case that in nearly all instances, the ordinary

meaning of the terms of the actual description in a tariff schedule accurately reflects and exhausts the content of

the legitimate expectations. It is clearly the case that most descriptions are to be treated with the utmost care to

maintain their integrity precisely because, on their face, they normally constitute the most concrete, tangible and

reliable evidence of commitments made. In our view, however, this cannot be the case a priori for all tariff

commitments. It must remain possible, at least in principle, that parties have legitimately formed expectations

based on other particular supplementary factors.”

Para. 8.27. “To deny this a priori would be to reduce the nature and meaning of commitments under Article II

to a purely formal and mechanical task of noting descriptions in schedules. This would be to rob such

commitments of the reality of the context in which they clearly occur in Article II.”

Para. 8.45. “We now turn to the examination of whether the actual tariff treatment of LAN equipment entitles

the United States to legitimate expectations in this regard sufficient to establish its claim of a violation of Article

II of GATT 1994 by the European Communities. In our view, an exporting Member's legitimate expectations

23

regarding tariff commitments are normally based, at a minimum, on the assumption that the actual tariff

treatment accorded to a particular product at the time of the negotiation will be continued unless such treatment

is manifestly anomalous or there is information readily available to the exporting Member that clearly indicates

the contrary. The existence of such expectations in tariff negotiations can be seen in the fact that negotiators

normally use actual trade data to calculate the effect of “requests” and “offers”, and to evaluate the resulting

tariff reductions in terms of trade-weighted average. In other words, they work on the general assumption that

the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particular product as traded is the relevant item for the purposes of

negotiations.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain

Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R e

WT/DS68/AB/R, paras. 81 e 84

Para. 81. “Second, we reject the Panel's view that Article II:5 of the GATT 1994 confirms that “legitimate

expectations are a vital element in the interpretation” of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 and of Members'

Schedules. It is clear from the wording of Article II:5 that it does not support the Panel's view. This paragraph

recognizes the possibility that the treatment contemplated in a concession, provided for in a Member's Schedule,

on a particular product, may differ from the treatment accorded to that product and provides for a compensatory

mechanism to rebalance the concessions between the two Members concerned in such a situation. However,

nothing in Article II:5 suggests that the expectations of only the exporting Member can be the basis for

interpreting a concession in a Member's Schedule for the purposes of determining whether that Member has

acted consistently with its obligations under Article II:1. In discussing Article II:5, the Panel overlooked the

second sentence of that provision, which clarifies that the “contemplated treatment” referred to in that provision

is the treatment contemplated by both Members.”

Para. 84. “The purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to ascertain the

common intentions of the parties. These common intentions cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective

and unilaterally determined “expectations” of one of the parties to a treaty. Tariff concessions provided for in a

Member's Schedule - the interpretation of which is at issue here - are reciprocal and result from a mutually-

advantageous negotiation between importing and exporting Members. A Schedule is made an integral part of the

GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the concessions provided for in that Schedule are part

of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied in interpreting the meaning of a

concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention.”

b) “Tratamento Não Menos Favorável (treatment no less favourable)”

O Órgão de Apelação definiu que a variação no tipo das tarifas aplicada e consolidada, consideradas as

modalidades ad valorem e específica, não justifica a violação do Artigo II, mas depende da análise da

equivalência entre essas.

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Appares and

other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.31-6.32 e 6.65

Para. 6.31. “We note that the past GATT practice is clear: a situation whereby a contracting party applies one

type of duties while its Schedule refers to bindings of another type of duties constitutes a violation of Article II

of GATT, without any obligation for the complaining party to submit further evidence that such variance leads

to an effective breach of bindings. The fact that Argentina claims that it is simply following its past practice of

using specific duties would not seem to be relevant, since it made ad valorem tariff concessions on the products

in question and thus created an obligation for itself to impose such type of duties. As a guarantee for

predictability and to ensure the full respect of the negotiations under Article II, GATT practice has generally

required that once a Member has indicated the type(s) of duties in specifying its bound rate, it must apply such

type(s) of duties. Accordingly, faced with such a variance in the type duties applied by Argentina from that

reflected in its Schedule, we consider that we do not have to examine the effects of that variance on possible

future imports. Indeed, such a variance undermines the stability and predictability of Members' Schedules.”

24

Para. 6.32. “We, therefore, find that Argentina, in using a system of specific minimum tariffs although it has

bound its tariffs at ad valorem rates only, is violating the provisions of Article II of GATT and that the United

States does not have to provide further evidence that the resultant duties exceed the bound tariff rate. Such a

variance between Argentina’s Schedule and its applied tariffs constitutes a less favourable treatment to the

commerce of the other Members than that provided for in Argentina’s Schedule, contrary to the provisions of

Article II of GATT.”

Para. 6.65. “In the light of the foregoing, we find that the United States has provided sufficient evidence that

Argentina has effectively imposed duties on imports of textiles and apparel above 35 per cent ad valorem, that

indeed the total amount of duties collected annually on these items leads to the conclusion that duties above 35

per cent ad valorem on the average transaction value have been imposed on the same items, and that in any case,

as we found in paragraph 6.47 above, the very nature of the minimum specific duty system imposed in

Argentina on the items at issue will inevitably lead, in certain instances, to the imposition of duties above 35 per

cent ad valorem. In addition, the fact that Argentina is using minimum specific duties while they bound their

tariffs according to an ad valorem type of duties, is inconsistent with its Schedule and with the requirements of

Article II of GATT. Therefore, we consider that minimum specific duties imposed by Argentina on textile and

apparel imports constitute a treatment of those imports that is less favourable than that provided for in

Argentina’s Schedule and contrary to Article II of GATT.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Appares and other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 56 e

62-63

Para. 56. “We modify the Panel's findings in paragraphs 6.31 and 6.32 of the Panel Report accordingly.”

Para. 62. “As noted above, the Panel stated that “... the very nature of the minimum specific duty system

imposed in Argentina on the items at issue will inevitably lead, in certain instances, to the imposition of duties

above 35 per cent ad valorem.” (emphasis added) This reference to “in certain instances” indicates that the Panel

did not conclude that there was infringement “in all cases”. We recall our finding that the DIEM regime, by its

structure and design, results in the application of specific duties with ad valorem equivalents exceeding 35 per

cent for all textile and apparel products imported at prices below the relevant “break-even” prices in the relevant

tariff categories. At the same time, products imported at prices above such “break-even” prices will be subject to

a duty equivalent to 35 per cent or less ad valorem. This proposition holds for all relevant tariff categories

relating to textile and apparel products to which the DIEM are applied. It is the result of Argentina requiring its

customs officials to collect the higher of two values: the applicable ad valorem duty or the DIEM. It follows

that, under such a system, the rate of duty applicable to any import transaction depends on the position of the

imported product within the prevailing price range in any relevant tariff category. Thus, some transactions will

fall within a price range where the application of the DIEM results in ad valorem equivalents exceeding 35 per

cent. Other transactions, on the other hand, will fall within a price range where the application of the DIEM

results in ad valorem equivalents less than, or equal to, 35 per cent. We agree with Argentina, therefore, that the

application of the DIEM does not result in a breach of Article II for each and every import transaction in a given

tariff category. At the same time, however, we agree with the Panel that there are sufficient reasons to conclude

that the structure and design of the DIEM will result, with respect to a certain range of import prices within a

relevant tariff category, in an infringement of Argentina's obligations under Article II:1 for all tariff categories

in Chapters 51 to 63 of the N.C.M.”

Para. 63. “For these reasons, we find no legal basis on which to reverse the Panel's findings in paragraph 6.65

of the Panel Report.”

3. Artigo II.1(b)

a) “Ao entrarem no território de outra Parte Contratante” (on their importation into the territory)

25

O DSB identificou na expressão “ao entrarem no território” um elemento temporal que faz com que a obrigação

de pagar direitos aduaneiros ordinários se constitua no momento em que a mercadoria ingressa no território de

outra Parte Contratante.

Relatório do Painel no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts),

Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.184-7.185

Para. 7.184. “We therefore conclude that the ordinary meaning of “on their importation” in Article II:1(b), first

sentence, of the GATT 1994, considered in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994,

contains a strict and precise temporal element which cannot be ignored. This means that the obligation to pay

ordinary customs duties is linked to the product at the moment it enters the territory of another Member. If the

right to impose ordinary customs duties – and the importer's obligation to pay it – accrues because of the

importation of the product at the very moment it enters the territory of another Member, ordinary customs duties

should necessarily be related to the status of the product at that single moment. It is at this moment, and this

moment only, that the obligation to pay such charge accrues.”

Para. 7.185. “In contrast to ordinary customs duties, the obligation to pay internal charges does not accrue

because of the importation of the product at the very moment it enters the territory of another Member but

because of the internal factors (e.g., because the product was re-sold internally or because the product was used

internally), which occurs once the product has been imported into the territory of another member. The status of

the imported good, which does not necessarily correspond to its status at the moment of importation, seems to

be the relevant basis to assess this internal charge.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China -

Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 153 e 158

Para. 153. “The other terms contained in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) shed some light on the scope and

meaning of “ordinary customs duties” and indicate, for example, that an ordinary customs duty is a charge

imposed on products, on their importation. The Panel recognized both of these elements as immediate context

for the term “ordinary customs duties” in the first sentence of Article II:1(b), and attached particular

significance to the second of these elements. Thus, the Panel emphasized the temporal limits of the first

sentence of Article II:1(b), and underlined that a key criterion for a charge to constitute an ordinary customs

duty under Article II:1(b) is that it accrue at the moment of importation”.”

Para. 158. “(…) The right of a WTO Member to impose a customs duty, and the obligation of an importer to

pay such a duty, accrue at the very moment the product enters the customs territory of that Member and by

virtue of the event of importation. In contrast, the classification rules according to which customs authorities

determine under which tariff heading the “product” concerned falls, depending on its “status” or “condition”,

are not relevant to the nature of the “duty” itself because they do not determine the moment at which the

obligation to pay accrues, but only the amount of that duty. Similarly, as all of the participants agree, the

moment at which a charge is collected or paid is not determinative of whether it is an ordinary customs duty or

an internal charge. Ordinary customs duties may be collected after the moment of importation, and internal

charges may be collected at the moment of importation. For a charge to constitute an ordinary customs duty,

however, the obligation to pay it must accrue at the moment and by virtue of or, in the words of Article II:1(b),

“on”, importation.”

b) “Direitos aduaneiros ordinários” (ordinary customs duties)

Segundo o DSB, os “direitos aduaneiros ordinários” consistem nos direitos que recaem sobre bens

exclusivamente no momento de sua entrada no território de outro Membro.

Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain

Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, para. 7.104

26

Para. 7.104. “We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure “other than an ordinary customs

duty”, which is prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We have also found that

“ordinary customs duties” must have the same meaning in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and

Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties not constituting ordinary customs duties,

their consistency with Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed under the first sentence of that provision, which only

applies to ordinary customs duties.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to

Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, para.

147

Para. 147. “The Panel's reasoning and findings under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 may be summarized as

follows. The Panel began by finding that the first sentence of Article II:1(b) is not applicable to the Chilean

price band duties, because the Panel had already found that they are not “ordinary customs duties”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts),

Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.192, 7.204 e 7.210

Para. 7.192. “In sum, based on its ordinary meaning and its context, we conclude that “ordinary customs duties”

within the meaning of the first sentence of Article II:1(b) refer to duties imposed on goods at the moment of

their “importation” into the customs territory of an importing Member and must be interpreted more narrowly

than “other charges and duties” under the second sentence of Article II:1(b), which are imposed on goods “on or

in connection with importation”.

Para. 7.204. “(...) if the obligation to pay a charge does not accrue based on the product at the moment of its

importation, it cannot be an 'ordinary customs duty' within the meaning of Article II:1(b), first sentence of the

GATT 1994: it is, instead, an 'internal charge' under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, which obligation to pay

accrues based on internal factors.”

Para. 7.210. “In sum, based on the above elements considered as a whole, in particular the fact that the charge

under the measures relates to the internal assembly of auto parts into motor vehicles, we conclude that the

charge is an internal charge within the meaning of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China -

Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R e WT/DS342/AB/R, paras. 141, 166 e

171-172

Para. 141. “It seems to us that an examination of whether a particular charge is an internal charge or a border

measure involves consideration of all three types of charges, that is: ordinary customs duties under the first

sentence of Article II:1(b); other duties and charges under the second sentence of Article II:1(b); and internal

charges and taxes under Article III:2. This should assist a panel in understanding the relationship among these

fundamental GATT provisions.”

Para. 166. “(…) The Harmonized System does not provide context that is relevant to the threshold question or

to the assessment of the respective scope of application of “ordinary customs duties” in the first sentence of

Article II:1(b) and “internal charges” in Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 that must be undertaken in answering

that question. It follows that the Panel did not err in interpreting the term “ordinary customs duties” in the first

sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 without relying on the rules of the Harmonized System, in general,

or GIR 2(a), in particular.”

Para. 171. “We consider that a panel's determination of whether a specific charge falls under Article II:1(b) or

Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 must be made in the light of the characteristics of the measure and the

circumstances of the case. In many cases this will be a straightforward exercise. In others, the picture will be

more mixed, and the challenge faced by a panel more complex. A panel must thoroughly scrutinize the measure

before it, both in its design and in its operation, and identify its principal characteristics. Having done so, the

27

panel must then seek to identify the leading or core features of the measure at issue, those that define its “centre

of gravity” for purposes of characterizing the charge that it imposes as an ordinary customs duty or an internal

charge. It is not surprising, and indeed to be expected, that the same measure may exhibit some characteristics

that suggest it is a measure falling within the scope of Article II:1(b), and others suggesting it is a measure

falling within the scope of Article III:2. In making its objective assessment of the applicability of specific

provisions of the covered agreements to a measure properly before it, a panel must identify all relevant

characteristics of the measure, and recognize which features are the most central to that measure itself, and

which are to be accorded the most significance for purposes of characterizing the relevant charge and, thereby,

properly determining the discipline(s) to which it is subject under the covered agreements.”

Para. 172. “We understand the Panel to have adopted just such an approach to the measures at issue in this case.

The Panel identified the following characteristics of the charge as having particular significance for legal

characterization purposes: (i) the obligation to pay the charge accrues internally after auto parts have entered the

customs territory of China and have been assembled/produced into motor vehicles; (ii) the charge is imposed on

automobile manufacturers rather than on importers in general; (iii) the charge is imposed based on how the

imported auto parts are used, that is, not based on the auto parts as they enter, but instead based on what other

parts from other countries and/or other importers and/or domestic parts are subsequently used, together with

those imported parts, in assembling a vehicle model; and (iv) the fact that identical auto parts imported at the

same time in the same container or vessel can be subject to different charge rates depending on which vehicle

model they are assembled into.”

Relatório do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United

States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, para. 7.246 e 7.249

Para. 7.246. “The AD, as its statutory name makes clear, is a “duty”. It applies to goods (articles) which are

imported into India (in our case, alcoholic liquor). It does not apply to domestic goods. The AD is assessed at

the time and point of importation by India's Customs authorities. The good which is imported and subject to the

AD is cleared through customs for entry into India's customs territory once the AD has been paid. The AD is

payable by the importers of the subject goods or their agents. Furthermore, as imposed through CN 32/2003, the

AD on alcoholic liquor took the form of either an ad valorem duty or a specific duty.”

Para. 7.249. “Judging exclusively by the above characteristics of the AD on alcoholic liquor as in force on the

date of establishment of this Panel, we would agree with the United States that the AD on alcoholic liquor

could, in principle, have qualified as an “ordinary customs duty”, or an “other duty or charge”, within the

meaning of Article II:1(b). However, these same characteristics are also consistent with India's view that the AD

on alcoholic liquor qualified as a charge imposed on the importation of a product and equivalent to an internal

tax imposed in respect of the like domestic product within the meaning of Article II:2(a). In this regard, to

mention only a few elements, the AD being a “duty” imposed on a product, it can be considered a “charge”

imposed on a product as that term is used in Article II:2(a). Also, as we have explained, the AD is a duty

imposed “on the importation of a product”. And finally, as is already clear from its name, the AD is imposed in

addition to India's basic customs duty (BCD) which the United States does not dispute is an “ordinary customs

duty” within the meaning of Article II:1(b). Article II:2 implies that Article II:2(a) charges may be imposed on a

product subject to a tariff binding in addition to the ordinary customs duty levied on that product.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from

the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras. 156-157 e

164

Para. 156. “The Panel acknowledged that the phrase “'other duties and charges of any kind' could conceivably

support the interpretation argued for by the United States”, but considered that customary rules of treaty

interpretation require that the terms of the treaty also be read in their context and in the light of the treaty's

object and purpose. As “immediate context”, the Panel noted a “parallelism” between the two sentences of

Article II:1(b) and concluded that this parallelism “strongly suggests that ... the charges intended to be covered

by the two provisions are charges of the same kind”. In addition, the Panel reasoned that OCDs “inherently

discriminate against, or disadvantage, imports”, and that there is a “readily apparent rationale” — that is,

28

avoiding the circumvention of tariff concessions — for subjecting ODCs that are “of the same kind” as OCDs to

the same disciplines. Finally, the Panel considered that the charges referred to in Article II:2 differ from OCDs

and ODCs because they do not “inherently discriminate against, or disadvantage, imports”, and inferred from

this that charges falling under Article II:2 are therefore outside the scope of Article II:1(b).”

Para. 157. “We do not agree with the Panel that Article II:1(b) “strongly suggests” that OCDs and ODCs are

“of the same kind”. As the Panel itself observed, the two sets of charges are described and disciplined in

separate sentences of Article II:1(b), and may, by their terms, not pertain to the same event of importation.

While both sentences of Article II:1(b) relate to duties or charges applied “on the importation” of certain

products, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) also uniquely covers charges imposed “in connection with the

importation” of such products. Moreover, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) refers to duties or charges “of

any kind”, which suggests that, while in some instances ODCs may be of a similar kind to OCDs, in other

instances they may be of a different kind. Accordingly, we do not find the language of Article II:1(b) read in its

context to be conclusive as to whether OCDs and ODCs are necessarily of a similar or dissimilar kind.”

Para. 164. “For these reasons, we find that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article II:1(b) as covering

only duties or charges that “inherently discriminate against imports”, and of Article II:2(a) as covering only

charges that do not “inherently discriminate against imports”.”

c) “Observados os termos, condições ou requisitos constantes” (subject to the terms, conditions or

qualifications set forth)

Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo II do GATT permite que as Partes Contratantes incorporem concessões

em seus cronogramas, mas não é possível reduzir os compromissos assumidos.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/GTM e WT/DS27/R/HND, paras. 5.2-5.7

Para. 5.2. “The Panel first examined the issue in the light of the wording of Article II. It noted that in Article

II:1(b), the words “subject to the ... qualifications set forth in that Schedule” are used in conjunction with the

words “shall ... be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth in [the Schedule]”. This

suggests that Article II:1(b) permits contracting parties to qualify the obligation to exempt products from

customs duties in excess of the levels specified in the Schedule, not however to qualify their obligations under

other Articles of the General Agreement. The Panel further noted that the title of Article II is “Schedules of

Concessions” and that the ordinary meaning of the word “to concede” is “to grant or yield”. This also suggests

in the view of the Panel that Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts

yielding rights under the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement.”

Para. 5.3. “The Panel then examined the issue in the light of the purpose of the General Agreement. It noted

that one of the basic functions of the General Agreement is, according to its Preamble, to provide a legal

framework enabling contracting parties to enter into “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements

directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade”. Where the General Agreement

mentions specific types of negotiations, it refers to negotiations aimed at the reduction of barriers to trade

(Articles IV(d), XVII:3 and XXVIII bis). This supports in the view of the Panel the assumption that Article II

gives contracting parties the possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the General Agreement

commitments additional to those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such additional

commitments, not however to reduce their commitments under other provisions of that Agreement.”

Para. 5.4. “The Panel then examined the issue in the context of the provisions of the General Agreement

related to Article II. It noted that negotiations on obstacles to trade created by the operation of state-trading

enterprises may be conducted under Article XVII:3 and that a note to that provision provides that such

negotiations “may be directed towards the reduction of duties and other charges on imports and exports or

29

towards the conclusion of any other mutually satisfactory arrangement consistent with the provisions of this

Agreement (See paragraph 4 of Article II and the note to that paragraph).” (emphasis added). (…)”

Para. 5.5. “(…) it does support, in the view of the Panel, the conclusion that the CONTRACTING PARTIES

did not envisage that qualifications in Schedules established in accordance with Article II:1(b) could justify

measures inconsistent with the other Articles of the General Agreement.”

Para. 5.6. “The Panel finally examined the issue in the light of the drafting history. It noted that the reference to

“terms and qualifications” was included in a draft of the present Article II:1(b) during the Second Session of the

Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. The original draft had

referred only to “conditions”. This amendment was proposed and adopted “in order to provide more generally

for the sort of qualifications actually provided in the form of notes in the specimen Schedule. A number of these

notes are, in effect, additional concessions rather than conditions governing the tariff bindings to which they

relate” (E/PC/T/153 and E/PC/T/W/295). Schedule provisions qualifying obligations under the General

Agreement were not included in the specimen Schedule nor was the possibility of such Schedule provisions

mentioned by the drafters. (…)”

Para. 5.7. “For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel found that Article II:1(b) does not

permit contracting parties to qualify their obligations under other provisions of the General Agreement (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e

EUA, WT/DS27/R/GTM e WT/DS27/R/HND, para. 154

Para. 154. “The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the Uruguay Round of

multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Members' Schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, and are an

integral part of the GATT 1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh Protocol, the Schedules are “Schedules to the

GATT 1994”, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 provides that “Schedules annexed to this Agreement are

hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement”. With respect to concessions contained in the

Schedules annexed to the GATT 1947, the panel in United States - Restrictions on Importation of Sugar

(“United States - Sugar Headnote”) found that:

(...) Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts

yielding rights under the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations

under that Agreement.

This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions and commitments for

agricultural products contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994. The

ordinary meaning of the term “concessions” suggests that a Member may yield rights

and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations.

We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure “other than an

ordinary customs duty”, which is prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on

Agriculture. We have also found that “ordinary customs duties” must have the same

meaning in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT

1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties not constituting ordinary customs duties,

their consistency with Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed under the first sentence of

that provision, which only applies to ordinary customs duties.” (emphasis added)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities -

Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador

e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 416-418 e 432

Para. 416. “While it is unusual that a tariff concession inscribed in a Member's Schedule would be limited in

time, such limitation does not appear to be precluded by the wording of Article II:1(b), which refers to “terms,

conditions or qualifications” set forth in a Member's Schedule. The parties agree in principle that Article II:1(b)

allows WTO Members to subject tariff concessions to the “terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in [their]

Schedule”. (…)”

30

Para. 417. “In GATT and WTO jurisprudence, it has been recognized that there are limits to the terms,

conditions, or qualifications that may be incorporated in a Member's Schedule of Concessions. In EC – Bananas

III, the Appellate Body stated that “the ordinary meaning of the term 'concession' suggests that a Member may

yield rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations” under the WTO covered agreements

through an entry in its Schedule. The GATT panel in US – Sugar found that:

Article II gives Members the possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the

General Agreement commitments additional to those already contained in the General

Agreement and to qualify such additional commitments, not however to reduce their

commitments under other provisions of that Agreement.”

Para. 418. “Insofar as a temporal limitation does not diminish obligations or reduce commitments under other

provisions of the covered agreements, scheduling a temporal limitation to a tariff concession does not seem

incompatible with the findings of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III and the GATT panel in US – Sugar.”

Para. 432. “The Panel relied on the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994, as reflected

in the preambles of these two Agreements. It noted that “concessions made by WTO Members should be

interpreted so as to further the general objective of expanding trade in goods and services and reducing barriers

to trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.” At the same time, the

Panel considered that “this general object and purpose is consistent with the more specific object and purpose of

Article II:1(a) and (b).” It referred, in particular, to the “objective of promoting security and predictability in

international trade, through the exchange of concessions”, which is subject to conditions and qualifications in

Members' Schedules. According to the Panel, its finding that the tariff quota concession had expired was

consistent with the specific objective of promoting security and predictability in international trade through the

exchange of concessions, because it gave effect to the terms and conditions incorporated into the European

Communities' Schedule, including the temporal limitation provided for in the Bananas Framework Agreement.

The Panel considered that the general object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 of

expanding trade and reducing barriers to trade through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous

arrangements had to be reconciled with the specific objective of respecting scheduled concessions including the

terms and conditions inscribed in Schedules. (…)”

Relatório do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities - Regime for the

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador,

(WT/DS27/RW2/ECU), paras. 7.496 e 7.501

Para. 7.496. “(…) The Panel has already noted that it would follow the approach indicated by the Appellate

Body in its report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, and begin its analysis with consideration of the first

sentence of Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.501. “The Panel recalls the words of the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina – Textiles and

Apparel:

It is evident to us that the application of customs duties in excess of those provided for

in a Member's Schedule, inconsistent with the first sentence of Article II:1(b),

constitutes 'less favourable' treatment under the provisions of Article II:1(a) …

d) “Direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza” (other duties or charges of any kind)

O DSB concluiu que o termo “direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza” compreende qualquer taxa ou encargo

relacionado à importação, mas que não corresponde a um direito aduaneiro ordinário, imposto ou direito listado

no Artigo II:2.

Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain

Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, paras. 7.105-

7.108

31

Para. 7.105. “The next question is whether the Chilean PBS duties could be considered as “other duties or

charges of any kind” imposed on or in connection with importation, under the second sentence of Article II:1(b).

We have already indicated that all “other duties or charges of any kind” should in our view be assessed under

the second sentence of Article II:1(b). Pursuant to the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of

Article II:1(b), such other duties or charges had to be recorded in a newly created column “other duties and

charges” in the Members' Schedules. Paragraph 1 of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of

Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 (“the Understanding”) reads:

(…) [i]n order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from

paragraph 1(b) of Article II, the nature and level of any 'other duties or charges' levied

on bound tariff items, as referred in that provision, shall be recorded in the Schedules

and concessions annexed to GATT 1994 against the tariff item to which they apply. It

is understood that such recording does not change the legal character of 'other duties

or charges'.”

Para. 7.106. “According to the second paragraph of the Understanding:

(…) [t]he date as of which “other duties or charges” are bound, for the purposes of

Article II, shall be 15 April 1994. 'Other duties or charges' shall therefore be recorded

in the Schedules at the levels applying on this date.”

Para. 7.107. “Other duties or charges must not exceed the binding in this “other duties and charges” column of

the Schedule. If other duties or charges were not recorded but are nevertheless levied, they are inconsistent with

the second sentence of Article II:1(b), in light of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b). We

note that Chile did not record its PBS in the “other duties and charges” column of its Schedule.”

Para. 7.108. “We therefore find that the Chilean PBS duties are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of

GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to

Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System) Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/R,

paras. 153, 165, 168 e 177

Para. 153. “The question before us in this appeal is whether the claim that Argentina actually made before the

Panel was limited to the first sentence of Article II:1(b), or whether that claim also included the second

sentence of that provision.”

Para. 165. “For all these reasons, we conclude that, although Argentina's request for the establishment of a

panel was phrased broadly enough to include a claim under both sentences of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994,

a close examination of Argentina's submissions reveals that the only claim made by Argentina was under the

first sentence of Article II:1(b).”

Para. 168. “Contrary to what Argentina argues, given our finding that Argentina has not made a claim under the

second sentence of Article II:1(b), the Panel in this case had neither a “right” nor a “duty” to develop its own

legal reasoning to support a claim under the second sentence. The Panel was not entitled to make a claim for

Argentina, or to develop its own legal reasoning on a provision that was not at issue.”

Para. 177. “For these reasons, we find that, by making a finding in paragraph 7.108 of the Panel Report that the

duties resulting from Chile's price band system are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 on the

basis of the second sentence of that provision, which was not part of the matter before the Panel, and also by

thereby denying Chile the due process of a fair right of response, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11

of the DSU. Therefore, we reverse that finding.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and International

Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.113-

7.115

32

Para. 7.113. Although there is no definition of what constitutes an “other duty or charge” in the GATT 1994

and in the “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade 1994”, the ordinary meanings of Article II:1(b) and Article II:2 make it clear that any fee or charge that is

in connection with importation and that is not an ordinary customs duty, nor a tax or duty as listed under

Article II:2 (internal tax, anti-dumping duty, countervailing duty, fees or charges commensurate with the cost of

services rendered) would qualify for a measure as an “other duties or charges” under Article II:1(b).”

Para. 7.114. “The travaux préparatoires concerning the Understanding confirm such interpretation. The

Secretariat note on “Article II:1(b): OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT” stated:

‘4 The definition of ODCs falling under the purview of Article II:1(b) can only be

done by exclusion -i.e. by reference to those categories of ODC not covered by it. It

would be impossible, and logically fallacious, to draw up an exhaustive list of ODCs

which do fall under the purview of Article II:1(b), since it is always possible for

governments to invent new charges. Indeed, an attempt to provide an exhaustive list

would create the false impression that charges omitted from it, or newly invented,

were exempt from the II:1(b) obligation’.”

Para. 7.115. “The foreign exchange fee is imposed on imported products only and it is not an ordinary customs

duty. It is computed on the value of imports, not on the cost of the services rendered by the customs authorities.

Consequently, it is not a fee or charge that falls under Article VIII of the GATT. It is obviously not an anti-

dumping or countervailing duty. Therefore, it is a border measure in the nature of an ODC within the meaning

of Article II:1(b).”

4. Artigo II.2 (a)

a) “Encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido” (charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed)

O Órgão de Apelação avaliou que o termo “equivalente” só pode ser determinado por meio de comparação

qualitativa e quantitativa, incluindo elementos de efeito e valor.

Relatório do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra - Additional Duties on Imports from the United

States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras. 7.194, 7.198, 7.273 e

7.283

Para. 7.194. “(...) As we will explain further below, if a border charge is determined to be equivalent to an

internal tax, it is caught by the provisions of Article III:2, first sentence. Article III:2, first sentence, sets out a

strict national treatment obligation. Indeed, as the United States itself has reminded us, under Article III:2, first

sentence, even a de minimis tax burden differential disfavouring the product being imported would put the

importing Member in breach of Article III:2. Thus, we do not believe the interpretation which we consider

should be given to the term “equivalent” in Article II:2(a) diminishes the value of tariff concessions.”

Para. 7.198. “The foregoing considerations lead us to the view that, in an Article II:2(a) inquiry, it is only if a

border charge is equivalent to an internal tax that it can (ever) be concluded that – to use terms similar to those

appearing in the chapeau of Article II:2 – “nothing in Article II would prevent” the imposition of such a charge.

Or to put it another way, for the purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry, “equivalence” is a necessary condition

for a charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1. It is important to recall, however, that “equivalence” is a

necessary condition for the purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry only. To explain, even if a border charge is not

equivalent to an internal tax and thus does not fall within the scope of Article II:2(a), it may still fall within the

scope of, e.g., Article II:2(b). If it meets the conditions of Article II:2(b), it falls outside the scope of Article II:1.

Hence, in cases where a border charge is not equivalent to an internal tax, it may or may not fall outside the

scope of Article II:1.”

Para. 7.273. “In our view, even if, as appears possible, the form (ad valorem vs. specific duties, etc.) and

structure of the rates of AD for alcoholic liquor were different from the form and structure of the rates of State

excise duties on alcoholic liquor, this would not demonstrate that the AD on alcoholic liquor was not equivalent

33

to State excise duties on domestic alcoholic liquor. The concept of “equivalence” as it appears in Article II:2(a)

does not imply that a border charge and an internal tax need to have the same form (ad valorem vs. specific

duties, etc.) and/or rate structure. Rather, it implies that they need to have the same function of imposing a

charge on a product qua product. We do not see why a border charge and an internal tax having a different form

(ad valorem vs. specific duties, etc.) and/or rate structure could not nonetheless fulfil the same relative function

within the customs duty and tax system of the Member concerned.”

Para. 7.283. “Nevertheless, the design of the AD on alcoholic liquor could not, in any event, be determinative,

on its own, of whether it was equivalent to State excise duties. As we have pointed out, the outcome of an

“equivalence” inquiry under Article II:2(a) is context-dependent. Depending on the context, one and the same

border charge may be equivalent, or not equivalent, to an internal tax. As a result, we also need to examine the

AD on alcoholic liquor in its relevant context.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from

the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/AB/R, paras. 167, 170-

172 e 175

Para. 167. “The Panel considered several dictionary definitions of the term “equivalent” and concluded that

whether a border charge and internal tax are “equivalent” is determined by whether they “have the same

function”. The United States argues that the Panel erred by “incorrectly focus[ing] on a single attribute to

determine whether the charge and the internal tax are 'equivalent'“. We agree that all relevant attributes or

definitions need to be considered in ascribing to a treaty's terms the ordinary meaning given to those terms in

their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, we note that the Panel considered

various definitions in interpreting the meaning of the term “equivalent” in Article II:2(a), and we do not find the

fact that the Panel settled on one attribute of that term to be in error per se.”

Para. 170. “In our view, these two concepts — “equivalence” and “consistency with Article III:2” — cannot be

interpreted in isolation from each other; they impart meaning to each other and need to be interpreted

harmoniously. By contrast, the Panel's interpretation was predicated on its understanding that, because the term

“equivalent” refers to the border charge, and the phrase “imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph

2 of Article III” refers to the internal tax, Article II:2(a) draws a distinction between the two concepts. We are

not persuaded that the phrase “imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” relates

exclusively to the words “internal tax”. Determining whether a charge is imposed consistently with Article III:2

necessarily involves a comparison of a border charge with an internal tax in order to determine whether one is

“in excess of” the other. Yet, the Panel's statement that the “term 'imposed' in Article II:2(a) relates to the

internal tax and not the border charge” leaves nothing with which the internal tax can be compared.”

Para. 171. “Moreover, we disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the term “equivalent” does not require any

quantitative comparison of the charge and internal tax. This would mean that a border charge that is

significantly greater in amount than an internal tax could still be deemed “equivalent” under Article II:2(a),

provided that the two were functionally equivalent. We find that such a result would be incompatible with a

proper interpretation of Article II:2(a).”

Para. 172. “To give meaning and effect to the phrase “imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2

of Article III”, we consider it necessary, in the light of the structure and context of Article II:2, to read this

phrase in a manner that imparts meaning to the assessment of whether the charge and internal tax are

“equivalent”. We disagree with the Panel that understanding the term “equivalent” as requiring a quantitative

comparison would make redundant the reference to consistency with Article III:2. Indeed, as we see it, the

reference in Article II:2(a) to consistency with Article III:2 suggests that the concept of equivalence includes

elements of “effect” and “amount” that necessarily imply a quantitative comparison.”

Para. 175. “We thus consider that the term “equivalent” calls for a comparative assessment that is both

qualitative and quantitative in nature. Such an assessment is not limited to the relative function of a charge and

an internal tax, but must also include quantitative considerations relating to their effect and amount. For the

34

foregoing reasons, we find that the Panel erred in attributing an overly narrow meaning to the term

“equivalent”.”

b) “De conformidade como o disposto no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III” (consistently with the provisions of

paragraph 2 of Article III)

O Órgão de Apelação considera que o ponto central do termo é estabelecer um elo com as provisões do Artigo

III:2, não sendo necessário o reclamante mencionar explicitamente este Artigo para que o Painel verifique sua

consistência.

Relatório do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United

States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras. 2.212-2.215

Para. 2.212. “We do not think it is possible to draw particular inferences from the reference to consistency with

Article III:2 regarding the GATT 1947 negotiators' intentions in respect of those cases, discussed above, where

a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax, but the tax is imposed inconsistently with Article III:2. Indeed,

as we have suggested, Article II:2(a) in our view refers to an internal tax imposed “consistently with”

Article III:2 because this is what the GATT 1947 prescribed (and the GATT 1994 still prescribes today). Where

a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax, it is subject to Article III:2, and so the internal tax to which the

border charge is equivalent must be imposed consistently with Article III:2. If a reference to other requirements

to be complied with – specifically, those contained in Article III:2 – was to be included in Article II:2(a), it

stands to reason that the text of Article II:2(a) would do so in a manner that reflects, and is consistent with, what

the GATT 1947 prescribed and, hence, would contemplate an internal tax imposed consistently with

Article III:2. In the light of this, the fact that the text of Article II:2(a) contemplates an internal tax imposed

“consistently with” Article III:2 in our view does not support the conclusion that the GATT 1947 negotiators

considered that if a contracting party subsequently imposed an internal tax inconsistently with Article III:2, the

border charge equivalent to that internal tax would be subject to the provisions of Article II:1.”

Para. 2.213. “Additionally, we note that the relevant context of Article II:2(a) includes Article II:2(b) which

makes clear that Article II does not prevent the imposition, on the importation of a product, of an “anti-dumping

or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of Article VI”. In our view, similarly to what we

have said in respect of the concept of “consistency with Article III:2” in Article II:2(a), the concept of

“consistency with Article VI” in Article II:2(b) is not to be regarded as a necessary condition, for the purposes

of an Article II:2(b) inquiry, for an “anti-dumping or countervailing duty” imposed on the importation of a

product to fall outside the scope of Article II:1. Accordingly, we consider that our interpretation of the phrase

“an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” in Article II:2(a) is

consistent with the provisions of Article II:2(b).”

Para. 2.214. “As to whether our interpretation of the phrase “an internal tax imposed consistently with the

provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” is consistent with the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, we recall

our view that a border charge equivalent to an internal tax which is imposed inconsistently with the provisions

of Article III:2 would fall outside the scope of Article II:1. However, we have also indicated that such a border

charge would be caught by the strict obligations contained in Article III:2. In the light of this, we do not

consider that our interpretation of the aforementioned phrase could be said to undermine the value of tariff

concessions negotiated by exporting Members. As our interpretation does not threaten to undermine the value of

tariff concessions, we do not consider that it runs counter to the object and purpose, expressed in the preamble

to the GATT 1994, of substantially reducing “tariffs”.”

Para. 2.215. “A final point should be made. In keeping with our view that the reference in Article II:2(a) to

“consistency with Article III:2” is not intended to stipulate an additional requirement to be met for a border

charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1, we would not proceed, in an inquiry under Article II:2(a), to

examine the consistency of an internal tax with Article III:2 after having determined that a particular border

charge is equivalent to that internal tax. It is important to keep in mind, in this connection, that if the

complaining party wishes a panel to examine the internal tax and an equivalent border charge in the light of the

35

requirements of Article III:2, it is open to the complaining party to include in its panel request an independent

claim of violation of Article III:2, and to develop such a claim in its submissions to a panel.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from

the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/AB/R, paras. 179-181

Para. 179. “We note, however, the Panel's statement that “for the purposes of an inquiry under Article II:2(a) ...

consistency of the internal tax with the provisions of Article III:2 is not a necessary condition”. The Panel added

that “the reference in Article II:2(a) to ‘consistency with Article III:2’ is not intended to stipulate an additional

requirement to be met for a border charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1.” Given these unequivocal

statements, we do not consider that the Panel preserved a role for evaluating “consistency with Article III:2” in

the context of Article II:2(a).”

Para. 180. “We consider that Article II:2(a) should not be interpreted in a manner that reads out the

significance, for purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry, of the element of “consistency with Article III:2” or, at

most, ascribes to it the purpose of “acknowledg[ing], and call[ing] attention to, the existence of relevant

requirements stipulated elsewhere in the GATT 1994.” Rather, as we have indicated, we believe that the

requirement of “consistency with Article III:2” must be read together with, and imparts meaning to, the

requirement that a charge and internal tax be “equivalent”. We recall that Article II:2(a) refers to “a charge

equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of

the like domestic product”. We also recall that the first sentence of Article III:2 prohibits the imposition on

imported products of “internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or

indirectly, to like domestic products”. We therefore consider that whether a charge is imposed “in excess of” a

corresponding internal tax is an integral part of the analysis in determining whether the charge is justified under

Article II:2(a). Contrary to what the Panel suggests, a complaining party is not required to file an independent

claim of violation of Article III:2 if it wishes to challenge the consistency of a border charge with Article III:2.”

Para. 181. “We thus find that the element “imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article

III” forms an integral part of the assessment under Article II:2(a) of whether a charge and an internal tax are

“equivalent”. Accordingly, we believe the Panel erred in its interpretation that the element of “consistency with

Article III:2” is not a necessary condition in the application of Article II:2(a).”

5. Relação com outros Dispositivos

a) “Artigo XIII do GATT e Acordo sobre Agricultura”

As qualificações dos compromissos tarifários não podem reduzir as obrigações contidas no GATT. Ademais, as

regras do GATT aplicam-se aos compromissos de acesso a mercados para produtos agrícolas, exceto quando o

Acordo sobre Agricultura dispuser de modo contrário.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/ABR, paras. 153-155

Para. 153. “The European Communities raises the question whether the market access concessions for

agricultural products made by the European Communities pursuant to the Agreement on Agriculture prevail

over Article XIII of the GATT 1994. (…)”

Para. 154. “The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the Uruguay Round of

multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Members' Schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, and are an

integral part of the GATT 1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh Protocol, the Schedules are “Schedules to the

GATT 1994”, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 provides that “Schedules annexed to this Agreement are

hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement”. With respect to concessions contained in the

Schedules annexed to the GATT 1947, the panel in United States - Restrictions on Importation of Sugar

(“United States - Sugar Headnote”) found that:

36

(...) Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts

yielding rights under the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations

under that Agreement.

This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions and commitments for

agricultural products contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994. The

ordinary meaning of the term “concessions” suggests that a Member may yield rights

and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations. This interpretation is

confirmed by paragraph 3 of the Marrakesh Protocol, which provides:

The implementation of the concessions and commitments contained in the schedules

annexed to this Protocol shall, upon request, be subject to multilateral examination by

the Members. This would be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of

Members under Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.” (emphasis added)

Para. 155. “The question remains whether the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture allow market access

concessions on agricultural products to deviate from Article XIII of the GATT 1994. The preamble of the

Agreement on Agriculture states that it establishes “a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in

agriculture” and that this reform process “should be initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support

and protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and

disciplines”. The relationship between the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Agriculture is

set out in Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture:

The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex

1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.

Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII, apply to market

access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the

Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the

same matter.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/R, paras. 7.113-7.114

Para. 7.113. “The panel in the Sugar Headnote case found that qualifications on tariff bindings do not override

other GATT provisions after an analysis of the wording of Article II, its object, purpose and context, and the

drafting history of the provision. Although it made no mention of the Vienna Convention, it seems to have

followed closely Articles 31 and 32 thereof. (…)”

Para. 7.114. “We agree with the analysis of the Sugar Headnote panel report and note that Article II was not

changed in any relevant way as a result of the Uruguay Round. Thus, based on the Sugar Headnote case, we

conclude that the EC’s inclusion of allocations inconsistent with the requirements of Article XIII in its Schedule

does not prevent them from being challenged by other Members. We note in this regard that the Uruguay Round

tariff schedules were prepared with full knowledge of the Sugar Headnote panel report, which was adopted by

the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES in the middle of the Round (June 1989). (…)”

b) “Artigo XXVIII do GATT”

Um Membro da OMC permanece vinculado à lista de concessões prevista no Artigo II do GATT até o término

do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT.

Relatório do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities - Regime for the

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador,

WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, para. 7.454

Para. 7.454. “The examination of a claim relating to a possible breach of GATT Article XXVIII of the GATT

1994 would be outside the terms of reference of this Panel. Nevertheless, in light of the specific matter before

this Panel and because of the numerous references made to Article XXVIII in the Doha Waiver, the Panel

cannot totally disregard this provision. The combined reading of Articles II and XXVIII of the GATT 1994

37

implies that, until negotiations under the latter provision are formally concluded, a Member continues to be

bound by the concessions contained in its Schedule. (…)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities -

Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador

e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 378, 382-385 e 395

Para. 378. “We begin by noting three different methods that Members may use to interpret or modify WTO law

provided for in the WTO Agreement: (i) waivers (Article IX:3); (ii) multilateral interpretations (Article IX:2);

and (iii) amendments (Article X). (…)”

Para. 382. “In our view, the function of a waiver is to relieve a Member, for a specified period of time, from a

particular obligation provided for in the covered agreements, subject to the terms, conditions, justifying

exceptional circumstances or policy objectives described in the waiver decision. Its purpose is not to modify

existing provisions in the agreements, let alone create new law or add to or amend the obligations under a

covered agreement or Schedule. Therefore, waivers are exceptional in nature, subject to strict disciplines and

should be interpreted with great care.”

Para. 383. “Multilateral interpretations of provisions of WTO law are the next method identified above. Article

IX:2 of the WTO Agreement sets out specific requirements for decisions that may be taken by the Ministerial

Conference or the General Council to adopt interpretations of provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.

Such multilateral interpretations are meant to clarify the meaning of existing obligations, not to modify their

content. Article IX:2 emphasizes that such interpretations “shall not be used in a manner that would undermine

the amendment provisions in Article X”. A multilateral interpretation should also be distinguished from a

waiver, which allows a Member to depart from an existing WTO obligation for a limited period of time. We

consider that a multilateral interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement can be likened to a

subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions pursuant to

Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, as far as the interpretation of the WTO agreements is concerned.”

Para. 384. “The third method mentioned above is amendments to the WTO agreements. Article X of the WTO

Agreement sets out rules and procedures to amend the provisions in the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Article

X specifies the process and quorum required to amend particular provisions or covered agreements.

Amendments, unlike waivers, are not limited in time and create new or modify existing rights and obligations

for WTO Members. Special rules on acceptance and entry into force apply, depending on the provisions that are

being amended and on whether the amendment “would alter the rights and obligations of the Members”.

Amendments to the WTO Agreement and to a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1 enter into force

following a formal acceptance process pursuant to Article X:7.”

Para. 385. “The modification of Schedules of Concessions, which are an integral part of the GATT 1994, does

not require a formal amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement, but is enacted through a special

procedure set out in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 or through multilateral rounds of tariff negotiations.

Pursuant to Article XXVIII, a Member may modify or withdraw a concession annexed to the GATT 1994 by

negotiation and agreement with other Members that are “primarily concerned”, and in consultation with

Members that have a substantial interest in the concession. Article XXVIII:2 provides that, in an agreement on

the renegotiation of a concession, which may include compensatory adjustment, WTO Members “shall

endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable

to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations”. If an agreement cannot be reached,

the modifying Member is free to modify or withdraw the concession, while other Members that are primarily

concerned or have a substantial interest in the concession are free to withdraw substantially equivalent

concessions initially negotiated with the modifying Member.”

Para. 395. “Moreover, while it is true that pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 Members' Schedules of

Concessions are integral parts of the covered agreements, Schedules are usually not modified by means of an

amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement: special rules and procedures that Members are

required to follow when they wish to modify their Schedules unless they enter into tariff commitments by means

38

of the conclusion of multilateral rounds of trade negotiations are provided in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994.

In our view, if the duration of the tariff quota concession in the European Communities' Schedule had to be

modified or extended, negotiations under Article XXVIII would be the proper procedure to follow.”

III. Comentários

1. Artigo II Geral

Os dispositivos que regulam os compromissos assumidos pelas partes quanto à liberalização de seus mercados

estão expressos no Artigo II do GATT 1947 e GATT 1994. O Artigo mencionado visa, sobretudo, a prover

segurança e previsibilidade ao processo de consolidação de tarifas de importação das Partes Contratantes no

âmbito do Sistema Multilateral de Comércio. Segundo a própria instituição, o processo de consolidação tarifária

foi intensificado, principalmente, a partir da Rodada Uruguai (1986-1994), na qual se pode observar um elevado

crescimento do percentual de tarifas consolidadas tanto dos países desenvolvidos (PD) quanto daqueles em

desenvolvimento (PED) (34).

Em linhas gerais, o propósito de garantir segurança e previsibilidade às Partes Contratantes da OMC encontrou

respaldo nas decisões do Painel, no DS269 e DS375/376/377, e do Órgão de Apelação, no DS 269.

No caso EC – Chicken Cuts (DS269), a Comissão Europeia, por meio do regulamento EC 1233/2002 e da

Decisão EC 2003/97, alterou a classificação tarifária dos cortes de frango salgados congelados, o que, na

prática, significou uma elevação tarifária de 15,4% ad valorem (CN 02.10.90.20) para aproximadamente 70%

ad valorem (tributo específico de 1,024 euros por tonelada – CN 02.07.41.10). Esse fato fez com que o Brasil

alegasse que a medida fosse incompatível com os Artigos II: 1(a) e II:1 (b) do GATT 94, uma vez que conferia

tratamento menos favorável do que aquele conferido na Lista de Compromissos das Comunidades Europeias

(35).

A União Europeia argumentava que o frango salgado exportado pelo Brasil não poderia ser classificado como

“salgado” de acordo com a linha tarifária 02.010.90.20, uma vez que esse processo não havia sido

implementado com o intuito de preservar o produto no longo prazo (long term preservation). Dessa forma, toda

a análise do Painel girou em torno da relação entre o termo “salgado” (presente na CN 02.10.90.20) e a noção de

preservação no longo prazo que o processo de salga deveria conferir ao produto. Ao entender que a lista de

concessões tarifárias da CE (e consequentemente o CN 02.10.90.20) era linguagem jurídica proveniente de um

tratado, o Painel utilizou-se dos procedimentos previstos nos Artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viena dos

Direitos Tratados (CVDT) para interpretar a linguagem da linha tarifária em questão. Apesar de análise do

termo “salgado” ter sido realizada com base nos diversos elementos referentes aos Artigos 31 e 32 da CVDT

(sentido ordinário, contexto, entre outros), merece destaque a interpretação do termo em relação ao objeto e

propósito do tratado constitutivo da OMC e do GATT94. Nesse sentido, o Painel constatou que a CE não

apresentou nenhuma ideia clara do conceito de “preservação no longo prazo” no que se refere ao termo

“salgado”, e a falta de certeza na utilização desse critério na linha tarifária 02.10.90.20 vai de encontro a um dos

objetos e propósitos da OMC e do GATT 1994, que é o de preservar a segurança e previsibilidade nas

concessões mutuamente acordadas entre as partes.

O Órgão de Apelação concordou com a interpretação do Painel e ainda atentou para o fato de potenciais

problemas surgirem ao se interpretar, isoladamente, disposições específicas do tratado, sem levar em

consideração os objetivos e propósitos gerais deste.

No caso EC – IT Products (DS375/376/377), o tratamento tarifário dado pela CE a determinados produtos de

Tecnologia da Informação gerou questionamentos de Taiwan, Japão e EUA, que alegaram que o Bloco havia

violado, entre outros, os Artigos II:1 (a) e II:1(b) do GATT. De acordo com os demandantes, por conta de a CE

ser signatária do Acordo de Tecnologia de Informação (ITA), firmado em 1996 por alguns Membros da OMC, o

bloco deveria garantir que não seriam cobrados impostos sobre tais produtos (duty free treatment).

O ponto central da disputa estava novamente na análise dos termos que caracterizariam tais produtos. A partir da

interpretação de tais termos, poder-se-ia dizer se estes estariam ou não cobertos pelo ITA e, consequentemente,

39

se poderiam gozar de tratamento tarifário diferenciado (duty free). Um dos termos que, por conta de ter sido

alvo de interpretação do Painel, merece destaque é “Input or output units”, contido na linha tarifária 847160,

que constava no ITA, gozava de tratamento tarifário diferenciado e, segundo os demandantes, teria sido objeto

de violação por parte da CE. A análise do Painel, que ocorreu nos termos dos Artigos 31 e 32 da CVDT (36),

procurou avaliar o sentido ordinário da linha tarifária em questão, com base em seu contexto e sob a luz dos

seus objetivos e propósitos.

Inicialmente, o Painel expôs que o objeto e propósito relevante para sua interpretação é o Acordo constitutivo da

OMC, do qual fazem parte o GATT 94 e a Lista de Concessões da CE. Em seguida, alertou para o fato de que a

concessão tarifária dos Membros da OMC devia ser interpretada de modo a fomentar a segurança e

previsibilidade das vantagens mutuamente acordadas entre eles, as quais visam a reduzir barreiras ao comércio.

Por fim, ao interpretar o texto da linha tarifária 847160 da lista de Concessões da CE, sob a luz do objeto e

propósito dos preceitos supracitados, o Painel indicou que não havia nada que impedisse o tratamento tarifário

diferenciado à concessão.

A relação entre o objeto e propósito gerais do GATT 1994 e a concessão tarifária de um Membro também foi

analisada pelo Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina – Textiles and Apparel (DS56). Segundo a interpretação

do Órgão, qualquer redução de uma concessão, por meio da imposição de tarifas em excesso daquilo que foi

consolidado entre os Membros, promoveria um distúrbio no equilíbrio das concessões entre estes (37).

Em suma, tendo como referência os casos em questão, pode-se perceber que as análises do Painel e do Órgão de

Apelação referentes à relação entre as concessões negociadas pelas Partes Contratantes e o objeto e propósito do

Acordo da OMC mostram uma recorrente tendência em se interpretar o(s) termo(s) controverso(s) sob a luz de

preceitos fundamentais para o Sistema Multilateral de Comércio, como segurança jurídica e previsibilidade, a

partir do cumprimento daquilo que foi acordado entre as Partes Contratantes.

2. Artigo II.1(a)

O Painel decidiu que a proteção das expectativas legítimas relacionadas às concessões tarifárias corresponde a

uma das funções mais importantes do Artigo II. (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para.

8.23, DS62, 67 e 68). Este posicionamento pode ser corroborado, de acordo com o Painel, pelo disposto no

Artigo II.5 (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 8.24, DS62, 67 e 68).

Para o Painel, embora na maioria das vezes a descrição contida na lista de concessões reflita as expectativas

legítimas, há casos em que tais expectativas podem ser formadas também por outros fatores. (Relatório do

Painel no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 8.26, DS62, 67 e 68). O Órgão de Apelação reverteu o

entendimento do Painel mencionado acima, e entendeu que o Artigo II.5 não preconiza que a expectativa

somente do Membro exportador pode ser a base para a interpretação da lista de concessões com o escopo de

analisar se o Membro agiu em consonância com as suas obrigações descritas no Artigo II.1 (Relatório do Órgão

de Apelação no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 81, DS62, 67 e 68).

Tal decisão do Órgão de Apelação utilizou a regra de interpretação contida no Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena

e, por isso, buscou a intenção comum das partes. O Órgão de Apelação asseverou que a intenção comum não se

depreende de uma expectativa unilateral, já que concessões tarifárias são recíprocas e resultam de mútuas

negociações. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84, DS62, 67 e 68).

Por fim, deve-se mencionar que no entendimento do Painel as expectativas legítimas do Membro exportador são

pautadas, no mínimo, na continuação do tratamento tarifário existente no momento da negociação, exceto

quando há evidências no sentido oposto (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 8.45,

DS62, 67 e 68).

Tratamento Não Menos Favorável

40

Por considerar que as práticas do GATT não forneciam princípios claros para julgar alterações feitas pelos

Membros no tipo do direito cobrado na importação de mercadorias, o DSB elaborou nova interpretação sobre

em quais circunstâncias a modificação do tipo de direito cobrado viola o Artigo II do GATT.

No julgamento do caso 56 (Argentina – Textiles and Apparel), o Painel considerou que a simples variação do

tipo do direito cobrado pela Argentina – utilização do direito específico mínimo ao invés de ad valorem,

conforme prevê a lista de concessões do país – já constitui, por si só, “tratamento não menos favorável” e,

portanto, automática violação ao Artigo II:1(a) (Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina – Textiles and Apparel

que afetam importações de têxtil e vestuário, para. 6.31 – 6.32, WT/DS56/R). O Painel havia se baseado em

interpretações anteriores, especificamente o Caso 158 (EC - Bananas).

O Órgão de Apelação, no entanto, considerou que a decisão do Painel não se baseou na leitura do Artigo II:1(a)

e 1(b), mas sim em frágeis decisões anteriores do GATT que não serviam como referência para o Caso 56, o que

motivou a busca por uma interpretação nova. Com a leitura do Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b), o Órgão de Apelação notou

que o principal objetivo da norma é fazer com que os países preservem o valor das tarifas negociadas na lista de

concessões (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, paras. 45–47 WT/DS56/R).

Portanto, o principal princípio a ser respeitado para que o Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b) não seja violado é que a mudança

na forma de cobrar o direito não gere valor que exceda aquele consolidado pelo Membro na lista de concessões.

Ao definir a nova interpretação, o Órgão de Apelação apresentou como premissa que a violação da obrigação

contida no Artigo II:1(b) viola automaticamente o Artigo II:1(a). Desta forma, o Órgão de Apelação preferiu

utilizar para o julgamento o Artigo II:1(b), por ser mais “específico” e trazer provisões mais “relevantes” do que

o Artigo II:1(a). Como conclusão, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que a aplicação de um tipo de direito diferente

daquele acordado na lista de concessões (neste caso, mudança de ad valorem para direito específico mínimo)

viola a obrigação contida no Artigo II:1(b), e portanto também 1(a), somente na medida que esta alteração

implique em que a tarifa cobrada exceda o valor consolidado (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no Caso

Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, paras. 55–56, WT/DS56/R).

3. Artigo II.1(b)

A evolução interpretativa do Artigo II:1(b) do GATT 1994 e do Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo

II:1(b) foi relevante para adicionar precisão na definição de três tipos de direitos e encargos: os direitos

aduaneiros ordinários (ordinary customs duties – primeira sentença do Artigo II:1(b)); os outros direitos e

encargos (other duties and charges – segunda sentença do Artigo II:1(b)); e os encargos e tributos internos

(internal charges and taxes – Artigo III:2).

No que se refere à diferenciação entre os direitos aduaneiros ordinários previstos pelo Artigo II:1(b) e os

tributos internos do Artigo III:2, o Órgão de Apelação definiu a importância de se observar se o fato gerador

decorre do momento da importação. O aspecto temporal foi enfatizado para a identificação do direito aduaneiro

ordinário, no sentido de que a obrigação do importador recolher o direito decorre do momento em que o produto

entra no território aduaneiro de um Membro e em função da importação. Não obstante, um direito aduaneiro

ordinário pode ser recolhido após a importação e um tributo interno pode ser recolhido no momento da

importação. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Auto Parts, paras. 153 e 158, DS339/340/342).

Ademais, o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu que um direito pode apresentar, de forma simultânea, características

de um direito aduaneiro ordinário e de um tributo interno. Nesses casos, deve-se levar em consideração os

elementos centrais mais relevantes que caracterizam a aplicação do direito. Além da determinação do momento

do fato gerador, podem ser observados os responsáveis pelo recolhimento do tributo (importador versus agente

doméstico) e a comparação ao tratamento dado a outros produtos No que se refere à diferenciação entre os

semelhantes importados no mesmo momento. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Auto Parts,

paras. 171, 172, DS339/340/342).

Direitos aduaneiros ordinários e os outros direitos e encargos (respectivamente, primeira e segunda sentença do

Artigo II:1(b)), o Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo II:1(b) estabelecido na Rodada Uruguai previu a

separação destes em uma nova coluna na lista de concessões dos Membros. Não obstante, o Órgão de Apelação

41

definiu que os direitos aduaneiros ordinários e os outros direitos e encargos não possuem a mesma natureza,

sendo que o segundo não apresenta relação com o momento da importação, mas está conectado com a

importação. Ademais, os outros direitos aduaneiros podem ser de qualquer tipo e, portanto, são mais

abrangentes que os direitos aduaneiros ordinários. Nesse sentido, a definição de outros direitos aduaneiros

somente pode ser realizada por exclusão. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import

Duties, paras. 156- 157, DS360 e Relatório do Panel no caso Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of

Cigarettes, paras. 7113-7114, DS302).

4. Artigo II.2(a)

Encargos equivalentes a um imposto interno exigido

A deliberação do DSB referente ao Artigo II:2(a) adicionou entendimentos importantes para definir o que se

deve compreender sobre os conceitos “equivalente a um imposto interno” e “em conformidade com o disposto

no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III”. Além disso, houve deliberação sobre a quem recai o ônus da prova em casos

envolvendo o Artigo.

O conceito de “equivalente a um imposto interno” gerou interpretações distintas entre o Painel e o Órgão de

Apelação, mas como conclusão final o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a interpretação inicial do Painel de que o

termo “equivalente” deva ser entendido exclusivamente como “ter a mesma função ou ter função

correspondente”. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, esta definição não pode ser aceita, pois seria o mesmo que

dizer que as tarifas aduaneiras e internas podem ser equivalentes ainda que exista um diferencial de carga

tributária em detrimento do produto importado. Em outras palavras, o termo equivalente não pode ter o seu

significado entendido de maneira estreita e demanda também uma comparação quantitativa entre as tarifas de

importação e os impostos internos.

No caso de referência, caso 360 (India - Addictional Import Duties), o órgão afirmou que, “quando uma tarifa é

imposta em excesso aos correspondentes tributos internos, é parte integral da análise determinar o quanto esta

carga é justificada de acordo com o Artigo II:2(a)” (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional

Import Duties, para. 180, WT/DS360/AB/R).

Outra deliberação importante do Órgão de Apelação é de que o conceito “equivalente” e “consistência com o

parágrafo 2 do Artigo III” não podem ser interpretados isoladamente um do outro, pois eles se comunicam entre

si e requerem uma “leitura conjunta” (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import

Duties, para. 180, WT/DS360/AB/R). Além disso, não é necessário que o demandante entre com uma

representação de violação do Artigo II:2(a) em conjunto com a do Artigo III:2 para que este último seja levado

em consideração, pois ao acionar o primeiro, automaticamente o último deve ser analisado (Relatório do Órgão

de Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 181, WT/DS360/AB/R). Em resumo, a imposição

do tributo “de forma consistente com o Artigo III:2” é parcela integrante da determinação em relação ao Artigo

II:2(a), a fim de determinar o quanto uma tarifa e os impostos internos são equivalentes.

O Órgão de Apelação deliberou também sobre qual parte contratante deve ser responsável por providenciar

prova em casos de suspeita de violação do Artigo II:2(a). A decisão do Órgão de Apelação foi de que a

atribuição do ônus da prova deve ser julgada “caso a caso, provisão por provisão e medida por medida”

(Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 186, WT/DS360/AB/R).

De conformidade com o disposto no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III

O Painel decidiu que o elemento de consistência com o Artigo III.2 não é uma condição necessária para a

aplicação do Artigo II:2(a) (Relatório do Painel no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 2.212, DS360).

Todavia, tal entendimento foi modificado pelo Órgão de Apelação, que exigiu a observância do Artigo III.2 do

GATT na verificação de equivalência entre encargos aduaneiros e impostos internos. (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 181, DS360).

42

Ademais, o Painel entendia ser necessário um questionamento específico para o Artigo III.2 do GATT, caso o

demandante desejasse a análise da equivalência entre impostos internos e encargos aduaneiros, prevista no

Artigo II:2(a) do GATT, à luz do Artigo III.2 do GATT (Relatório do Painel no caso India – Addictional Import

Duties, para. 2.215, DS360). Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação reverteu esse entendimento, pois considera que a

análise do Artigo III.2 do GATT é inerente à verificação do Artigo II.2(a) neste aspecto (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, DS360).

5. Relação com outros Artigos

Artigo XIII do GATT e Acordo sobre Agricultura

Observa-se que o Artigo II do GATT não foi alterado durante a Rodada Uruguai. Assim, o Órgão de Apelação,

ao analisar a relação entre o GATT (Artigos II e XIII) e o Acordo sobre Agricultura no caso EC – Bananas III,

seguiu a jurisprudência do antigo GATT, especificamente contida no caso US – Restrições na Importação de

Açúcar. Tal decisão determinou que um Membro pode estabelecer seus direitos relacionados a compromissos

tarifários, desde que não diminua as obrigações assumidas no âmbito do GATT (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação no caso EC – Bananas III, para. 154, DS27). Desse modo, o Órgão de Apelação corroborou também a

decisão do Painel no caso EC – Bananas III, que havia registrado a violação das Comunidades Europeias com

fundamentação semelhante (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Bananas III, paras. 7.113-7.114, DS27). Cabe

pontuar que tal decisão vai ao encontro do parágrafo 3 do Protocolo de Marraqueche.

Já no tocante a aspectos relacionados a produtos agrícolas, o relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC –

Bananas III estatui a aplicação dos compromissos assumidos pelos Membros relacionados a acesso a mercados,

respeitando os dispositivos específicos do Acordo sobre Agricultura. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso

EC – Bananas III, para. 155, DS27). Ressalte-se que o Acordo sobre Agricultura, por ser mais específico que o

GATT, deve prevalecer sobre este nos casos de conflito aparente entre tais normas.

Artigo XXVIII do GATT

No caso EC – Bananas III o Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 se manifestou sobre a relação do Artigo

II com o Artigo XXVIII do GATT, ressaltando que tal análise não era objeto do seu termo de referência. Não

obstante, concluiu que um Membro continua vinculado a sua lista de concessões até a conclusão do

procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT. (Relatório do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no

caso EC - Bananas III, para. 7.454, DS27).

Já o Órgão de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 do caso em questão destacou que a modificação da

lista de concessões não exige uma emenda formal nos termos do Artigo X do Acordo da OMC. Essa alteração é

efetuada por meio do procedimento estabelecido no Artigo XXVIII do GATT ou por meio de rodadas

multilaterais de negociações. Assim, decidiu que eventual modificação ou prorrogação das quotas concedidas

pela lista de concessões das Comunidades Europeias deve ser feita por meio do procedimento previsto no Artigo

XXVIII do GATT. Portanto, o Órgão de Apelação corroborou o entendimento do Painel. (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso EC - Bananas III, paras. 385 e 395, DS27).

FOOTNOTES:

Footnote 34: Segundo a OMC, o percentual de tarifas consolidadas dos PD aumentou 21 pontos percentuais (p.p.), saindo de 78% para

99% ao final dessa Rodada. No que se refere aos países em desenvolvimento, o percentual de tarifas consolidadas, que antes de 1994 era

de 21%, passou a ser de 73% após esse período, o que representou um crescimento de 52 p.p. Fonte: Organização Mundial do Comércio

(OMC). Disponível em: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm Acesso em: 18/10/2011>. Footnote 35: GARBELINI JÚNIOR, A. “O contencioso entre as Comunidades Europeias e o Brasil” em Solução de Controvérsias: O

Brasil e o contencioso na OMC. PÁDUA LIMA, Maria Lúcia; ROSENBERG, Bárbara (Coords.). Tomo 1 (Série GV Law). São Paulo:

Saraiva, 2009. pp. 384-385. Footnote 36: Relatório do Painel, WT/DS375/R WT/DS376/R WT/DS377/R, para 7.1246. Footnote 37: Relatório do Órgão de Apelação: Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 47; Panel Report on EC - Chicken Cuts, para.

7.319.

43

Artigo III

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article III

National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

3.1 The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations

and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or

use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of

products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products

so as to afford protection to domestic production.

3.2 The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other

contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges

of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no

contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic

products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.

3.3 With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 2, but

which is specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on April 10, 1947, in which the

import duty on the taxed product is bound against increase, the contracting party imposing the tax shall

be free to postpone the application of the provisions of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can

obtain release from the obligations of such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such duty

to the extent necessary to compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax.

3.4 The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other

contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of

national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering

for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not

prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on

the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.

3.5 No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the

mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or

indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the

regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise

apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.

3.6 The provisions of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal quantitative regulation in forcein the

territory of any contracting party on July 1, 1939, April 10, 1947, or March 24, 1948, at the option of

that contracting party; Provided that any such regulation which is contrary to the provisions of

paragraph 5 shall not be modified to the detriment of imports and shall be treated as a customs duty for

the purpose of negotiation.

3.7 No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified

amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion

among external sources of supply.

3.8 (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing

the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes

and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for

commercial sale.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to

domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of

44

internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies

effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

3.9 The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price control measures, even though

conforming to the other provisions of this Article, can have effects prejudicial to the interests of

contracting parties supplying imported products. Accordingly, contracting parties applying such

measures shall take account of the interests of exporting contracting parties with a view to avoiding

to the fullest practicable extent such prejudicial effects.

3.10 The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting party from establishing or

maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films and meeting

the requirements of

Article IV

Notes and Supplementary Provisions

Ad Article III

Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in

paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced

in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an

internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1,

and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III.

Paragraph 1

The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by local governments and authorities with the

territory of a contracting party is subject to the provisions of the final paragraph of Article XXIV. The term

“reasonable measures” in the last-mentioned paragraph would not require, for example, the repeal of existing

national legislation authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes which, although technically

inconsistent with the letter of Article III, are not in fact inconsistent with its spirit, if such repeal would result in

a serious financial hardship for the local governments or authorities concerned. With regard to taxation by local

governments or authorities which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Article III, the term

“reasonable measures” would permit a contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over a

transition period, if abrupt action would create serious administrative and financial difficulties.

Paragraph 2

A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be considered to be

inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where competition was involved between,

on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which

was not similarly taxed.

Paragraph 5

Regulations consistent with the provisions of the first sentence of paragraph 5 shall not be considered to be

contrary to the provisions of the second sentence in any case in which all of the products subject to the

regulations are produced domestically in substantial quantities. A regulation cannot be justified as being

consistent with the provisions of the second sentence on the ground that the proportion or amount allocated to

each of the products which are the subject of the regulation constitutes an equitable relationship between

imported and domestic products.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo III

Tratamento Nacional no tocante à Tributação e Regulamentação Internas

45

3.1 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que os impostos e outros tributos internos, assim como leis,

regulamentos e exigências relacionadas com a venda, oferta para venda, compra, transporte,

distribuição ou utilização de produtos no mercado interno e as regulamentações sobre medidas

quantitativas internas que exijam a mistura, a transformação ou utilização de produtos, em

quantidade e proporções especificadas, não devem ser aplicados a produtos importados ou nacionais,

de modo a proteger a produção nacional.

3.2 Os produtos do território de qualquer Parte Contratante, importados por outra Parte Contratante, não

estão sujeitos, direta ou indiretamente, a impostos ou outros tributos internos de qualquer espécie

superiores aos que incidem, direta ou indiretamente, sobre produtos nacionais. Além disso nenhuma

Parte Contratante aplicará de outro modo, impostos ou outros encargos internos a produtos nacionais

ou importados, contrariamente aos princípios estabelecidos no parágrafo 1.

3.3 Relativamente a qualquer imposto interno existente, incompatível com o que dispõe o parágrafo 2,

mas expressamente autorizado por um acordo comercial, em vigor a 10 de abril de 1947, no qual se

estabelece o congelamento do direito de importação que recai sobre um produto à Parte Contratante

que aplica o imposto será lícito protelar a aplicação dos dispositivos do parágrafo 2 a tal imposto, até

que possa obter dispensadas obrigações desse acordo comercial, de modo a lhe ser permitido

aumentar tal direito na medida necessária compensar a supressão da proteção assegurada pelo

imposto.

3.4 Os produtos de território de uma Parte Contratante que entrem no território de outra Parte

Contratante não usufruirão tratamento menos favorável que o concedido a produtos similares de

origem nacional, no que diz respeito às leis, regulamento e exigências relacionadas com a venda,

oferta para venda, compra, transporte, distribuição e utilização no mercado interno. Os dispositivos

deste parágrafo não impedirão a aplicação de tarifas de transporte internas diferenciais, desde que se

baseiem exclusivamente na operação econômica dos meios de transporte e não na nacionalidade do

produto.

3.5 Nenhuma Parte Contratante estabelecerá ou manterá qualquer regulamentação quantitativa interna

que se relacione com a mistura, transformação ou utilização de produtos em quantidades ou

proporções determinadas e que exija, direta ou indiretamente o fornecimento pelas fontes produtoras

nacionais, de quantidade ou proporção determinada de um produto enquadrado na regulamentação.

Além disso, nenhuma Parte Contratante aplicará de outro modo, regulamentações quantitativas

internas, de forma a contrariar os princípios estabelecidos no parágrafo 1.

3.6 Os dispositivos do parágrafo 5 não se aplicarão a qualquer regulamentação quantitativa interna em

vigor, no território de qualquer Parte Contratante, a 1 de julho de 1939, a 10 de abril de 1947, ou a 24

de março de 1948, à escolha da Parte Contratante, contanto que qualquer regulamentação dessa

natureza, contrária ao que dispõe o parágrafo 5, não seja modificada em detrimento de importações e

seja tratada como se fosse um direito aduaneiro, para efeito de negociação.

3.7 Nenhuma regulamentação quantitativa interna que se relacione com a mistura, transformação ou

utilização de produtos em quantidades ou proporções determinadas será aplicada, de modo a repartir

qualquer quantidade, ou proporção dessa natureza entre fontes estrangeiras de suprimento.

3.8 (a) As disposições desse Artigo não se aplicarão às leis, regulamentos ou exigências que se

refiram a aquisições, por órgão governamentais de produtos comprados para atender às

necessidades dos poderes públicos e não se destinam à revenda, no comércio, ou à produção

de bens para venda no comércio.

(b) As disposições deste Artigo não impedirão o pagamento de subsídios exclusivamente a

produtores nacionais compreendidos os pagamentos a produtores nacionais com recursos

provenientes da arrecadação dos impostos ou tributos internos aplicados de conformidade

46

com os dispositivos deste Artigo e de subsídios concedidos sob a forma de compra de

produtos nacionais pelos poderes públicos.

3.9 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as medidas internas para controle de preços máximos

embora guardem conformidade com outros dispositivos deste Artigo, podem ocasionar prejuízos aos

interesses das Partes Contratantes que fornecem os produtos importados. As Partes Contratantes que

tomarem tais medidas levarão em conta os interesses das Partes Contratantes exportadoras, com o

fim de evitar o mais possível, esses efeitos perniciosos.

3.10 Os dispositivos deste Artigo não impedirão qualquer Parte Contratante de estabelecer ou manter

regulamentações quantitativas internas relativas à exibição de filmes cinematográficos e de atender

às exigências do Artigo IV.

Notas e Disposições Adicionais

Ao Artigo III

Qualquer imposto ou outros tributos internos, bem como qualquer lei, regulamento ou prescrição mencionados

no Parágrafo 1 que se apliquem não só ao produto importado como também ao produto nacional similar e que

sejam cobrados ou exigidos no caso do produto importado no momento e no local da importação, serão não

obstante considerados como taxa interna ou um outro tributo interno ou como uma lei, regulamentação ou

exigências regidas no Parágrafo 1 e estão consequentemente sujeitas às disposições do Artigo III.

Parágrafo primeiro

A aplicação do parágrafo primeiro às taxas internas cobradas pelas autoridades governamentais ou

administrativas locais do território de uma Parte Contratante é regida pelas disposições constantes do último

parágrafo do Artigo XXIV. A expressão “medidas razoáveis que estejam a seu alcance” que figura nesse

parágrafo não deve ser interpretada como obrigando, por exemplo uma Parte Contratante a revogar uma

legislação nacional que dá às autoridades mencionadas acima, o poder de aplicar taxas internas que sejam

contrárias na forma, à letra do Artigo III, sem contratarem, de fato, o espírito deste Artigo se essa extinção

trouxer graves dificuldades financeiras para as autoridades locais interessadas. No que concerne às taxas

cobradas por essas autoridades locais e que sejam contrárias à letra e ao espírito do Artigo III, a expressão

“medidas razoáveis que estejam a seu alcance” permite a uma Parte Contratante elimina progressivamente essas

taxas no curso de um período de transição, se a sua supressão imediata ameace provocar graves dificuldades

administrativas e financeiras.

Parágrafo 2

Uma taxa que satisfaça às prescrições da primeira frase do parágrafo 2 somente deve ser considerada como

incompatível com as prescrições da Segunda frase nos casos em que haja concorrência entre de um lado, o

produto taxado e de outro, um produto diretamente competidor ou que possa ser substituto direto e que não seja

taxado igualmente.

Parágrafo 5

As medidas de regulamentação compatíveis com as disposições da primeira frase do parágrafo 5 não serão

consideradas como contrárias às disposições da segunda frase se o país que aplica a regulamentação produz em

quantidade substancial todos os produtos a ela submetidos. Não se poderá invocar o fato de que na atribuição de

uma determinada proporção ou quantidade de cada um dos produtos submetidos à regulamentação guardou-se

uma relação quantitativa entre os produtos nacionais e os importados para sustentar que uma regulamentação

está conforme com as disposições da Segunda frase.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar

47

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo III:2

1. Artigo III.2, primeira frase – significado de “produtos similares aos nacionais” (like domestic products)

a) Definição de “produtos similares” (like products)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 112-114

Para. 112. “Because the second sentence of Article III:2 provides for a separate and distinctive consideration of

the protective aspect of a measure in examining its application to a broader category of products that are not

“like products” as contemplated by the first sentence, we agree with the Panel that the first sentence of Article

III:2 must be construed narrowly so as not to condemn measures that its strict terms are not meant to condemn.”

Para. 113. “How narrowly is a matter that should be determined separately for each tax measure in each case.

We agree with the practice under the GATT 1947 of determining whether imported and domestic products are

“like” on a case-by-case basis.”

Para. 114. “No one approach to exercising judgement will be appropriate for all cases. The criteria in Border

Tax Adjustments should be examined, but there can be no one precise and absolute definition of what is “like”.

The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion of “likeness”

stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width

of the accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the term

“like” is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that

provision may apply.”

b) “Critérios”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 113-115

Para. 113. “(…) In applying the criteria cited in Border Tax Adjustments to the facts of any particular case, and

in considering other criteria that may also be relevant in certain cases, panels can only apply their best

judgement in determining whether in fact products are “like”. This will always involve an unavoidable element

of individual, discretionary judgement (…).”

Para. 114. “(…) it is a discretionary decision that must be made in considering the various characteristics of

products in individual cases.”

Uniform classification in tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmonized System (the

“HS”) was recognized in GATT 1947 practice as providing a useful basis for

confirming “likeness” in products. However, there is a major difference between tariff

classification nomenclature and tariff bindings or concessions made by Members of

the WTO under Article of the GATT 1994.

Para. 115. “(…) tariff bindings that include a wide range of products are not a reliable criterion for determining

or confirming product “likeness” under Article III:2.”

48

2. Artigo III.2, primeira frase – significado de “superiores aos que incidem” (in excess of)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 112 e 115

Para. 112. “(…) Read in their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose of the WTO Agreement,

the words of the first sentence require an examination of the conformity of an internal tax measure with Article

III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and domestic products are “like” and, second, whether the

taxes applied to the imported products are “in excess of” those applied to the like domestic products. If the

imported and domestic products are “like products”, and if the taxes applied to the imported products are “in

excess of” those applied to the like domestic products, then the measure is inconsistent with Article III:2, first

sentence.”

Para. 115. “(…) Even the smallest amount of “excess” is too much. “The prohibition of discriminatory taxes in

Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is it qualified by a de minimis

standard.”

3. Artigo III.2, segunda frase - significado de “produto diretamente competidor ou que possa ser

substituto direto” (“like” and “directly competitive or substitutable” products)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, para. 117

Para. 117. “(…) As with “like products” under the first sentence, the determination of the appropriate range of

“directly competitive or substitutable products” under the second sentence must be made on a case-by-case

basis. In this case, the Panel emphasized the need to look not only at such matters as physical characteristics,

common end-uses, and tariff classifications, but also at the “market-place”. This seems appropriate. (…) It does

not seem inappropriate to look at competition in the relevant markets as one among a number of means of

identifying the broader category of products that might be described as “directly competitive or substitutable”.

Nor does it seem inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution as one means of examining those relevant

markets.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages),

Demandante: EUA e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS75/AB/R, paras. 114-115, 118, 120, 124, 127, 134,

137 e 142-143

Para. 114. “The term “directly competitive or substitutable” describes a particular type of relationship between

two products, one imported and the other domestic. It is evident from the wording of the term that the essence of

that relationship is that the products are in competition. This much is clear both from the word “competitive”

which means “characterized by competition”, and from the word “substitutable” which means “able to be

substituted”. The context of the competitive relationship is necessarily the marketplace since this is the forum

49

where consumers choose between different products. Competition in the market-place is a dynamic, evolving

process. Accordingly, the wording of the term “directly competitive or substitutable” implies that the

competitive relationship between products is not to be analyzed exclusively by reference to current consumer

preferences. In our view, the word “substitutable” indicates that the requisite relationship may exist between

products that are not, at a given moment, considered by consumers to be substitutes but which are, nonetheless,

capable of being substituted for one another.”

Para. 115. “Thus, according to the ordinary meaning of the term, products are competitive or substitutable when

they are interchangeable or if they offer, as the Panel noted, “alternative ways of satisfying a particular need or

taste”. Particularly in a market where there are regulatory barriers to trade or to competition, there may well be

latent demand.”

Para. 118. “(…) “Like” products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all like products

are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all “directly competitive or

substitutable” products are “like”. The notion of like products must be construed narrowly but the category of

directly competitive or substitutable products is broader. While perfectly substitutable products fall within

Article III:2, first sentence, imperfectly substitutable products can be assessed under Article III:2, second

sentence.”

Para. 120. “In view of the objectives of avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive conditions

and protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships, we decline to take a static view of the term

“directly competitive or substitutable.” The object and purpose of Article III confirms that the scope of the term

“directly competitive or substitutable” cannot be limited to situations where consumers already regard products

as alternatives. If reliance could be placed only on current instances of substitution, the object and purpose of

Article III:2 could be defeated by the protective taxation that the provision aims to prohibit.”

Para. 124. “(…) the term “directly competitive or substitutable” does not prevent a panel from taking account

of evidence of latent consumer demand as one of a range of factors to be considered when assessing the

competitive relationship between imported and domestic products under Article III:2, second sentence, of the

GATT 1994.”

Para. 127. “(…) the object and purpose of Article III is the maintenance of equality of competitive conditions

for imported and domestic products. It is, therefore, not only legitimate, but even necessary, to take account of

this purpose in interpreting the term “directly competitive or substitutable product”.”

Para. 134. “In taking issue with the use of the term “nature of competition”, Korea, in effect, objects to the

Panel’s sceptical attitude to quantification of the competitive relationship between imported and domestic

products. For the reasons set above, we share the Panel’s reluctance to rely unduly on quantitative analyses of

the competitive relationship. In our view, an approach that focused solely on the quantitative overlap of

competition would, in essence, make cross-price elasticity the decisive criterion in determining whether

products are “directly competitive or substitutable”.”

Para. 137. “It is, of course, true that the “directly competitive or substitutable” relationship must be present in

the market at issue. (…) It is also true that consumer responsiveness to products may vary from country to

country. This does not, however, preclude consideration of consumer behaviour in a country other than the one

at issue. It seems to us that evidence from other markets may be pertinent to the examination of the market at

issue, particularly when demand on that market has been influenced by regulatory barriers to trade or to

competition. Clearly, not every other market will be relevant to the market at issue. But if another market

displays characteristics similar to the market at issue, then evidence of consumer demand in that other market

may have some relevance to the market at issue. This, however, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis,

taking account of all relevant facts.”

Para. 142. “(…) Some grouping is almost always necessary in cases arising under Article III:2, second

sentence, since generic categories commonly include products with some variation in composition, quality,

function and price, and thus commonly give rise to sub-categories. From a slightly different perspective, we

50

note that “grouping” of products involves at least a preliminary characterization by the treaty interpreter that

certain products are sufficiently similar as to, for instance, composition, quality, function and price, to warrant

treating them as a group for convenience in analysis. But, the use of such “analytical tools” does not relieve a

panel of its duty to make an objective assessment of whether the components of a group of imported products

are directly competitive or substitutable with the domestic products.”

Para. 143. “Whether, and to what extent, products can be grouped is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case

basis.”

4. Artigo III.2, segunda frase – significado de “não seja taxado igualmente” (not similarly taxed)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 118-119

Para. 118. “To interpret “in excess of” and “not similarly taxed” identically would deny any distinction between

the first and second sentences of Article III:2. Thus, in any given case, there may be some amount of taxation on

imported products that may well be “in excess of” the tax on domestic “like products” but may not be so much

as to compel a conclusion that “directly competitive or substitutable” imported and domestic products are “not

similarly taxed” for the purposes of the Ad Article to Article III:2, second sentence. In other words, there may

be an amount of excess taxation that may well be more of a burden on imported products than on domestic

“directly competitive or substitutable products” but may nevertheless not be enough to justify a conclusion that

such products are “not similarly taxed” for the purposes of Article III:2, second sentence.”

Para.119. “(…) We agree with the Panel that this amount of differential taxation must be more than de minimis

to be deemed “not similarly taxed” in any given case. And, like the Panel, we believe that whether any particular

differential amount of taxation is de minimis or is not de minimis must, here too, be determined on a case-by-

case basis. Thus, to be “not similarly taxed”, the tax burden on imported products must be heavier than on

“directly competitive or substitutable” domestic products, and that burden must be more than de minimis in any

given case.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic Beverages),

Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/AB/R, paras. 49 e 52-53

Para. 49. “(…) We must, therefore, assess the relative tax burden imposed on directly competitive or

substitutable domestic and imported products.”

Para. 52. “(…) The examination under the second issue must, therefore, take into account the fact that the group

of directly competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products at issue in this case is not limited solely

to beverages of a specific alcohol content, falling within a particular fiscal category, but covers all the distilled

alcoholic beverages in each and every fiscal category under the New Chilean System.”

Para. 53. “A comprehensive examination of this nature, which looks at all of the directly competitive or

substitutable domestic and imported products, shows that the tax burden on imported products, most of which

will be subject to a tax rate of 47 per cent, will be heavier than the tax burden on domestic products, most of

which will be subject to a tax rate of 27 per cent.”

51

III. Comentários

No tocante ao Artigo III.2, é possível constatar que sua interpretação pelo Órgão de Apelação inicia-se no caso

Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II. De acordo com essa decisão, para o Artigo III não importa a intenção, ou seja,

não importa se o Membro desenhou sua regulação interna no sentido de favorecer empresas nacionais, mas

apenas se a regulação interna objetivamente concede essa proteção.

De fato, o Artigo III estabelece alguns parâmetros para a investigação da proteção interna: ele distingue entre os

produtos nacionais que podem ser qualificados como “similares” de produtos importados (primeira frase do

segundo parágrafo) e os produtos internos que são “diretamente competidores e substitutos” dos importados

(segunda frase do segundo parágrafo).

Esses dois tipos de produtos estão sujeitos a conceitos jurídicos distintos: se, de um lado, o conceito de produtos

“similares” parece ambíguo, de outro o conceito que se aplica a produtos “diretamente competidores e

substitutos” e a distinção entre essas duas categorias está muito mais clara.

No caso Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, o Órgão de Apelação foi claro ao afirmar que “even the smallest

amount of excess is too much… The prohibition under Article III.2, first sentence, is not conditional on a trade

effects test nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard”. Esta afirmação nos faz indagar como são aferidos os

“produtos similares”, e, em particular, como os “produtos similares” podem ser diferenciados dos “produtos

diretamente competidores e substitutos”.

Como esclarecido nas várias decisões do Órgão de Apelação acima mencionadas, os “produtos similares” são

espécie do gênero “produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos”. Produtos similares importados ou

nacionais devem supostamente possuir mais características físicas em comum e devem, ordinariamente, estar

sujeitos aos mesmos impostos.

No tocante aos produtos “competidores e substitutos”, o critério jurídico não é tão claro. Em primeiro lugar, a

diferença no tratamento de produtos estrangeiros e nacionais está sujeita a um critério minimalista. Ou seja, para

que seja proibido, será necessário demonstrar que o tratamento de produtos nacionais e importados não é

similar. Em segundo lugar, como a segunda frase do Artigo III.2 faz referência expressa ao primeiro parágrafo

do mesmo dispositivo, entende-se que, para que seja proibido, é imprescindível demonstrar também que a

diferença de tratamento de produtos nacionais e estrangeiros é o que efetivamente confere proteção àquele.

As diferenças entre produtos “similares” e produtos “competidores diretos e substitutos” e seus critérios

restritivos parecem estar associadas à presunção de que se dois produtos são bastante semelhantes, qualquer

diferença de tratamento entre eles traduzirá em uma proteção significativa para o produto que se beneficiará de

condições mais favoráveis. Neste caso, presume-se que o efeito de proteção existe e é significativo. De outro

lado, se os produtos são mais diferenciados, o sentido do efeito de proteção tem que ser demonstrado. Esta

presunção, todavia, parece não estar correta. Se o grau de proteção se eleva na proporção do aumento da

possibilidade de substituição de um produto pelo outro, isto não é condição suficiente para gerar uma proteção

necessariamente significativa.

Daí porque, deve-se questionar o sentido prático de distinguir entre os critérios jurídicos aplicados a produtos

“similares” e produtos “competidores diretos e substitutos”.

Em primeiro lugar, a distinção entre os dois tipos de produtos não é, na prática, nada fácil. De acordo com as

decisões do Órgão de Apelação acima mencionadas, essa distinção deve ser feita caso a caso e não existe um

critério único que possa ser usado em todos os casos. Como já dito, existe um aparente consenso de que

“produtos similares” devem compartilhar mesmas características físicas e produtos “competidores diretos e

substitutos” devem ser aferidos de acordo com regras de mercado, levando-se em conta a similaridade no uso

final do produto. No entanto, mais do que isto, quase nenhuma outra informação sistemática pode ser extraída

das decisões do Órgão de Apelação.

52

Em segundo lugar, a distinção entre critérios jurídicos aplicáveis a dois tipos de produtos é imaterial. O caso do

Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II é emblemático: ficou decidido pelo painel que “for it to conclude that dissimilar

taxation afforded protection, it would be sufficient for it to find that the dissimilarity is not de minimis”. Em

outras palavras, se a diferença de tratamento é muito grande, o efeito protetivo pode ser presumido (no caso de

“produtos similares”). Daí porque, a única diferença entre o critério aplicado a produtos “similares” e

“diretamente competidores e substitutos” estaria relacionada à importância do tratamento da desigualdade. No

entanto, o Órgão de Apelação discordou desse entendimento e afirmou que a questão de aferir se a proteção foi

concedida deve ser entendida separadamente da questão de aferir se o tratamento foi desigual.

Infelizmente, contudo, o Órgão de Apelação somente discorreu vagamente sobre o tema de como aferir a

proteção, referindo que, acima da importância do tratamento desigual, existem “other factors to be considered”.

Não se encontra esclarecido quais devem ser esses “other factors”.

Conclui-se, portanto, que nenhuma avaliação dos efeitos da proteção é necessária para “produtos similares”,

diferentemente do que ocorre com os “produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos”. É certo que os Painéis

da OMC evitam padrões quantitativos. Mesmo assim, para verificar se um produto substitui outro é obviamente

uma questão de gradação, já que não existe padrão para decidir quando a substituição é pequena o suficiente

para considerar que os produtos não são competidores diretos. Pelo mesmo motivo, os painéis da OMC não têm

considerado nenhum padrão para avaliar a desigualdade entre produtos.

Esses Painéis têm tentado identificar “produtos similares” e “produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos”

separadamente de sua avaliação da importância das barreiras que são criadas para as empresas estrangeiras (a

importância da desigualdade no tratamento). Mesmo assim, pode-se reconhecer que a proteção é,

verdadeiramente, uma questão de gradação e não uma questão de princípios.

Ademais, o quanto as empresas nacionais protegem-se por barreiras não-tarifárias será determinado (entre

outros fatores) pelo grau de substituição entre produtos nacionais e estrangeiros e a importância da barreira

imposta. Em outras palavras, se o Artigo III expressa um padrão quanto ao grau de proteção, não se pode

escapar de estabelecer também algum nível de padrão para o que é considerado um grau de proteção admissível.

Desta feita, a avaliação da proteção atual em face do padrão deveria considerar conjuntamente a importância da

barreira e o grau de substituição entre os produtos nacionais e estrangeiros.

53

Artigo IV

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article IV

Special Provisions relating to Cinematograph Films

If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed

cinematograph films, such regulations shall take the form of screen quotas which shall conform to the following

requirements:

(a) Screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph films of national origin during a

specified minimum proportion of the total screen time actually utilized, over a specified

period of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all films of whatever origin,

and shall be computed on the basis of screen time per theatre per year or the equivalent

thereof;

(b) With the exception of screen time reserved for films of national origin under a screen quota,

screen time including that released by administrative action from screen time reserved for

films of national origin, shall not be allocated formally or in effect among sources of supply;

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b) of this Article, any contracting party

may maintain screen quotas conforming to the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this

Article which reserve a minimum proportion of screen time for films of a specified origin

other than that of the contracting party imposing such screen quotas; Provided that no such

minimum proportion of screen time shall be increased above the level in effect on April 10,

1947;

(d) Screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation, liberalization or elimination.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

NÃO HÁ DECISÕES

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo IV

III. Comentário

54

Artigo V

Felipe de Andrade Krausz

Vera Kanas

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article V

Freedom of Transit

5.1 Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be deemed to be in

transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across such territory, with or

without transshipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a

portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party

across whose territory the traffic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed in this article “traffic in

transit”.

5.2 There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via the routes most

convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting

parties. No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin,

departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of

vessels or of other means of transport.

5.3 Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered at the proper

custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations,

such traffic coming from or going to the territory of other contracting parties shall not be subject to

any unnecessary delays or restrictions and shall be exempt from customs duties and from all transit

duties or other charges imposed in respect of transit, except charges for transportation or those

commensurate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services rendered.

5.4 All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit to or from the territories

of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic.

5.5 With respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit, each contracting

party shall accord to traffic in transit to or from the territory of any other contracting party treatment

no less favourable than the treatment accorded to traffic in transit to or from any third country.

5.6 Each contracting party shall accord to products which have been in transit through the territory of any

other contracting party treatment no less favourable than that which would have been accorded to such

products had they been transported from their place of origin to their destination without going

through the territory of such other contracting party. Any contracting party shall, however, be free to

maintain its requirements of direct consignment existing on the date of this Agreement, in respect of

any goods in regard to which such direct consignment is a requisite condition of eligibility for entry of

the goods at preferential rates of duty or has relation to the contracting party’s prescribed method of

valuation for duty purposes.

5.7 The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the operation of aircraft in transit, but shall apply to air

transit of goods (including baggage).

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo V

Liberdade de Trânsito

55

5.1 As mercadorias (compreendidas as bagagens) assim como os navios e outros meios de transporte

serão considerados em trânsito através do território de uma Parte Contratante, quando a passagem

através dêsse território, quer se efetue ou não com baldeação, armazenagem, ruptura de carga ou

mudança na forma de transporte, não constitua senão uma fração de uma viagem completa, iniciada e

terminada fora das fronteiras da Parte Contratante em cujo território se efetua. No presente artigo,

um tráfego dessa natureza é denominado “tráfego em trânsito.”

5.2 Haverá liberdade de trânsito através do território das Partes Contratantes para o tráfego em trânsito

com destino a ou de procedência de territórios de outras Partes Contratantes pelas rotas mais

cômodas para o trânsito internacional. Nenhuma distinção será baseada no pavilhão dos navios ou

barcos, no lugar de origem, no ponto partida, de entrada, de saída ou destino ou sôbre considerações

relativas à propriedade das mercadorias, dos navios, barcos ou outros meios de transporte.

5.3 Qualquer Parte Contratante poderá exigir que o tráfego em trânsito pelo seu território seja objeto de

uma declaração na Alfândega interessada; todavia, salvo quando houver falta de observação das leis

e regulamentos alegários aplicáveis, os transportes dessa natureza procedentes de outras Partes

Contratantes ou a êles destinados não serão submetidos a prazos ou restrições inúteis e ficarão

insentos de direitos de trânsito e de qualquer outro encargo relativo ao trânsito, excetuadas as

despesas de transporte ou pagamentos correspondentes às despesas administrativas ocasionadas pelo

trânsito ou ao custo,dos serviços prestados.

5.4 Todos os direitos e regulamentos aplicados pelas Partes Contratantes ao tráfego em trânsito

proveniente de outras Partes Contratantes ou a êles destinado deverão ser eqüitativos, tendo em vista

as condições do tráfego.

5.5 No que diz respeito aos direitos, regulamentos e formalidades relativos ao trânsito, cada Parte

Contratante concederá, ao tráfego em trânsito procedente de outra Parte Contratante ou a ela

destinado, um tratamento não menos favorável do que o concedido ao tráfego em trânsito

proveniente de qualquer outro país ou a éle destinado.

5.6 Cada Parte Contratante concederá aos produtos que tenham transitado pelo território de qualquer

outra Parte Contratante tratamento não menos favorável do que aquêle que lhe seria concedido se

tivessem sido transportados do seu lugar de origem ao de destino sem passar pelo referido território.

Será, todavia, facultado a qualquer Parte Contratante manter as condições de expedição direta

vigentes na data dêste Acôrdo, em relação a tôdas as mercadorias para as quais a expedição direta

constitua uma condição de admissão ao gôzo de direitos preferenciais ou se relacione à forma de

avaliação prescrita pela Parte Contratante para a fixação dos direitos alfandegários.

5.7 As disposições do presente artigo não serão aplicáveis às aeronaves em trânsito, mas serão aplicáveis

ao trânsito aéreo de mercadorias, compreendidas as bagagens.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo V

A interpretação do Artigo V do GATT pelo Painel encontra-se limitada ao Relatório do Painel em Colombia -

Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, única vez em que o presente artigo sofreu escrutínio

durante o processo de solução de controvérsias na OMC. A sua interpretação foi construída com base nos

seguintes elementos:

56

(a) O âmbito de aplicação do conceito de tráfego em trânsito no Artigo V:2 (the scope

of the concept of traffic in transit in Article V:2)

(b) As obrigações substantivas na primeira e na segunda frase do Artigo V:2 (the

substantive obligations in Article V:2, first and second sentences)

(i) Primeira frase do Artigo V:2 (Article V:2, first sentence)

(ii) Segunda frase do Artigo V:2 (Article V:2, second sentence)

(c) O âmbito de aplicação da obrigação da Nação Mais Favorecida no Artigo V:6 do

GATT 1994 (the scope of application of the MFN obligation in Article V:6 of the

GATT 1994)

(d) As obrigações substantivas no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994 (the substantive

obligations in Article V:6 of the GATT 1994)

Relatório do Painel no litígio Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia -

Ports of Entry), WT/DS366/R, paras. 7.392, 7.396-7.397, 7.400-7.402, 7.453-7.459, 7.464-7468 e 7.475-

7.478

a) “O âmbito de aplicação do conceito de tráfego em trânsito no Artigo V:2”

Nesses trechos, o Painel identifica o elemento central para a construção da interpretação das disposições

do Artigo V do GATT. Trata-se da expressão “tráfego em trânsito” e sua definição, tal como

estabelecida no Artigo V:1 do GATT, a qual o Painel ressalta ser clara e suficiente em si. Dessa forma,

quando em conjunto com a interpretação do Artigo V:2 do GATT, o Painel destaca que para todos os

produtos em “tráfego em trânsito” deverá ser concedida respectiva “liberdade de trânsito” no transporte

dentro do território do Membro em que estes produtos estiverem em trânsito. O Painel também indica

que, apesar da ausência de referência explícita à expressão “tráfego em trânsito”, na segunda frase do

Artigo V:2 do GATT, resta claro que a extensão da obrigação da nação mais favorecida destina-se à

promoção da “liberdade de trânsito” para produtos em “tráfego em trânsito”. Assim, a segunda frase do

Artigo V:2 do GATT complementa e estende a “liberdade de trânsito” para produtos em “tráfego em

trânsito”, independente de critérios injustamente discriminatórios assim listados e determinados no

próprio texto do Artigo V do GATT.

Para.7.392. “The Panel recalls that both parties have referred to Article V:1 to inform the scope of the

obligations under Article V:2. In particular, Article V:1 defines goods as “traffic in transit” when their

passage across the territory of a Member “with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or

change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond

the frontier of the Member across whose territory the traffic passes”. (38)

Para. 7.396. “In the Panel's view, the definition of “traffic in transit” provided in Article V:1 seems

sufficiently clear on its face. When applied to Article V:2, “freedom of transit” must thus be extended to all

traffic in transit when the goods' passage across the territory of a Member is a only a portion of a complete

journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Member across whose territory the traffic

passes. Freedom of transit must additionally be guaranteed with or without trans-shipment, warehousing,

breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport.”

Para. 7.397. “The Panel notes that the term “traffic in transit” does not appear in Article V:2, second

sentence. This provision reads: “No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place

of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of

vessels or of other means of transport.” In spite of the absence of an explicit reference to traffic in transit in

this second sentence of Article V:2, the Panel believes that it is sufficiently clear from its text that the MFN

obligation in the second sentence is closely related to the obligation to extend freedom of transit, in the first

sentence. In the Panel's view, the second sentence complements and expands upon the obligation to extend

freedom of transit, stating additionally that distinctions must not be made based on the nationality, or place

of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination of the vessel transporting goods. Moreover, both obligations

form part of the same textual provision.”

b) “As obrigações substantivas na primeira e na segunda frase do Artigo V:2”

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(i) Primeira frase do Artigo V:2

Nas disposições a seguir, o Painel nota que a promoção da “liberdade de trânsito” pelos Membros no

âmbito do seu território necessita ser realizada indiscriminadamente, a partir de um mínimo que se

completa por meio das rotas mais convenientes para o trânsito internacional. Isto implica no delineamento

de uma condição limitante sobre a obrigação de promoção da “liberdade de trânsito”, a qual não precisa

ser estendida a todas as rotas possíveis, mas deve ser necessariamente garantida nas rotas mais

convenientes para o trânsito, da entrada à saída do território do Membro. Assim, a obrigação de estender a

“liberdade de trânsito” à mercadorias em “tráfego em trânsito” exige acesso irrestrito, mas apenas às

rotas mais convenientes para o transporte de mercadorias, não havendo, portanto, obrigação do Membro

de garantir a “liberdade de trânsito” à todas as rotas possíveis dentro de seu território.

Para. 7.400. “In addition to the definition of “freedom”, the Panel notes the significance of the rest of the

text in Article V:2. The opening text in Article V:2, first sentence (“There shall be freedom of transit through

the territory of each contracting party ...”) introduces the obligation – the provision of “freedom of transit”

by Members within their territory. The intermediate clause in Article V:2, first sentence (“... via the routes

most convenient for international transit ...”) imposes a limiting condition on the obligation – that freedom

of transit should be provided on the most convenient routes. The remainder of Article V:2, first sentence (“...

for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties”) explains that “freedom of transit”

must be provided for 'traffic in transit” entering and then subsequently departing from the Member's territory.

The Panel notes that the term of art “traffic in transit” has been defined in the preceding section to include

goods when those goods' passage across the territory of a Member with or without trans-shipment,

warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey

beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Member across whose territory the traffic passes.”

Para. 7.401. “In light of the ordinary meaning of freedom and the text of Article V:2, the Panel concludes

that the provision of “freedom of transit” pursuant to Article V:2, first sentence requires extending

unrestricted access via the most convenient routes for the passage of goods in international transit whether or

not the goods have been trans-shipped, warehoused, break-bulked, or have changed modes of transport.

Accordingly, goods in international transit from any Member must be allowed entry whenever destined for

the territory of a third country. Reasonably, in the Panel's view, a Member is not required to guarantee

transport on necessarily any or all routes in its territory, but only on the ones “most convenient” for transport

through its territory.”

(ii) Segunda frase do Artigo V:2

No trecho a seguir, o Painel indica que as disposições presentes na segunda frase do Artigo V:2 do

GATT são suficientemente claras. Dessa forma, é possível identificar a obrigação estabelecida de

assegurar-se, a todos os produtos de todos os Membros da OMC, um nível idêntico de acesso e

igualdade de condições durante o seu transporte em trânsito internacional. Proíbe-se, assim,

discriminações com base no pavilhão dos navios ou barcos, no lugar de origem, no ponto partida, de

entrada, de saída ou destino, na propriedade dos produtos, dos navios, barcos ou outros meios de

transporte, como objetivamente expresso no Artigo V:2 do GATT.

Para. 7.402. “The Panel shall now turn to examine the scope of the obligation in Article V:2, second

sentence. In this regard, the Panel considers that the obligation in Article V:2, second sentence is clear on its

face: Members shall not make distinctions between goods which are “traffic in transit” based on the flag of

vessels; the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination of the vessel; or on any circumstances

relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport. As noted, the first sentence in

Article V:2 addresses freedom of transit for goods in international transit. As a complement to this

protection, the Panel considers that Article V:2, second sentence further prohibits Members from making

distinctions in the treatment of goods, based on their origin or trajectory prior to arriving in their territory,

based on their ownership, or based on the transport or vessel of the goods. Accordingly, the Panel concludes

that Article V:2, second sentence requires that goods from all Members must be ensured an identical level of

access and equal conditions when proceeding in international transit.”

58

c) “O âmbito de aplicação da obrigação da nação mais favorecida no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994”

Nos trechos em destaque, o Painel entende que as obrigações presentes nas disposições do Artigo V:6 do

GATT destinam-se aos Membros cujo território é o destino final dos produtos em trânsito internacional,

uma vez que os requisitos para a remessa ou entrega direta são indicados como critérios para a

elegibilidade de entrada de produtos, sujeitos à preferências tarifárias ou como elementos que mantém

relação com os métodos de valoração dos produtos para fins de tributação. Tais referências, presentes

nas disposições do Artigo V:6 do GATT, apenas justificam-se se dirigidas aos Membros cujo território é

o destino final dos produtos em trânsito internacional, conforme destaca o Painel. Dessa forma, as

disposições do Artigo V:6 do GATT estabelecem a proteção da cláusula da nação mais favorecida para

produtos que estiveram sujeitos ao “trânsito em tráfego” quando da sua chegada ao destino final, no

território de determinado Membro, consubstanciando proteção contra discriminação baseada no curso

geográfico do trânsito destes produtos.

Para. 7.453. “The Panel notes that Article V:6, first sentence includes the phrase “products which have been

in transit through the territory of any other contracting party” (emphasis added) when discussing the

applicable goods regulated by the provision. The Panel notes that the phrase incorporates the present perfect

tense of the verb “to be”. No other provisions in Article V employ the present perfect verb tense, instead

relying on the term of art “traffic in transit”, which is defined in Article V:1, when discussing the applicable

goods regulated by the provision. (39) In particular, Article V:5 addresses MFN protection requiring parties

to accord “treatment no less favourable” to “traffic in transit through the territory of any other contracting

party” “[w]ith respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit”. The text of

Article V:6 does not provide that each contracting party shall accord treatment no less favourable to traffic in

transit through the territory of any other contracting party. Moreover, Members are not obliged to accord

MFN protection to products which are in transit, or to products which were in transit. Instead, Article V:6

requires Members to extend MFN protection to “products which have been in transit through the territory of

any other contracting party”.”

Para. 7.454. “The Panel thus considers it necessary to examine the meaning of the phrase “products which

have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party” in order to determine the scope of

Article V:6, i.e. what goods are regulated by the provision. The Panel recalls that the Appellate Body in

Chile – Price Band System observed generally that requirements expressed in the present perfect tense

impose obligations that came into being in the past, but may continue to apply at present. (40) Implicitly, the

present perfect verb tense refers to an action that happened at an unspecified time in the past before the

present moment. In addition, the perfect aspect refers to a past happening that is considered in relation to a

later event or time, although it is unclear whether the event referred to is understood to continue at present, or

has recently concluded. (41) As such, the ordinary meaning of products which “have been in transit” remains

unclear. On the one hand, the goods may have begun transit in the past, but are still continuing in transit until

an unspecified time in the future. On the other hand, the goods may have recently been in transit, but are no

longer in transit. Due to these opposing possibilities for interpretation, the Panel considers it is not possible

to clearly determine the meaning of the phrase “to products which have been in transit” simply by reference

to the text. Accordingly, the Panel will consider Article V:6 in light of context provided elsewhere in

Article V.”

Para. 7.455. “As discussed above and in relation to Panama's Article V:2 claim, Article V is generally

entitled “Freedom of Transit”. Moreover, the Panel notes that a definition of the term “traffic in transit”

appears in Article V:1. Colombia argues that the scope of Article V is informed by its title (“Freedom of

Transit”) and the definition of “traffic in transit” provided in Article V:1 that goods are “deemed to be in

transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across such territory ... is only a portion of

a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose

territory the traffic passes.” (42) Colombia argues that this definition of “traffic in transit” informs the

definition of “transit” for the entire Article, including Article V:6. (43) Thus, Colombia argues that the scope

of Article V is limited to goods destined for sale outside of the country through which it is passing. (44)”

59

Para. 7.456. “While Colombia considers that “freedom of transit” is one and the same for all provisions, the

Panel does not agree. The Panel notes that neither “freedom” nor “transit” are defined anywhere in Article V

or the WTO Agreement. The Panel recalls that the dictionary definition of “freedom” as referred to in relation

to Panama's Article V:2 claim is “the unrestricted use of something”. (45) Moreover, the Panel notes that the

dictionary definition of “transit” is “the action of passing across or through; passage or journey from one

place or point to another” (46), or “[t]he passage or carriage of people or goods from one place to another.”

(47) Taken in combination, consideration of the dictionary or ordinary meaning of these terms does not shed

light on the issue of whether Article V:6 only concerns goods which are in passage through a territory with a

destination outside/beyond that territory, whether it concerns goods which have arrived at their final

destination, or both. (48) Thus, the title and the ordinary meaning of the term “transit” do not inform the

scope of all the provisions of Article V.”

Para. 7.457. “Additionally, the Panel rejects the view that the definition of “traffic in transit” provided in

Article V:1 necessarily informs the definition of transit for the entire article, in particular, the reference to

“products which have been in transit” in Article V:6. As the Panel has noted, while the term of art “traffic in

transit” appears in paragraphs 1-5 of Article V, the term is not used in paragraph 6. Contrary to Colombia's

argument, Article V:1 clearly indicates that “[t]raffic of this nature is termed in this Article 'traffic in transit'“

(emphasis added) when referring to goods in which “passage across such territory ... is only a portion of a

complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose

territory the traffic passes”. Moreover, Article V:1 does not expressly state that the concept of “traffic in

transit” is applicable to all provisions in Article V. Therefore, the Panel declines to conclude based either on

the definition of traffic in transit appearing in Article V:1 that the scope of Article V:6 only concerns goods

which pass through a territory of a Member as a portion of a larger trajectory that begins and ends in beyond

the frontier of the Member across whose territory the goods pass.”

Para. 7.458. “In the Panel's view, the immediate context provided by Article V:6, second sentence helps to

inform the intended scope and application of Article V:6. The Panel recalls that the second sentence in

Article V:6 provides as follows:

Any contracting party shall, however be free to maintain its requirements of direct

consignment existing on the date of this Agreement, in respect of any goods in regard

to which such direct consignment is a requisite condition of eligibility for entry of the

goods at preferential rates of duty or has relation to the contracting party's prescribed

method of valuation for duty purposes.”

Para. 7.459. “The Panel notes the inclusion of the terms “direct consignment” as “a requisite condition of

eligibility for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty” and “method of valuation for duty purposes”.

As argued by Panama, these terms are irrelevant for countries that are intermediary destinations for goods in

transit, since “eligibility for entry”, “valuation” and “duty” collection are not undertaken for goods in transit

through a Member's territory that will not be subject to importation and customs valuation requirements. In

light of the focus on activities in the second sentence commonly associated with importation of goods,

Panama argues that the requirements of the second sentence of Article V:6 would be unnecessary if the first

sentence of Article V:6 were limited in application to goods that are in transit through a Member's territory.

Panama submits that such an interpretation is impermissible as it cannot be reconciled with the principle that

interpreters may not reduce whole clauses to inutility.” (49)

Para. 7.464. “In terms of substance, the Panel notes that the second sentence permits a Member to maintain

any direct consignment requirements that existed in 1947, whenever those direct consignment requirements

were a mandatory condition for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty or related to the Member's

prescribed method of customs duty valuation. Requirements related to the direct consignment of goods have

previously been discussed in a 1981 Note by the WTO Secretariat. (50) In that Note, the Secretariat indicated

that direct consignment rules for goods require that a product must be transported directly from the place of

production to its preferential destination in order to be eligible for origin treatment. Moreover, the Note

explains (as relevant at that point in time) that a good under direct consignment could only be transported

through territory other than that of its origin or final destination, if justified for geographical reasons, and if

60

the goods in question have remained under customs surveillance and have not entered into the commerce of

the transit country.”

Para. 7.465. “Though not binding on Members' rights and obligations, the Panel considers the Secretariat's

commentary consistent with the view that the second sentence of Article V:6 is intended to clarify that, in

complying with requirements of the first sentence of Article V:6, a Member is nevertheless permitted to

maintain any direct consignment requirements that existed in 1947 (when commitments among Members

were negotiated) without violating the obligation in the first sentence. In other words, Article V:6, first

sentence requires Members to extend MFN treatment to all goods that have been in international transit,

except with respect to specific, pre-existing direct consignment commitments.”

Para. 7.466. “In light of the fact that direct consignment requirements are discussed in the context of being a

prerequisite for the eligibility for entry of goods at preferential rates of duty or that relate to that Member's

method of valuation for duty purposes, the Panel thus considers that both the first and second sentences of

Article V:6 apply to a Member's territory which serve as the final destination of the goods.” (51)

Para. 7.467. “In reaching its conclusion, the Panel considers that its interpretation conforms with the

principles of treaty interpretation set forth by the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline to avoid interpretations

that reduce certain other provisions to inutility. The Panel recalls its findings above (52), that Article V:2,

second sentence imposes an MFN obligation by prohibiting Members from making distinction based on the

flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to

the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport of “traffic in transit”. The definition of

“traffic in transit” from Article V:1 include those goods “when the passage across such territory, ... is only a

portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across

whose territory the traffic passes”. Thus, Article V:2 extends MFN protection to goods in transit through

Member countries, while Article V:6 extends MFN protection from discrimination based on the geographic

course of goods in transit upon reaching their final destination.”

Para. 7.468. “The Panel additionally notes that Article V:5 extends MFN protection to “traffic in transit”

“[w]ith respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit” (emphasis added). In

accordance with the Ad Note to this provision, MFN protection extends to “like products being transported

on the same route under like conditions” in relation to transportation charges. Setting aside transportation

charges, the protection under Article V:5 broadly extends to all regulations and formalities for all “traffic in

transit”. As Article V:6 extends MFN protection broadly to “treatment” (i.e. “Each contracting party shall

accord to products which have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party treatment

no less favourable...”), an interpretation that Article V:6 governs treatment extended to “traffic in transit”

would overlap with the broad protection already ensured by Article V:5.”

Para. 7.475. “For all of the foregoing reasons, the Panel concludes that the obligations in Article V:6, first

and second sentences apply to Members whose territory is the final destination for goods in international

transit.”

d) “As obrigações substantivas no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994”

Nos trechos abaixo, o Painel destaca que as disposições sobre as obrigações materiais presentes no

Artigo V:6 do GATT são plenamente compatíveis a partir da interpretação literal de seu texto legal.

Com efeito, estabeleceu-se que o tratamento reservado aos produtos transportados diretamente do seu

local de origem até o seu destino, ou seja, sem passar pelo território de outro Membro, deve ser

igualmente destinado aos produtos que tenham sido transportados do seu local de origem ao local do

destino final, percorrendo os territórios de Membros na condição de “tráfego em trânsito”. Como a

comparação entre o tratamento dispensado aos produtos, os quais estiveram em “tráfego em trânsito”, e

aos produtos que seriam importados de forma direta é realizada hipoteticamente, uma vez que a

importação direta efetivamente não ocorreu não há análise de similaridade entre os produtos.

61

Para. 7.476. “In light of its determination that Article V:6 extends obligations with respect to goods that

have been in transit, but have reached their final destination, the Panel will consider the obligation to provide

“treatment no less favourable” to those goods in comparison to the same goods “had they been transported

from their place of origin to their destination without going through the territory of such other contracting

party”.”

Para. 7.477. “The Panel considers the obligation in Article V:6 first sentence is straightforward: all

treatment extended to goods that were transported from their place of origin to their destination without

going through the territory of other contracting party, must be extended to goods that have been transported

from their place of origin, and passed through the territories of such other contracting countries as “traffic in

transit” prior to reaching their final destination. Such “treatment” must strictly be “no less favourable”. As

the comparison is made based on a hypothetical, identical set of goods, i.e. the passage a good that was

shipped from its origin via its actual route through one or more Member countries prior to arrival at its final

destination is compared to the hypothetical passage of that good directly from its place of origin to its final

destination, no like product analysis is required.” (53)

Para. 7.478. “Thus, products that are transported from their place of origin which pass through any other

Member country on the route to their final destination must be treated no less favourably than had those

same products been transported from their place of origin to their final destination without ever passing

through that other Member's territory.”

III. Comentários

A interpretação do Artigo V do GATT ainda carece de maior escrutínio, por futuros Painéis e,

eventualmente, pelo Órgão de Apelação, para que seja possível afirmar a criação de uma jurisprudência

sólida sobre suas disposições. Atualmente, apenas em Colombia - Ports of Entry pode-se identificar no

Relatório do Painel interpretação específica sobre o Artigo V do GATT. A atuação do Painel em Colombia -

Ports of Entry foi eminentemente conservadora, em razão da falta de guias interpretativos originários de

Relatórios anteriores. Esse fato por diversas vezes foi incorporado no texto do Relatório, com vistas a

resguardar a posição dos panelistas na interpretação inédita das disposições do Artigo V do GATT. Nesse

sentido, ainda que não seja possível determinar linhas interpretativas que serão utilizadas como precedentes

em futuros casos, o Relatório do Painel Colombia - Ports of Entry esclarece importantes disposições do

Artigo V do GATT, notadamente os conceitos de “tráfego em trânsito” e “liberdade de trânsito”, e as

obrigações materiais impostas aos Membros da OMC.

Importa destacar que na definição de “tráfego em trânsito” e “liberdade de trânsito”, o Painel utilizou-se do

texto do próprio Artigo V do GATT, na medida em que restringiu sua interpretação aos limites propostos

pela interpretação textual. Ressaltou-se, frequentemente, que devido à clareza textual das disposições do

Artigo V do GATT, estaria o significado das expressões “tráfego em trânsito” e “liberdade de trânsito”

patentes evidenciadas em sua leitura, não cabendo maiores considerações por parte do Painel. No Relatório,

o Painel dispõe que o “tráfego em trânsito” é elemento basilar na interpretação do Artigo V do GATT, uma

vez estabelecida a esfera de abrangência da incidência de suas obrigações. Dessa maneira, por estarem as

mercadorias em “tráfego em trânsito”, incidem as obrigações dispostas no Artigo V do GATT, notadamente

a “liberdade de trânsito”. Outro ponto importante cinge questões discriminatórias, em paralelo com a

promoção da “liberdade de trânsito” dos produtos em “tráfego em trânsito” no território de um Membro.

O Artigo V:2 do GATT é bastante expressivo, ao repudiar tratamento discriminatório para produtos com

base em elementos que não sejam caracterizadores destes produtos em si, mas que, não obstante, ensejam

tratamentos discriminatórios que seriam repelidos por outras disposições do GATT. Assim, o “pavilhão dos

navios ou barcos, no lugar de origem, no ponto partida, de entrada, de saída ou destino ou sobre

considerações relativas à propriedade das mercadorias, dos navios, barcos ou outros meios de transporte” não

podem ser invocados, mesmo que indiretamente ou utilizados como elementos para a aplicação de

tratamento diferenciado que acabe por discriminar os produtos em trânsito no território de um Membro.

62

Foi crucial para a completa interpretação do Artigo V do GATT a delimitação da abrangência de seus

parágrafos, de modo a identificar a extensão adequada das obrigações de não discriminação para produtos,

com base no seu trajeto até alcançar o destino final, inclusive em relação às disposições específicas

constantes no Artigo V:6 do GATT. Resta identificado que, - apesar da excepcionalidade da manutenção de

requisitos relacionados à entrega ou remessa direta (“direct consignment”), para a elegibilidade da entrada de

produtos sujeitos a preferências tarifárias ou relacionados aos métodos dos Membros de valoração dos

produtos para fins de tributação, - os Membros permancem obrigados às demais disposições do Artigo V do

GATT, ainda que seja o destino final dos produtos que estiveram sujeitos ao “tráfego em trânsito”.

Identifica-se, portanto, que a linha interpretativa estabelecida pelo Painel em Colombia - Ports of Entry é de

valoração da interpretação textual das disposições do Artigo V do GATT, destacando-se a obrigação de

liberdade de trânsito para produtos durante o transporte, e abolindo o tratamento discriminatório, com base

em aspectos relativos à natureza do produto e de seu transporte, notadamente a sua origem e a reafirmação da

cláusula da nação mais favorecida.

FOOTNOTES:

Footnote 38: Taken as a whole and read objectively, Article V:1 appears plainly definitional in purpose. In its entirety, this

provision defines when goods qualify as being “in transit across the territory of a contracting party”.

Footnote 39: The Panel notes that Article V:1 defines the term “traffic in transit”. Subsequently, paragraphs 2-5 employ this term.

Paragraph 2 reads in part: “There shall be freedom of transit ... for traffic in transit ...” (emphasis added). Paragraph 3 reads in part:

“Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered at the proper custom house ...” (emphasis

added). Paragraph 4 reads in part: “All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit ...” (emphasis

added). Paragraph 5 reads: “With respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit, each contracting party

shall accord to traffic in transit to or from the territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favourable than the treatment

accorded to traffic in transit to or from any third country” (emphasis added). Paragraph 6 does not refer to “traffic in transit” in its

text.

Footnote 40: Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 206, citing G. Leech and J. Svartvik, A Communicative

Grammar of English, (Longman, 1979), paras. 112-119. R. Quirk and S. Greenbaum, A University Grammar of English, (Longman,

1979), paras. 328-330.

Footnote 41: G. Leech and J. Svartvik, A Communicative Grammar of English, (Longman, 3rd edition, 2002), paras. 122 and 125.

The authors comment that the present perfect tense has four related possible uses: (i) a past event with results in the present time; (ii)

an indefinite event in a period leading up to the present time; (iii) a habit in a period leading up to the present time; and (iv) a state

leading up to the present time. In uses (i), (iii), and (iv) the authors note that events may be understood to continue at the present time.

However in use (ii), the authors note that the present perfect tense often refers to the recent indefinite past, i.e. the event has recently

concluded.

Footnote 42: Colombia's comment on Panama's response to Panel question No. 116.

Footnote 43: Colombia's comment on Panama's response to Panel question No. 116.

Footnote 44: Colombia's first written submission, para. 279.

Footnote 45: See Panama's first written submission, para. 171, citing The New Oxford Dictionary of English, (Clarendon Press, 2nd

Ed. 2001), p. 730.

Footnote 46: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 4th Ed. 1993), p. 3327.

Footnote 47: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 4th Ed. 1993), p. 3327.

Footnote 48: For instance, in the Panel's view, these terms may be construed to mean “the unrestricted passage or journey of goods

through a territory”, but also “the unrestricted passage or journey from one location to another location.”

Footnote 49: Question nº 8 from Panama to Colombia.

Footnote 50: See Rules of Origin, Note by the Secretariat, Consultative Group of Eighteen, Fourteenth Meeting, 25-27 March 1981,

CG.18/W.48, 6 March 1981, Special Distribution, p. 5.

Footnote 51: In resorting to the second sentence of Article V:6 as context to interpret the first sentence of the same provision, the

Panel does not reach any finding in regard to the provisions in the second sentence. The Panel recognizes that the second sentence

provides a limited and time-bound exception to the requirements set forth in the first sentence. Furthermore, the Panel is not aware of

the existence of any direct consignment rules that comply with the second sentence.

Footnote 52: See Section Erro! Fonte de referência não encontrada..

Footnote 53: In this respect, the Panel would like to address Colombia's argument that adherence to Panama's interpretation of MFN

obligations in Article V:6 would essentially undo the explicit limitation of MFN protections set forth in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

As explained above, Article V:6 requires a Member to treat a good shipped from its origin via its actual route through one or more

Member countries prior to arrival at its final destination, identically had that same good hypothetically passed from its place of origin

to its final destination without traversing a particular territory in question. In contrast, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 broadly ensures

that any advantage extended to a product of a particular origin must be extended immediately and unconditionally to the like product

originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. Thus, Article I:1 ensures MFN treatment to like products of all

origins, whereas Article V:6 ensures MFN treatment based on its transit trajectory regardless of the existence of a like product of a

different origin. In the Panel's view, the obligations in these two provisions are not the same and should not be treated as redundant.

63

Artigo VI

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article VI

Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties

6.1 The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one country are introduced

into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be

condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a

contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the purposes of

this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an importing

country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another

(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when

destined for consumption in the exporting country, or,

(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either

(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in

the ordinary course of trade, or

(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable

addition for selling cost and profit.

Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of sale, for differences in

taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability.

6.2 In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-

dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product. For the

purposes of this Article, the margin of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with

the provisions of paragraph 1.

6.3 No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any contracting party

imported into the territory of another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the estimated

bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture,

production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special

subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The term “countervailing duty” shall be

understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy

bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise.

6.4 No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other

contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption

of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the

country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.

6.5 No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other

contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for

the same situation of dumping or export subsidization.

6.6 (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation

of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect

of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material

injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment

of a domestic industry.

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(b) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive the requirement of subparagraph (a) of this

paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to levy an anti-dumping or countervailing duty

on the importation of any product for the purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization

which causes or threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting

party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting party. The

CONTRACTING PARTIES shall waive the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this

paragraph, so as to permit the levying of a countervailing duty, in cases in which they find

that a subsidy is causing or threatening material injury to an industry in the territory of

another contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing

contracting party.

(c) In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause damage which would be

difficult to repair, a contracting party may levy a countervailing duty for the purpose referred

to in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph without the prior approval of the CONTRACTING

PARTIES; Provided that such action shall be reported immediately to the CONTRACTING

PARTIES and that the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly if the

CONTRACTING PARTIES disapprove.

6.7 A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to domestic producers of a

primary commodity, independently of the movements of export prices, which results at times in the

sale of the commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like

commodity to buyers in the domestic market, shall be presumed not to result in material injury

within the meaning of paragraph 6 if it is determined by consultation among the contracting parties

substantially interested in the commodity concerned that:

(a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the comm odity for export at a price higher than

the comparable price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and

(b) the system is so operated, either because of the effective regulation of production, or

otherwise, as not to stimulate exports unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of

other contracting parties.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo VI

III. Comentário

65

Artigo VII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article VII

Valuation for Customs Purposes

7.1 The contracting parties recognize the validity of the general principles of valuation set forth in the

following paragraphs of this Article, and they undertake to give effect to such principles, in respect

of all products subject to duties or other charges or restrictions on importation and exportation based

upon or regulated in any manner by value. Moreover, they shall, upon a request by another

contracting party review the operation of any of their laws or regulations relating to value for

customs purposes in the light of these principles. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may request from

contracting parties reports on steps taken by them in pursuance of the provisions of this Article.

7.2 (a) The value for customs purposes of imported merchandise should be based on the actual

value of the imported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and

should not be based on the value of merchandise of national origin or on arbitrary or

fictitious values.

(b) “Actual value” should be the price at which, at a time and place determined by the legislation

of the country of importation, such or like merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the

ordinary course of trade under fully competitive conditions. To the extent to which the price

of such or like merchandise is governed by the quantity in a particular transaction, the price

to be considered should uniformly be related to either (i) comparable quantities, or (ii)

quantities not less favourable to importers than those in which the greater volume of the

merchandise is sold in the trade between the countries of exportation and importation.

(c) When the actual value is not ascertainable in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this

paragraph, the value for customs purposes should be based on the nearest ascertainable

equivalent of such value.

7.3 The value for customs purposes of any imported product should not include the amount of any

internal tax, applicable within the country of origin or export, from which the imported product has

been exempted or has been or will be relieved by means of refund.

7.4 (a) Except as otherwise provided for in this paragraph, where it is necessary for the purposes of

paragraph 2 of this Article for a contracting party to convert into its own currency a price

expressed in the currency of another country, the conversion rate of exchange to be used

shall be based, for each currency involved, on the par value as established pursuant to the

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or on the rate of exchange

recognized by the Fund, or on the par value established in accordance with a special

exchange agreement entered into pursuant to Article XV of this Agreement.

(b) Where no such established par value and no such recognized rate of exchange exist, the

conversion rate shall reflect effectively the current value of such currency in commercial

transactions.

(c) The CONTRACTING PARTIES, in agreement with the International Monetary Fund, shall

formulate rules governing the conversion by contracting parties of any foreign currency in

respect of which multiple rates of exchange are maintained consistently with the Articles of

Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Any contracting party may apply such rules

in respect of such foreign currencies for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article as an

alternative to the use of par values. Until such rules are adopted by the Contracting Parties,

any contracting party may employ, in respect of any such foreign currency, rules of

66

conversion for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article which are designed to reflect

effectively the value of such foreign currency in commercial transactions.

(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require any contracting party to alter the

method of converting currencies for customs purposes which is applicable in its territory on

the date of this Agreement, if such alteration would have the effect of increasing generally

the amounts of duty payable.

7.5 The bases and methods for determining the value of products subject to duties or other charges or

restrictions based upon or regulated in any manner by value should be stable and should be given

sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the value for

customs purposes.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo VII

III. Comentário

67

Artigo VIII

Fabio Weinberg Crocco

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article VIII

Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation*

8.1 (a) All fees and charges of whatever character (other than import and export duties and other

than taxes within the purview of Article III) imposed by contracting parties on or in

connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the approximate

cost of services rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products

or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes.

(b) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of fees and

charges referred to in subparagraph (a).

(c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity

of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export

documentation requirements.*

8.2 A contracting party shall, upon request by another contracting party or by the CONTRACTING

PARTIES, review the operation of its laws and regulations in the light of the provisions of this

Article.

8.3 No contracting party shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or

procedural requirements. In particular, no penalty in respect of any omission or mistake in customs

documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross

negligence shall be greater than necessary to serve merely as a warning.

8.4 The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities and requirements imposed by

governmental authorities in connection with importation and exportation, including those relating to:

(a) consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificates;

(b) quantitative restrictions;

(c) licensing;

(d) exchange control;

(e) statistical services;

(f) documents, documentation and certification;

(g) analysis and inspection; and

(h) quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo VIII

Formalidades Relativas à importação e à exportação

8.1 As partes Contratantes reconhecem que os direitos e taxas que não sejam os direitos alfandegários

impostos pelas autoridades governamentais à importação ou à exportação ou relativos à importação

ou exportação, deveriam limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados e não constituir uma

proteção indireta aos produtos nacionais ou taxas de caráter fiscal sobre a importação ou a

exportação.

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem, igualmente, a necessidade de limitar o número e a diversidade

desses direitos e taxas, de reduzir ao mínimo os efeitos e a complexidade das formalidades de

68

importação e de exportação e de reduzir e simplificar as formalidades relativas aos documentos a

fornecer em matéria de importação e de exportação.

8.2 As Partes Contratantes tomarão logo que possível medidas de acordo com os princípios e objetivos

mencionados no parágrafo 1 do presente Artigo. Além disso, examinarão, cada vez que outra Parte

Contratante o solicitar, a aplicação de qualquer lei ou de qualquer regulamento à luz dos referidos

princípios.

8.3 Nenhuma Parte Contratante imporá penalidades severas por ligeiras infrações à regulamentação ou

ao processo aduaneiro. Em particular, as penalidades pecuniárias impostas em virtude de omissões

ou erros nos documentos apresentados à Alfândega não excederão, nos casos em que forem

facilmente reparáveis e manifestamente isentos de qualquer intenção fraudulenta, que não

correspondam a negligência grave, importância que represente uma simples advertência.

8.4 As disposições do presente Artigo se estenderão aos emolumentos, taxas, formalidades e exigências

impostas pelas autoridades governamentais em conexão com a importação e exportação, inclusive no

que disser respeito:

(a) às formalidades consulares, tais como faturas e certificados consulares:

(b) às restrições quantitativas;

(c) às licenças;

(d) ao controle de câmbios;

(e) aos serviços de estatística;

(f) aos documentos a exibir, à documentação e à emissão de certificados;

(g) às análises e às verificações;

(h) à quarentena, à inspeção sanitária e à desinfeção

(Lei nº 313, de 30 de julho de 1948)

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

De modo geral, a tradução do Artigo VIII do GATT não observa integralmente a forma e o teor da versão em

inglês do referido dispositivo normativo. Em relação à forma, destaca-se que o texto do Artigo traduzido não foi

estruturado da mesma maneira que o original em inglês. Ademais, cumpre notar que na tradução suprimiu-se a

referência expressa ao Artigo III do GATT. Quanto ao conteúdo, verifica-se que certas palavras foram

suprimidas da versão em português. Abaixo está proposta de tradução do Artigo:

“Artigo VIII

Taxas e Formalidades Relativas à importação e à exportação

1) (a) Todas as taxas e cobranças de qualquer natureza (exceto direitos de importação e exportação e tributos abrangidos no escopo do

Artigo III) impostos pelas autoridades governamentais à importação ou à exportação ou relativos à importação ou exportação, deveriam

limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados e não constituir uma proteção indireta aos produtos nacionais ou tributação sobre a

importação ou a exportação.

(b) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of fees and charges referred to in subparagraph (a).

(c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for

decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requirements.*

(b) As Partes Contratantes reconhecem a necessidade de limitar o número e a diversidade desses direitos e taxas referidos no subitem (a),

acima.

(c) As Partes Contratantes reconhecem, igualmente, a necessidade de reduzir ao mínimo os efeitos e a complexidade das formalidades de

importação e de exportação e de reduzir e simplificar as formalidades relativas aos documentos a fornecer em matéria de importação e de

exportação.

2. Uma Parte Contratante, mediante requerimento de outra parte contratante ou das PARTES CONTRATANTES, deverá rever a

aplicação de suas leis e regulamentação à luz do disposto neste Artigo.

3. Nenhuma Parte Contratante imporá penalidades severas por infrações leves à regulamentação ou aos procedimentos aduaneiros. Em

particular, as penalidades impostas em decorrência de omissões ou erros referentes à documentação alfandegária, que forem de fácil

retificação, desde que ocasionados sem propósito fraudulento ou por negligência grave, não deverão ser impostas além do necessário

para representar uma simples advertência.

69

4. As disposições do presente Artigo se estenderão aos emolumentos, taxas, formalidades e exigências impostas pelas autoridades

governamentais em conexão com a importação e exportação, inclusive no que disser respeito:

a) às formalidades consulares, tais como faturas e certificados consulares:

b) às restrições quantitativas;

c) às licenças;

d) ao controle de câmbios;

e) aos serviços de estatística;

f) aos documentos a exibir, à documentação e à certificação;

g) às análises e às inspeções; e

h) à quarentena, à inspeção sanitária e à desinfeção.”

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo VIII

1. Definição dos termos “limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and

other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, para. 6.75

Ao interpretar a expressão “limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados”, o Painel em Argentina –

Textil and Apparel reproduziu trechos constantes de relatório do caso US - Customs User Fee (35S/245).

Reiterou-se que a expressão impõe um requisito duplo. Primeiro, as taxas e cobranças devem envolver a

prestação de determinado serviço. Segundo, o valor cobrado não deve exceder o custo dos serviços prestados.

Para. 6.75. “The meaning of Article VIII was examined in detail in the Panel Report on. The panel found that

Article VIII’s requirement that the charge be ‘limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered’ is

‘actually a dual requirement, because the charge in question must first involve a ‘service’ rendered, and then the

level of the charge must not exceed the approximate cost of that ‘service’. According to the panel report, the

term ‘services rendered’ means ‘services rendered to the individual importer in question’.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Painel no caso US - Certain EC Products, demandante:

EUA, WT/DS165/R, para. 6.69

2. Imposição de Taxas ad valorem ilimitadas

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and

other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, para. 6.75

O DSB entendeu que a imposição de taxas ad valorem ilimitadas está em desconformidade com o disposto no

Artigo VIII do GATT. Justificou que a imposição de taxas sob a referida modalidade não refletiria o custos dos

serviços prestados, ou seja, não se limitaria ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados.

Para. 6.75. “An ad valorem duty with no fixed maximum fee, by its very nature, is not ‘limited in amount to the

approximate cost of services rendered’. For example, high-price items necessarily will bear a much greater tax

burden than low-price goods, yet the service accorded to both is essentially the same. An unlimited ad valorem

charge on imported goods violates the provisions of Article VIII because such a charge cannot be related to the

cost of the service rendered.”

3. Taxas alfandegárias com propósitos fiscais

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and

other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.77-6.78

O DSB esclareceu que o Artigo VIII do GATT veda a imposição de taxas alfandegárias com propósitos fiscais

(arrecadatórios).

70

Para. 6.77. “(…) While the gathering of statistical information concerning imports may benefit traders in

general, Article VIII bars the levying of any tax or charge on importers to support the related costs ‘for the

individual entry in question’ since it will also benefit exports and exporters.”

Para. 6.78. “As to Argentina’s argument that it was collecting this tax for ‘fiscal’ purposes in the context of its

undertakings with the IMF, we note that not only does Article VIII of GATT expressly prohibit such measures

for fiscal purposes but that clearly a measure for fiscal purposes will normally lead to a situation where the tax

results in charges being levied in excess of the approximate costs of the statistical services rendered.”

4. Relação com outros Acordos

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and

other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, para 6.79

Com base em circunstâncias fáticas, o Painel em Argentina - Textiles and Apparel concluiu que não haveria nos

Acordos da OMC exceções ao disposto no Artigo VIII do GATT. Chegou-se à mesma conclusão em relação ao

acordo firmado entre OMC e FMI, à Declaração sobre a relação entre a OMC e o FMI, e à Declaração sobre a

Contribuição da OMC para alcançar maior coerência na política econômica global.

Para. 6.79. “(…) Argentina argues that the tax should be found to comply with Article VIII, if necessary

through a less strict application of the requirements of Article VIII of GATT than was adopted in the Customs

Users Fee. We find no exception in the WTO Agreement that would excuse Argentina's compliance with the

requirements of Article VIII of GATT. Moreover, we see nothing in the Agreement between the IMF and the

WTO, the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization with the International Monetary

Fund and the Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence

in Global Economic Policymaking that suggests that we should interpret Article VIII as argued by Argentina.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina – Textiles and

Apparel, demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/AB/R, para. 74.

5. Definição dos termos “taxas” e “cobranças”

Relatório do Painel China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China - Raw

Materials), Demandantes: União Europeia, México e EUA, WT/DS394/DS395/DS398/R, para. 7.844

O DSB interpretou de forma ampla os termos “taxas” (i.e. fees) e “cobranças” (i.e. charges) constantes do

Artigo VIII do GATT. De acordo com a definição adotada pelo Painel em China – Raw Materials, “taxas” e

“cobranças”, previstas no Artigo VIII do GATT, devem: (a) ser impostas de forma relacionada à importações ou

exportações; e (b) ser cobradas em contrapartida à prestação de serviços.

Para. 7.844. “The Panel concluded above that the meaning of ‘fees’ or ‘charges’ that fall within the scope of

Article VIII is broad. Notwithstanding this view, the Panel concluded further that only fees imposed ‘on or in

connection with importation or exportation’ and collected in exchange for a ‘service rendered’ may be

considered as falling within the scope of Article VIII:1(a). The Panel noted that typically such fees or charges

would include payments provided for customs-related documentary, certification and inspection, and statistical

activities.”

III. Comentários

Poucos foram os precedentes em que o DSB analisou detidamente o conteúdo do Artigo VIII do GATT. Nos

relatórios em que o dispositivo em questão foi apreciado, focou-se em expressões constantes do primeiro

parágrafo do Artigo, tais como: “taxas”, “cobranças” e “serviços prestados”.

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A partir da análise de precedentes, resta claro que taxas e cobranças impostas por autoridades governamentais,

nos termos do Artigo VIII do GATT devem: (a) ter como contrapartida a prestação de serviços; (b) ser impostas

de forma relacionada a importações ou exportações; e (c) estar limitadas ao custo dos serviços efetivamente

prestados. Referidas taxas e cobranças não poderiam, portanto, ser impostas de forma ilimitada, bem como com

propósitos arrecadatórios.

Não obstante, pelo fato de o Artigo VIII do GATT ser dotado de linguagem ampla, é possível identificar

diversas lacunas interpretativas. O disposto no parágrafo 3 do Artigo VIII é exemplo disso, visto que até o

momento não houve posicionamentos em relação ao significado dos termos “penalidades substanciais por

infrações leves”.

72

Artigo IX

José Guilherme Moreno Caiado

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article IX

Marks of Origin

9.1 Each contracting party shall accord to the products of the territories of other contracting parties

treatment with regard to marking requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like

products of any third country.

9.2 The contracting parties recognize that, in adopting and enforcing laws and regulations relating to

marks of origin, the difficulties and inconveniences which such measures may cause to the

commerce and industry of exporting countries should be reduced to a minimum, due regard being

had to the necessity of protecting consumers against fraudulent or misleading indications.

9.3 Whenever it is administratively practicable to do so, contracting parties should permit required marks

of origin to be affixed at the time of importation.

9.4 The laws and regulations of contracting parties relating to the marking of imported products shall be

such as to permit compliance without seriously damaging the products, or materially reducing their

value, or unreasonably increasing their cost.

9.5 As a general rule, no special duty or penalty should be imposed by any contracting party for failure

to comply with marking requirements prior to importation unless corrective marking is unreasonably

delayed or deceptive marks have been affixed or the required marking has been intentionally

omitted.

9.6 The contracting parties shall co-operate with each other with a view to preventing the use of trade

names in such manner as to misrepresent the true origin of a product, to the detriment of such

distinctive regional or geographical names of products of the territory of a contracting party as are

protected by its legislation. Each contracting party shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to

such requests or representations as may be made by any other contracting party regarding the

application of the undertaking set forth in the preceding sentence to names of products which have

been communicated to it by the other contracting party.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo IX

Marcas de Origem

9.1 No que diz respeito às condições relativas às marcas, cada Parte Contratante concederá aos produtos

do território das outras Partes Contratantes um tratamento não menos favorável que o concedido aos

produtos similares de qualquer terceiro país.

9.2 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que, no estabelecimento e aplicação das leis e regulamentos

relativos às marcas de origem, conviria reduzir a um mínimo as dificuldades e os inconvenientes que

tais medidas possam acarretar para o comércio e a produção dos países exportadores, levando

devidamente em conta a necessidade de proteger os consumidores as indicações fraudulentas ou de

natureza a induzir em erro.

9.3 Sempre que possível do ponto de vista administrativo, as Partes Contratantes deverão permitir a

oposição, por ocasião da importação, das marcas de origem.

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9.4 No que diz respeito à marcação de produtos importados, as leis e regulamentos das Partes

Contratantes serão de natureza a permitir a sua aplicação sem ocasionar danos sérios aos produtos

nem reduzir substancialmente o seu valor ou elevar inutilmente o seu preço de custo.

9.5 Em regra geral, nenhuma parte Contratante deverá impor multa ou direito especial por falta de

observação dos regulamentos relativos à marcação antes da importação, a menos que a retificação da

marcação seja indevidamente retardada ou que marcas de natureza a induzir em erro tenham sido

opostas ou que a marcação tenha sido intencionalmente omitida.

9.6 As Partes Contratantes colaborarão entre si para o fim de evitar que as marcas comerciais sejam

utilizadas de forma a induzir em erro quanto à verdadeira origem do produto em detrimento das

denominações de origem regional ou geográfica dos produtos do território de uma Parte Contratante

que sejam protegidos pela legislação dessa Parte Contratante. Cada Parte Contratante dará inteira e

amistosa consideração aos pedidos ou representações que possa lhe dirigir uma outra Parte

Contratante sobre abusos tais como os mencionados acima no presente parágrafo, que lhe tenham

sido assinalados por essa outra Parte Contratante em relação à denominação dos produtos que a

mesma houver comunicado à primeira Parte Contratante.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

A tradução para o português foi feita de forma quase literal. No item 3, entretanto, o texto em português traduziu

o termo “affixed” por “oposição”. Essa escolha, no entanto, pode levar a interpretações incorretas. O termo

“oposição” é usado na sub-área do direito de propriedade intelectual, com o significado de contestação de uma

determinada marca, sentido que parece não representar aquele do termo “affixed”, o qual mais se aproxima de

“afixação”, no caso, de símbolo que represente a marca de origem em determinado produto.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo IX

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea -

Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS161/R e WT/DS169/R, paras. 7.502, 7.505 e 7.510

De acordo com o entendimento do Painel, a medida em questão não esta restrita à marca de origem e,

portanto, não se aplica o Artigo IX do GATT.

Para. 7.502. “The United States does not consider that this is a general country of origin requirement as

described in Article IX of GATT 1994 but rather is a special rule triggered by the fact that a third country

product is characterized as a GI and is intended to encumber the third country GI itself. There is nothing in

Article IX that exempts such a requirement from the obligation to provide no less favourable treatment to

imported products.”

Para. 7.505. “The European Communities argues that Article III:4 is not applicable. Marks of origin are dealt

with in Article IX of GATT 1994, which contains an MFN obligation but not a national treatment obligation.

This omission implies that Members are free to impose country of origin marking requirements only with

respect to imported products and not domestic products.”

Para. 7.510. “As for the European Communities' argument that this labelling requirement cannot be subject to

the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of GATT 1994 due to the terms of Article IX of GATT 1994 on

marks of origin, it suffices to note that the labelling requirement is part of the Regulation, which is a law or

regulation affecting the internal sale and offering for sale of products within the meaning of Article III:4 of

GATT 1994. In any event, it has not been shown that this is, in fact, a requirement to display a mark of origin.”

A discussão versa sobre a existência de obrigação de tratamento nacional no Artigo IX. A União Europeia

argumenta que, de acordo com o texto legal, somente haveria uma obrigação do tipo nação mais

favorecida. O Painel, contudo, entendeu que a medida não se refere ao Artigo IX e, portanto, não é

integrante do mérito da questão.

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III. Comentário

O Artigo IX trata do uso de marcas de origem. Sergundo a sua redação, os Membros da OMC mantêm a sua

discricionariedade para legislar sobre o assunto. As legislações domésticas, entretanto, não devem conceder

tratamento menos favorável aos produtos similares de outros países, e devem ser elaboradas de forma que

reduzam as dificuldades e inconvenientes para a indústria dos países exportadores. No entanto, em seu parágrafo

segundo, o Artigo IX ressalta o direito dos Membros de adotar as normas domésticas para proteger

consumidores de marcas de origens fraudulentas ou que possam induzir a erro.

O Artigo, entretanto, não traz uma definição clara do termo “marca de origem” e o assunto já foi alvo de

disputas, como em Korea - Beef acima. Ainda que a decisão do Painel do caso não esclareça definifitamente o

conceito, dá a entender que o significado de “marca de origem” seja diverso do de “regra de origem”, e também

de “indicação geográfica”. De acordo com ZIEGLER e GRATTON (2011) (54), um exemplo comum de marca

de origem é a marca “Made in ...” afixada em diversos produtos. Ainda assim, uma clara diferenciação entre

esses conceitos não consta no GATT e na jurisprudência atual do Artigo IX.

Outros conceitos presentes nos parágrafos do Artigo IX como, por exemplo, “reduzir a um mínimo” e “danos

sérios... reduzir substancialmente o seu valor ou elevar inutilmente o seu preço de custo” apresentam certo grau

de imprecisão e carecem de interpretação. Por fim, chama ainda à atenção a ausência de uma cláusula de

tratamento nacional, e, dada a importância desta para os acordos da OMC, deve-se indagar se o Artigo IX não

precisa ser lido em conjunto com o Artigo III do GATT. Por fim, aos interessados no assunto, pode ser

conveniente recorrer ao texto do Acordo sobre Regras de Origem, bem como à doutrina sobre esse assunto.

FOOTNOTE:

Footnote 54: Ziegler and Gratoon, in Wolfrum & Stoll & Hestermeyer (eds), Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5,

Art. IX, para. 15.

75

Artigo X

Artigo X

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article X

Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations

10.1 Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made

effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for

customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or

prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale,

distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or

other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to

become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in force

between the government or a governmental agency of any contracting party and the government or

governmental agency of any other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this

paragraph shall not require any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would

impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the

legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.

10.2 No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a rate of

duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, or imposing a new or

more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments

therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially published.

10.3 (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its

laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.

(b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or

administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and

correction of administrative action relating to customs matters. Such tribunals or procedures

shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement and their

decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unless an

appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time prescribed

for appeals to be lodged by importers; Provided that the central administration of such

agency may take steps to obtain a review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good

cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with established principles of law or the

actual facts.

(c) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the elimination or

substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date of this

Agreement which in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of administrative

action even though such procedures are not fully or formally independent of the agencies

entrusted with administrative enforcement. Any contracting party employing such

procedures shall, upon request, furnish the CONTRACTING PARTIES with full information

thereon in order that they may determine whether such procedures conform to the

requirements of this subparagraph.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo X

Publicação e Apuração dos Regulamentos Relativos Ao Comércio

10.1 As leis, regulamentos, decisões judiciárias e administrativas de aplicação geral, adotados por

qualquer Parte Contratante e que visem à classificação ou avaliação dos produtos para fins

76

aduaneiros, às tarifas de Alfândegas, taxas e outras despesas, ou às prescrições, restrições ou

interdições de importação ou de exportação, ou a transferência de pagamentos que lhes digam

respeito, ou que se refiram à sua venda, sua distribuição, seu transporte ou seu seguro, ou à sua

estadia em entreposto, sua inspeção, sua exposição, sua transformação, sua mistura ou outras

utilizações, serão prontamente publicados de maneira a permitir aos Governos ou aos comerciantes

deles tomar conhecimento. Os acordos em vigor entre o Governo ou um órgão governamental de

qualquer Parte Contratante e o Governo ou um órgão governamental de uma outra Parte Contratante

que afetem a política econômica internacional serão igualmente publicados. O presente parágrafo

não obrigará uma Parte Contratante a revelar informações de ordem confidencial que constituam

obstáculo à aplicação das leis ou que, por outro lado, sejam contrários ao interesse público ou tragam

prejuízo aos interesses comerciais legítimos de empresas públicas ou particulares.

10.2 Nenhuma medida de ordem geral, que possa tomar uma Parte Contratante e que tenha por

consequência uma elevação do nível de um direito alfandegário ou de outra taxa imposta à

importação em virtude de usos estabelecidos e uniformes, ou da qual resume uma prescrição, uma

restrição ou uma interdição novas ou agravadas em matéria de importação ou de transferência de

fundos relativos a uma importação deverá ser posta em vigor antes de ter sido publicada

oficialmente.

10.3 (a) Cada Parte Contratante manterá ou aplicará de maneira uniforme, imparcial e equitativa

todos os regulamentos, leis, decisões judiciárias e administrativas da categoria visada no

parágrafo 1 de presente Artigo.

(b) Cada Parte Contratante manterá ou instituirá, logo que possível, tribunais judiciários,

administrativos ou de arbitragem, ou instâncias que tenham por fim especialmente

reexaminar e retificar prontamente as medidas administrativas relacionadas com as questões

aduaneiras. Esses tribunais ou instâncias serão independentes dos organismos encarregados

de aplicação das medidas administrativas e suas decisões serão executadas por esses

organismos, cuja prática administrativa dirigirão igualmente, a menos que seja interposta

apelação junto a uma jurisdição superior nos prazos previstos para as apelações interpostas

pelos importadores, ressalvada a possibilidade da administração central de tal organismo

tomar medidas com o fim de obter uma revisão da questão em uma outra ação, se houver

base para supor que a decisão é incompatível com os princípios fixados pela lei ou com a

realidade dos fatos.

(c) Disposição alguma da alínea (b) do presente parágrafo exigirá a eliminação ou substituição

dos processos em vigor no território de uma Parte Contratante no dia da assinatura do

presente Acordo, que prevejam uma revisão imparcial das decisões administrativas, ainda

mesmo que esses procedimentos não sejam plena ou oficialmente independentes dos

organismos encarregados da aplicação das medidas administrativas. Qualquer Parte

Contratante que aplicar tais processos deverá, quando solicitada, comunicar às Partes

Contratantes todas as informações pertinentes que as habilitem a decidir se esses processos

estão de acordo com a prescrição da presente alínea.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo X

1. Objeto do Artigo

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry

Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115

77

Para. 115. “Article X relates to the publication and administration of ‘laws, regulations, judicial decisions and

administrative rulings of general application’, rather than to the substantive content of such measures. Thus, to

the extent that Brazil’s appeal relates to the substantive content of the EC rules themselves, and not to their

publication or administration, that appeal falls outside the scope of Article X of the GATT 1994.”

2. Artigo X:1: primeira frase - significado do termo “de aplicação geral” (of general application)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain

Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras. 111 e 113

Para. 111. “Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 makes it clear that Article X does not deal with specific transactions,

but rather with rules ‘of general application’. It is clear to us that the EC rules pertaining to import licensing set

out in Regulation 1431/94 are rules ‘of general application’. (…)”

Para. 113. “Although it is true, as Brazil contends, that any measure of general application will always have to

be applied in specific cases, nevertheless, the particular treatment accorded to each individual shipment cannot

be considered a measure ‘of general application’ within the meaning of Article X. The Panel cited the following

passage from the panel report in United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre

Underwear:

The mere fact that the restraint at issue was an administrative order does not prevent

us from concluding that the restraint was a measure of general application. Nor does

the fact that it was a country-specific measure exclude the possibility of it being a

measure of general application. If, for instance, the restraint was addressed to a

specific company or applied to a specific shipment, it would not have qualified as a

measure of general application. However, to the extent that the restraint affects an

unidentified number of economic operators, including domestic and foreign

producers, we find it to be a measure of general application.

We agree with the Panel that “conversely, licences issued to a specific company or

applied to a specific shipment cannot be considered to be a measure ‘of general

application’ within the meaning of Article X.”

3. Artigo X:2

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre

Underwear (US - Underwear), Demandante: Costa Rica, WT/DS24/AB/R, páginas 20-21

Pg. 20. “Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance - that

of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and enterprises,

whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of

transparency and has obviously due process dimensions. The essential implication is that Members and other

persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other

burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and

accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures.”

78

Pg. 21. “[W]e are bound to observe that Article X:2 of the General Agreement, does not speak to, and hence

does not resolve, the issue of permissibility of giving retroactive effect to a safeguard restraint measure. The

presumption of prospective effect only does, of course, relate to the basic principles of transparency and due

process, being grounded on, among other things, these principles. But prior publication is required for all

measures falling within the scope of Article X:2, not just ATC safeguard restraint measures sought to be applied

retrospectively. Prior publication may be an autonomous condition for giving effect at all to a restraint measure.

Where no authority exists to give retroactive effect to a restrictive governmental measure, that deficiency is not

cured by publishing the measure sometime before its actual application. The necessary authorization is not

supplied by Article X:2 of the General Agreement.”

4. Artigo X:3

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US

- Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Paquistão, Tailândia e Malásia, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 182-183

Para. 182. “[T]he provision of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 bear upon this matter. In our view, Section 609

falls within the “laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application”

described in Article X:1. Inasmuch there are due process requirements generally for measures that are otherwise

imposed in compliance with WTO obligations, it is only reasonable that rigorous compliance with the

fundamental requirements of due process should be required in the application and administration of a measure

which purports to be an exception to the treaty obligations of the member imposing the measure and which

effectively results in a suspension pro hac vice of the treaty rights of other members.”

Para. 183. “It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain minimum standards for

transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations which, in our view, are not met

here. The non-transparent and ex parte nature of the internal governmental procedures applied by the competent

officials in the Office of Marine Conservation, the Department of State, and the United States National Marine

Fisheries Service throughout the certification processes under Section 609, as well as the fact that countries

whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons for the denial, and

the fact, too, that there is no formal legal procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an application, are

all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994.”

b) “Objeto do Artigo”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 200

Para. 200. “The text of Article X:3(a) clearly indicates that the requirements of ‘uniformity, impartiality and

reasonableness’ do not apply to the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings themselves, but rather to the

administration of those laws, regulations, decisions and rulings. The context of Article X:3(a) within Article X,

which is entitled ‘Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations’, and a reading of the other paragraphs

of Article X, make it clear that Article X applies to the administration of laws, regulations, decisions and

79

rulings. To the extent that the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings themselves are discriminatory, they can be

examined for their consistency with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994.”

III. Comentários

O objetivo primordial do Artigo X é promover a transparência na publicação e apuração dos regulamentos

relacionados ao comércio internacional. Ou seja, dar publicidade imediata e adequada às alterações em leis e

regulamentos concernentes ao comércio internacional. No caso EC - Poultry, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a

reivindicação do Brasil de aplicação retroativa de medidas de salvaguardas transitórias no Acordo sobre Têxteis

e Vestuário.

O Artigo X:1 prevê que cada Membro deve prontamente publicar suas leis, regulamentos, decisões judiciais e

regras administrativas que afetem o comércio exterior. Acordos que afetem regras do comércio internacional

também devem ser publicados. A publicação deve ocorrer “de maneira a permitir aos governos ou respectivos

comerciantes tomar conhecimento”. Para lidar com os possíveis efeitos colaterais negativos decorrentes da

obrigatoriedade de comunicação, o Artigo X:1 estabelece que “não obrigará uma Parte Contratante a revelar

informações de ordem confidencial que constituam obstáculo à aplicação das leis ou que, por outro lado, sejam

contrários ao interesse público ou tragam prejuízo aos interesses comerciais legítimos de empresas públicas ou

particulares”.

No caso EC - Poultry, o Órgão de Apelação reformou a decisão do Painel de que certas licenças de importação

das Comunidades Europeias a respeito de determinados produtos de frango violavam o Artigo X, porque a

informação solicitada pelo Brasil dizia respeito a um carregamento específico, fora do objeto do Artigo X (“the

information which Brazil claims the EC should have made available concerns a specific shipment, which is

outside the scope of Article X of GATT”). O Artigo X:2 estabelece que nenhum Membro pode fazer valer

determinadas medidas antes da respectiva publicação oficial. As medidas cobertas por essa obrigação incluem a

“elevação do nível de um direito alfandegário ou de outra taxa imposta à importação em virtude de usos

estabelecidos e uniformes, ou da qual resume uma prescrição, uma restrição ou uma interdição nova ou

agravada em matéria de importação ou de transferência de fundos relativos a uma importação”.

O Painel US - Underwear foi estabelecido para decidir se um Membro está autorizado, quando utilizar medidas

de salvaguardas provisórias do Artigo 6 do ATC, a retroagir a aplicação de tais medidas para a data de

publicação do pedido de consulta. O Painel entendeu que o Artigo 6.10 era omisso sobre a questão, a qual, por

sua vez, deveria ser resolvida com base no Artigo X do GATT. O Painel concluiu que “if the importing country

publishes the proposed restraint period and restraint level after the request for consultations, it can later set the

initial date of the restraint period as the date of the publication of the proposed restraint”. No entanto, o Órgão

de Apelação divergiu da conclusão do Painel quanto à omissão e entendeu que o Artigo 6.10 proíbe a

retroatividade. Com relação ao entendimento do Painel a respeito do Artigo X do GATT, o Órgão de Apelação

decidiu que a publicação prévia da medida, nos termos do referido dispositivo, não pode, por si, justificar o

efeito retroativo de medida governamental restritiva.

O Artigo X:3 determina a aplicação, pelos Membros, de todas as leis, regulamentos, decisões judiciárias e

administrativas listadas no parágrafo 1, “de maneira uniforme, imparcial e equitativa”, devendo manter ou

instituir, “logo que possível” tribunais judiciários, administrativos ou de arbitragem, ou instâncias que tenham

por fim especialmente reexaminar e retificar prontamente as medidas administrativas relacionadas com as

questões aduaneiras, gozando esses tribunais de certas garantias de independência em relação aos órgãos aos

quais pertencem.

Excetuam-se, os procedimentos que preveem uma revisão imparcial das decisões administrativas, ainda que

esses procedimentos não sejam plena ou oficialmente independentes dos organismos encarregados da aplicação

das medidas administrativas, se já estiverem em vigor “no dia da assinatura do presente Acordo”. No entanto,

em caso de utilização deste procedimento por qualquer uma das Partes Contratantes, esta deverá comunicar às

demais Partes Contratantes, quando solicitada. Vale ressaltar que, a facilitação comercial (trade facilitation) é

um dos principais temas da Rodada de Doha de negociações multilaterais da OMC, foro negociador de um

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“Acordo de Facilitação Comercial” que tenha por objeto a simplificação, harmonização, padronização e

modernização dos procedimentos do comércio internacional.

No tocante à transparência normativa, o primeiro aspecto do Acordo de Facilitação Comercial refere-se à

obrigatoriedade da publicação e disponibilização de informações relacionadas ao comércio exterior, por meio da

internet ou do estabelecimento de serviços de informação, ou seja, por meio de notificação ao público

interessado. A obrigatoriedade é de que cada Membro publique prontamente, de forma não discriminatória e

adequada, diversos tipos de informações. A obrigatoriedade é positiva, pois objetiva assegurar o acesso e, logo,

previsibilidade no planejamento das operações de comércio exterior.

Outro ponto de destaque é a obrigatoriedade de pré-publicação e discussão prévia de normas que impliquem

alteração de procedimentos. Trata-se de medida para aumentar a participação dos operadores na elaboração das

normas. O Acordo obrigaria o estabelecimento de prazos razoáveis entre a publicação e a entrada em vigor da

nova legislação.

Ainda no contexto da transparência, deve-se mencionar as tratativas para a instituição de um mecanismo de

consulta prévia (decisões antecipadas) relativa à interpretação da legislação. Caso aprovado, o Brasil deverá

ampliar o alcance da consulta tradicional, instituída por meio da Lei nº 9.430/96. O objetivo é precisamente o

mesmo, ou seja, garantir a certeza na interpretação da legislação. Há a obrigatoriedade a cada Membro de

estabelecer uma central de serviços de informação.

Um outro destaque, é a obrigatoriedade do direito de recurso aos operadores, a partir da criação e manutenção

de tribunais administrativos ou judiciais imparciais voltados ao julgamento de causas no comércio exterior. O

Brasil já trabalha com tal mecanismo no Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (CARF). Ainda, outra

demanda atendida no Acordo é a obrigatoriedade de utilização da análise de riscos para promover a liberação de

mercadorias de baixo risco, assim como a utilização de auditoria a posteriori por parte das Aduanas, para

agilizar a liberação das mercadorias na zona primária.

81

Artigo XI

Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XI

General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions

11.1 No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective

through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any

contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or

on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting

party.

11.2 The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following:

(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages

of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party;

(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or

regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade;

(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary

to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:

(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or

produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a

domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted; or

(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no

substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which

the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to

certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current

market level; or

(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the

production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported

commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible.

Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to subparagraph (c) of

this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported

during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied

under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production,

as compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of

restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion

prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be

affecting the trade in the product concerned.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XI

Eliminação Geral das Restrições Quantitativas

11.1 Nenhuma Parte Contratante instituirá ou manterá, para a importação de um produto originário do

território de outra Parte Contratante, ou para a exportação ou venda para exportação de um produto

destinado ao território de outra Parte Contratante, proibições ou restrições a não ser direitos

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alfandegários, impostos ou outras taxas, quer a sua aplicação seja feita por meio de contingentes, de

licenças de importação ou exportação, quer por outro qualquer processo.

11.2 As disposições do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo não se estenderão aos casos seguintes:

(a) proibições ou restrições aplicadas temporariamente à exportação para prevenir ou remediar

uma situação crítica, devido a uma penúria de produtos alimentares ou de outros produtos

essenciais para a Parte Contratante exportadora;

(b) proibições ou restrições à importação e à exportação necessárias à aplicação de normas ou

regulamentações referentes à classificação, controle da qualidade ou venda de produtos

destinados ao comércio internacional;

(c) restrições à importação de qualquer produto agrícola ou de pescaria, seja qual for a forma de

importação desses produtos, quando forem necessárias à aplicação de medidas

governamentais que tenham por efeito:

(i) restringir a quantidade do produto nacional similar a ser posta à venda ou produzida,

ou na falta de produção nacional importante do produto similar, a quantidade de um

produto nacional que o produto importado possa substituir diretamente;

(ii) reabsorver um excedente temporário do produto nacional similar ou, na falta de

produção nacional importante do produto similar, de um produto nacional que o

produto importado possa substituir diretamente colocando esse excedente à

disposição de certos grupos de consumidores do país gratuitamente ou a preços

inferiores aos correntes no mercado; ou

(iii) restringir a quantidade a ser produzida de qualquer produto de origem animal cuja

produção depende diretamente, na totalidade ou na maior parte, do produto

importado, se a produção nacional deste último for relativamente desprezível.

Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplicar restrições à importação de um produto de acordo com as disposições da

presente alínea (c) do presente parágrafo, tornará público o total do volume ou do valor do produto cuja

importação for autorizada para um período ulterior determinado assim como qualquer modificação sobrevinda

nesse volume ou nesse valor. Além disso, as restrições aplicadas conforme o item (i) supra não deverão ser tais

que reduzam o total das importações em relação ao da produção nacional, em comparação com a proporção que

se poderia razoavelmente antecipar entre ambas na ausência das ditas restrições. Para determinar essa

proporção, a Parte Contratante levará devidamente em conta a que existia no correr de um período de referência

anterior e todos os fatores especiais.

IC. Comentários à Tradução

Nenhum comentário.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XI

1. Medida Interna lidando com o Tratamento dos Produtos Importados (Internal measure dealing with

the treatment of imported products)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing

Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.98-8.100

O Painel entendeu que houve violação ao Artigo III:4, o qual é aplicável ao caso em que uma medida interna

disponha sobre o tratamento de produtos importados. O Artigo XI:1 é aplicável às transações comerciais de

exportação, mas não se aplica ao caso no contexto das atividades dessas exportações. A posição do Canadá de

excluir o Artigo XI:1 do caso foi negada. O Canadá pediu pela aplicação cumulativa dos Artigos XI:1 e III:4 na

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parte relativa ao decreto de proibição à importação, mas o Painel não considerou que essa é a referência seguida

pelo DSB.

Para. 8.98. “As regards Canada's reference to paragraph 4.26 of the aforementioned report, we consider that it

does not substantiate Canada's position in this case either. In this paragraph, the Panel refrains from ruling on a

violation of Article III:4. It appears to do so, however, for reasons of legal economy because it simultaneously

recognizes that Article III:4 could apply to state-trading transactions. Contrary to Canada's assertion, this

paragraph does not confirm the non-applicability of Article III:4 to the part of an internal measure dealing with

the treatment of imported products. At the most, it could confirm the application of both provisions.

Nevertheless, as explained in the preceding paragraph, the Panel found that Article XI:1 applied, referring to the

Note Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII. This Note only applies to state-trading transactions. In the

present case, however, there is no question of a measure applied in the context of state-trading activities.”

Para. 8.99. “For the foregoing reasons, we consider that Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 applies to the ban on

importing asbestos and asbestos-containing products imposed by the Decree. On the basis of the grounds for this

conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to examine further Canada's arguments on the exclusive application

of Article XI:1.”

Para. 8.100. “Looking at Canada's arguments, it is difficult to see whether Canada is claiming that, even if the

import ban falls under Article III:4, it is also covered by Article XI:1. If Canada does in fact make such a claim

for the cumulative application of Article III:4 and Article XI:1 to the part of the Decree banning imports, we do

not consider that this forms part of the terms of reference given to the Panel by the DSB and, even if that were

the case, Canada's arguments do not make a prima facie case in the sense given to this concept by the Appellate

Body. Consequently, we do not consider it necessary to examine this point any further.”

2. A Noção de Restrição à Importação (the notion of “restriction… on importation”)

Relatório do Painel no caso India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos), WT/DS146/R

e WT/DS175/R, para. 7.265

Em consideração à proibição expressa no Artigo XI:1, a conclusão do Painel é a de que qualquer forma de

limitação à importação constitui uma restrição.

Para. 7.265. “This Panel endorses the ordinary meaning of the term “restriction” as identified by the India -

Quantitative Restrictions panel and its view as to the generally broad scope of the prohibition expressed in

Article XI:1. As a result, it can be concluded that any form of limitation imposed on, or in relation to

importation constitutes a restriction on importation within the meaning of Article XI:1.”

3. Análise das Condições de Equilíbrio de Comércio (Analysis of the trade balancing condition)

Relatório do Painel no caso India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS146/R; EUA, WT/DS175/R, para. 7.278

O Painel afirma que a nota nº 60 do Memorandum de Entendimento que limita a quantidade de importação a um

compromisso de exportação é uma restrição prevista no Artigo XI:1.

Para. 7.278. “The Panel therefore finds that the trade balancing condition contained in Public Notice nº 60 and

in the Memorandum of Understanding MOUs signed thereunder, by limiting the amount of imports through

linking them to an export commitment, acts as a restriction on importation, contrary to the terms of Article XI:1.

With respect to the European Communities' argument that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

signatories that have yet to achieve the 70% indigenization requirement would continue to incur export

obligations after 1 April 2001, the Panel notes that no evidence was presented to show that any such new export

obligations have in fact accrued.”

84

4. Alimento de Grama ou de Grão, Condicionantes Limitadores e Restrições à Importação (Grass-

fed/grain-fed condition constitutes a limit and an import restriction)

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea -

Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: EUA - WT/DS161/R; e Austrália - WT/DS169/R, paras. 777-778

O Painel entende que o uso de limitações condicionadas ao alimento do gado corresponde às restrições à

importação previstas no Artigo XI.

Para. 777. “In the light of the evidence before it, the Panel considers that the LPMO (NR: G/STR/N/4/KOR, 10

December 1998 - LPMO is a notified state-trading agency for beef and imports its share of the annual quota

through a tendering system) practices to call for tenders on the basis of the distinction between grass-fed and

grain-fed beef, constitute an import restriction in violation of Article XI of GATT, through the Ad Note to

Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII.”

Para. 778. “The Panel considers that pursuant to Article II, any other “terms, conditions or qualifications” that

add to import concessions must be set forth in Korea's Schedule. The Panel recalls that Korea has made no

condition concerning grass-fed/grain-fed beef in its Schedule. In administering its import beef quota on the basis

of grain-fed and grass-fed beef distinctions, Korea is imposing a condition in the form of individual limits

applied to grass and grain-fed beef, within Korea's total import quota. The Panel recalls its conclusion above,

that such grass-fed/grain-fed condition constitutes a limit, an import restriction, inconsistent with Article XI of

GATT.”

5. Discriminação dos Preços Transnacionais (Transnational price discrimination)

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante:

Japão, WT/DS162/R, para. 6.277

Com respeito à necessidade de deliberar sobre o Artigo XI, o Painel entendeu que o Artigo VI aplica-se mais

diretamente ao 1916 Act do que o Artigo XI:1, no que se refere à discriminação dos preços internacionais. O

Artigo VI é aplicável sempre que uma medida objetivar uma situação de discriminação de preços transnacionais,

conforme definido no no Artigo VI:1.

Para. 6.277. “With respect to the necessity to make findings under Article XI of GATT 1994, we are of the

view that the same reasoning as with Article III:4 applies. In our opinion, Article VI addresses the basic feature

of the 1916 Act (i.e. transnational price discrimination) more directly than Article XI:1. In our findings, we

concluded that Article VI applies to a measure whenever that measure objectively targets a situation of

transnational price discrimination, as defined in Article VI:1. Thus, we found that the 1916 Act was fully subject

to the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement and could not escape the

disciplines of Article VI by the mere fact that it had anti-trust objectives, did not address injurious dumping as

such, included additional requirements of an anti-trust nature or led to the imposition of measures other than

anti-dumping duties.”

6. A Inconsistência do 1916 Act com as Obrigações dos Estados Unidos - Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT

1994 (1916 Act’s inconsistency with United States' obligations under Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT

1994)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),

Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R; Japão, WT/DS162/AB/R, paras. 153-154

O Japão e as Comunidades Europeias pleitearam ao Órgão de Apelação a deliberação sobre a inconsistência do

1916 Act com os Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT 1994 e XVI:4 do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, em atendimento

aos Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT 1994. Para tanto, o Órgão de Apelação deveria modificar o posicionamento do

Painel em relação ao 1916 Act, com base no Artigo VI do GATT e do Acordo Anti-Dumping. As condições

85

para o pleito, no entanto, não foram satisfeitas, não tendo sido acolhidos os argumentos oferecidos pelas

Comunidades Europeias e pelo Japão.

Para. 153. “In their joint other appellant's submission, the European Communities and Japan ask us to rule that

the 1916 Act is inconsistent with United States' obligations under Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994 and

Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. With respect to Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994, their requests

are conditioned on our reversal of the Panel's findings that the 1916 Act falls within the scope of Article VI of

the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement. With respect to Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, their

requests are conditioned on our reversal of the Panel's findings with respect to jurisdiction and the distinction

between mandatory and discretionary legislation. Since, however, the conditions on which these requests are

predicated have not been fulfilled, there is no need for us to examine the conditional appeals of the European

Communities and Japan.”

Para. 154. “For these reasons, we decline to rule on the conditional appeals of the European Communities and

Japan relating to Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.”

7. A Decisão de um Painelista (Findings: one panelist’s view)

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Import Measures Certain Products from the European

Communities (US - Certain EC Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS165/R, para.

6.60

A opinião de um dos painelistas caminhou no sentido de que os requisitos podem legitimamente ser alocados

para reforçar os direitos e obrigações da OMC.

Para. 6.60. “One Panelist is of the view that bonding requirements can legitimately be in place to enforce WTO

compatible rights and obligations. Such bonding requirements could benefit from the application of Article

XX(d), as “measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with

the provisions of this Agreement”, assuming they support WTO compatible rights/obligations and they are not

inconsistent with the provisions of the chapeau of Article XX). If bonding requirements are used to secure the

respect of WTO compatible rights/obligations, they would not appear to be inconsistent with the WTO

Agreement. However, if not, they could be viewed as effectively imposing a form of 'restriction' contrary to

Article XI of GATT.”

8. Avaliação (Evaluation)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of

Biotech Products (EU - Biotech Products), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R e

WT/DS293/R, paras. 7.3428-7.3429

As medidas de salvaguardas são inconsistentes com o Artigo XI:1, bem como com os Artigos 5.1 e 2.2 do

Acordo de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias.

Para. 7.3428. “The Panel notes that the United States' claim under Article XI:1 concerns one of the nine

safeguard measures challenged by it, namely, Greece – Topas oilseed rape. Canada's claim under Article XI:1 is

in respect of the same Greek safeguard measure.”

Para. 7.3429. “We recall that we have already reached the conclusion that the aforementioned safeguard

measures being challenged by the United States and Canada, respectively, are inconsistent with Article 5.1 and,

by implication, the second and third requirements in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. In these circumstances,

we see no need to examine, and offer additional findings on, whether the relevant safeguard measures are also

inconsistent with Article XI:1. Accordingly, as did previous panels in similar situations, we exercise judicial

economy with regard to the United States' and Canada's claims under Article XI:1.”

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9. Restrição à Importação de Cigarros (Restriction “on the importation” of cigarettes)

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.257-7.258

O Painel não se convenceu de que requisitos, como a exigência de vínculo, são uma restrição à importação de

cigarros. Segundo o seu entendimento, o Artigo XI:1 do GATT não versa sobre qualquer restrição, apenas as

restrições instituídas ou mantidas por um Membro “na importação” (ou exportação) de produtos.

Para. 7.257. “The Panel notes that, in the case of imported cigarettes, the bond is not enforced either at the time

or at the point of importation. Indeed, under Article 14 of the Decree 79-03, the bond is posted both by

importers and local manufacturers with the Directorate General of Internal Taxes, and not with customs

authorities. The Dominican Republic has informed that, after the bond is posted with the Directorate General of

Internal Taxes, it is then sent to the National Treasury (Tesorería Nacional) for safekeeping. The Dominican

Republic has added that it is not the customs authorities, but the internal tax authorities, who would verify that

the bond has been posted.”

Para. 7.258. “Most importantly, the Panel is not persuaded that the bond requirement is a restriction “on the

importation” of cigarettes. Article XI:1 of the GATT does not cover any restriction, but only those restrictions

that are instituted or maintained by any Member “on the importation” (or exportation) of products. In the

expression “on the importation” – read in the context of an Article that is entitled “General Elimination of

Quantitative Restrictions” –, the ordinary meaning of the word “on” suggests that it is a preposition denoting a

relation. In that sense, the expression “on the importation” would be akin to “with respect to the importation”.

Indeed, the panel on India – Autos, considering the ordinary meaning of the phrase “restriction on importation”,

reached a similar conclusion. “An ordinary meaning of the term 'on', relevant to a description of the relationship

which should exist between the measure and the importation of the product, includes 'with respect to', 'in

connection, association or activity with or with regard to'. In the context of Article XI:1, the expression

'restriction… on importation' may thus be appropriately read as meaning a restriction 'with regard to' or 'in

connection with' the importation of the product.” Even if, arguendo, the bond requirement could be considered

to be a limiting condition, the Panel still does not find evidence that it is a condition specifically related to the

importation of cigarettes, nor that it is instituted or maintained “with regard to” or “in connection with” the

importation of cigarettes.”

10. Portaria SECEX 14/2004

Relatório do Painel no caso Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil - Retreaded

Tyres), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS332/R, para. 7.34

O Painel entendeu que a licença de importação das Portarias SECEX 14/2004 e DECEX 8 são inconsistentes

com o Artigo XI:1 do GATT 1994, no que se refere à importação de pneus recauchutados, o que não ocorre com

a Resolução CONAMA 23/1996.

Para. 7.34. “For the reasons provided above, the Panel finds that the prohibition on granting of import licences

under Portaria SECEX 14/2004 is an import prohibition inconsistent with the requirements under Article XI:1 of

the GATT 1994. We also find that Portaria DECEX 8/1991, to the extent that it prohibits the importation of

retreaded tyres, is also an import prohibition inconsistent with Article XI:1. We do not find, however, that

Resolution CONAMA 23/1996 is inconsistent with Article XI:1 in respect of the importation of retreaded tyres.

As for the other four measures listed in the European Communities' panel request, the Panel considers that the

European Communities has not established a prima facie case regarding these claims.”

11. Condição de Compra Doméstica (Domestic purchase requirement)

Relatório do Painel no caso Turkey - Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice (Turkey - Rice),

WT/DS334/R, paras. 7.194-7.196

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Os EUA entenderam que, em relação aos requisitos de compras domésticas, os Artigos XI:1 do GATT e 4.2 do

Acordo sobre Agricultura devem ser considerados equivalentes.

Para. 7.194. “Only after the Panel considers the consistency of the domestic purchase requirement with Article

III:4 of the GATT 1994, will it turn to the issue of whether the same measure should also, or alternatively, be

viewed as a border measure and thus properly analysed under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 or Article 4.2 of

the Agreement on A product, while Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is limited to measures imposed

on products that fall within the scope of the Agreement of Agriculture.”

Para. 7.195. “In this particular case, and with regard to the domestic purchase requirement, the United States'

claims under both Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture may be

considered to be equivalent. Following the same approach used before, if the Panel decides that it should also,

or alternatively, consider the domestic purchase requirement as a border measure, it will start by examining the

claims presented by the United States under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since this Agreement

may be considered more specific in respect of border measures imposed on agricultural products.”

Para. 7.196. “In conclusion, the Panel will begin its analysis of the claims advanced by the United States

regarding the domestic purchase requirement, by considering first the claim brought under Article III:4 of the

GATT 1994. After the domestic purchase requirement has been considered under Article III:4 of the GATT

1994, the Panel will then consider whether the same measure should also, or alternatively, be viewed as a border

measure and thus analysed under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 or Article 4.2 of the Agreement on

Agriculture, or both. In this part of its analysis, should it be necessary, the Panel would start by examining the

claims presented by the United States under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since this Agreement

may be considered more specific in respect of border measures imposed on agricultural products. If the Panel

were to make findings under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, it would then consider whether it

should also make findings under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Finally, if the Panel were to determine that the

domestic purchase requirement was inconsistent with any or all of the above-cited GATT provisions, it would

then consider whether it is also necessary to issue findings under the TRIMs Agreement.”

III. Comentários

Em junho de 1992, o primeiro Painel aberto sob a égide do GATT 1994 contra os regimes nacionais europeus de

importação de bananas baseou-se na desconformidade da prática com os Artigos I e XI.1 do GATT.

Para confirmar a existência de restrições quantitativas proibidas à importação de bananas, o Painel seguiu os

precedentes dos casos “Canadá - restrições à importação de sorvete e iogurte” (BISD 36S/68), “CEE -

Restrições às importações de maçãs - Denúncia pelo Chile” (BISD 36S/93), “CEE - Restrições à importação de

maçãs - Denúncia pelos Estados Unidos” (BISD 36S/135) e “Japão - Restrições às importações de determinados

produtos agrícolas” (BISD 35S/163), e submeteu o regime europeu e as políticas nacionais dos principais

importadores ao crivo do Artigo XI.2(c), que apresenta exceção à regra geral desde que contempladas,

cumulativamente, as seguintes hipóteses:

(i) a medida deve constituir uma restrição à importação;

(ii) a restrição à importação deve recair sobre um produto agrícola ou de pesca;

(iii) deve haver uma medida governamental para limitar as quantidades de um produto permitido a ser

comercializado ou produzido;

(iv) a restrição à importação deve ser necessária à execução de uma restrição na oferta interna;

(v) a restrição à importação não deve reduzir o total de importações em relação ao total da produção interna,

quando comparada com a proporção que se poderia razoavelmente esperar entre os dois, na ausência de

restrições;

(vi) a restrição à importação e a restrição do abastecimento doméstico devem, em princípio, ser aplicáveis a

produtos similares;

(vii) deve ser tornados públicos a quantidade total permitida ou o valor da cota para cada produto.

A cumulatividade, com efeito, refere-se, tão-somente, aos critérios inscritos na letra (c), não havendo, em sede

dessa jurisprudência, interpretação no sentido da inseparabilidade daqueles ínsitos nos Artigo XI.2 (a), (b) e (c):

88

De acordo com o Painel, por ter demonstrado em análise anterior que duas ou mais condições do Artigo XI:2 (c)

não haviam sido cumpridas em relação às medidas adotadas pela França, Portugal e Espanha, não seria

necessário examinar essas medidas à luz das demais condições previstas neste Artigo. O Painel conclui, assim,

em seu Relatório de junho de 1993, pela condenação dos regimes nacionais anteriores ao regime comum

europeu, por serem ilegais e discriminatórios. Novo Painel foi aberto para questionar o próprio regime comum

de bananas: o DS38/R, ou caso Bananas II.

O Relatório, finalizado em janeiro de 1994, também condenou o novo regime. As argumentações contidas no

Relatório de Bananas II forneceram a base para as conclusões do DS27, o caso Bananas III, já sob a égide da

OMC. Os demandantes do caso DS38/R alegaram que o regime comum europeu, com o seu sistema de quotas

tarifárias, tarifas extra-cotas e licenças não automáticas à importação de bananas, - em tese, permitidas -

impunha restrições quantitativas de fato, ao contra-argumento da CEE de que o regime europeu para importação

de bananas era apresentado no âmbito do Artigo II do GATT (Agenda de Concessões, ou Compromissos), e,

portanto, fora dos parâmetros do Artigo XI.

O Painel concluiu que a aplicação de quotas tarifárias per se, sob o Artigo II, não violou o Artigo XI, pois

nenhum Membro Contratante havia alegado incompatibilidade nesse tocante. Assim, também seriam as tarifas

extra-quotas (aquelas especificamente aplicadas quando a quantidade importada extrapolar a quota inicialmente

pactuada), ainda que seus efeitos sobre o mercado tornassem as exportações desvantajosas.

Para o Painel, o Artigo XI:1 faz distinção apenas entre “proibições e restrições” por um lado, e “taxas, impostos

ou outros encargos”, em nada se referindo aos efeitos comerciais da utilização destes instrumentos. O Relatório

do Painel menciona, sem individualizar, casos anteriores nos quais teria assinalado que, para determinar se uma

medida constitui ou não restrição quantitativa, seria irrelevante averiguar o real impacto da medida sobre os

fluxos de comércio. Finalmente, no que tange às licenças não automáticas, o Painel concluiu que qualquer que

fosse o regime de licenciamento, este não alteraria a natureza do contingente pautal e, como tal, seria consistente

com o Artigo XI:1.

Embora, não com base no Artigo XI.1, mas, sim, nos Artigos I, II e III, o Painel concluiu que o regime comum

de bananas era discriminatório por três motivos: (a) impunha tratamento preferencial em tarifas; (b) impunha

tratamento preferencial em quotas; e, (c) atribuía sistemas discriminatórios de concessão de licenças. Para

aquele colegiado, a única forma legal, em relação ao sistema multilateral de comércio, que as Comunidades

Europeias teriam de oferecer tais privilégios às exportações de bananas dos membros da ACP seria pela

conceção de um waiver. Esse relatório, tampouco foi adotado em razão da vigência da cláusula de consenso

positivo existente no sistema multilateral de comércio pré-OMC.

Em 1995, dois anos após a entrada em vigor do regulamento europeu que criou o mercado comum de bananas, e

um ano após o fim do Painel no caso Bananas II, sob a égide da recém criada OMC, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA abriram pedido de consultas junto ao DSB para perquirir as Comunidades Europeias acerca da

adequação dos supramencionados acordos às regras da OMC. O DS16, porém, parou na fase de consultas, pois,

com a entrada do Equador, o maior exportador de bananas do mundo, na Organização, os postulantes do DS16

decidiram reingressar, juntamente com aquele país, com pedido de abertura de Painel junto ao DSB da OMC.

Deu-se origem ao DS27, ou Bananas III.

Os demandantes do DS27 solicitaram que um Painel fosse aberto para examinar a política europeia à luz do

GATT, do Acordo sobre Procedimentos para o Licenciamento de Importações, do Acordo sobre Agricultura, do

GATS e do TRIMS. Para os fins deste trabalho, interessa-nos as teses defendidas em torno do Artigo X do

GATT, argumentações e contra-argumentações, assim como as conclusões do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação. A

tese dos demandantes, no que se refere à inadequação da restrição quantitativa contida no Regulamento às

normas multilaterais de comércio, assentou-se sobre três pilares: (o) a de que os “direitos do avô” não se

aplicam às práticas discriminatórias; (ii) ainda que se aplicassem, as vantagens e o acesso oferecidos pelo

mercado comum de bananas excedia àqueles mantidos pelos regimes europeus que lhe antecederam; e,

finalmente, (iii) alguns dispositivos do regime de distribuição de quotas gerava efeitos distorcivos ao mercado

europeu.

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O Órgão de Apelação conclui, em 1997, que o regime de importação de bananas da União Europeia era

inconsistente com as regras da OMC, pois: (1) a alocação das cotas tarifárias, sobretudo para os países da ACP,

era contrária à regra de não-discriminação (Artigo 13 do GATT); (2) os procedimentos para a emissão de

licenças, os quais envolviam a compra de bananas dos países da ACP para se ter o direito de importar bananas

de alguns países latino-americanos (ou outros países), eram contrários ao princípio da nação mais favorecida e

ao princípio do tratamento nacional (Artigos 1 e 3 do GATT, respectivamente); e (3) os procedimentos de

licenciamento eram também contrários ao princípio da nação mais favorecida e ao princípio do tratamento

nacional (Artigos 2 e 17 do GATS). Não houve, portanto, reconhecimento de que o regime comum de bananas

feria o Artigo XI.

Após o caso Bananas III, outros quatro casos foram postulados na OMC sobre o mesmo objeto, tendo sido,

todos eles, considerados prejudicados pelo andamento do DS27, DS105 (entendido como prejudicado pela

DS27), DS158 (aberto após o período de 15 meses estabelecidos pelo DSB para o início da entrada em vigor das

medidas necessárias para atender às conclusões do relatório do Órgão de Apelação), DS361 e DS364 (sobre o

novo regime comum de bananas, em vigor desde 2006).

O Painel considerou que a alusão ao Artigo XI, entre outros, como base legal para questionar a moratória

europeia era desnecessária em razão d e o Artigo. 2.3 do Acordo de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias,

igualmente evocado, ser suficiente para enquadrar o tema. O mencionado Artigo estabelece que tais medidas

não devem gerar discriminação arbitrária ou injustificada entre os Membros, e que elas não devem ser usadas de

modo a que se constituam restriçõrd disfarçadas ao comércio. Em outras palavras, o Painel eximiu-se, portanto,

de examinar o DS291, DS292 e DS293, em relação aos quais expediu o mesmo relatório, à luz do Artigo XI.

As Comunidades Europeias solicitaram consulta à República Popular da China sobre a imposição de medidas

que afetavam negativamente as exportações de peças de automóveis das Comunidades para aquele país. Entre

outras irregularidades, a China teria agido de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 2.1 e Artigo 2.2 do TRIMs, em

conjunto com o parágrafo 1(a) da lista exemplificativa anexa ao TRIMs pela aplicação de medidas de

investimento relacionadas ao comércio de bens, e com as disposições dos Artigos III e XI do GATT.

As medidas comerciais chinesas, em questão, impunham tarifa de 25% sobre as importações de peças

automotivas as quais representavam mais de 60% do valor do veículo. A tarifa aplicada a peças que não se

encaixavam nessa categoria era de 10%. Essas políticas resultavam em discriminação de peças estrangeiras e

gerava subsídio à produção doméstica. A imposição da tarifa também coloca por terra o compromisso da China

de não tratar peças como carros inteiros, assumido por ocasião da acessão à OMC. A China alegava que a

medida era necessária, a fim de prevenir a ocorrência de evasão fiscal por parte de empresas que importam

carros inteiros desmontados, com o objetivo de evitar as tarifas mais elevadas aplicadas a automóveis montados.

O relatório do Painel evocou o caso US - Sugar para explicar que o Artigo II confere às partes contratantes a

possibilidade de incorporar e de qualificar, no quadro legal dos compromissos decorrentes do GATT,

compromissos adicionais, mas não a oportunidade de reduzir seus compromissos em outras disposições desse

Acordo. O Artigo II:1(b) não permitiria, portanto, a manutenção de restrições quantitativas, incompatíveis que

são com o Artigo XI:1.

Tanto o relatório do Painel quanto o do Órgão de Apelação tenderam a considerar que o objetivo preponderante

das normativas chinesas, quanto à importação de autopeças era a imposição de parâmetros de conteúdo

nacional. As restrições quantitativas e a remissão ao Artigo XI ficaram, assim, em segundo plano. O relatório do

Órgão de Apelação sequer as mencionou.

A Índia, entre outros dispositivos, alegou, na fase de consultas, que a medida norte-americana enfrenta o Artigo

XI do GATT, uma vez que a exigência de depósitos maiores do que os regulares pode ser caracterizada como

uma medida outra que não encargos e obrigações. Com essa argumentação, a Índia abriu o escopo semântico do

Artigo XI do GATT para sustentar que esses depósitos serviriam como uma forma de restrição quantitativa, pois

não se tratavam de direitos, tributos ou outros encargos, ao passo que efetivamente impunham uma restrição ao

comércio.

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O Painel isentou-se de se pronunciar sobre a denúncia da Índia, no que se refere ao Artigo XI, julgando

suficientes as ponderações feitas acerca dos outros Artigos levantados. Justificou-se nos precedentes do Órgão e

fundamentou-se na necessidade de economia processual (parágrafo 7.167 do Relatório).

Nada obstante, no Anexo A do Relatório do Painel, sobre os sumários executivos das primeiras petições

escritas, encontra-se a afirmação de que a diretiva não limitava a quantidade de camarão que poderia ser

importada para os EUA e, portanto, não constituía uma restrição quantitativa, na acepção do Artigo XIII do

GATT. A Índia não teria oferecido suporte para a sua afirmação de que os EUA teria violado o Artigo XIII,

além do argumento de que a diretiva “restringe severamente as importações”. Essa afirmação seria insuficiente

para concluir que a diretiva era uma restrição quantitativa. Em sede de apelação, não foi evocado o Artigo XI,

motivo por que o relatório do Órgão de Apelação tampouco o menciona.

A controvérsia sobre restrições quantitativas, no entanto, versou apenas sobre a limitação dos portos de entrada.

O Panamá pretendeu forjar a tese de que o termo “restrição”, contido no Artigo XI do GATT, referia-se à toda e

qualquer “condição limitante” sobre a importação de produtos não classificáveis como obrigações, tributos e

outros encargos. Evocou, em apoio à sua tese, a jurisprudência dos casos India - Quantitative Restrictions on

Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Product e India - Autos. De sua feita, a Colômbia entendeu que o

entendimento nesse viés seria demasiado amplo, porquanto, no limite, a proibição alcançaria toda e qualquer

medida condicionante à importação - por definição, limitante. O Painel acompanhou a Colômbia e não

reconheceu o mérito da alegação de que a medida infringiria o Artigo XI:1. Não foi utilizada a via recursal.

Em julho de 1997, os EUA abriram consulta junto à Índia por considerar que as restrições quantitativas

mantidas por ela – incluindo, mas não limitados – aos mais de 2.700 linhas de produtos agrícolas e industriais

notificados à OMC no Anexo I, Parte B do WT/BOP/N/21 (Notificação prevista no parágrafo 9 do

Entendimento das Disposições sobre Balança de Pagamentos do GATT), datado 22 de maio de 1997, parecem

ser incompatíveis com as obrigações da Índia sob diversos Artigos, dentre os quais o XI:1.

As restrições quantitativas englobariam todas as proibições de importação, proibições, restrições, licenças de

importação, licenças especiais de importação e a proibição de não-comerciais (amostra) quantidades, bem como

os procedimentos para implementar e administrar essas medidas. O Artigo XVIII do GATT, sob o título “Ajuda

Governamental ao Desenvolvimento Econômico”, Seção B, permite aos países nos primeiros estágios de

desenvolvimento, com dificuldades de manter condições mínimas de vida para seus súditos e em processo de

rápida expansão de seu mercado interno, restringirem quantitativamente as importações ao enfrentarem

dificuldades na Balança de Pagamentos, garantindo-lhes níveis de reservas adequadas ao seu programa de

desenvolvimento econômico.

As medidas, contudo, somente podem ser instituídas, mantidas ou intensificadas perante sério risco de declínio

das reservas monetárias e até que atinja níveis razoáveis dessa reserva. No processo, poderá priorizar a

importação de produtos essenciais à luz de sua política econômica de desenvolvimento, desde que, inter alia,

sejam aplicadas de modo a evitar danos desnecessários aos interesses econômicos e a não obstacularizar os

canais regulares de comércio.

A Índia afirmou que ao Painel não caberia vergar-se sobre o Artigo XI:1, uma vez que o Artigo apenas enuncia

a proibição geral de restrições quantitativas, mas não a forma como as restrições autorizados sob s exceções ao

seriam administradas.

Os EUA apontaram que o GATT em muitas ocasiões reconheceu, em interpretação expansiva, que o

licenciamento discricionário e não automático de importação constitui uma restrição quantitativa sobre o

comércio nos termos do Artigo XI: 1. Evocou, em auxílio à tese, o relatório do Painel CE - Regime para a

importação, venda e distribuição de bananas, o caso CE - Programa de Preços Mínimos de Importação, Licenças

e Depósitos de Seguro para Certas Frutas Processadas e Vegetais e o Painel Japão - Comércio de Semi-

condutores.

91

As importações dos bens constantes no título “Itens restritos”, Anexo II da Notificação sob a referência

WT/BOP/N/24, necessitam de licença emitida pelo Diretor-Geral do Comércio Exterior (DGFT) da Índia. De

acordo com os EUA, o licenciamento seria discricionário e não transparente.

A Índia contra-argumentou afirmando que o sistema era transparente e baseado em regras, e registrou, em

particular, que o Ato sobre Comércio Exterior, de 1992, apresenta os critérios para a concessão de licenças e o

dever de que a recusa de concessão de uma licença seja motivada por escrito e as decisões sobre a concessão de

licenças, incluindo recusas, passíveis de recurso.

O Painel secundou as alegações norte-americanas (parágrafo 5.128 do relatório) e confirmou que o Artigo X:1

tem escopo largo e se aplica a quaisquer medidas restritivas que não possam ser enquadradas em direitos,

tributos e outros encargos, tal qual decidido o âmbito do Painel Japão - Comércio de Semi-condutores. Em

particular, a jurisprudência do GATT, no Painel sobre Restrições Quantitativas à Importação de Certos Produtos

de Hong Kong, por interpretação extensiva, fez equivaler certas medidas de licença a restrições quantitativas.

Para o Painel seria pacífico o entendimento de que sistemas de licenciamento discricionários ou não-

automáticos, pela sua própria natureza, funcionam como limitações na ação, já que certas importações não

podem ser permitidas. Com isso, houve certa modificação jurisprudencial quanto ao escopo do Artigo X.1 tal

qual proclamado em Bananas III. Conforme visto, a despeito das alegações norte-americanas, licenças não-

automáticas não eram per se consideradas restrições quantitativas. Aliadas, contudo, a critérios sinuosos de

qualificação para a concessão de licenças de importação, elas se constituiriam, à luz do caso em apreço, não

apenas restrições não tarifárias – gerais e ilegítimas – ao comércio, mas restrições quantitativas em si. O Órgão

de Apelação sustentou os argumentos do Painel quanto ao Artigo XI:1.

Em India - Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, o Painel considerou que a

Índia agiu de forma inconsistente com suas obrigações nos termos do Artigo XI do GATT de 1994, impondo

aos fabricantes de automóveis, nos termos do Edital nº 60 e respectivos memorandos de entendimento

assinados, a obrigação de equilibrar a importação de kits e componentes com determinadas exportações de valor

equivalente. A Índia chegou a levar o caso ao Órgão de Apelação, mas retirou o pedido recursal.

Com efeito, é possível concluir que a evolução das interpretações do DSB em relação ao Artigo XI e XI:1 do

GATT foi bastante significativa e as conclusões do DSB variam em nível de complexidade. Esse nível se

intensifica desde a definição do termo “restrição”, no caso India - Autos, até análises mais complexas. Nota-se

uma evolução da complexidade das decisões relativas ao Artigo XI e XI:1 em alguns dos casos, como por

exemplo: India - Autos, que analisou as condições da balança comercial das partes; Korea - Beef, no qual o

Painel determinou que havia restrição à importação, uma vez que o governo coreano diferenciava o tratamento

comercial em função da dieta do gado, cuja carne era importada de países que os alimentavam com grãos ou

com grama.

Nesse caso, o Painel concluiu que tal diferença de tratamento, com base no tipo de alimento dado ao gado,

significava uma restrição ao comércio. A partir dos casos visualizados, chega-se à conclusão de que as

demandas dos Membros com o pleito de eliminação de restrições quantitativas têm propiciado a evolução das

interpretações. As decisões do DSB relativas ao Artigo XI e XI.1 dependem, cada vez mais, de esforços de

definição de parâmetros que impeçam que outras medidas protetivas ao livre comércio sejam estabelecidas;

possibilitando, assim, que as regras determinadas nos Acordos da OMC sejam obedecidas por todos os

Membros.

92

Artigo XII

Felipe Herzog

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XII

Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments

12.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI, any contracting party, in order to

safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments, may restrict the quantity or

value of merchandise permitted to be imported, subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs

of this Article.

12.2 (a) Import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified by a contracting party under this

Article shall not exceed those necessary:

(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary

reserves, or

(ii) in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a

reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.

Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may be affecting the reserves of such

contracting party or its need for reserves, including, where special external credits or other resources are

available to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such credits or resources.

(b) Contracting parties applying restrictions under sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall

progressively relax them as such conditions improve, maintaining them only to the extent

that the conditions specified in that sub-paragraph still justify their application. They shall

eliminate the restrictions when conditions would no longer justify their institution or

maintenance under that sub-paragraph.

12.3 (a) Contracting parties undertake, in carrying out their domestic policies, to pay due regard to

the need for maintaining or restoring equilibrium in their balance of payments on a sound

and lasting basis and to the desirability of avoiding an uneconomic employment of

productive resources. They recognize that, in order to achieve these ends, it is desirable so

far as possible to adopt measures which expand rather than contract international trade.

(b) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article may determine the incidence of

the restrictions on imports of different products or classes of products in such a way as to

give priority to the importation of those products which are more essential.

(c) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article undertake:

(i) to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic interests of any other

contracting party;

(ii) not to apply restrictions so as to prevent unreasonably the importation of any

description of goods in minimum commercial quantities the exclusion of which

would impair regular channels of trade; and

(ii) not to apply restrictions which would prevent the importations of commercial

samples or prevent compliance with patent, trade mark, copyright, or similar

procedures.

(d) The contracting parties recognize that, as a result of domestic policies directed towards the

achievement and maintenance of full and productive employment or towards the

development of economic resources, a contracting party may experience a high level of

93

demand for imports involving a threat to its monetary reserves of the sort referred to in

paragraph 2 (a) of this Article. Accordingly, a contracting party otherwise complying with

the provisions of this Article shall not be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the

ground that a change in those policies would render unnecessary restrictions which it is

applying under this Article.

12.4 (a) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising the general level of its existing

restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures applied under this Article shall

immediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which

prior consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with the Contracting Parties as to

the nature of its balance of payments difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may

be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other contracting

parties.

(b) On a date to be determined by them, the Contracting Parties shall review all restrictions still

applied under this Article on that date. Beginning one year after that date, contracting parties

applying import restrictions under this Article shall enter into consultations of the type

provided for in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph with the Contracting Parties annually.

(c) (i) If, in the course of consultations with a contracting party under sub-paragraph (a) or

(b) above, the Contracting Parties find that the restrictions are not consistent with

provisions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of

Article XIV), they shall indicate the nature of the inconsistency and may advise that

the restrictions be suitably modified.

(ii) If, however, as a result of the consultations, the Contracting Parties determine that

the restrictions are being applied in a manner involving an inconsistency of a serious

nature with the provisions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the

provisions of Article XIV) and that damage to the trade of any contracting party is

caused or threatened thereby, they shall so inform the contracting party applying the

restrictions and shall make appropriate recommendations for securing conformity

with such provisions within the specified period of time. If such contracting party

does not comply with these recommendations within the specified period, the

Contracting Parties may release any contracting party the trade of which is adversely

affected by the restrictions from such obligations under this Agreement towards the

contracting party applying the restrictions as they deter mine to be appropriate in the

circumstances.

(d) The Contracting Parties shall invite any contracting party which is applying restrictions

under this Article to enter into consultations with them at the request of any contracting party

which can establish a prima facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the

provisions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article

XIV) and that its trade is adversely affected thereby. However, no such invitation shall be

issued unless the Contracting Parties have ascertained that direct discussions between the

contracting parties concerned have not been successful. If, as a result of the consultations

with the Contracting Parties, no agreement is reached and they determine that the restrictions

are being applied inconsistently with such provisions, and that damage to the trade of the

contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or threatened thereby, they shall

recommend the withdrawal or modification of the restrictions. If the restrictions are not

withdrawn or modified within such time as the Contracting Parties may prescribe, they may

release the contracting party initiating the procedure from such obligations under this

Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they determine to be

appropriate in the circumstances.

94

(e) In proceeding under this paragraph, the Contracting Parties shall have due regard to any

special external factors adversely affecting the export trade of the contracting party applying

the restrictions.

(f) Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered expeditiously and, if possible, within

sixty days of the initiation of the consultations.

12.5 If there is a persistent and widespread application of import restrictions under this Article, indicating

the existence of a general disequilibrium which is restricting international trade, the Contracting

Parties shall initiate discussions to consider whether other measures might be taken, either by those

contracting parties the balance of payments of which are under pressure or by those the balance of

payments of which are tending to be exceptionally favourable, or by any appropriate

intergovernmental organization, to remove the underlying causes of the disequilibrium. On the

invitation of the Contracting Parties, contracting parties shall participate in such discussions.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXII

Consultas

12.1 Cada Parte Contratante examinará com compreensão as representações que lhe sejam encaminhadas

por qualquer outra Parte Contratante e deverá se prestar a consultas a respeito daquelas

representações, desde que elas digam respeito a questões relativas à aplicação do presente Acordo.

12.2 As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma das Partes Contratantes, entrar em entendimentos

com uma ou várias Partes Contratantes sobre questões para as quais a solução satisfatória não poderia

ser alcançada através das consultas previstas no parágrafo primeiro.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXII

Este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

III. Comentários

Nada a observar, uma vez que este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

95

Artigo XIII

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XIII

Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions

13.1 No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of any

product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined

for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third

countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or

restricted.

13.2 In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of trade

in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties

might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the

following provisions:

(a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of permitted imports (whether

allocated among supplying countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given of their amount

in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of this Article;

(b) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may be applied by means of

import licences or permits without a quota;

(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas allocated in accordance

with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, require that import licences or permits be utilized

for the importation of the product concerned from a particular country or source;

(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the contracting party

applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the

quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product

concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting party

concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the

product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during a

previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due

account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the

trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any

contracting party from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has

been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to which

the quota may relate.

13.3 (a) In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with import restrictions, the

contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide, upon the request of any contracting

party having an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant information

concerning the administration of the restrictions, the import licences granted over a recent

period and the distribution of such licences among supplying countries; Provided that there

shall be no obligation to supply information as to the names of importing or supplying

enterprises.

(b) In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party

applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product

or products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of

any change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in question which were en

96

route at the time at which public notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided

that they may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity permitted to be imported

in the period in question, and also, where necessary, against the quantities permitted to be

imported in the next following period or periods; and Provided further that if any contracting

party customarily exempts from such restrictions products entered for consumption or

withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of

such public notice, such practice shall be considered full compliance with this subparagraph.

(c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party applying the

restrictions shall promptly inform all other contracting parties having an interest in supplying

the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to

the various supplying countries and shall give public notice thereof.

13.4 With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or under

paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the

appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the

contracting party applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting party shall, upon the request

of any other contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the

request of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult promptly with the other contracting party or the

CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of

the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination

of conditions, formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of

an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.

13.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any

contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export

restrictions.

(…)

ANNEX I

NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

(…)

Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII

Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms “import restrictions” or “export restrictions”

include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations.

(…)

Ad Article XIII

Paragraph 2 (d)

No mention was made of “commercial considerations” as a rule for the allocation of quotas because it was

considered that its application by governmental authorities might not always be practicable. Moreover, in cases

where it is practicable, a contracting party could apply these considerations in the process of seeking agreement,

consistently with the general rule laid down in the opening sentence of paragraph 2.

Paragraph 4

See note relating to “special factors” in connection with the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 of Article XI.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

97

Artigo XIII

Aplicação Não Discriminatória das Restrições Quantitativas

13.1 Nenhuma proibição ou restrição será aplicada por uma Parte Contratante à importação de um produto

originário do território de outra Parte Contratante ou à exportação de um produto destinado ao

território de outra Parte Contratante a menos que proibições ou restrições semelhantes sejam

aplicadas à importação do produto similar originário de todos os outros países ou à exportação do

produto similar destinado a todos os outros países.

13.2 Na aplicação das restrições à importação de um produto qualquer, as Partes Contratantes esforçar-se-

ão por chegar a uma repartição do comércio desse produto que se aproxime tanto quanto possível da

que, na ausência dessas medidas, as diferentes Partes Contratantes teriam o direito de esperar,

observando para esse fim as disposições seguintes:

(a) Sempre que for possível, contingentes que representem a soma global das importações

autorizadas (sejam eles ou não repartidos entre os países fornecedores) serão fixados e sua

importância será publicada de acordo com a alínea 3 (b) do presente Artigo;

(b) Quando não for possível fixar contingentes globais, as restrições poderão ser aplicadas por

meio de licenças ou permissões de importação sem contingente global;

(c) A menos que se trate de tornar efetivas as cotas concedidas segundo a alínea (d) do presente

parágrafo, as Partes Contratantes não prescreverão que as licenças ou permissões de

exportação sejam utilizadas para a importação do produto visado de proveniência de uma

fonte abastecedora ou de um país determinado;

(d) Nos casos de ser um contingente repartido entre os países fornecedores, a Parte Contratante

que aplica as restrições poderá entender-se com todas as Partes Contratantes que têm um

interesse substancial no fornecimento do produto visado para a repartição do contingente.

Nos casos em que não for razoavelmente possível aplicar este método, a Parte Contratante

em questão atribuirá às Partes Contratantes que têm um interesse substancial no

fornecimento desse produto, partes proporcionais à contribuição trazida pelas Partes

Contratantes ao volume total ou valor total das importações do produto em questão no

decorrer de um período anterior de referência, devidamente levados em conta todos os

elementos especiais que tenham podido ou que possam afetar o comércio desse produto. Não

será imposta nenhuma condição ou formalidade de natureza a impedir uma Parte Contratante

de utilizar ao máximo a parcela do volume total ou do valor total que lhe for atribuída, com a

condição de ser a importação feita dentro dos limites do período fixado para a utilização

desse contingente.

13.3 (a) Nos casos de serem as licenças de importação atribuídas dentro do quadro de restrições à

importação, a Parte Contratante que aplicar a restrição fornecerá, a pedido de qualquer Parte

Contratante interessada no comércio do produto visado, todas as informações pertinentes

relativas à aplicação dessa restrição, as licenças de importação concedidas no decorrer de um

período recente e à repartição dessas licenças entre os países fornecedores, ficando entendido

que não será obrigada a fornecer informações a respeito do nome dos estabelecimentos

importadores e fornecedores.

(b) Nos casos de restrições à importação que comportem a fixação de contingentes, a Parte

Contratante que as aplicar tornará público o volume total ou o valor total do ou dos produtos

cuja importação for autorizada no decorrer de um período ulterior determinado bem como

toda modificação sobrevinda neste volume ou nesse valor. Se qualquer desses produtos em

questão estiver em viagem no momento em que o aviso for publicado, a entrada não será

proibida. Todavia, será facultado computar esse produto, na medida do possível, na

quantidade cuja importação estiver autorizada no decorrer do período em questão, e

98

igualmente, se for o caso, na quantidade cuja importação for autorizada no decorrer do

período ou dos períodos seguintes. Além disso, se de modo habitual, uma Parte Contratante

dispensar dessas restrições os produtos que forem, dentro de trinta dias a contar da data dessa

publicação, declarados com destino ao consumo ou que forem retirados de entrepostos com

fins de consumo, essa prática será considerada plenamente satisfatória às prescrições da

presente alínea.

(c) Nos casos de contingentes repartidos entre os países fornecedores, a Parte Contratante que

aplicar as restrições informará sem demora todas as outras Partes Contratantes interessadas

no fornecimento do produto em questão da parcela do contingente expressa em volume ou

em valor, comumente atribuída aos diversos países fornecedores e publicará todas as

informações úteis a esse respeito.

13.4 No que se refere às restrições aplicadas de acordo com a alínea 2 (d) do presente Artigo ou a alínea 2

(c) do Artigo XI a escolha, para qualquer produto, de um período de referência e a apreciação dos

elementos especiais que afetam seu comércio serão feitos, a princípio, pela Parte Contratante que

instituir a restrição. A dita Parte Contratante, a pedido de qualquer outra Parte Contratante que tenha

um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, ou a pedido das Partes Contratantes,

consultará sem demora a outra Parte Contratante ou às Partes Contratantes a respeito da necessidade

de ajustar a repartição ou o período de referência ou de apreciar de novo os elementos especiais em

jogo ou de suprimir as condições, formalidades ou outras disposições prescritas de modo unilateral a

respeito da atribuição de um contingente apropriado ou de sua utilização sem restrição.

13.5 As disposições do presente Artigo aplicar-se-ão a qualquer contingente alfandegário instituído ou

mantido por uma Parte Contratante; além disso, tanto quanto possível, os princípios do presente

Artigo aplicar-se-ão igualmente às restrições à exportação.

ANEXO I

NOTAS E DISPOSIÇÕES ADICIONAIS

(...)

Aos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII

Nos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII as expressões “restrições à importação” ou “restrições à exportação”

visam igualmente às restrições aplicadas por meio de transações efetuadas em decorrência do comércio do

Estado.

Ao Artigo XIII

Parágrafo 2(d)

Nenhuma menção foi feita às “considerações de ordem comercial”, como critério para a distribuição de cotas,

porque foi considerado que sua aplicação pelas autoridades governamentais nem sempre pode ser praticável.

Além disso, nos casos em que essa aplicação seja possível, uma parte contratante poderia aplicar esse critério

como instrumento para chegar a um acordo, conforme a regra geral consignada na primeira sentença do § 2.

Parágrafo 4

Vide a nota relativa “aos fatores especiais” em conexão com a última alínea do § 2 do Artigo XI.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

• Houve erro de tradução no tocante ao parágrafo 2(c). A expressão “import licences or permits” foi traduzida

como “as licenças ou permissões de exportação”, quando o correto seria “as licenças ou permissões de

importações”.

99

• Quando da internalização do GATT 1947, a tradução nacional baseou-se na versão francesa. Todavia,

quando se incorporou o GATT 1994 ao ordenamento pátrio, a tradução lastreou-se no texto oficial em inglês

(1). Isto é importante para se compreender a observação a seguir.

• Verifica-se que a passagem “a Parte Contratante em questão atribuirá às Partes Contratantes que têm um

interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, partes proporcionais”, inserida no parágrafo 2(d), na forma

como traduzida, apresenta-se truncada, pois seria melhor que a vírgula constante do texto fosse suprimida ou

que fosse acrescida outra vírgula imediatamente em seguida ao verbo “atribuirá”. Nesta quadra, observa-se que

a versão oficial em inglês não apresenta qualquer vírgula no trecho em apreço (“the contracting party concerned

shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the

proportions”). Já a versão francesa dispõe o seguinte: “la partie contractante en question attribuera, aux parties

contractantes ayant un intérêt substantiel à la fourniture de ce produit, des parts proportionnelles”. Tendo a

versão nacional sido efetuada com arrimo na sua congênere francesa, deveria ter seguido a metodologia desta e

empregado uma vírgula logo após o verbo “atribuirá”, o que tornaria o texto mais suave.

• Por fim, nota-se, na parte final do parágrafo 3(a), o uso da expressão “do nome”. A versão inglesa refere-se a

“the names” (plural), enquanto que a francesa utilizava “le nom” (singular).

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XIII

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e

WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 343

A idéia de não-discriminação prevista no Artigo I:1 é diferente daquela contida no Artigo XIII.

Para. 343: “If a Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier

countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member fails to give access to or allocate

tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the requirements of Articles XIII:1

and XIII:2 would apply. In the absence of Article XIII, Article I would not provide specific guidance on how to

administer tariff quotas in a manner that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of

Certain Poultry Products (EC - Proultry Products), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 108

Contigentes alfandegários devem ser calculados com base na totalidade das importações, incluindo Membros e

não-Membros da OMC.

Para. 108: “Therefore, we uphold the finding of the Panel in paragraph 233 of the Panel Report that the

European Communities has not acted inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 by calculating Brazil´s

tariff-rate quota based on the total quantity of imports, including those from non-Members.”

Relatório de Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, para. 6.46

No caso vertente, apontou-se como uma distorção, entre outras, o fato de que o período anterior de referência,

constante do Artigo XIII:2(d), não pode estar acobertado por distorções de mercado.

Para. 6.46: “(...) the world market excluding the European Communities is of limited value for purposes of

calculating country shares based on a previous representative period because different banana-exporting

countries have quite different market shares in different regions of the world. For example, Ecuador´s world

market share has increased from 26 to 36 per cent during the last decade and thus is significantly higher than its

country allocation under the EC revised regime (...) Because different banana-exporting countries have quite

100

different market shares in different regions of the world, it would also be difficult, if not impossible, to use a

regional or specific country market as a basis for allocating tariff quota shares”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190

A utilização de dois regimes jurídicos distintos, por parte um Membro da OMC, não tem relevância na aplicação

do princípio da Não-Discriminação previsto no Artigo XIII.

Para. 190: “If, by choosing a different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different

tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like

products from different Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination provisions would be

defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT

1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements, if these provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established

by that Member.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded

Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS202/R,

para. 7.49

O Painel em US – Line Pipe consignou que, caso os negociadores da Rodada Uruguai tivessem pretendido

expressamente omitir o Artigo XIII do contexto das medidas de salvaguarda, eles poderiam ter dito isso no

Acordo de Salvaguardas, mas não o fizeram. Aprofundando a explanação, o Painel asseverou que:

Para. 7.49: “(...) we would suggest that it is the paucity of disciplines governing the application of tariff quota

safeguard measure in Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement that supports our interpretation of Article XIII. If

Article XIII did not apply to tariff quota safeguard measures, such safeguard measures would escape the

majority of the disciplines set forth in Article 5. This is an important consideration, given the quantitative aspect

of a tariff quota. For example, if Article XIII did not apply, quantitative criteria regarding the availability of

lower tariff rates could be introduced in a discriminatory manner, without any consideration to prior quantitative

performance. In our view, the potential for such discrimination is contrary to the object and purpose of both the

Safeguards Agreement, and the WTO Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded

Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS202/R,

para. 7.54

O Painel em US - Line Pipe entendeu que, na aplicação do Artigo XIII, caput, devem ser levados em

consideração os padrões tradicionais de comércio entre as partes.

Para. 7.54. “(...) imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (...) Trade flows

before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have

ocurred in the absence of that measure.”

III. Comentários

A eliminação geral das restrições quantitativas é uma das ideias basilares do sistema GATT/OMC, estando

prevista no Artigo XI do GATT 1994. Entretanto, este mesmo Artigo prevê algumas exceções a essa regra.

Acontece que, para que essas exceções sejam utilizadas, elas devem obedecer às disposições do Artigo XIII, que

versa sobre a administração não-discriminatória das restrições quantitativas. O Artigo XIII tem um histórico de

jurisprudência relativamente escasso. Poucos foram os litígios solucionados pelo sistema de solução de

controvérsias da OMC, o que contribui para que boa parte das disposições do mencionado Artigo XIII ainda

permaneça sem uma interpretação segura.

101

Fator que corrobora para a rara incidência do Artigo ora em foco é a utilização do princípio da economia

processual pelo órgão julgador (seja Painel ou o Órgão Permanente de Apelação). O uso desse princípio tem um

viés político. É difícil saber até que ponto os julgadores querem evitar a criação de jurisprudência. O Artigo XIII

tem uma redação extensa, que, em algumas passagens, reflete a dificuldade – típica de tratados multilaterais

com muitos participantes - de se chegar a termos precisos. Em Artigo divulgado em 2010, Busch e Pelc

assinalam que

(...) in 41 percent of all cases, panels exercise judicial economy, a practice by which

they rule not to rule on certain of the litigants ́ legal arguments, deeming these

unnecessary to solving the dispute at hand. This practice is important not only for the

litigants, who frequently appeal its use, but for the membership as a whole, since

judicial economy limits the scope of the case law that results. We argue in this article

that panels invoke judicial economy to narrow the precedent they create, and do so

largely at the insistence of the wider membership. (1)

Entre as expressões do Artigo XIII, que ainda necessitam ter seus significados delineados, destacam-se: “todos

os elementos especiais” e “período anterior de referência”, ambas constantes do parágrafo 2(d) e que têm grande

importância para a aplicação do Artigo em apreço. Embora já tenha um Painel do caso EC - Bananas,

estabelecido com base em recurso ao Artigo 21.5 do DSU, consignando que o “período anterior de referência”

não deve estar abarcado por distorções de mercado, ainda se está longe de ser definido um marco temporal

preciso.

Por fim, útil frisar que, às vezes, a parte demandada usa a estratégia de invocar uma outra disposição ou instituto

da legislação da OMC para tentar afastar a incidência do Artigo XIII, como, por exemplo, o Artigo XIX, que

cuida das medidas de salvaguarda, ou o waiver, que é uma derrogação temporária das obrigações assumidas. O

Órgão de Apelação tem rejeitado essa tese de defesa. Percebe-se que o argumento empregado é o de que o

Princípio da Não-Discriminação (inserido no Artigo XIII) não pode ser afastado por normas de exceção que

permitem um afrouxamento dos compromissos assumidos no sistema GATT/OMC.

Footnote 1: BUSCH, Marc L.; PELC, Krzysztof J. The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization. International

Organization 64, Spring 2010, pp. 257-58. Disponível em:

http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/Busch%20&%20Pelc%20Judicial%20Economy%20IO.pdf. Acesso em: 13 de dezembro de

2011.

102

Artigo XIII

Fabio Weinberg Crocco

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XIII*

Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions

13.1 No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of any

product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined

for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third

countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or

restricted.

13.2 In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of trade

in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties

might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the

following provisions:

(a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of permitted imports (whether

allocated among supplying countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given of their amount

in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of this Article;

(b) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may be applied by means of

import licences or permits without a quota;

(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas allocated in accordance

with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, require that import licences or permits be utilized

for the importation of the product concerned from a particular country or source;

(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the contracting party

applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the

quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product

concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting party

concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the

product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during a

previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due

account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the

trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any

contracting party from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has

been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to which

the quota may relate.*

13.3 (a) In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with import restrictions, the

contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide, upon the request of any contracting

party having an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant information

concerning the administration of the restrictions, the import licences granted over a recent

period and the distribution of such licences among supplying countries; Provided that there

shall be no obligation to supply information as to the names of importing or supplying

enterprises.

(b) In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party

applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product

or products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of

any change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in question which were en

103

route at the time at which public notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided

that they may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity permitted to be imported

in the period in question, and also, where necessary, against the quantities permitted to be

imported in the next following period or periods; and Provided further that if any contracting

party customarily exempts from such restrictions products entered for consumption or

withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of

such public notice, such practice shall be considered full compliance with this subparagraph.

(c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party applying the

restrictions shall promptly inform all other contracting parties having an interest in supplying

the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to

the various supplying countries and shall give public notice thereof.

13.4 With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or under

paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the

appraisal of any special factors* affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the

contracting party applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting party shall, upon the request

of any other contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the

request of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult promptly with the other contracting party or the

CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of

the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination

of conditions, formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of

an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.

13.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any

contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export

restrictions.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XIII

Aplicação não discriminatória das restrições quantitativas

13.1 Nenhuma proibição ou restrição será aplicada por uma parte contratante à importação de um produto

originário do território de outra parte contratante ou à exportação de um produto destinado ao

território de outra parte contratante a menos que proibições ou restrições semelhantes sejam

aplicadas à importação do produto similar originário de todos os outros países ou à exportação do

produto similar destinado a todos os outros países.

13.2 Na aplicação das restrições à importação de um produto qualquer, as partes contratantes esforçar-se-

ão por chegar a uma repartição do comércio desse produto que se aproxime tanto quanto possível da

que, na ausência dessas medidas, as diferentes partes contratantes teriam o direito de esperar,

observando para esse fim as disposições seguintes:

(a) Sempre que for possível, contingentes que representem a soma global das importações

autorizadas (sejam eles ou não repartidos entre os países fornecedores) serão fixados e sua

importância será publicada de acordo com a alínea 3 (b) do presente Artigo;

(b) quando não for possível fixar contingentes globais, as restrições poderão ser aplicadas por

meio de licenças ou permissões de importação sem contingente global;

(c) a menos que se trate de tornar efetivas as quotas concedidas segundo a alínea (d) do presente

parágrafo, as partes contratantes não prescreverão que as licenças ou permissões de

exportação sejam utilizadas para a importação do produto visado de proveniência de uma

fonte abastecedora ou de um país determinado;

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(d) nos casos de ser um contingente repartido entre os países fornecedores, a parte contratante

que aplica as restrições poderá entender-se com todas as partes contratantes que têm um

interesse substancial no fornecimento do produto visado para a repartição do contingente.

Nos casos em que não for razoavelmente possível aplicar este método, a parte contratante em

questão atribuirá às partes contratantes que têm um interesse substancial no fornecimento

desse produto, partes proporcionais à contribuição trazida pelas partes contratantes ao

volume total ou valor total das importações do produto em questão no decorrer de um

período anterior de referência, devidamente levados em conta todos os elementos especiais

que tenham podido ou que possam afetar o comércio desse produto. Não será imposta

nenhuma condição ou formalidade de natureza a impedir uma parte contratante de utilizar ao

máximo a parcela do volume total ou do valor total que lhe for atribuída, com a condição de

ser a importação feita dentro dos limites do período fixado para a utilização desse

contingente.

13.3 (a) Nos casos de serem as licenças de importação atribuídas dentro do quadro de restrições à

importação, a parte contratante que aplicar a restrição fornecerá, a pedido de qualquer parte

contratante interessada no comércio do produto visado, todas as informações pertinentes

relativas à aplicação dessa restrição, as licenças de importação concedidas no decorrer de um

período recente e à repartição dessas licenças entre os países fornecedores, ficando entendido

que não será obrigada a fornecer informações a respeito do nome dos estabelecimentos

importadores e fornecedores.

(b) Nos casos de restrições à importação que comportem a fixação de contingentes, a parte

contratante que as aplicar tornará público o volume total ou o valor total do ou dos produtos

cuja importação for autorizada no decorrer de um período ulterior determinado bem como

toda modificação sobrevinda neste volume ou nesse valor. Se qualquer desses produtos em

questão estiver em viagem no momento em que o aviso for publicado, a entrada não será

proibida. Todavia, será facultado computar esse produto, na medida do possível, na

quantidade cuja importação estiver autorizada no decorrer do período em questão, e

igualmente, se for o caso, na quantidade cuja importação for autorizada no decorrer do

período ou dos períodos, seguintes. Além disso, se de modo habitual, uma parte contratante

dispensar dessas restrições os produtos que forem, dentro de trinta dias a contar da data dessa

publicação, declarados com destino ao consumo ou que forem retirados de entrepostos com

fins de consumo, essa prática será considerada plenamente satisfatória às prescrições da

presente alínea.

(c) Nos casos de contingentes repartidos entre os países fornecedores. a parte contratante que

aplicar as restrições informará sem demora todas as outras partes contratantes interessadas

no fornecimento do produto em questão da parcela do contingente expressa em volume ou

em valor comumente atribuída aos diversos países fornecedores e publicará todas as

informações úteis a esse respeito.

13.4 No que se refere às restrições aplicadas de acordo com a alínea 2 (d) do presente Artigo ou a alínea 2

(c) do Artigo XI a escolha, para qualquer produto, de um período de referência e a apreciação dos

elementos especiais que afetam seu comércio serão feitos, a princípio, pela parte contratante que

instituir a restrição. A dita parte contratante, a pedido de qualquer outra parte contratante que tenha

um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, ou a pedido das partes contratantes,

consultará sem demora a outra parte contratante ou às partes contratantes a respeito da necessidade

de ajustar a repartição ou o período de referência ou de apreciar de novo os elementos especiais em

jogo ou de suprimir as condições, formalidades ou outras disposições prescritas de modo unilateral a

respeito da atribuição de um contingente apropriado ou de sua utilização sem restrição.

13.5 As disposições do presente Artigo aplicar-se-ão a qualquer contingente alfandegário instituído ou

mantido por uma parte contratante; além disso, tanto quanto possível, os princípios do presente

Artigo aplicar-se-ão igualmente às restrições à exportação e a qualquer regulamentação e exigência

de ordem interna prevista nos §§ 3 e do Artigo III.

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(Lei n.º 313, de 30 de Julho de 1948)

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XIII

1. Artigo XIII, caput

a) “Regimes administrativos de alocação de quotas tarifárias diferenciados”

Em CE – Bananas III o DSB concluiu que as regras de não-discriminação dispostas no Artigo XIII do GATT

aplicam-se a um determinado produto, independentemente da forma pela qual os Membros implementam seus

regimes de alocação de quotas tarifárias.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.79

Para. 7.79. “We note that Article XIII:1 provides that no restriction shall be applied by any Member on the

importation of any product of another Member ‘unless the importation of the like product of all third countries

... is similarly ... restricted’. Article XIII:2 requires Members when allocating tariff quota shares to ‘aim at a

distribution of trade (...) approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be

expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions’. By their terms, these two provisions of Article XIII do

not provide a basis for analysing quota allocation regimes separately because they have different legal bases or

because different tariff rates are applicable. Article XIII applies to allocations of shares in an import market for

a particular product which is restricted by a quota or tariff quota. In our view, its non-discrimination

requirements apply to that market for that product, irrespective of whether or how a Member subdivides it for

administrative or other reasons. Indeed, to accept that a Member could establish quota regimes by different legal

instruments and argue that they are not as a consequence subject to Article XIII would be, as argued by the

Complainants, to eviscerate the non-discrimination provisions of Article XIII.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas III,

(WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 190

2. Artigo XIII:1

a) Interpretação do termo “restrição”

O Painel em EC – Bananas III interpretou a palavra “restrição” de modo amplo, como qualquer benefício

concedido a um determinado Membro que seja capaz de afetar competitividade de outros Membros.

Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale

and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e

EUA, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, para. 7.332

Para. 7.332. “Given that broad interpretation of the term ‘restriction’, the Panel sees the European

Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota as a restriction for Ecuador within the meaning of Article XIII:1 of

the GATT 1994. As the European Communities recognizes, its banana import regime confers a benefit, although

a quantitatively limited one, to ACP countries, and Ecuador, like other MFN banana suppliers, cannot have

access to that quantitatively limited benefit. Any benefit accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members

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presumably affects the competitive opportunities of like bananas imported from other Members, including from

Ecuador, to the European Communities market. By its very nature, such a benefit reserved for some Members

generally represents a disadvantage for other Members.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso European

Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III),

WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 7.679

Mudança de posicionamento:

Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel, restringindo a interpretação do

termo “restrição”. De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação o referido termo deveria ser lido como uma referência a

“quotas tarifárias”, e não como “benefício”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities - Regime for

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, paras. 337 e 346

Para. 337. “[…] “Applying Article XIII:1 to a tariff quota requires that the word ‘restriction’ be read as a

reference to a tariff quota. Article XIII:1 is then rendered thus: no tariff quota shall be applied by a Member on

the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member, unless the importation of the like product of

all third countries is similarly made subject to the tariff quota. The application of the tariff quota is thus on a

product-wide basis. The principle of non-discriminatory application captured by Article XIII:1 requires that, if a

tariff quota is applied to one Member, it must be applied to all; and, consequently, the term ‘similarly restricted’

means, in the case of tariff quotas, that imports of like products of all third countries must have access to, and be

given an opportunity of, participation. If a Member is excluded from access to, and participation in, the tariff

quota, then imports of like products from all third countries are not ‘similarly restricted’.”

Para. 346. “Having said that, we note our disagreement with the Panel's overly broad interpretation of the term

‘restriction’ in Article XIII:1 as ‘[a]ny benefit accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members presumably

affect[ing] the competitive opportunities of like bananas imported from other Members’ considering that ‘[b]y

its very nature, ... a benefit reserved for some Members generally represents a disadvantage for other Members.’

Such a broad reading of the term ‘restriction’ in Article XIII would mean that even a simple tariff preference

without a limitation would lead to dissimilar restrictions within the meaning of Article XIII, thus confounding

the function and coverage of Article I and Article XIII. Such an interpretation would also ignore the fact that

Article XIII is concerned with the non-discriminatory administration of tariff quotas, and does not prohibit them

as such.”

3. Artigo XIII:2

a) “Objetivo e propósito”

De acordo com a intepretação adotada pelo DSB, o Artigo XIII:2 objetivaria minimizar os impactos causados

aos fluxos internacionais de comércio em decorrência da imposição de quotas tarifárias.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.68

Para. 7.68. “[…] “In light of the terms of Article XIII, it can be said that the object and purpose of Article

XIII:2 is to minimize the impact of a quota or tariff quota regime on trade flows by attempting to approximate

under such measures the trade shares that would have occurred in the absence of the regime. In interpreting the

terms of Article XIII, it is important to keep their context in mind. Article XIII is basically a provision relating

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to the administration of restrictions authorized as exceptions to one of the most basic GATT provisions-the

general ban on quotas and other non-tariff restrictions contained in Article XI.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso EC – Bananas III,

para. 7.706.

4. Artigo XIII:2(a)

a) “Aplicação da tarifa mínima”

O Painel no caso US – Pipe Line concluiu que o Artigo XIII:2(a) do GATT impõe o dever de, sempre que

possível, fixar o montante total de importações permitidas com base na tarifa mais baixa existente.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded

Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Pipe Line), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS202/R, para.

7.58

Para. 7.58. “Irrespective of whether or not tariff quotas constitute ‘quotas’ within the meaning of Article

XIII:2(a), tariff quotas are necessarily subject to the disciplines contained in Article XIII:2(a) as a result of the

express language of Article XIII:5. Thus, Article XIII:2(a) must have meaning in the context of tariff quotas.

We believe that, in respect of tariff quotas, Article XIII:2(a) requires Members to fix, wherever practicable, the

total amount of imports permitted at the lower tariff rate.” (1)

Footnote 1: The obligation cannot extend to fixing the total amount of permitted imports at the higher tariff rate, because that would

effectively undermine the distinction between tariff quotas and quantitative restrictions.

5. Artigo XIII:2(d)

a) “Aplicação do princípio de não discriminação à alocação de quotas tarifárias”

O Órgão de Apelação concluiu em EC - Bananas III que Membros estão impedidos de fazer discriminações ao

alocar quotas tarifárias entre Membros que não tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado

produto.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e

EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 161

Para. 161. “(...) [A]llocation to Members not having a substantial interest must be subject to the basic principle

of nondiscrimination. When this principle of non-discrimination is applied to the allocation of tariff quota shares

to Members not having a substantial interest, it is clear that a Member cannot, whether by agreement or by

assignment, allocate tariff quota shares to some Members not having a substantial interest while not allocating

shares to other Members who likewise do not have a substantial interest. To do so is clearly inconsistent with

the requirement in Article XIII:1 that a Member cannot restrict the importation of any product from another

Member unless the importation of the like product from all third countries is ‘similarly’ restricted.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento nos seguintes relatórios: (i) Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Bananas III,

(WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA), para. 7.73 e (ii) Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso EC – Bananas III,

(WT/DS27/RW/USA), para. 7.715.

b) “Presunção relativa em relação aos critérios previstos no Artigo XIII:2, caput”

108

De acordo com o relatório do Órgão de Apelação na fase de implementação do caso EC – Bananas III, o Artigo

XIII:2(d) estabelece uma presunção relativa em relação à observância dos critérios estabelecidos no Artigo

XIII:2, caput.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities - Regime for

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 338

Para. 338. “(…) Article XIII:2(d) allows for the case where a quota is allocated among supplying countries,

either by way of agreement or, where this is not reasonably practicable, by allotment to Members having a

substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, and in accordance with the proportions supplied by

those Members during a previous representative period, taking due account of ‘special factors’. In other words,

Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive ‘safe harbour’; compliance with the requirements of Article XIII:2(d) is

presumed to lead to a distribution of trade as foreseen in the chapeau of Article XIII:2, as far as substantial

suppliers are concerned.”

c)”Relação subsidiária entre primeira e segundas frases do Artigo XIII:2”

De acordo com o entendimento do DSB, a relação entre as duas frases constantes do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT

é de natureza subsidiária. Ademais, não seria permissível firmar acordos com apenas determinados Membros

que tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.72

Para. 7.72. “The terms of Article XIII:2(d) make clear that the combined use of agreements and unilateral

allocations to Members with substantial interests is not permitted. The text of Article XIII:2(d) provides that

where the first ‘method’, i.e., agreement, is not reasonably practicable, then an allocation must be made. Thus,

in the absence of agreements with all Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product, the

Member applying the restriction must allocate shares in accordance with the rules of Article XIII:2(d), second

sentence. In the absence of this rule, the Member allocating shares could reach agreements with some Members

having a substantial interest in supplying the product that discriminated against other Members having a

substantial interest supplying the product, even if those other Members objected to the shares they were to be

allocated.”

d) “Discriminação entre estados que não tenham interesse no fornecimento de determinado produto”

Em CE – Bananas III o Painel concluiu que se, por ventura, um Membro optar por alocar quotas tarifárias a

Membros que não tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto, tais quotas devem ser

estendidas a todos os Membros enquadrados nessa categoria.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.73

Para. 7.73. “The question then is whether country-specific shares can also be allocated to Members that do not

have a substantial interest in supplying the product and, if so, what the method of allocation would have to be.

As to the first point, we note that the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) refers to allocation of a quota ‘among

supplying countries’. This could be read to imply that an allocation may also be made to Members that do not

have a substantial interest in supplying the product. If this interpretation is accepted, any such allocation must,

however, meet the requirements of Article XIII:1 and the general rule in the chapeau to Article XIII:2(d).

Therefore, if a Member wishes to allocate shares of a tariff quota to some suppliers without a substantial

109

interest, then such shares must be allocated to all such suppliers. Otherwise, imports from Members would not

be similarly restricted as required by Article XIII:1. As to the second point, in such a case it would be required

to use the same method as was used to allocate the country-specific shares to the Members having a substantial

interest in supplying the product, because otherwise the requirements of Article XIII:1 would also not be met.”

e) “Estados Não-Membros”

O Painel do caso CE – Frangos posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII:2 do GATT permite alocações de

quotas tarifárias a Membros que não sejam Membros da OMC e não seriam vedadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do

GATT.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry

Products (EC – Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/R, paras. 230-232

Para. 230. “We note that Article XIII carefully distinguishes between Members (‘contracting parties’ in the

original text of GATT 1947) and ‘supplying countries’ or ‘source’. There is nothing in Article XIII that

obligates Members to calculate tariff quota shares on the basis of imports from Members only. If the purpose of

using past trade performance is to approximate the shares in the absence of the restrictions as required under the

chapeau of Article XIII:2, exclusion of a non-Member, particularly if it is an efficient supplier, would not serve

that purpose.”

Para. 231. “This interpretation is also confirmed by the use in Article XIII:2(d) of the term ‘of the total quantity

or value of imports of the product’ without limiting the total quantity to imports from Members.”

Para. 232. “The conclusion above is not affected by the fact that the TRQ in question was opened as

compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII because Article XIII is a general provision regarding the non-

discriminatory administration of import restrictions applicable to any TRQs regardless of their origin.”

O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Poultry,

(WT/DS69/AB/R), paras. 106 e 108

f) “Relação entre o disposto em XIII:1 e XIII:2(d) do GATT”

Nos termos do relatório do Painel no caso EC – Poultry o disposto no Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT deve ser tido

como lex especialis em relação ao Artigo XIII:1, e não como uma exceção.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.75

Para. 7.75. “The consequence of the foregoing analysis is that Members may be effectively required to use a

general ‘others’ category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest in supplying the

product. The fact that in this situation tariff quota shares are allocated to some Members, notably those having a

substantial interest in supplying the product, but not to others that do not have a substantial interest in supplying

the product, would not necessarily be in conflict with Article XIII:1. While the requirement of Article XIII:2(d)

is not expressed as an exception to the requirements of Article XIII:1, it may be regarded, to the extent that its

practical application is inconsistent with it, as lex specialis in respect of Members with a substantial interest in

supplying the product concerned.”

6. Artigo XIII:5

a) “Aplicação do Artigo XIII a regimes com uma única quota tarifária”

110

O Painel, na fase de implementação do caso CE – Bananas, concluiu, por meio de interpretação literal do Artigo

XIII:5 do GATT, que o Artigo XIII do GATT é aplicável tanto aos regimes de impostação de quotas tarifárias

múltiplas, quanto àqueles regimes que preveem apenas uma quota tarifária.

Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale

and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e

EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, para. 7.290

Para. 7.290. “First, the Panel looks at the language of Article XIII:5 of the GATT 1994. The words ‘any’ (both

before the terms ‘tariff quota’ and ‘contracting party’) and ‘shall’ in Article XIII:5 underscore the absolute and

categorical nature of the application of ‘the provisions of (...) Article [XIII]’ to tariff quotas. The Panel notes

also that Article XIII:5 uses the term ‘any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any [Member]’ in the singular.

The Panel reads this to mean that Article XIII of the GATT 1994 is also applicable to one single tariff quota,

and that this is so irrespective of whether that single tariff quota is prt of an import regime with more tariff

quotas or is part of an import regime that comprises only one tariff quota.”

Ademais, o DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII do GATT é aplicável a quotas tarifárias.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.68

Para. 7.68. “However, Article XIII:5 makes it clear, and the parties agree, that Article XIII applies to the

administration of tariff quotas.”

O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas

III, (WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 160

7. Relação com outros Artigos do GATT

a) “Artigo I do GATT”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (CE – Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.107

De acordo com o entendimento do DSB, o Artigo I do GATT prevê regra geral de não discriminação. O Artigo

XIII:1, por sua vez, também prevê a mesma regra, mas especificamente em relação à administração de quotas

tarifarias. Trata-se, portanto, de norma mais específica.

Para. 7.107. “Such an interpretation is also supported by the close relationship between Articles I and XIII:1,

both of which prohibit discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatment in respect of ‘rules and

formalities in connection with importation, a phrase that has been interpreted broadly in past GATT practice,

such that it can appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff quota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules

applied in connection with importation. Indeed, they are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be

imposed. To describe the relationship somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring

non-discriminatory treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation.

Article XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the administration of quantitative

restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with that of Article I.”

111

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities – Regime for

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 343

Não obstante, de acordo com o entendimento do Órgão de Apelação constante do relatório de EC – Bananas III,

a despeito de os Artigos I e XIII do GATT imporem deveres de não-discriminação, a dispensa do cumprimento

do disposto no primeiro dispositivo não implica dispensa do cumprimento no segundo.

Para. 343. “We consider that the notion of ‘non-discrimination’ in the application of tariffs under Article I:1

and the notion of non-discriminatory application of a ‘prohibition or restriction’ under Article XIII are distinct,

and that Article XIII ensures that a Member applying a restriction or prohibition does not discriminate among all

other Members. Article I:1, which applies to tariffs, and Article XIII:1, which applies to quantitative restrictions

and tariff quotas, may apply to different elements of a measure or import regime. Article XIII adapts the MFN-

treatment principle to specific types of measures, that is, quantitative restrictions, and, by virtue of Article

XIII:5, tariff quotas. Tariff quotas must comply with the requirements of both Article I:1 and Article XIII of the

GATT 1994. This, in our view, does not make Article XIII redundant in respect of tariff quotas: if a Member

imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier countries under a tariff

quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member fails to give access to or allocate tariff quota shares on a

non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would apply.

In the absence of Article XIII, Article I would not provide specific guidance on how to administer tariff quotas

in a manner that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares.”

8. Relação com outros acordos

a) “Acordo de Agricultura”

O DSB concluiu que o Acordo sobre Agricultura não prevê expressamente a alocação de quotas tarifárias

específicas para cada país em relação a produtos agrícolas. De acordo com o posicionamento do DSB, se essa

fosse a intenção dos negociadores, haveria previsão específica a esse respeito no Acordo de Agricultura.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.124

Para. 7.124. “(…) If the Agreement on Agriculture would have allowed for country-specific allocations of tariff

quotas there would have been a specific provision to this effect in deviation from Article XIII:2(d) as with the

special treatment provisions of Annex 5. In contrast, Article 4.2 is a substantive provision in that it prohibits the

use of certain non-tariff barriers, subject to certain qualifications. As a substantive provision, it prevails over

such GATT provisions as Article XI:2(c).”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento nos seguintes relatórios: (i) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC –

Bananas III, (WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 157 e (ii) Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso EC –

Bananas III, (WT/DS27/RW/USA), para. 7.642.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.126

O DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT aplica-se aos compromissos de

acesso a mercado, relacionados a produtos agrícolas, exceto se previsto expressamente em sentido contrário no

Acordo sobre Agricultura.

112

Para. 7.126. “Finally, we note that, pursuant to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, GATT rules apply

‘subject to’ the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, a wording that clearly suggests priority for the

latter. But giving priority to Article 4.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which simply ‘relates’ market access

concessions to Members' goods schedules as attached to GATT by the Marrakesh Protocol, does not necessitate,

or even suggest, a limitation on the application of Article XIII. The provisions are complementary, and do not

clash. Thus, Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture is not relevant in this case.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e

EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 155

Para. 155. “(…) Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII, apply to market access

commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains

specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.”

b) “Acordo de Salvaguardas”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded

Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US – Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS202/R, paras.

7.40-7.44 e 7.49

O DSB concluiu que o Artigo XIII do GATT deve ser observado para fins de imposição de medidas de

salvaguarda. Alegou-se, portanto, que não há disposição expressa no Acordo de Salvaguardas que autorize os

Membros a agirem em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII.

Para. 7.40. “In this regard, we note the Appellate Body's finding in EC- Bananas III (AB) that ‘[i]f the

negotiators had intended to permit Members to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 [by virtue

of the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture], they would have said so explicitly.’ We see nothing in the

Safeguards Agreement that expressly authorises a Member to act inconsistently with Article XIII. The fact that

the Safeguards Agreement does not contain any express reference to Article XIII certainly does not amount to

an express authorisation to depart from the provisions of that Article.”

Para. 7.44. “(…) “Just because some provisions of Article XIII are replicated in the Safeguards Agreement, that

alone does not mean that the remaining provisions cease to be binding on Members. We therefore decline to

draw any conclusions from the fact that certain Article XIII provisions are not replicated in the Safeguards

Agreement. Like the Appellate Body, we consider that if the Uruguay Round negotiators had intended to

expressly omit Article XIII from the safeguards context, “they would and could have said so in the Agreement

on Safeguards. They did not”.”

Para. 7.49. “(…) We are of the view that non-application of Article XIII in the context of safeguards would

result in tariff quota safeguard measures partially escaping the control of multilateral disciplines. This result

would be contrary to the objectives set out in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded

Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US – Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS202/R, para.

7.54

Também em US – Line Pipe, o Painel concluiu que a imposição de medidas de salvaguarda em dissonância com

padrões históricos de fluxos internacionais de comércio estaria em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo

XIII:2, caput, do GATT.

Para. 7.54. “In our view, Korea is correct to argue that a Member would violate the general rule set forth in the

chapeau of Article XIII:2 if it imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (at least

in the absence of any evidence indicating that the shares a Member might be expected to obtain in the future

113

differ, as a result of changed circumstances, from its historical share). Trade flows before the imposition of a

safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of

that measure.”

9. Lomé Waiver

Em EC – Bananas III, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de que o Lomé Waiver se estenderia não apenas ao

disposto no Artigo I:1 do GATT, mas também ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,

WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e

WT/DS27/R/USA, paras. 7.106 e 7.107

Para. 7.106. “(…) If the Lomé waiver is interpreted to waive only compliance with the obligations of Article

I:1, the waiver would effectively limit preferential treatment to tariff preferences. (…) In other words, in order

to give real effect to the Lomé waiver, it needs to cover Article XIII to the extent necessary to allow the EC to

allocate country-specific tariff quota shares to the ACP countries in the amount of their pre-1991 best- ever

banana exports to the EC. Otherwise, the EC could not practically fulfil its basic obligation under the Lomé

Convention in respect of bananas, as we have found that it was not unreasonable for the EC to conclude that the

Lomé Convention may be interpreted to require country-specific tariff quota shares at levels not compatible

with Article XIII. Since it was the objective of the Lomé waiver to permit the EC to fulfil that basic obligation,

logically we have no choice therefore but to interpret the waiver so that it accomplishes that objective (…).”

Para. 7.107. “Such an interpretation is also supported by the close relationship between Articles I and XIII:1,

both of which prohibit discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatment in respect of ‘rules and

formalities in connection with importation’, a phrase that has been interpreted broadly in past GATT practice,

such that it can appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff quota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules

applied in connection with importation. Indeed, they are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be

imposed. To describe the relationship somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring

non-discriminatory treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation.

Article XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the administration of quantitative

restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with that of Article I.”

Mudança de posicionamento

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e

EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 183

O Órgão de Apelação, no entanto, o divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel. De acordo com o seu

entendimento, o Lomé Waiver não implica dispensa do cumprimento de obrigações previstas no Artigo XIII do

GATT.

Para. 183. “We disagree with the Panel's conclusion. The wording of the Lomé Waiver is clear and

unambiguous. By its precise terms, it waives only ‘the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General

Agreement ... to the extent necessary’ to do what is ‘required’ by the relevant provisions of the Lomé

Convention. The Lomé Waiver does not refer to, or mention in any way, any other provision of the GATT 1994

or of any other covered agreement. Neither the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the Lomé Waiver,

nor the need to interpret it so as to permit it to achieve its objectives, allow us to disregard the clear and plain

wording of the Lomé Waiver by extending its scope to include a waiver from the obligations under Article XIII.

Moreover, although Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 are both non-discrimination provisions, their

relationship is not such that a waiver from the obligations under Article I implies a waiver from the obligations

under Article XIII.”

114

O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação,

no caso EC – Bananas III (Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA),

(WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA), para. 350.

III. Comentários

A análise de precedentes envolvendo a interpretação do Artigo XIII do GATT demonstra que questões

relacionadas à administração de regimes de quotas tarifárias foram objeto de diversas disputas no âmbito da

OMC. Trata-se, portanto, de tema significativamente controvertido. Certamente, a natureza aberta e até mesmo

indefinida de diversos conceitos constantes do Artigo XIII do GATT contribuiu para tanto. Ademais, pôde-se

verificar que diversas disputas tiveram como cerne a relação dos parágrafos do referido Artigo, bem como a

relação do Artigo com outros dispositivos constantes de outros acordos da OMC.

Em EC – Bananas III, por exemplo, analisou-se se a criação de regimes diferenciados de alocação de quotas

tarifárias para importações de um mesmo produto estaria em conformidade com os acordos da OMC. Com

fundamento no Artigo XIII do GATT, concluiu-se que a subdivisão de regimes administrativos de importação

não pode ser utilizada como mecanismo destinado a circunvir obrigações de não-discriminação. Firmou-se,

portanto, o entendimento de que as regras de não-discriminação dispostas no Artigo XIII do GATT aplicam-se a

um determinado produto, independentemente da forma pela qual os Membros implementam seus regimes de

alocação de quotas tarifárias. Assim, a criação de regimes administrativos diferenciados de alocação de quotas

tarifárias não é vedada per se, sendo permissível desde que observadas as obrigações de não-discriminação entre

os Membros.

Conforme mencionado, o DSB também foi questionado sobre o significado de termos constantes do Artigo XIII.

Por exemplo, na fase de implementação de EC – Bananas III, o Painel interpretou de modo amplo o termo

“restrição”, constante do Artigo XIII:1 do GATT. De acordo com a abordagem adotada pelo Painel, a palavra

“restrição” deveria ser interpretada como qualquer benefício concedido a um determinado Membro que fosse

capaz de afetar a competitividade de outros Membros. Contudo, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da abordagem

adotada pelo Painel, restringindo a interpretação do termo “restrição”.

De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, o referido termo deveria ser lido como uma referência ao termo “quotas

tarifárias”, e não como “benefício”. Segundo a definição mais precisa adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo

XIII:1 do GATT impõe aos Membros o dever de não imporem quotas tarifárias a outros Membros, a menos que

quotas tarifárias semelhantes sejam impostas à importação do produto similar originário de todos os outros

Membros exportadores.

Também foi objeto de apreciação do DSB a interpretação de princípios gerais constantes do Artigo XIII do

GATT. Em EC – Bananas III, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a alocação de quotas tarifárias deve ser feita

em observância ao princípio de não-discriminação previsto no Artigo XIII:1 do GATT. Com efeito, entendeu-se

que Membros estão impedidos de fazer discriminações na alocação de quotas tarifárias entre Membros que não

tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto.

Também pôde-se identificar intepretações finalísticas do Artigo em comento. Exemplo disso é a análise sobre o

objeto e propósito do Artigo XIII:2 do GATT feita pelo Painel no caso EC – Bananas III. De acordo com a

intepretação dada pelo Painel, o referido dispositivo objetivaria reduzir o impacto que a imposição de quotas

tarifárias causa nos fluxos internacionais de comércio.

Conforme mencionado, o DSB também analisou a relação entre os diversos parágrafos e alíneas do Artigo XIII.

Por exemplo, de acordo com o relatório do Órgão de Apelação na fase de implementação do caso EC – Bananas

III, o Artigo XIII:2(d) estabelece uma presunção relativa em relação à observância dos critérios estabelecidos no

Artigo XIII:2, caput.

115

O relatório do Painel no caso EC – Bananas III contém outro exemplo de análise da relação entre os parágrafos

do Artigo XIII. Nos termos do relatório em questão, o Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT deve ser tido como lex

especialis em relação ao Artigo XIII:1. Ou seja, o Painel rejeitou o argumento de que o Artigo XIII:2(d)

representaria uma exceção ao disposto no Artigo XIII:1. Concluiu-se, nesse sentido, que por serem autorizadas

pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT, práticas de alocação de quotas tarifárias apenas a Membros com interesse

substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto não estão, necessariamente, em desconformidade com o

disposto no Artigo XIII:1.

Ademais, analisou-se a relação de frases constantes de um mesmo dispositivo. De acordo com o entendimento

firmado no relatório do Painel em EC – Bananas III, sobre a relação entre as duas frases constantes do Artigo

XIII:2(d) do GATT é de natureza subsidiária. Segundo esse posicionamento, primeiro o Membro importador

deve tentar buscar firmar acordos com todos os Membros que tiverem interesse substancial no fornecimento de

um determinado produto. Caso conclua-se que chegar a um acordo não é praticável, o Membro importador

deverá alocar quotas tarifárias em observância ao disposto na segunda frase do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT.

Ademais, concluiu-se que não é permissível firmar acordos com apenas determinados Membros que tenham

interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto.

A relação do Artigo XIII com outros Artigos do GATT também foi objeto de análise. Por exemplo, o DSB

firmou o entendimento de que o Artigo I do GATT prevê regra geral de não-discriminação. O Artigo XIII:1, por

sua vez, também reflete o mesmo princípio, porém com abrangência restrita à administração de quotas tarifárias.

Ou seja, trata-se de norma de natureza mais específica.

Outra questão controversa analisada foi o tratamento concedido a Membros que não têm interesse no

fornecimento de determinados produtos. Em EC – Bananas III, o Painel concluiu que se, por ventura, um

Membro optar por alocar quotas tarifárias a Membros que não tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de

determinado produto, tais quotas devem ser estendidas a todos os Membros enquadrados nessa categoria.

Também discutiu-se se a alocação de quotas tarifárias a Estados que não sejam Membros da OMC seria vedada,

por força do Artigo XIII:2 do GATT. A esse respeito, o Painel em EC – Poultry posicionou-se no sentido de que

o Artigo XIII:2 do GATT não obriga Membros a calcularem quotas tarifárias exclusivamente com base em

importações oriundas de outros Membros. Portanto, concluiu-se que alocações de quotas tarifárias a Membros

que não sejam Membros da OMC não seriam vedadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT.

Também foi objeto de análise a relação do Artigo XIII com dispositivos constantes de outros acordos da OMC.

Por exemplo, em US – Pipe Line, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo XIII do GATT deve ser observado para fins da

imposição de medidas de salvaguarda. Para tanto, constatou-se que não há disposição expressa no Acordo de

Salvaguardas que autorize expressamente Membros a agirem em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo

XIII. No mesmo precedente, o Painel considerou as consequências políticas e jurídicas da eventual

inaplicabilidade do Artigo XIII do GATT ao contexto da imposição das medidas de salvaguarda. Também em

US – Pipe Line, o Painel concluiu que a imposição de medidas de salvaguarda em dissonância com padrões

históricos de fluxos internacionais de comércio estaria em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:2,

caput, do GATT. Por consequência, concluiu-se que o referido dispositivo deve ser observado por Membros que

impõem medidas de salvaguarda.

O DSB também analisou a relação entre o Artigo XIII do GATT e as normas constantes do Acordo sobre

Agricultura. A esse respeito, destacam-se dois entendimentos firmados em EC – Bananas III. Primeiro, o DSB

concluiu que o Acordo sobre Agricultura não prevê expressamente a alocação de quotas tarifárias específicas

para cada país em relação a produtos agrícolas. De acordo com o posicionamento do DSB, se essa fosse a

intenção dos negociadores, haveria previsão específica a esse respeito no Acordo sobre Agricultura. Em

segundo lugar, o DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT aplica-se aos

compromissos de acesso a mercado relacionado a produtos agrícolas, exceto se previsto expressamente em

sentido contrário no Acordo sobre Agricultura.

Por fim, cumpre destacar a mudança de entendimento em relação à extensão do Lomé Waiver ao disposto no

Artigo XIII. Inicialmente, em EC – Bananas III, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de que o Lomé Waiver se

116

estenderia não apenas ao disposto no Artigo I:1 do GATT, mas também ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT.

Todavia, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel. De acordo com o entendimento do

Órgão de Apelação, o Lomé Waiver não implica dispensa do cumprimento de obrigações previstas no Artigo

XIII do GATT. Ao reverter o entendimento adotado pelo Painel, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que o referido

waiver não contém nenhuma referência ao GATT 1994. O entendimento do Órgão de Apelação também pautou-

se nas circunstâncias envolvidas na negociação do Lomé Waiver. Levando-se em consideração os objetivos dos

negociadores do referido waiver, concluiu-se que não haveria fundamentos sólidos que permitissem estender o

escopo do Lomé Waiver ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT.

117

Artigo XIV

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XIV

Exceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination

14.1 A contracting party which applies restrictions under Article XII or under Section B of Article XVIII

may, in the application of such restrictions, deviate from the provisions of Article XIII in a manner

having equivalent effect to restrictions on payments and transfers for current international

transactions which that contracting party may at that time apply under Article VIII or XIV of the

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or under analogous provisions of a

special exchange agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XV.

14.2 A contracting party which is applying import restrictions under Article XII or under Section B of

Article XVIII may, with the consent of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, temporarily deviate from

the provisions of Article XIII in respect of a small part of its external trade where the benefits to the

contracting party or contracting parties concerned substantially outweigh any injury which may

result to the trade of other contracting parties.

14.3 The provisions of Article XIII shall not preclude a group of territories having a common quota in the

International Monetary Fund from applying against imports from other countries, but not among

themselves, restrictions in accordance with the provisions of Article XII or of Section B of Article

XVIII on condition that such restrictions are in all other respects consistent with the provisions of

Article XIII.

14.4 A contracting party applying import restrictions under Article XII or under Section B of Article

XVIII shall not be precluded by Articles XI to XV or Section B of Article XVIII of this Agreement

from applying measures to direct its exports in such a manner as to increase its earnings of currencies

which it can use without deviation from the provisions of Article XIII.

14.5 A contracting party shall not be precluded by Articles XI to XV, inclusive, or by Section B of Article

XVIII, of this Agreement from applying quantitative restrictions:

(a) having equivalent effect to exchange restrictions authorized under Section 3 (b) of Article

VII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or

(b) under the preferential arrangements provided for in Annex A of this Agreement, pending the

outcome of the negotiations referred to therein.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

NÃO TEM DECISÃO

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

118

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XIV

III. Comentário

119

Artigo XV

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XV

Exchange Arrangements

15.1 The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation with the International Monetary Fund to the

end that the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated policy with regard

to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions of quantitative restrictions

and other trade measures within the jurisdiction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

15.2 In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or deal with

problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements,

they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such consultations, the

CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the

Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the

determination of the Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in

accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with the terms of

a special exchange agreement between that contracting party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

The CONTRACTING PARTIES in reaching their final decision in cases involving the criteria set

forth in paragraph 2 (a) of Article XII or in paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the

determination of the Fund as to what constitutes a serious decline in the contracting party’s monetary

reserves, a very low level of its monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase in its monetary

reserves, and as to the financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such cases.

15.3 The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek agreement with the Fund regarding procedures for

consultation under paragraph 2 of this Article.

15.4 Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate* the intent of the provisions of this

Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the

International Monetary Fund.

15.5 If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider, at any time, that exchange restrictions on payments and

transfers in connection with imports are being applied by a contracting party in a manner inconsistent

with the exceptions provided for in this Agreement for quantitative restrictions, they shall report

thereon to the Fund.

15.6 Any contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall, within a time to be determined by the

CONTRACTING PARTIES after consultation with the Fund, become a member of the Fund, or,

failing that, enter into a special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES. A

contracting party which ceases to be a member of the Fund shall forthwith enter into a special

exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Any special exchange agreement entered

into by a contracting party under this paragraph shall thereupon become part of its obligations under

this Agreement.

15.7 (a) A special exchange agreement between a contracting party and the CONTRACTINg

PARTIES under paragraph 6 of this Article shall provide to the satisfaction of the

CONTRACTING PARTIES that the objectives of this Agreement will not be frustrated as a

result of action in exchange matters by the contracting party in question.

(b) The terms of any such agreement shall not impose obligations on the contracting party in

exchange matters generally more restrictive than those imposed by the Articles of Agreement

of the International Monetary Fund on members of the Fund.

120

15.8 A contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall furnish such information within the

general scope of section 5 of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary

Fund as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may require in order to carry out their functions under this

Agreement.

15.9 Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude:

(a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance

with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or with that contracting

party’s special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, or

(b) the use by a contracting party of restrictions or controls in imports or exports, the sole effect

of which, additional to the effects permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII and XIV, is to make

effective such exchange controls or exchange restrictions.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XV

Acordos em Matéria de Câmbio

15.1 As Partes Contratantes se esforçarão por colaborar com o Fundo Monetário Internacional, a fim de

promover uma política coordenada no que se refere às questões de câmbio, dentro da competência do

Fundo e as questões de restrições quantitativas ou outras medidas comerciais, dentro da competência

das Partes Contratantes,

15.2 Em todos os casos em que as Partes Contratantes forem chamadas a examinar ou a resolver

problemas relativos às reservas monetárias, à balança de pagamentos ou aos sistemas e acordos de

câmbio, entrarão em ligação estreita com o Fundo Monetário Internacional. No decorrer dessas

consultas, as Partes Contratantes aceitarão todas as constatações de fato, de ordem estatística ou de

outra que lhes forem comunicadas pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional em matéria de câmbio, de

reservas monetárias e de balança de pagamento; e todas as conclusões do Fundo sobre a

conformidade das medidas tomadas por uma Parte Contratante em matéria de câmbio, com os

Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional ou com as disposições de um acordo especial de câmbio

concluído entre essa Parte Contratante e as Partes Contratantes. Quando tiver que tomar sua decisão

final nos casos em que entrem em linha de conta os critérios estabelecidos no § 2 (a) do Artigo XII

ou no parágrafo 9 do Artigo XVIII, as Partes Contratantes aceitarão as conclusões do Fundo

Monetário Internacional sobre a questão de saber se as reservas monetárias da Parte Contratante

sofreram uma baixa importante, se se acham em nível muito baixo ou se se elevaram segundo um

quociente de crescimento razoável, assim como sobre os aspectos financeiros dos outros problemas

aos quais se estendam as consultas em semelhante caso.

15.3 As Partes Contratantes procurarão um acordo com o Fundo Monetário Internacional a respeito do

processo de consulta prevista no § 2 da presente Artigo.

15.4 As Partes Contratantes abster-se-ão de qualquer medida cambial que possa frustrar os objetivos

considerados no presente Acordo e de qualquer medida comercial que possa frustrar os objetivos

visados pelos Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional.

15.5 Se a qualquer momento as Partes Contratantes considerarem que uma das partes aplica restrições

cambiais que incidem sobre os pagamentos e as transferências relativas às importações de modo

incompatível com as exceções previstas no presente Acordo no que se refere às restrições

quantitativas, encaminharão ao Fundo Monetário Internacional um relatório a esse respeito.

15.6 Toda Parte Contratante que não for membro do Fundo Monetário Internacional deverá, dentro de um

prazo a ser fixado pelas Partes Contratantes. após consulta ao Fundo Monetário Internacional, tornar-

se membro do Fundo, ou senão, concluir com as Partes Contratantes um acordo especial sobre

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câmbio. A Parte Contratante que deixar de ser membro do Fundo Monetário Internacional concluirá

imediatamente com as Partes Contratantes um Acordo especial de câmbio. Qualquer acordo especial

sobre câmbio concluído por uma Parte Contratante em virtude do presente parágrafo, fará, logo após

sua conclusão, parte dos compromissos assumidos por essa Parte Contratante nos termos do presente

acordo.

15.7 (a) Qualquer acordo especial de câmbio, concluído entre uma Parte Contratante e as Partes

Contratantes em virtude do § 6 do presente Artigo, conterá as disposições que as Partes

Contratantes acharem necessárias para que as medidas tomadas em matéria de câmbio pela

Parte Contratante em questão não contrariem o presente acordo.

(b) Os termos de tal acordo não imporão à Parte Contratante, em matéria de câmbio, obrigações

mais restritivas no seu conjunto que as impostas pelos Estatutos do Fundo Monetário

Internacional a seus próprios membros.

15.8 A Parte Contratante que não for membro do Fundo Monetário Internacional fornecerá às Partes

Contratantes as informações que elas possam pedir dentro do quadro geral da Seção 5 do Artigo VIII

dos Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional, com o fim de desempenhar as funções que lhes

atribui o presente acordo.

15.9 Nada neste Acordo impedirá:

(a) O recurso, por uma Parte Contratante, aos controles ou a restrições cambiais, de acordo com

os Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional ou com o acordo especial sobre câmbio

concluído entre aquela Parte Contratante e as Partes Contratantes;

(b) nem o recurso, por uma Parte Contratante, a restrições ou a medidas de controle incidindo

sobre importações ou exportações cujo único efeito sem prejuízo dos fins autorizados pelos

Artigos XI, XII, XIII e XIV, seja dar eficácia às medidas de controle ou restrições cambiais

dessa natureza.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

• Parágrafo 1 – “Deverão se esforçar” seria melhor do que “se esforçarão” para “shall seek”.

• Parágrafo 2 – Ao invés de “entrarão em ligação estreita”¸seria melhor “sempre deverão consultar”, no caso

de “shall fully consult”. “Deverão aceitar”, ao invés de “aceitarão”. Melhor sugestão de pontuação para o trecho

grifado, a seguir: “de reservas monetárias, de balança de pagamentos e todas as conclusões do Fundo”. A

expressão “em que entrem em linha de conta” não é usual, recomenda-se “que envolvam” somente. Novamente,

sugere-se “deverão aceitar”. Ao invés de “baixa importante”, sugere-se “queda significativa”. Por fim, o trecho

final do parágrafo está com uma redação estranha, sugerindo a seguinte redação: “se encontram num nível muito

baixo ou se possuem uma taxa razoável de crescimento, bem como sobre os aspectos financeiros de outras

questões relacionadas às consultas em casos similares”.

• Parágrafo 3 – “Deverão procurar” seria melhor do que “procurarão”, no caso de “shall seek”. “Prevista” está

errado, deveria ser “previsto”, já que se refere ao processo.

• Parágrafo 4 – Sugere-se nova redação a esse importante dispositivo do GATT: “As partes contratantes não

deverão, por meio de ações relacionadas ao câmbio [exchange action], frustrar o propósito dos dispositivos do

GATT nem, por ação de comércio, o propósito dos dispositivos dos Artigos do Acordo do FMI”.

• Parágrafo 5 – Ao invés de “encaminharão”, sugere-se “deverão encaminhar”, para a expressão “shall report”.

• Parágrafo 6 – Ao invés de “concluirá”, sugere-se “deverá concluir”.

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• Parágrafo 7 – (a) “§6” ao invés de “§6”. “Deverá conter” ao invés de “conterá”. Sugere-se “ações

relacionadas ao câmbio” ao invés de “medidas tomadas em matéria de câmbio”; (b) “não deverão impor” ao

invés de “não imporão”. Também sugere-se “ações relacionadas ao câmbio” ao invés de “em matéria de

câmbio”. Por fim, sugere-se “em seu conjunto do que” ao invés de “no seu conjunto que”.

• Parágrafo 8 – Ao invés de “fornecerão”, recomenda-se “deverão fornecer”, para “shall furnish”.

• Parágrafo 9 – Sugere-se para o trecho grifado: “efeito, além dos fins autorizados pelos (...)”.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XV

1. Taxa de Câmbio como Extrapolação dos Compromissos assumidos na Agenda de um Membro

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

para. 7.106

Para. 7.106. “Honduras claims that the foreign exchange fee as an “other duty or charge” is inconsistent with

Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. The Dominican Republic contends that the fee is an exchange restriction

justified under Article XV:9(a). It states that should the Panel find to the contrary, it is nevertheless consistent

with Article II:1(b) since it was recorded in the Schedule. Given its terms of reference and in light of the

parties' claims and arguments during the proceedings, the Panel considers it necessary to examine the matter by

analysing the following legal issues: (i) whether the foreign exchange fee is an ODC as recorded in the

Schedule; (ii) whether the foreign exchange fee is inconsistent with Article II:1(b); (iii) whether the foreign

exchange fee is an “exchange restriction” under Article XV:9(a); (iv) whether the fee is imposed “in accordance

with” Articles of Agreement of the IMF; and (v) whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the

GATT.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.116-122

Para. 7.116. “On the issue of whether the foreign exchange fee as an ODC has been recorded in the Schedules

of Concessions of the Dominican Republic, the Panel notes that the parties made essentially the same arguments

as they did on the issue of whether the surcharge measure has been recorded in the Schedule. The Panel

therefore considers that the same analysis the Panel made with respect to the recording of the surcharge measure

in paragraphs 7.37 to 7.40 also applies to the recording of the foreign exchange although the Panel notes that the

foreign exchange fee did exist at the level of 1.5 per cent as of 15 April 1994.”

Para. 7.117. “Therefore, the Panel's overall factual assessment with respect to the recording of the foreign

exchange fee measure is that the foreign exchange fee was applied at 1.5 per cent in 1994, but it was not

recorded in the Schedule. What the Dominican Republic notified in document G/SP/3 was basically the products

list and the ad valorem Selective Consumption Tax rates as applied to these imported products under Law 11-92

in force in 1994. It is clear that in fact these products were only subject to the Selective Consumption Tax, not to

an equal amount of additional “other duties and charges” back in 1994.”

123

Para. 7.118. “The Panel has found in paragraph 7.40 that the Dominican Republic has actually recorded in its

Schedule the Selective Consumption Tax as it applied to imported products as of 15 April 1994. The fact that

the Selective Consumption Tax applied both to imported and domestic products makes it clear that it is in the

nature of an internal tax. Article II:2(a) and Article II:1(b) make a distinction between an internal tax that is

subject to Article III and an ODC that is subject to a bound requirement with the consequence that the two are

mutually exclusive. If a measure is in the nature of an internal tax, it is not an ODC. If a measure is in the nature

of an ODC, it is not an internal tax. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Dominican Republic has not

established that the nature of the measure recorded in the Schedule of the Dominican Republic is an ODC

measure within the meaning of Article II:1(b) that could be invoked to justify the current ODC measure, the

foreign exchange fee.”

Para. 7.119. “The Panel also considers that Honduras’s challenge to the nature of the recorded measure is not

prohibited by paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Understanding or by the fact of absence of invocation of the

Understanding in its Panel request based on the same analysis as developed by the Panel in paragraphs 7.67,

7.71 and 7.78.”

Para. 7.120. “The Panel recalls that the foreign exchange fee is applied to all imported products, well beyond

the selective products list in the G/SP/3 notification. As the Panel found in paragraph 7.103, the foreign

exchange fee as applied to products outside the scope of the products listed in the G/SP/3 notification, is within

the Panel's terms of reference.”

Para. 7.121. “The Panel concludes for the reasons set out above, that there was no legally valid recording of any

ODC measure as required by the Understanding in the Schedule of the Dominican Republic. For all legal and

practical purposes, what was notified by the Dominican Republic in document G/SP/3 is equivalent to “zero” in

the Schedule. The Panel finds that the foreign exchange fee is therefore applied in excess of the level of “zero”

pursuant to the Schedule of the Dominican Republic and therefore is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the

GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.122. “The Panel also considers that the application of foreign exchange fee to products other than those

products listed in the G/SP/3 notification is in excess of the level of “zero” or “none” pursuant to the Schedule

of the Dominican Republic, since nothing was recorded for these products, either as an ODC or otherwise.”

2. Relação do Artigo XV:2 com as Regras do FMI

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/AB/R e

WT/DS56/AB/R/Corr.1, paras. 84-85

Para. 84. “The only provision of the WTO Agreement that requires consultations with the IMF is Article XV:2

of the GATT 1994. This provision requires the WTO to consult with the IMF when dealing with “problems

concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements”.”

Para. 85. “As in the WTO Agreement, there are no provisions in the Agreement Between the IMF and the WTO

that require a panel to consult with the IMF in a case such as this. Under paragraph 8 of this latter Agreement, in

a case involving “exchange measures within the Fund’s jurisdiction”, the IMF “shall inform in writing the

relevant WTO body (including dispute settlement panels) (…) whether such measures are consistent with the

Articles of Agreement of the Fund.” This case does not, however, involve “exchange measures within the

Fund’s jurisdiction”. Paragraph 8 also provides that the IMF “may communicate its views in writing on matters

of mutual interest to the [WTO] or any of its organs or bodies (excluding the WTO’s dispute settlement panels)

(…)” (emphasis added). Evidently, the IMF has not been authorized to provide its views to a WTO dispute

124

settlement panel on matters not relating to exchange measures within its jurisdiction, unless it is requested to do

so by a panel under Article 13 of the DSU.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

paras. 149, 151-152

Para. 149. “On the basis of these provisions, the Panel submitted to the IMF a number of questions regarding

India’s balance-of-payments situation. The Panel gave considerable weight to the views expressed by the IMF in

its reply to these questions. However, nothing in the Panel Report supports India’s argument that the Panel

delegated to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective assessment of the matter. A careful reading of the

Panel Report makes clear that the Panel did not simply accept the views of the IMF. The Panel critically

assessed these views and also considered other data and opinions in reaching its conclusions.”

Para. 151. “We conclude that the Panel made an objective assessment of the matter before it. Therefore, we do

not agree with India that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.”

Para. 152. “The question whether Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994 requires panels to consult with the IMF and

to consider as dispositive specific determinations of the IMF was debated at length by the parties before the

Panel. However, the Panel did not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this dispute, to decide this issue. As

this finding of the Panel is not appealed, we abstain from taking any position on it.”

3. Relação do Artigo XV:9 (a) com as Regras do FMI

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

para. 1.8

Para. 1.8. “Pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 8 of the 1996 Agreement between the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization, the Panel, on 17 May 2004, requested the IMF to provide

information on how the “Comisión Cambiaria a las Importaciones” (previously called “Comisión de Cambio”

and originally introduced by the Monetary Board of the Dominican Republic's Central Bank on 24 January

1991) is being implemented by the Dominican Republic. The Panel also requested the IMF to provide its views

on whether the “Comisión Cambiaria a las Importaciones”, as applied by the Dominican Republic, is considered

to be an “exchange control” or “exchange restriction” under the Articles of Agreement of the International

Monetary Fund. On 25 June 2004 the IMF sent its response to the Panel. (1) The letter from the IMF was

circulated to Parties and the Panel invited Parties to make comments. Honduras made some comments and the

Dominican Republic did not submit any comments.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

para. 7.123

125

Para. 7.123. “The Dominican Republic argues that the foreign exchange fee is an exchange measure justified by

Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994. The Dominican Republic considers that Article XV:9(a) is an exception to

other provisions of the GATT, including Article II. In its view, Members are entitled to use exchange controls or

exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.138-7.146

Paras. 7.138. “The Panel takes note of the argument made by the Dominican Republic that the foreign exchange

fee is approved by the IMF as a part of the stand-by arrangement between the IMF and therefore it is in

accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. (2) The Panel notes that paragraph 2 of Article XV

provides that:

In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or

deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign

exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund.

In such consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of

statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange,

monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the determination of the

Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance

with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with the terms

of a special exchange arrangement between that contracting party and the

CONTRACTING PARTIES.... (emphasis added)

Paras. 7.139. “The Panel considered during the proceedings that it needed to seek more information on the

precise legal nature and status of the foreign exchange fee measure in the stand-by arrangement between the

IMF and the Dominican Republic. Secondly, since the Dominican Republic argues that the fee is an exchange

restriction and it is imposed in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Panel considered that

it needed to consult with the IMF based on paragraph 2 of Article XV to verify such an argument for a

determination by the Panel on whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT. The core

issue in this regard is whether the foreign exchange measure constitutes an “exchange restriction” in the package

of the stand-by arrangement. If the answer is positive, the next issue then is whether the foreign exchange fee is

“in accordance with” the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and hence justified under Article XV:9(a) of the

GATT 1994.”

Paras. 7.140. “The Panel is also aware of the provision in paragraph 8 of the 1996 Agreement between the

International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization that “The Fund shall inform in writing the

relevant WTO body (including dispute settlement panels) considering exchange measures within the Fund's

jurisdiction whether such measures are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund”.”

Paras. 7.141. “The Panel also recalls a similar situation in Argentina – Textiles, where an ad valorem statistical

tax was imposed allegedly for fiscal performance purposes so as to obtain IMF financing to deal with a financial

crisis. That panel in that instance did not consult with the IMF. The Appellate Body considered that that panel

had good reason for not consulting the IMF because the statistical tax was not one of the “problems concerning

monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements”. However, it nevertheless stated

that “it might perhaps have been useful for the Panel to have consulted with the IMF on the legal character of

the relationship or arrangement between Argentina and the IMF in this case”. (3)

Paras. 7.142. “Bearing these considerations in mind, the Panel requested information on 17 May 2004 from the

IMF on the following two issues: (i) how the foreign exchange fee is being implemented by the Dominican

126

Republic; (ii) whether the foreign exchange fee as currently applied by the Dominican Republic is an “exchange

control” or “exchange restriction” under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.”

Paras. 7.143. “On the first issue, the IMF General Counsel replied that:

(a) The 'exchange commission' is levied under the legal authority of the Banco Central

de la República Dominicana (BCRD). Since its introduction in January 1991, the

commission has undergone a number of changes in the way that it is levied. Initially,

the commission was payable on sales of foreign exchange and was calculated as a

percentage of the selling rate.

(b) Since August 2002, however, pursuant to the Agreement between the BCRD and

the Directorate General for Customs (DGC) of August 22, 2002, the commission has

been collected in its entirety by the DGC. Moreover, although the commission is still

referred to as an “exchange commission” (because it is levied on the basis of the legal

authority vested in the BCRD to charge a commission on sales of foreign exchange),

the commission is no longer payable on sales of foreign exchange. Rather, it is

payable as a condition for the importation of goods, and the amount of the

commission is now calculated exclusively on the CIF valuation of the imported goods

as determined by the DGC (Article 1 of the Agreement between the BCRD and the

DGC). By Notice of Resolution nº 1 of the Monetary Board of October 22, 2003,

the rate of the commission was increased to ten per cent in October 2003.” (4)

Paras. 7.144. “On the second issue that the Panel requested information on, the reply states:

As applied since August 2002, the exchange commission is no longer a measure

subject to Fund approval. As noted above, the commission is no longer payable on

sales of foreign exchange. It is payable as a condition for the importation of goods and

the amount to be paid is based on the CIF value of the imported goods (rather than the

amount of foreign exchange sold to an importer for the payment of goods). As such, it

does not constitute a multiple currency practice or an exchange restriction

notwithstanding its label or the fact that the commission is charged on the basis of the

legal authority vested in the BCRD to charge an exchange commission on sales of

foreign exchange. For the same reasons, it is not an exchange control

measure.”(emphasis added)

Paras. 7.145. “The Panel fully agrees with the opinion of the IMF. For the reasons set out above by the Panel

and considering the opinion expressed by the IMF, the Panel finds that the foreign exchange fee measure as it is

currently applied by the Dominican Republic does not constitute an “exchange restriction” within the meaning

of Article XV: 9(a) of the GATT 1994.”

Paras. 7.146. “Whether the fee is imposed “in accordance with” Articles of Agreement of the IMF:

(a) Arguments of the parties

The Dominican Republic argues that the foreign exchange fee is applied in

accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund as provided in Article

XV:9(a). On 29 August 2003, The Dominican Republic concluded a stand-by

arrangement with the Fund by which the Dominican Republic enforced, inter alia, a

non-unified exchange rate system. The stand-by arrangement incorporated

performance criteria calling for full unification of the dual exchange system by the

end of 2003. The Fund approved the non-unified exchange rate system. However, due

to its economic performance, the Dominican Republic was unable to fulfil its

commitments made in the stand-by arrangement with the Fund and requested a waiver

from the Fund in January 2004 for non-observance of the performance criteria, inter

alia, on the unification of the foreign exchange market and for the continuous

performance criteria regarding exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency

practices. The Dominican Republic submits that the Executive Board of the Fund

completed its first review and the Dominican Republic understands that the Fund

approved the “exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practices”. The foreign

exchange fee as an exchange rate restriction, or multiple currency practice, is applied

by the Dominican Republic “in accordance with” the Fund Articles of Agreement.

Therefore, in the opinion of the Dominican Republic, it is permitted under Article

XV:9(a) of the GATT.”

127

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.150-7.155

Para. 7.150. “In fact, the reply of the IMF General Counsel concludes that since the foreign exchange

commission does not constitute an exchange restriction, “the issue of its consistency or inconsistency with the

Funds Articles for purpose of paragraph 8 of the Co-operation Agreement does not arise”. The Panel fully

agrees with this statement.”

Para. 7.151. “The Panel considers that even if the foreign exchange fee does constitute an “exchange

restriction”, Article XV:9(a) requires that it has to be applied “in accordance with” Articles of Agreement of the

IMF. In light of the parties' arguments in this regard, the Panel will analyse whether the Dominican Republic

has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the foreign exchange fee is “in accordance with” the Articles of

Agreement of the IMF.”

Para. 7.152. “The Dominican Republic refers only to an IMF news release. The Panel has not been presented

with a copy of the formal Decision made by IMF. The Dominican Republic referred to this decision as a

“waiver”. It is not clear which provision of the IMF Articles of Agreement is the legal basis of the waiver and

what is the legal basis to establish that the waiver was made in accordance with the Articles of Agreement. The

Dominican Republic confirmed in its replies to questions that the waiver will be valid for three months. (5) As a

result, the legal status of the waiver after the three-month period is not clear to the Panel.”

Para. 7.153. “On the substance of the IMF news release, the meaning of the language that the IMF “approved

the Dominican Republic's request to waive the non-observance of (...) continuous performance criteria

concerning (...) exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practice” is not self-evident. Does it mean that

the IMF waived the obligation for the Dominican Republic to completely unify the dual exchange markets and

to form one unified exchange rate? Is the foreign exchange fee one component of the “exchange rate

restrictions”? The Panel considers that the foreign exchange fee measure is independent of the dual exchange

rates system. Even before the dual exchange rates are unified, the foreign exchange fee can be eliminated

without changing the dual exchange rate system. It is also true that, even after the dual exchange rates are

unified, the foreign exchange fee can still be imposed without changing the unified exchange rate market.”

Para. 7.154. “For these reasons, the Panel finds that the IMF waiver decision does not constitute a legal basis

for the application of the foreign exchange fee measure and the Dominican Republic has not demonstrated that

the foreign exchange fee is applied “in accordance with” the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.”

Whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994

Para. 7.155. “The Panel considers that Article XV:9(a) as an exception provision has to be invoked and proved

by the Dominican Republic to justify the inconsistency of the foreign exchange fee measure with the second

sentence of Article II:1(b). As the Panel has already found that the measure does not constitute an “exchange

restriction” within the meaning of Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994 and that the Dominican Republic has not

demonstrated that it is “in accordance with” the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Panel concludes that the

foreign exchange fee is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) and can not be justified under Article XV:9(a) of the

GATT 1994.”

4. Conceito de “Exchange restriction” de acordo com o Artigo XV:9 (a)

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.124- 7.125

128

Paras. 7.124. “The Dominican Republic also argues that the foreign exchange fee is an “exchange restriction”

because of the following features: it is prescribed by monetary authorities, not by trade or customs authorities; it

applies to exchange actions, not to import transactions as such; and it is a charge on foreign exchange

transactions imposed through the banking system, not a charge on import transactions levied by customs

authorities. (6)”

Paras. 7.125. “The Dominican Republic considers that the meaning of exchange restrictions is to be interpreted

by the IMF. In this regard, it reminds the Panel of a Decision made by the Executive Directors of the Fund on 1

June 1960 stating that “[t]he guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a restriction on payments

and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII, Section 2, is whether it involves a direct governmental

limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such”. (7) The Dominican Republic considers that the

criterion for identifying an “exchange restriction” does not involve the motive behind a measure or the effect it

produces. (8) The Dominican Republic considers that the foreign exchange fee is an “exchange restriction”

because paragraph 12 of the Resolution of 24 January 1991 provides that the Central Bank will levy a

percentage on foreign exchange transactions. (9)

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.132

Paras. 7.132. “The Panel is also aware of the argument of the Dominican Republic that the criterion for

determining whether a measure is an “exchange restriction” is “whether it involves a direct governmental

limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such”, as set out by a Decision of the Executive Directors of

the Fund in 1960 and the fact that Honduras does not disagree with this criterion. The Panel considers that, since

Article XV:9 of the GATT exempts exchange restrictions measures that are applied in accordance with the Fund

Articles, from obligations under other Articles of the GATT, the guiding principle that the IMF prescribed as the

criterion for the determination of what constitutes an “exchange restriction” should be respected by this Panel.

Therefore, the Panel should apply this criterion in its evaluation of the measure before it.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.134- 7.137

Paras. 7.134. “The Panel considers it necessary to examine the specific aspects of the current foreign exchange

measure to determine whether it is in fact imposed solely on import-related exchange transactions. In this

regard, the Panel notes that the 1991 Resolution provides differently from that of the later Resolution.”

Paras. 7.135. “A reading of the 1991 Resolution reveals the nature of foreign exchange fee as it was applied in

1991. Paragraph 12 provides: “the Central Bank shall charge users of official foreign exchange transactions and

commercial banks, for the delegation of foreign exchange operations, the equivalent in Dominican Pesos (RD$)

of two and a half per cent (2-1/2%) of the selling exchange rate applied to each transaction”. This means that the

fee was originally imposed on foreign exchange transactions conducted in both official and private foreign

exchange markets through either the Central Bank or commercial banks. This Resolution actually required that

129

the foreign exchange fee be paid for all kinds of foreign currency transactions, including both selling and

purchasing transactions. This measure actually increased the cost for the use of foreign currency, for all kinds of

transactions regardless of whether the transaction was related to importation. The Panel considers that the

foreign exchange fee as it was applied in 1991 could be characterized as an exchange measure, as it is possible

that the IMF would deem the increase of cost for the availability of foreign exchange as a means of “restriction”

on the availability of the foreign currency. However, it is not necessary for the Panel to decide on the measure as

it was applied in 1991. The measure to be examined by the Panel for the resolution of the dispute is the currently

applied foreign exchange fee measure.”

Paras. 7.136. “With regard to the currently applied foreign exchange fee measure, the Panel notes that the

relevant provisions in the 1991 Resolution of the Monetary Board have been amended by later resolutions. On

the issue of whether the fee is imposed on all types of transactions or solely on import-related transactions, the

applicable rules are those under the Resolution of 20 August 2002. Paragraph 2 of this Resolution provides

“exchange commissions shall henceforth no longer be applied to external debt service payments, capital

repatriation, remittances of profits, technology transfers, sales for travel expenses and medical services, credit

cards and other services”. (10) The Dominican Republic confirms in its replies to a Panel question that “[t]he

foreign exchange fee applies only to importation of goods. It does not apply to foreign exchange payments of

non-import related services, nor to foreign currency payments made by Dominican Republic residents, nor to

remittance of dividends from companies located in the Dominican Republic”. (11)

Paras. 7.137. “The Panel considers that the ordinary meaning of the “direct limitation on availability or use of

exchange (...) as such” means a limitation directly on the use of exchange itself, which means the use of

exchange for all purposes. It cannot be interpreted in a way so as to permit the restriction on the use of

exchanges that only affects importation. To conclude otherwise would logically lead to the situation whereby

any WTO Member could easily circumvent obligations under Article II:1(b) by imposing a foreign currency fee

or charge on imports at the customs and then conveniently characterize it as an “exchange restriction”. Such

types of measures would seriously discriminate against imports while not necessarily being effective in

achieving the legitimate goals under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Therefore, the Panel finds that

because the fee as currently applied is imposed only on foreign exchange transactions that relate to the

importation of goods, and not on other types of transactions, it is not “a direct limitation on the availability or

use of exchange as such”.

5. Ônus de invocar o Artigo XV como Exceção ou Defesa Afirmativa

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of

Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.107 e 7.131

Para. 7.107. “As to the order of analysis of the claim made by Honduras and the defence made by the

Dominican Republic, the Panel considers it necessary to first examine the claim of inconsistency of the fee with

Article II:1(b). Both parties agree that Article XV of the GATT is an exception or an affirmative defence. The

Panel agrees with this characterization of Article XV. That means that it serves as a justification for

inconsistency with other provisions of the GATT. If there is no inconsistency with other GATT provisions in the

first place, there is no need to have recourse to any affirmative defence for justification. Therefore, the Panel

should begin its analysis with the claim under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.131. “The Panel takes note that both parties agree that Article XV of the GATT 1994 is an exception or

an affirmative defence. Although the two concepts are not identical, an exception can often be invoked as an

affirmative defence. It is well established that under an exception provision, the burden is on the defending party

to justify the consistency of its measure under the exception provision it invoked (12) Therefore, in this case, the

Dominican Republic bears the burden to establish: (i) that the foreign exchange fee measure is an “exchange

130

control or exchange restriction” within the meaning of Article XV:9(a); and (ii) that the measure is “in

accordance with” the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund”, as required by Article

XV:9(a).”

Footnote 1: Letter dated 25 June 2004 addressed to Chairman of the Panel, from the General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund,

in response to Panel request for information (See Annex D).

Footnote 2: First written submission of the Dominican Republic, 13 April 2004, paras. 199-201.

Footnote 3: Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles, para. 65.

Footnote 4: Letter from the General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund, Annex D, supra note 6.

Footnote 5: Replies of the Dominican Republic to questions addressed by the Panel, reply to question nº 63.

Footnote 6: Ibid., para. 93.

Footnote7: First written submission of the Dominican Republic, 13 April 2004, para. 94.

Footnote 8: Ibid.

Footnote 9: Replies of the Dominican Republic to questions addressed by the Panel, reply to question nº 58.

Footnote 10: The text of the First Resolution of the Monetary Board, dated 20 August 2002, was provided by Honduras as Exhibit

HOND-3(c).

Footnote 11: See, Replies of the Dominican Republic to questions addressed by the Panel, reply to question nº 9.

Footnote 12: For the reasoning of the Appellate Body, see Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirt and Blouses, pp. 15-16; Appellate

Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 104-105; Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 22-23; and Appellate Body Report,

Turkey – Textiles, para. 45.

III. Comentários

O Artigo XV do GATT, apesar de abordar o tema sensível do câmbio e de extrema relevância, não foi

interpretado pelo DSB em muitas disputas no âmbito da OMC. De acordo com a base de dados da OMC, o

referido dispositivo foi invocado como violado em apenas duas disputas, havendo interpretações do OSC

relevantes com relação à sua aplicação em não mais que três disputas. Não obstante, as interpretações realizadas

detêm sua relevância e foram aqui divididas por temas, quais sejam: (i) Taxa de câmbio como extrapolação dos

compromissos assumidos na Agenda de um Membro; (ii) Relação do Artigo XV:2 com as regras do FMI; (iii)

Relação do Artigo XV:9 com as regras do FMI, (iv) Conceito de “Exchange restriction” de acordo com o Artigo

XV:9 (a) e; finalmente, (v) Ônus de invocar o Artigo XV como exceção ou defesa afirmativa. Quanto ao

primeiro tema, o Painel na DS302 contribui para atentar para a importância de se observar os compromissos

assumidos na agenda do Membro, ao se analisar se a taxa de câmbio é uma violação ao GATT ou uma exceção

dentro do Artigo XV:9 (a).

Conforme metodologia adotada pelo Painel para analisar a referida violação (vide parágrafo 7.106 do relatório),

o primeiro passo é verificar se a medida em questão, no caso a taxa de câmbio é uma extrapolação dos

compromissos firmados na Agenda. Na disputa, o Painel entendeu que a taxa de câmbio implementada pela

República Dominicana foi aplicada em excesso, sendo inconsistente com o Artigo II:1(b) do GATT. A relação

do dispositivo com as regras do FMI é objeto do segundo e terceiro tema sugerido de análise, mais

especificamente com relação ao parágrafo XV:2 e XV:9 (a), respectivamente.

No que diz respeito ao primeiro parágrafo, denota-se que o Órgão de Apelação já entendeu que tal era o único

dispositivo da OMC que ilustra uma situação na qual uma consulta com o FMI se faz necessária, qual seja,

quando se considera questões como reservas monetárias, balança de pagamentos ou acordos cambiais. O

entendimento do Órgão de Apelação também demonstra que cabe aos Painéis decidir se na disputa se faz

necessário recorrer ao entendimento do FMI para questões específicas, como ocorrido em diversas disputas

(como DS90, DS302). No caso DS90, por exemplo, o Painel ponderou seriamente o entendimento do FMI, mas

não o considerou como determinante para realizar suas conclusões.

Já a relação do Artigo XV: 9 (a) com as regras do FMI foi mais discutida no âmbito do DSB. Como explanado

anteriormente, o dispositivo delimita a possibilidade dos Membros recorrerem a medidas cambiais de acordo

com as regras do FMI. Em suma, o entendimento dos Painéis nos referidos casos demonstra: (a) o recurso ao

entendimento do FMI por parte do DSB para embasar suas decisões relacionadas a assuntos cambiais; e, (b) a

necessidade de verificação de compatibilidade com as regras do FMI para que uma medida seja entendida como

uma restrição cambial e, em caso afirmativo, considerada como uma exceção legítima nos termos do Artigo

XV:9 (a).

131

Por esses motivos, verifica-se a importância de se compreender a medida cambial aplicada pelo Membro,

inclusive sob a égide das regras do FMI, para que o DSB possa deliberar sobre a sua compatibilidade com o

GATT. Interessante notar que os casos demonstram que, de fato, se a medida for tida como compatível com as

regras do FMI, também são compatíveis com a OMC, e vice-versa, conforme prevê o Artigo XV:9 (a).

A título de curiosidade, cabe apontar que o Artigo XV(4) (“as partes contratantes não deverão, por meio de

ações relacionadas ao câmbio [exchange action], frustrar o propósito dos dispositivos do GATT nem, por ação

de comércio, o propósito dos dispositivos dos Artigos do Acordo do FMI”) também indica uma atuação da

OMC de forma a atentar para as regras do FMI.

O quarto tema foca no conceito de “restrição cambial” nas interpretações promovidas pelo DSB. O Painel no

caso DS302 reforça a necessidade de compreensão da medida aplicada para se concluir se tal pode ser

considerada uma efetiva “restrição cambial” à luz da definição trazida pelo FMI. Por ela, entende-se uma

medida como tal quando envolve uma “limitação governamental direta na disponibilidade e utilização do

câmbio como tal”. Mais uma vez, é reforçada a necessidade de recorrer ao entendimento do FMI para que DSB

analise tais temas.

O quinto e último tema demonstra ser relevante o entendimento do Painel, também na DS302, quanto ao caráter

excepcional ou de defesa afirmativo do Artigo XV, uma vez que serve como justificativa para que uma medida

seja inconsistente com outro dispositivo do GATT. Caso não haja inconsistência com outro dispositivo do

GATT, não há, portanto, necessidade de se recorrer à exceção do Artigo XV. Logicamente, por seu caráter

excepcional, cabe à parte demandada justificar a consistência da medida, de acordo com o dispositivo de

exceção invocado, bem como de provar a sua compatibilidade com as regras do FMI, tal como exige o já

mencionado Artigo XV:9 (a).

Por fim, diante do atual cenário de intensa discussão sobre a interferência do câmbio no comércio internacional,

ousa-se dizer que os dispositivos da OMC que tratam da questão cambial tal como o Artigo XV do GATT

ganham um papel ainda mais relevante na conjuntura da regulação do comércio exterior.

132

Artigo XVI

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XVI

Subsidies

Section A

Subsidies in General

16.1 If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price

support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce

imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of

the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity

of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the

circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious

prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such

subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other

contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of

limiting the subsidization.

Section B

Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies

16.2 The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy on the export

of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting,

may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement

of the objectives of this Agreement.

16.3 Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary

products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which

operates to increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be

applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of

world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such

trade in the product during a previous representative period, and any special factors which may have

affected or may be affecting such trade in the product.

16.4 Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting parties shall

cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other

than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower

than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31

December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that

existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies.

16.5 The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the provisions of this Article from

time to time with a view to examining its effectiveness, in the light of actual experience, in

promoting the objectives of this Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the

trade or interests of contracting parties.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

133

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XVI

III. Conclusão

134

Artigo XVII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XVII

State Trading Enterprises

17.1 (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise,

wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special

privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports,

act in a manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment

prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports and exports by

private traders.

(b) The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require that such

enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any such

purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price,

quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale,

and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in

accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases

or sales.

(c) No contracting party shall prevent any enterprise (whether or not an enterprise described in

subparagraph (a) of this paragraph) under its jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the

principles of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

17.2 The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to imports of products for immediate or

ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for resale or use in the production of

goods for sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting party shall accord to the trade of the

other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment.

17.3 The contracting parties recognize that their enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a) of this

article might be operated so as to create serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal

and mutually advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such obstacles are of importance to the

expansion of international trade.

17.4 (a) Contracting parties shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the products which are

imported into or exported from their territories by enterprises of the kind described in

paragraph 1 (a) of this article.

(b) A contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing an import monopoly of a

product, which is not the subject of a concession under Article II, shall, on the request of

another contracting party having a substantial trade in the product concerned, inform the

CONTRACTING PARTIES of the import mark-up on the product during a recent

representative period, or when it is not possible to do so, of the price charged on the resale of

the product.

(c) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party which has reason

to believe that its interest under this Agreement are being adversely affected by the

operations of an enterprise of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a), request the contracting

party establishing, maintaining or authorizing such enterprise to supply information about its

operations related to the carrying out of the provisions of this Agreement.

(d) The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to disclose

confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to

135

the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular

enterprises.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XVII

Empreendimentos Comerciais do Estado

17.1 (a) Cada Parte Contratante que funde ou mantenha uma empresa de Estado, seja onde for, ou

que conceda de direito ou de fato, a qualquer empresa privilégios exclusivos ou especiais

compromete-se a que essa empresa, em suas compras ou vendas que tenham por origem ou

por conseqüência importações ou exportações, se conforme ao princípio geral de não

discriminação adotado pelo presente Acordo para as medidas de natureza legislativa ou

administrativa relativas às importações ou exportações efetuadas pelos comerciantes

particulares.

(b) As disposições da alínea (a) do presente parágrafo deverão ser interpretadas como impondo a

essas empresas a obrigação, levadas devidamente em conta as outras disposições do presente

Acordo, de proceder às compras e vendas dessa natureza inspirando-se unicamente em

considerações de ordem comercial, inclusive no que diz respeito ao preço, à qualidade, às

quantidades disponíveis, às possibilidades de venda, aos transportes e outras indicações de

compra ou venda, e como impondo a obrigação de oferecer às empresas de outras Partes

Contratantes todas as facilidades de livre concorrência nas vendas ou compras dessa

natureza, de acordo com as práticas comerciais usuais,

(c) Nenhuma Parte Contratante impedirá qualquer empresa quer se trate ou não de uma empresa

mencionada na alínea (a) do presente parágrafo sujeita à sua jurisdição, de agir de acordo

com os princípios enunciados nas alíneas (a) e (b) do presente parágrafo.

17.2 As disposições do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo não se aplicarão às importações de produtos

destinados a serem imediata ou finalmente consumidos pelos poderes públicos ou por sua conta e

não a serem revendidos ou a servirem à produção de mercadorias destinadas à venda. No que diz

respeito a tais importações, cada Parte Contratante concederá ao comércio das outras Partes

Contratantes um tratamento leal e equitativo.

17.3 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que os empreendimentos do gênero daqueles que são definidos

na alínea (a) do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo poderão ser utilizados de maneira que deles

resultem sérios entraves ao comércio; nestas condições, é importante, para assegurar o

desenvolvimento do comércio internacional, entabular negociações sobre uma base de reciprocidade

e de vantagens mútuas, a fim de limitar ou de reduzir esses entraves.

a) 17.4(a) As Partes Contratantes notificarão às Partes Contratantes os produtos que são

importados em seus territórios ou que deles são exportados por empreendimentos do gênero

daqueles que são definidos na alínea (a) do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo.

b) Qualquer Parte Contratante que estabelece, mantém ou autoriza um monopólio de

importação de um produto sobre o qual não foi outorgada concessão nos termos do Artigo 2,

deverá, a pedido de uma outra Parte Contratante que tenha um comércio substancial deste

produto, levar ao conhecimento das Partes Contratantes a majoração do preço de importação

do dito produto durante um período de referência recente ou, quando isto não for possível o

preço cobrado, na revenda deste produto.

c) As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma Parte Contratante que tenha razões para

crer que seus interesses no quadro do presente acordo estão sendo atingidos pelas operações

de um empreendimento do gênero daqueles que são definidos na alínea (a) do parágrafo

primeiro, convidar a Parte Contratante que estabelece, mantém ou autoriza um tal

136

empreendimento a fornecer sobre as operações do mencionado empreendimento as

informações referentes à execução do presente acordo.

d) As disposições do presente parágrafo não obrigarão uma Parte Contratante a revelar

informações confidenciais cuja divulgação oponha obstáculo à aplicação das leis seja

contrária ao interesse público ou prejudique os interesses comerciais legítimos de um

empreendimento.

II. Evolução da Interpretação do Painel/Órgão de Apelação

1. Princípios de Tratamento Não Discriminatório

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment

of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

para. 85

Para. 85. “Subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 contains a number of different elements, including both an

acknowledgement and an obligation. It recognizes that Members may establish or maintain State enterprises or

grant exclusive or special privileges to private enterprises, but requires that, if they do so, such enterprises must,

when they are involved in certain types of transactions (“purchases or sales involving either imports or

exports”), comply with a specific requirement. That requirement is to act consistently with certain principles

contained in the GATT 1994 (“general principles of non-discriminatory treatment … for governmental

measures affecting imports or exports by private traders”). Subparagraph (a) seeks to ensure that a Member

cannot, through the creation or maintenance of a State enterprise or the grant of exclusive or special privileges

to any enterprise, engage in or facilitate conduct that would be condemned as discriminatory under the GATT

1994 if such conduct were undertaken directly by the Member itself. In other words, subparagraph (a) is an

“anti-circumvention” provision.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

87

Para. 87. “This requirement, which lies at the core of subparagraph (a), is a requirement that STEs not engage

in certain types of discriminatory conduct. When viewed in the abstract, the concept of discrimination may

encompass both the making of distinctions between similar situations, as well as treating dissimilar situations in

a formally identical manner. The Appellate Body has previously dealt with the concept of discrimination and the

meaning of the term “non-discriminatory”, and acknowledged that, at least insofar as the making of distinctions

between similar situations is concerned, the ordinary meaning of discrimination can accommodate both drawing

distinctions per se, and drawing distinctions on an improper basis. Only a full and proper interpretation of a

provision containing a prohibition on discrimination will reveal which type of differential treatment is

prohibited. In all cases, a claimant alleging discrimination will need to establish that differential treatment has

occurred in order to succeed in its claim.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment

of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

para. 98 e nota de rodapé 104

137

Para. 98 e Nota de Rodapé 104. “As we have seen, through its reference to the “general principles of non-

discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports

by private traders”, Article XVII:1 imposes an obligation on Members not to use STEs in order to discriminate

in ways that would be prohibited if undertaken directly by Members. Yet even if Article XVII:1 itself did not

exist, this would not imply that STEs would be subject to no disciplines under the GATT 1994. For example, the

express provisions of Article II:4 of the GATT 1994 and the ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII

constrain the behaviour of STEs. Other provisions of the GATT 1994, notably Article VI, also apply to the

activities of STEs.

Nota 104: <http.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s7a_e.htm#ft104>). We need not identify, for purposes of this appeal, all

of the provisions of the GATT 1994 that may apply to STEs, nor consider how these disciplines interact with and reinforce each other.

We do, however, believe that these other provisions reveal that, even in 1947, the negotiators of the GATT created a number of

complementary requirements to address the different ways in which STEs could be used by a contracting party to seek to circumvent its

obligations under the GATT. The existence of these other provisions of the GATT 1994 also supports the view that Article XVII was

never intended to be the sole source of the disciplines imposed on STEs under that Agreement. This is also consistent with the view that

Article XVII:1 was intended to impose disciplines on one particular type of STE behaviour, namely discriminatory behaviour, rather than

to constitute a comprehensive code of conduct for STEs. Moreover, as the Panel observed, since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, a

number of additional obligations, under different covered agreements, operate to further constrain the behaviour of STEs.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

145

Para. 145. “(…) The disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at preventing certain types of discriminatory

behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting that provision as imposing comprehensive competition-law-type

obligations on STEs, as the United States would have us do.”

2. Preços Diferenciados por Razões Comerciais (Note Ad, XVII do GATT 1994)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

94

Para. 94. “(…) This ad Note is attached to Article XVII:1 as a whole, rather than to either subparagraph (a) or

subparagraph (b) alone. This sentence of the ad Note confirms that at least one type of differential treatment —

price differentiation — is consistent with Article XVII:1 provided that the reasons for such differential prices

are commercial in nature, and gives an example of such commercial reasons (“to meet conditions of supply and

demand in export markets”). Thus, this Note also contemplates that determining the consistency or

inconsistency of an STE’s conduct with Article XVII:1 will involve an examination of both differential

treatment and of commercial considerations.”

3. Relação entre os Subparágrafos (a) e (b)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

89

138

Para. 89. “(…) the question we are asked to consider is how subparagraph (a) relates to subparagraph (b) of

Article XVII:1. In our view, the answer to that inquiry is not found in the text of subparagraph (a). Rather, the

words that bear most directly on the relationship between the first two paragraphs of Article XVII:1 are found in

the opening phrase of subparagraph (b), which states that the “provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph

shall be understood to require that such enterprises shall (…)”. (emphasis added) This phrase makes it

abundantly clear that the remainder of subparagraph (b) is dependent upon the content of subparagraph (a), and

operates to clarify the scope of the requirement not to discriminate in subparagraph (a). (…) Thus, the opening

phrase in subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 supports Canada’s view that the principal source of the relevant

obligation(s) in Article XVII:1(a) and (b) is, indeed, found in “[t]he provisions of subparagraph (a)”.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

91

Para. 91. “Having examined the text of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1, it is our view that

subparagraph (b), by defining and clarifying the requirement in subparagraph (a), is dependent upon, rather than

separate and independent from, subparagraph (a). (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

paras. 99-100

Para. 99. “(…) subparagraphs (a) and (b) are necessarily related to each other. Subparagraph (a) is the general

and principal provision, and subparagraph (b) explains it by identifying types of differential treatment in

commercial transactions. It appears to us that these types of differential treatment would be the most likely to

occur in practice and, therefore, that most if not all cases under Article XVII:1 will involve an analysis of both

subparagraphs (a) and (b).”

Para. 100. “For all these reasons, we are of the view that subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994

sets out an obligation of non-discrimination, and that subparagraph (b) clarifies the scope of that obligation. We

therefore disagree with the United States that subparagraph (b) establishes separate requirements that are

independent of subparagraph (a).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

106 e nota de rodapé 115

139

Para. 106 e Nota de Rodapé 115. “Our conclusions regarding the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and

(b) imply that a panel confronted with a claim that an STE has acted inconsistently with Article XVII:1 will

need to begin its analysis of that claim under subparagraph (a), because it is that provision which contains the

principal obligation of Article XVII:1, namely the requirement not to act in a manner contrary to the “general

principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in [the GATT 1994] for governmental measures affecting

imports or exports by private traders.” At the same time, because both subparagraphs (a) and (b) define the

scope of that non-discrimination obligation, we would expect that panels, in most if not all cases, would not be

in a position to make any finding of violation of Article XVII:1 until they have properly interpreted and applied

both provisions.

Nota 115: <http.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s7a_e.htm#ft115>.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

109

Para. 109. “Thus, in each case it is the nature of the relationship between two provisions that will determine

whether there exists a mandatory sequence of analysis which, if not followed, would amount to an error of law.

In some cases, this relationship is such that a failure to structure the analysis in the proper logical sequence will

have repercussions for the substance of the analysis itself.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

paras. 110-111

Para. 110. “(…) a panel faced with a claim of inconsistency with Article XVII:1(a) and (b) will, in most if not

all cases, need to analyze and apply both provisions in order to assess the consistency of the measure at issue.

Subparagraph (b) sets forth two specific conditions with which an STE must comply if allegedly discriminatory

conduct falling, prima facie, within the scope of subparagraph (a) is to be found consistent with Article XVII:1.

Yet, in order to know whether the conditions in (b) are satisfied, a panel must know what constitutes the conduct

alleged to be inconsistent with the principles of non-discriminatory treatment in the GATT 1994. A panel will

need to identify at least the differential treatment at issue. The outcome of an assessment under subparagraph (b)

of whether the differential treatment is consistent with commercial considerations may depend, in part, upon

whether the alleged discrimination relates to pricing, quality, or conditions of sale, and whether it is

discrimination between export markets or some other form of discrimination.”

Para. 111. “It follows that, logically, a panel cannot assess whether particular practices of an allegedly

discriminatory nature accord with commercial considerations without first identifying the key elements of the

alleged discrimination. We emphasize that we are not suggesting that panels are always obliged to make specific

factual and legal findings with respect to each element of a claim of discrimination under subparagraph (a)

before undertaking any analysis under subparagraph (b). Rather, because a panel’s analysis and application of

subparagraph (b) to the facts of the case is, like subparagraph (b) itself, dependent on the obligation set forth in

subparagraph (a), panels must identify the differential treatment alleged to be discriminatory under

subparagraph (a) in order to ensure that they are undertaking a proper inquiry under subparagraph (b).”

140

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

paras. 124-125

Para. 124. “(…) although the Panel refrained from explicitly defining the relationship between the first two

subparagraphs of Article XVII:1, its approach was consistent with our interpretation of that relationship.”

Para. 125. “In sum, we find that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Panel did not err in not

considering the “proper” relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994,

or in proceeding to examine the consistency of the CWB Export Regime with Article XVII:1(b) without first

having found a breach of Article XVII:1(a) (…).”

4. “Considerações Comerciais” (Artigo XVII:1(b) GATT 1994)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

paras. 140-141

Para. 140. “(…) The Panel began its analysis by considering the meaning of the term “commercial

considerations” in subparagraph (b) and found that this term should be understood as meaning “considerations

pertaining to commerce and trade, or considerations which involve regarding purchases or sales ‘as mere

matters of business’.” The Panel also determined that the requirement that STEs act solely in accordance with

such considerations “must imply that they should seek to purchase or sell on terms which are economically

advantageous for themselves and/or their owners, members, beneficiaries, etc.” Thus, the Panel interpreted the

term “commercial considerations” as encompassing a range of different considerations that are defined in any

given case by the type of “business” involved (purchases or sales), and by the economic considerations that

motivate actors engaged in business in the relevant market(s).”

Para. 141. “The Panel then turned to address several arguments advanced by the United States with respect to

the interpretation of the first clause of subparagraph (b). It was in responding to the United States’ assertion that

the requirement that STEs act “solely in accordance with commercial considerations” is equivalent to a

requirement that STEs act like “commercial actors” that the Panel made the statement that “the requirement in

question is simply intended to prevent STEs from behaving like ‘political’ actors”. Yet in so doing the Panel

expressly stated that it was not, as the United States now suggests that it did, equating “non-commercial” actors

with political actors. (…).”

Relatório do Orgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

paras. 144-145

Para. 144. “(…) it is important to observe that the Panel’s interpretation of the term “commercial

considerations” necessarily implies that the determination of whether or not a particular STE’s conduct is

141

consistent with the requirements of the first clause of subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 must be undertaken on

a case-by-case basis, and must involve a careful analysis of the relevant market(s). We see no error in the

Panel’s approach; only such an analysis will reveal the type and range of considerations properly considered

“commercial” as regards purchases and sales made in those markets, as well as how those considerations

influence the actions of participants in the market(s).”

Para. 145. “At the same time, our interpretation of the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article

XVII:1 necessarily implies that (…) a panel inquiring whether an STE has acted solely in accordance with

commercial considerations must undertake this inquiry with respect to the market(s) in which the STE is alleged

to be engaging in discriminatory conduct. Subparagraph (b) does not give panels a mandate to engage in a

broader inquiry into whether, in the abstract, STEs are acting “commercially”. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

146

Para. 146. “(…) For the United States, because commercial actors naturally conduct their business on the basis

of commercial considerations, the first clause of Article XVII:1(b) necessarily must prevent an STE from using

its privileges in a way that creates serious obstacles to trade and disadvantages such commercial actors. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, (WT/DS276/AB/R),

para. 149

Para. 149. “(…) the Panel’s approach emphasizes that whether an STE is in compliance with the disciplines in

Article XVII:1 must be assessed by means of a market-based analysis, rather than simply by determining

whether an STE has used the privileges that it has been granted. In arguing that Article XVII:1(b) must be

interpreted as prohibiting STEs from using their exclusive or special privileges to the disadvantage of

“commercial actors”, the United States appears to construe Article XVII:1(b) as requiring STEs to act not only

as commercial actors in the marketplace, but as virtuouscommercial actors, by tying their own hands. We do not

see how such an interpretation can be reconciled with an analysis of “commercial considerations” based on

market forces. In other words, we cannot accept that the first clause of subparagraph (b) would, as a general

rule, require STEs to refrain from using the privileges and advantages that they enjoy because such use might

“disadvantage” private enterprises. STEs, like private enterprises, are entitled to exploit the advantages they

may enjoy to their economic benefit. Article XVII:1(b) merely prohibits STEs from making purchases or sales

on the basis of non-commercial considerations.”

5. Oferecer às Empresas de outras Partes Contratantes todas as Facilidades de Livre Concorrência nas

Vendas ou Compras dessa Natureza

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

153

142

Para. 153. “(…) The United States asserts that the Panel’s incorrect interpretative approach led it to the

erroneous conclusion that this term [afford the enterprises of the other Member adequate opportunity … to

compete for participation in such purchases or sales] referred to enterprises that wish to buyfrom an STE, but

not to enterprises that wish to sell in competition with an STE. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

paras. 156-157

Para. 156. “In the abstract, competition to participate in purchases and sales could include competition to

participate as a buyer, as a seller, or both. However, the clause under examination does not refer, in the abstract,

to any purchases and sales. Rather, it refers to “such purchases or sales”, repeating the phrase found in the first

clause of subparagraph (b). As discussed in our analysis above, this phrase in subparagraph (b) of Article

XVII:1 refers back to the activities identified in subparagraph (a), namely the purchases and sales of an STE

involving imports or exports.”

Para. 157. “In other words, the second clause of subparagraph (b) refers to purchases and sales transactions

where: (i) one of the parties involved in the transaction is an STE; and (ii) the transaction involves imports to or

exports from the Member maintaining the STE. Thus, the requirement to afford an adequate opportunity to

compete for participation (i.e., taking part with others) in “such” purchases and sales (import or export

transactions involving an STE) must refer to the opportunity to become the STE’s counterpart in the transaction,

not to an opportunity to replace the STE as a participant in the transaction. If it were otherwise, the transaction

would no longer be the type of transaction described by the phrase “such purchases or sales” in the second

clause of Article XVII:1(b), because it would not involve an STE as a party. Thus, in transactions involving two

parties, one of whom is an STE seller, the word “enterprises” in the second clause of Article XVII:1(b) can refer

only to buyers.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment

of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,

para. 160

Para. 160. “(…) The Panel did not determine the full ambit of the requirement to “afford adequate opportunity

(…) to compete for participation” in relevant purchases and sales. Nor do we. The Panel expressly recognized

the possibility that, in other circumstances, particular enterprises could act both as a buyer and as a seller. The

Panel also explicitly stated that it was not asked to, and was not, ruling on the scope of the obligation in this

clause with respect to STEs that act as purchasers, rather than as sellers.”

6. Artigo XVII:3

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

97

Para. 97. “To us, [Article XVII:3] explicitly recognizes that, notwithstanding the existence of certain disciplines

on STEs in Article XVII:1, these alone may not suffice to prevent the various ways in which STEs might create

143

obstacles to trade, and that additional measures to limit or reduce such obstacles should therefore be pursued

through negotiation. Thus, this provision constitutes acknowledgement by the GATT contracting parties of the

limitations inherent in Article XVII:1, and recognizes that Article XVII:1 cannot serve as the sole legal basis for

eliminating all potential obstacles to trade relating to STEs. (…).”

III. Conclusão

144

Artigo XVIII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XVIII

Governmental Assistance to Economic Development

18.1 The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement will be

facilitated by the progressive development of their economies, particularly of those contracting

parties the economies of which can only support low standards of living and are in the early stages of

development.

18.2 The contracting parties recognize further that it may be necessary for those contracting parties, in

order to implement programmes and policies of economic development designed to raise the general

standard of living of their people, to take protective or other measures affecting imports, and that

such measures are justified in so far as they facilitate the attainment of the objectives of this

Agreement. They agree, therefore, that those contracting parties should enjoy additional facilities to

enable them (a) to maintain sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able to grant the tariff

protection required for the establishment of a particular industry and (b) to apply quantitative

restrictions for balance of payments purposes in a manner which takes full account of the continued

high level of demand for imports likely to be generated by their programmes of economic

development.

18.3 The contracting parties recognize finally that, with those additional facilities which are provided for

in Sections A and B of this Article, the provisions of this Agreement would normally be sufficient to

enable contracting parties to meet the requirements of their economic development. They agree,

however, that there may be circumstances where no measure consistent with those provisions is

practicable to permit a contracting party in the process of economic development to grant the

governmental assistance required to promote the establishment of particular industries with a view to

raising the general standard of living of its people. Special procedures are laid down in Sections C

and D of this Article to deal with those cases.

18.4 (a) Consequently, a contracting party, the economy of which can only support low standards of

living and is in the early stages of development, shall be free to deviate temporarily from the

provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement, as provided in Sections A, B and C of this

Article.

(b) A contracting party, the economy of which is in the process of development, but which does

not come within the scope of subparagraph (a) above, may submit applications to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES under Section D of this Article.

18.5 The contracting parties recognize that the export earnings of contracting parties, the economies of

which are of the type described in paragraph 4 (a) and (b) above and which depend on exports of a

small number of primary commodities, may be seriously reduced by a decline in the sale of such

commodities. Accordingly, when the exports of primary commodities by such a contracting party are

seriously affected by measures taken by another contracting party, it may have resort to the

consultation provisions of Article XXII of this Agreement.

18.6 The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review annually all measures applied pursuant to the

provisions of Sections C and D of this Article.

Section A

18.7 (a) If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article considerit

desirable, in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising

the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a concession included in

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the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall notify the CONTRACTING

PARTIES to this effect and enter into negotiations with any contracting party with which

such concession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party determined by

the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. If agreement is

reached between such contracting parties concerned, they shall be free to modify or

withdraw concessions under the appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order to give

effect to such agreement, including any compensatory adjustments involved.

(b) If agreement is not reached within sixty days after the notification provided for in

subparagraph (a) above, the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the

concession may refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES which shall promptly

examine it. If they find that the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the

concession has made every effort to reach an agreement and that the compensatory

adjustment offered by it is adequate, that contracting party shall be free to modify or

withdraw the concession if, at the same time, it gives effect to the compensatory adjustment.

If the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not find that the compensation offered by a contracting

party proposing to modify or withdraw the concession is adequate, but find that it has made

every reasonable effort to offer adequate compensation, that contracting party shall be free to

proceed with such modification or withdrawal. If such action is taken, any other contracting

party referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be free to modify or withdraw substantially

equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the contracting party which has taken the

action.

Section B

18.8 The contracting parties recognize that contracting parties coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a)

of this Article tend, when they are in rapid process of development, to experience balance of

payments difficulties arising mainly from efforts to expand their internal markets as well as from the

instability in their terms of trade.

18.9 In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the

implementation of its programme of economic development, a contracting party coming within the

scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control

the general level of its imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be

imported; Provided that the import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed

those necessary:

(a) to forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves, or

(b) in the case of a contracting party with inadequate monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable

rate of increase in its reserves.

Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may be affecting the reserves of the

contracting party or its need for reserves, including, where special external credits or other resources are

available to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such credits or resources.

18.10 In applying these restrictions, the contracting party may determine their incidence on imports of

different products or classes of products in such a way as to give priority to the importation of those

products which are more essential in the light of its policy of economic development; Provided that

the restrictions are so applied as to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic

interests of any other contracting party and not to prevent unreasonably the importation of any

description of goods in minimum commercial quantities the exclusion of which would impair regular

channels of trade; and Provided further that the restrictions are not so applied as to prevent the

importation of commercial samples or to prevent compliance with patent, trade mark, copyright or

similar procedures.

146

18.11 In carrying out its domestic policies, the contracting party concerned shall pay due regard to the need

for restoring equilibrium in its balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the

desirability of assuring an economic employment of productive resources. It shall progressively relax

any restrictions applied under this Section as conditions improve, maintaining them only to the

extent necessary under the terms of paragraph 9 of this Article and shall eliminate them when

conditions no longer justify such maintenance; Provided that no contracting party shall be required to

withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change in its development policy would render

unnecessary the restrictions which it is applying under this Section.

18.12 (a) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising the general level of its existing

restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures applied under this Section, shall

immediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which

prior consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with the CONTRACTING

PARTIES as to the nature of its balance of payments difficulties, alternative corrective

measures which may be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the

economies of other contracting parties.

(b) On a date to be determined by them the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review all

restrictions still applied under this Section on that date. Beginning two years after that date,

contracting parties applying restrictions under this Section shall enter into consultations of

the type provided for in subparagraph (a) above with the CONTRACTING PARTIES at

intervals of approximately, but not less than, two years according to a programme to be

drawn up each year by the CONTRACTING PARTIES; Provided that no consultation under

this subparagraph shall take place within two years after the conclusion of a consultation of a

general nature under any other provision of this paragraph.

(c) (i) If, in the course of consultations with a contracting party under subparagraph (a) or

(b) of this paragraph, the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that the restrictions are

not consistent with the provisions of this Section or with those of Article XIII

(subject to the provisions of Article XIV), they shall indicate the nature of the

inconsistency and may advise that the restrictions be suitably modified.

(ii) If, however, as a result of the consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES

determine that the restrictions are being applied in a manner involving an

inconsistency of a serious nature with the provisions of this Section or with those of

Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that damage to the trade

of any contracting party is caused or threatened thereby, they shall so inform the

contracting party applying the restrictions and shall make appropriate

recommendations for securing conformity with such provisions within a specified

period. If such contracting party does not comply with these recommendations

within the specified period, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may release any

contracting party the trade of which is adversely affected by the restrictions from

such obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the

restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.

(d) The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall invite any contracting party which is applying

restrictions under this Section to enter into consultations with them at the request of any

contracting party which can establish a prima facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent

with the provisions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of

Article XIV) and that its trade is adversely affected thereby. However, no such invitation

shall be issued unless the CONTRACTING PARTIES have ascertained that direct

discussions between the contracting parties concerned have not been successful. If, as a

result of the consultations with the CONTRACTING PARTIES no agreement is reached and

they determine that the restrictions are being applied inconsistently with such provisions, and

that damage to the trade of the contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or

147

threatened thereby, they shall recommend the withdrawal or modification of the restrictions.

If the restrictions are not withdrawn or modified within such time as the CONTRACTING

PARTIES may prescribe, they may release the contracting party initiating the procedure

from such obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the

restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.

(e) If a contracting party against which action has been taken in accordance with the last

sentence of subparagraph (c) (ii) or (d) of this paragraph, finds that the release of obligations

authorized by the CONTRACTING PARTIES adversely affects the operation of its

programme and policy of economic development, it shall be free, not later than sixty days

after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary(1) to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such

withdrawal shall take effect on the sixtieth day following the day on which the notice is

received by him.

(footnote original) 1 By the Decision of 23 March 1965, the CONTRACTING PARTIES changed the title of the

head of the GATT secretariat from “Executive Secretary” to “Director-General”.

(f) In proceeding under this paragraph, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall have due regard to

the factors referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. Determinations under this paragraph

shall be rendered expeditiously and, if possible, within sixty days of the initiation of the

consultations.

Section C

18.13 If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article finds that

governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view

to raising the general standard of living of its people, but that no measure consistent with the other

provisions of this Agreement is practicable to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the

provisions and procedures set out in this Section.

18.14 The contracting party concerned shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the special

difficulties which it meets in the achievement of the objective outlined in paragraph 13 of this Article

and shall indicate the specific measure affecting imports which it proposes to introduce in order to

remedy these difficulties. It shall not introduce that measure before the expiration of the time-limit

laid down in paragraph 15 or 17, as the case may be, or if the measure affects imports of a product

which is the subject of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement,

unless it has secured the concurrence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in accordance with

provisions of paragraph 18; Provided that, if the industry receiving assistance has already started

production, the contracting party may, after informing the CONTRACTING PARTIES, take such

measures as may be necessary to prevent, during that period, imports of the product or products

concerned from increasing substantially above a normal level.

18.15 If, within thirty days of the notification of the measure, the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not

request the contracting party concerned to consult with them, that contracting party shall be free to

deviate from the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to

apply the proposed measure.

18.16 If it is requested by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to do so, the contracting party concerned shall

consult with them as to the purpose of the proposed measure, as to alternative measures which may

be available under this Agreement, and as to the possible effect of the measure proposed on the

commercial and economic interests of other contracting parties. If, as a result of such consultation,

the CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that there is no measure consistent with the other provisions

of this Agreement which is practicable in order to achieve the objective outlined in paragraph 13 of

this Article, and concur in the proposed measure, the contracting party concerned shall be released

148

from its obligations under the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the

extent necessary to apply that measure.

18.17 If, within ninety days after the date of the notification of the proposed measure under paragraph 14 of

this Article, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have not concurred in such measure, the contracting

party concerned may introduce the measure proposed after informing the CONTRACTING

PARTIES.

18.18 If the proposed measure affects a product which is the subject of a concession included in the

appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, the contracting party concerned shall enter into

consultations with any other contracting party with which the concession was initially negotiated,

and with any other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a

substantial interest therein. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall concur in the measure if they

agree that there is no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement which is

practicable in order to achieve the objective set forth in paragraph 13 of this Article, and if they are

satisfied:

(a) that agreement has been reached with such other contracting parties as a result of the

consultations referred to above, or

(b) if no such agreement has been reached within sixty days after the notification provided for in

paragraph 14 has been received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, that the contracting

party having recourse to this Section has made all reasonable efforts to reach an agreement

and that the interests of other contracting parties are adequately safeguarded.

The contracting party having recourse to this Section shall thereupon be released from its obligations under the

relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to permit it to apply the

measure.

18.19 If a proposed measure of the type described in paragraph 13 of this Article concerns an industry the

establishment of which has in the initial period been facilitated by incidental protection afforded by

restrictions imposed by the contracting party concerned for balance of payments purposes under the

relevant provisions of this Agreement, that contracting party may resort to the provisions and

procedures of this Section; Provided that it shall not apply the proposed measure without the

concurrence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

18.20 Nothing in the preceding paragraphs of this Section shall authorize any deviation from the provisions

of Articles I, II and XIII of this Agreement. The provisos to paragraph 10 of this Article shall also be

applicable to any restriction under this Section.

18.21 At any time while a measure is being applied under paragraph 17 of this Article any contracting

party substantially affected by it may suspend the application to the trade of the contracting party

having recourse to this Section of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations

under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove;

Provided that sixty days’ notice of such suspension is given to the CONTRACTING PARTIES not

later than six months after the measure has been introduced or changed substantially to the detriment

of the contracting party affected. Any such contracting party shall afford adequate opportunity for

consultation in accordance with the provisions of Article XXII of this Agreement.

Section D

18.22 A contracting party coming within the scope of subparagraph 4 (b) of this Article desiring, in the

interest of the development of its economy, to introduce a measure of the type described in paragraph

13 of this Article in respect of the establishment of a particular industry may apply to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES for approval of such measure. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall

149

promptly consult with such contracting party and shall, in making their decision, be guided by the

considerations set out in paragraph 16. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES concur in the proposed

measure the contracting party concerned shall be released from its obligations under the relevant

provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to permit it to apply the

measure. If the proposed measure affects a product which is the subject of a concession included in

the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, the provisions of paragraph 18 shall apply.

18.23 Any measure applied under this Section shall comply with the provisions of paragraph 20 of this

Article.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XVIII

Ajuda do Estado em Favor de Desenvolvimento Econômico

18.1 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que a realização dos objetivos do presente Acordo será facilitada

pelo desenvolvimento progressivo de suas economias, em particular nos casos das Partes

Contratantes cuja economia não asseguram à população senão um baixo nível de vida e que está nos

primeiros estágios de seu desenvolvimento.

18.2 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem além disso que pode ser necessário para as Partes Contratantes

previstas no parágrafo primeiro, com o objetivo de executar seus programas e suas políticas de

desenvolvimento econômico orientados para a elevação do nível geral de vida de suas populações,

tomar medidas de proteção ou outras medidas que afetem as importações e que tais medidas são

justificadas na medida em que elas facilitem a obtenção dos objetivos deste Acordo. Elas estimam,

em consequência, que estas Partes Contratantes deveriam usufruir facilidades adicionais que as

possibilitem: (a) conservar na estrutura de suas tarifas aduaneiras suficiente flexibilidade para que

elas possam fornecer a proteção tarifária necessária à criação de um ramo de produção determinado,

e (b) instituir restrições quantitativas destinadas a proteger o equilíbrio de suas balanças de

pagamento de uma maneira que leve plenamente em conta o nível elevado e permanente da procura

de importação suscetível de ser criada pela realização de seus programas de desenvolvimento

econômico.

18.3 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem finalmente que, com as facilidades adicionais previstas nas

seções A e B do presente Artigo, as disposições do presente Acordo deveriam normalmente permitir

às Partes Contratantes enfrentar às necessidades de seu desenvolvimento econômico. Elas

reconhecem, todavia, que pode haver casos em que não seja possível, na prática, instituir a medida

compatível com aquelas disposições, que permitem a uma Parte Contratante em via de

desenvolvimento econômico, conceder o auxílio necessário do Estado para favorecer a criação de

ramos de produção determinada com o fim de elevar o nível de vida geral de sua população. Normas

especiais previstas para tais casos nas seções C e D do presente Artigo.

18.4 (a) Em consequência, qualquer Parte Contratante cuja economia não pode assegurar à população

senão um baixo nível de vida e que se encontra nos primeiros estágios de seu

desenvolvimento, terá a faculdade de dispensar-se, temporariamente, das disposições dos

outros Artigos do presente Acordo, na forma prevista nas seções A, B e C do presente

Artigo.

(b) Qualquer Parte Contratante cuja economia está em via de desenvolvimento, mas que não se

enquadra no plano da alínea (a) acima, pode encaminhar pedidos às Partes Contratantes, na

forma prevista na seção D do presente Artigo.

18.5 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as receitas de exportação das Partes Contratantes cuja

economia é do tipo descrito nas alíneas (a) e (b) do parágrafo 4 acima, e que dependem da

exportação de um pequeno número de produtos de base, podem sofrer uma séria baixa em face do

enfraquecimento da venda desses produtos. Em conseqüência quando as exportações dos produtos de

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base de uma Parte Contratante que se encontra nesta situação são afetadas seriamente por medidas

adotadas por uma outra Parte Contratante, a referida Parte Contratante poderá recorrer às disposições

do Artigo XXII do presente Acordo, relativas às consultas.

18.6 As Partes Contratantes procederão cada ano a um exame de todas as medidas aplicadas em virtude

das disposições das seções C e D do presente Artigo.

Seção A

18.7 (a) Se uma Parte Contratante que se enquadra na alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente Artigo,

considera conveniente, para a criação de determinado ramo da produção que tenha em vista a

elevação geral do nível de vida de sua população, a modificação ou a retirada de uma

concessão tarifária incluída na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, ela notificará

às Partes Contratantes, para esse fim, e entrará em negociações com a Parte Contratante com

a qual aquela concessão tenha sido negociada primitivamente e com qualquer outra Parte

Contratante cujo interesse substancial nesta concessão tenha sido reconhecido pelas Partes

Contratantes. Se houver um acordo entre as Partes Contratantes em apreço, a elas será

permitido modificar ou retirar as concessões incluídas nas listas correspondentes, anexas ao

presente Acordo, a fim de dar cumprimento ao aludido Acordo, inclusive as compensações

que ele comportar.

(b) Se, decorrido o prazo de sessenta dias, contado a partir da data da notificação mencionada na

alínea (a) acima, não se verificar um acordo, a Parte Contratante que se propõe a modificar

ou a retirar a concessão poderá submeter a questão à apreciação das Partes Contratantes que

deverão examiná-la prontamente. Se lhes parecer que a Parte Contratante que se propõe a

modificar ou a retirar a concessão fez tudo que lhe era possível fazer para chegar um acordo,

e que a compensação oferecida é suficiente, a referida Parte Contratante terá a faculdade de

modificar ou de retirar a concessão sob a condição de aplicar ao mesmo tempo a

compensação. Se parecer às Partes Contratantes que a compensação oferecida por uma Parte

Contratante que se propõe a modificar ou a retirar a concessão não é suficiente mas que esta

Parte Contratante fez tudo que lhe seria razoavelmente possível fazer para oferecer uma

compensação suficiente, a Parte Contratante terá a faculdade de por em aplicação a

modificação ou a retirada. Se tal medida for adotada, qualquer outra Parte Contratante

mencionada na alínea (a) acima terá a faculdade de modificar ou de retirar concessões

substancialmente equivalentes, negociadas primitivamente com a Parte Contratante que

adotou a medida em questão.

Seção B

18.8 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as Partes Contratantes enquadradas no plano da alínea (a) do

parágrafo 4 do presente Artigo podem, quando se encontram em rápido processo de desenvolvimento

experimentar, para equilibrar sua balança de pagamentos, dificuldades provenientes, sobretudo, dos

esforços que desenvolvem, no sentido de dar expansão aos seus mercados internos, bem como

instabilidade nos termos de seu intercâmbio.

18.9 Tendo em vista salvaguardar a sua situação financeira exterior e assegurar o nível de reservas

suficiente para a execução de seu programa de desenvolvimento econômico, uma Parte Contratante

que se enquadra no plano da alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente Artigo pode, sob reserva das

disposições dos parágrafos 10 a 12, regulamentar o nível geral de suas importações, limitando o

volume ou o valor das mercadorias cuja importação ela autoriza, com a condição de que as restrições

à importação instituídas ou mantidas intensificadas não devam ultrapassar do que é necessário: (a)

para se opor à ameaça de uma baixa importante de suas reservas monetárias ou para por fim a esta

baixa; (b) ou para aumentar suas reservas monetárias, segundo uma taxa de crescimento razoável,

caso elas sejam insuficientes. Nesses dois casos, serão devidamente considerados todos os fatores

especiais que possam afetar as reservas monetárias da Parte Contratante, ou as suas necessidades de

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reservas monetárias, e, notadamente, assim que, disponham de créditos externos especiais ou de

outros recursos, a necessidade de prever o emprego adequado dos seus créditos ou dos seus recursos.

18.10 Na aplicação destas restrições a Parte Contratante em apreço pode determinar sua incidência sobre as

importações dos diferentes produtos ou das várias categorias de produtos, de maneira a dar

prioridade à importação dos produtos mais necessários, levando em conta sua política de

desenvolvimento econômico; todavia, as restrições deverão ser aplicadas de modo a evitar um

prejuízo inútil dos interesses comerciais ou econômicos de qualquer outra Parte Contratante e não

causar indevidamente obstáculos à importação de mercadorias em quantidades comerciais mínimas

de qualquer natureza que sejam cuja exclusão embaraçaria as correntes normais de intercâmbio; além

disso, as referidas restrições não deverão ser aplicadas de modo a criar dificuldades à importação de

amostras comerciais ou à observação dos processos relativos à patentes, marcas de fábrica, direitos

autorais e de reprodução ou de outros processos análogos.

18.11 Na execução de sua política nacional a Parte Contratante em causa levará devidamente em conta a

necessidade de restabelecer o equilíbrio de sua balança de pagamentos numa base sadia e durável, e a

oportunidade de assegurar a utilização de seus recursos produtivos sobre uma base econômica. Ela

atenuará progressivamente, na medida que a situação melhorar, qualquer restrição adotada por força

da presente seção, e não a manterá senão na medida necessária, considerando as disposições do

parágrafo 9 do presente Artigo; tão logo a situação não mais justificar sua manutenção ela a

eliminará, contudo, nenhuma Parte Contratante será obrigada a suprimir ou modificar as restrições,

salvo se ocorrer uma mudança em sua política de desenvolvimento, caso em que as restrições que

aplica por força da presente seção deixarão de ser necessárias.

18.12 (a) Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique novas restrições ou que estabeleça o nível geral das

restrições existentes, reforçando de maneira substancial as medidas aplicadas em virtude da

presente seção, deverá, imediatamente após haver instituído ou reforçado essas restrições

(ou, no caso em que consultas prévias sejam possíveis na prática, antes de as haver feito),

consultar as Partes Contratantes sobre a natureza das dificuldades referentes à sua balança de

pagamentos, os diversos corretivos entre os quais ela tem preferência, bem como as

repercussões possíveis daquelas restrições sobre a economia de outras Partes Contratantes.

(b) Numa data a ser fixada, as Partes Contratantes passarão em revista todas as restrições que

naquela data forem ainda aplicadas por força da presente seção. No fim do período de dois

anos, a contar da data acima mencionada, as Partes Contratantes que aplicarem restrições em

virtude da presente seção, iniciarão, com as Partes Contratantes, em intervalos que serão

aproximadamente de dois anos, sem serem inferiores a esta duração consultas do tipo

previsto na alínea (a) acima, segundo um programa que será estabelecido anualmente pelas

Partes Contratantes; contudo, nenhuma consulta, em virtude da presente alínea, se efetuará

menos, de dois anos após o término de uma consulta de caráter geral que seria iniciada em

virtude de uma outra disposição do presente parágrafo.

(c) (i) Se, no decorrer dos entendimentos havidos com uma Parte Contratante, conforme a alínea

(a) ou alínea (b) do presente parágrafo, parecer às Partes Contratantes que as restrições não

são compatíveis com as disposições da presente seção ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob reserva

das disposições do Artigo XIV), elas indicarão os pontos de divergência e poderão

aconselhar no sentido de que modificações apropriadas sejam introduzidas nas restrições. (ii)

Contudo, se no decorrer daquelas consultas as Partes Contratantes determinem que as

restrições sejam aplicadas de maneira que comporte uma séria incompatibilidade com as

disposições da presente seção ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposições do

Artigo XIV) e que resulte num prejuízo ou numa ameaça de prejuízo para o comércio de uma

Parte Contratante, elas avisarão a Parte Contratante que aplica as restrições e farão

recomendações apropriadas, tendo em vista assegurar a observação num prazo determinado

das disposições em apreço. Se a Parte Contratante não se conforma com aquelas

recomendações no prazo fixado, as Partes Contratantes poderão dispensar qualquer Parte

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Contratante cujo comércio for prejudicado pelas restrições, de quaisquer obrigações

resultantes do presente Acordo, no que lhes parecer apropriado dispensar levando em conta

as circunstâncias com relação à Parte Contratante que aplica as restrições.

(d) As Partes Contratantes convidarão qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique restrições por

força da presente seção, a entrar em consulta com elas, a pedido de qualquer Parte

Contratante, e que possa estabelecer prima facie que as restrições são incompatíveis com as

disposições da presente seção ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob reserva de disposições do

Artigo XIV), e que seu comércio foi atingido. Todavia, este convite só será encaminhado se

as Partes Contratantes constatarem que as conversações mantidas diretamente entre as Partes

Contratantes interessadas não chegaram a bom termo. Se nenhum acordo for realizado em

decorrência das consultas com as Partes Contratantes, e se as Partes Contratantes determinam

que as restrições são aplicadas de modo incompatível com as disposições supramencionadas,

resultando num prejuízo ou numa ameaça de prejuízo para o comércio da Parte Contratante

que iniciou o procedimento elas recomendarão a supressão ou a modificação das restrições.

Se as restrições não são suprimidas ou modificadas no prazo a ser fixado pelas Partes

Contratantes, estas poderão dispensar a Parte Contratante que iniciou o procedimento de

qualquer compromisso resultante do presente Acordo, no que lhes parecer apropriado

dispensar levando em conta as circunstâncias, com a relação à Parte Contratante que aplica

as restrições.

(e) Se uma Parte Contratante, contra a qual uma medida foi tomada, de conformidade com a

última frase da alínea (c) (ii) ou da alínea (d) do presente parágrafo, verificar que a dispensa

concedida pelas Partes Contratantes prejudica a execução de seu programa e de sua política

de desenvolvimento econômico, lhe será permitido, num prazo de 30 dias, a contar da

aplicação desta medida, notificar por escrito ao Secretário Executivo3 das Partes

Contratantes, sua intenção de denunciar o presente Acordo. Esta denúncia entrará em vigor

ao expirar um prazo de sessenta dias contado a partir em que o Secretário executivo das

Partes Contratantes tiver recebido a referida notificação.

(f) Em qualquer procedimento iniciado, de conformidade com o presente parágrafo, as Partes

Contratantes levarão devidamente em conta os fatores mencionados no parágrafo 2 do

presente Artigo. As determinações previstas no presente parágrafo deverão ser apresentadas

prontamente e, se possível, num prazo de 60 dias, a contar da data em que as consultas

tiverem sido iniciadas.

Seção C

18.13 Se uma Parte Contratante enquadrada no plano da alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente Artigo

verifica que um auxílio do Estado é necessário para facilitar a criação de um determinado ramo de

produção com o fim de elevar o nível de vida geral da população, sem que seja possível na prática

adotar medidas compatíveis com as outras disposições do presente Acordo para realizar este

objetivo, lhe será permitido recorrer às disposições e aos processos da presente seção.

18.14 A Parte Contratante em apreço notificará as Partes Contratantes sobre as dificuldades especiais que

ela encontra na realização do objetivo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo; ela indicará a

medida precisa que afeta as importações que se propõe a promover para remediar tais dificuldades.

Ela não adotará esta medida antes do término do prazo fixado no parágrafo 15 ou no parágrafo 17,

conforme o caso, ou se a medida afeta as importações de um produto que se tornou objeto de uma

concessão contida na lista correspondente anexa ao presente Acordo, a não ser que tenha obtido a

aprovação das Partes Contratantes, de conformidade com as disposições do parágrafo 18; todavia, se

o ramo de produção que recebe uma ajuda do Estado já entrou em atividade, a Parte Contratante

poderá, após ter informado as Partes Contratantes, tomar as medidas necessárias para evitar que,

durante aquele período, as importações do produto ou dos produtos em questão não ultrapassem

substancialmente um nível normal.

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18.15 Se, num prazo de trinta dias contado a partir da notificação da referida medida as Partes Contratantes

não convidarem a Parte de Contratante em apreço a entrar em consultas com elas, a 3 Corresponde

hoje ao cargo de “Diretor Geral” Parte Contratante terá a faculdade de dispensar-se das disposições

dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo, aplicáveis em espécie, na medida necessária à aplicação da

medida projetada.

18.16 Se ela é convidada pelas Partes Contratantes, a Parte Contratante em causa entrará em consulta com

elas sobre o objeto da medida projetada, as diversas medidas entre as quais ela tem a escolha no

plano do presente Acordo, bem como as repercussões que a medida projetada poderia ter sobre os

interesses comerciais ou econômicos de outras Partes Contratantes. Se, no decorrer dessas consultas

as Partes Contratantes reconhecem que não é possível na prática adotar a medida compatível com as

outras disposições do presente Acordo para realizar o objetivo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente

Artigo, e, se elas dão sua aprovação à medida projetada, a Parte Contratante em causa será

desobrigada dos compromissos que lhe cabem nos termos das disposições dos outros Artigos do

presente Acordo aplicáveis em espécie, desde que aquela seja necessária à aplicação da medida.

18.17 Se, num prazo de 90 dias a contar daquele da notificação da medida projetada, conforme o parágrafo

14 do presente Artigo, as Partes Contratantes não aprovarem a medida em questão, a Parte

Contratante em causa poderá adotar a referida medida após ter informado as Partes Contratantes.

18.18 Se a medida projetada afeta um produto que foi o objeto de uma concessão contida na lista

correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo a Parte Contratante em apreço consultará qualquer outra

Parte Contratante com a qual a concessão tiver sido negociada primitivamente bem como com toda

outra Parte Contratante cujo interesse substancial na concessão tiver sido reconhecido pelas Partes

Contratantes. Estas darão sua aprovação à medida projetada se reconhecerem a impossibilidade, na

prática, de adotar a medida compatível com as outras disposições do presente Acordo para realizar o

objetivo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo e se elas tiverem a segurança. (a) que um

Acordo foi realizado com as outras Partes Contratantes em questão, em decorrência das consultas,

acima indicadas. (b) ou que, se nenhum Acordo foi realizado no prazo de 60 dias a partir da data em

que a notificação prevista no parágrafo 14, tenha sido recebida pelas Partes Contratantes, a Parte

Contratante que recorreu às disposições da presente seção fez tudo que lhe era razoavelmente

possível fazer para chegar a um tal acordo, e que os interesses das outras Partes Contratantes seriam

suficientemente salvaguardados. A Parte Contratante que recorreu às disposições da presente seção

será isentada das obrigações que lhe tocam nos termos das disposições dos demais Artigos do

presente Acordo aplicáveis na espécie, desde que isto seja necessário para lhe permitir a aplicação da

medida.

18.19 Se uma medida projetada do tipo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo se refere a um ramo da

produção, cuja criação foi facilitada, no decorrer do período inicial, pela proteção acessória

resultante das restrições que impõem a Parte Contratante a fim de proteger o equilíbrio de sua

balança de pagamentos a títulos das disposições do presente Acordo, aplicáveis na espécie, a Parte

Contratante poderá recorrer às disposições e aos processos da presente seção, com a condição de que

ela não aplique a medida projetada sem a aprovação das Partes Contratantes.

18.20 Nenhuma disposição dos parágrafos procedentes da presente seção autorizará a derrogação das

disposições dos Artigos primeiro, II e XIII do presente Acordo. As reservas do parágrafo 10 do

presente Artigo serão aplicáveis a qualquer restrição dependente da presente seção.

18.21 A qualquer momento durante a aplicação de uma medida, em virtude das disposições do parágrafo

1º, do presente Artigo, qualquer das Partes Contratantes afetada de modo substancial por aquela

medida poderá suspender a aplicação no comércio da Parte Contratante que recorreu às disposições

da presente seção de concessões ou de outras obrigações substancialmente equivalentes que resultem

do presente Acordo, e cujas Partes Contratantes não desaprovarem a suspensão, com a condição de

que um aviso prévio de 60 dias seja dado às Partes Contratantes, ou no máximo, seis meses depois

que a medida tenha sido adotada ou modificada de modo substancial em detrimento da Parte

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Contratante afetada. Esta Parte Contratante deverá se prestar às consultas, de conformidade com as

disposições do Artigo XXII do presente Acordo.

Seção D

18.22 Será permitido a qualquer Parte Contratante enquadrada no plano da alínea (b) do parágrafo 4 do

presente Artigo e que para favorecer o desenvolvimento de sua economia, deseja instituir uma

medida do tipo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo, no que se refere à criação de um

determinado ramo de produção determinando encaminhar às Partes Contratantes um pedido de

aprovação de uma tal medida. As Partes Contratantes entrarão prontamente em consultas com aquela

Parte Contratante, e, formulando sua decisão se inspirarão nas considerações expostas no parágrafo

16. Se as Partes Contratantes aprovarem a medida projetada, elas isentarão a Parte Contratante em

causa das obrigações que lhe cabem nos termos das disposições dos outros Artigos do presente

Acordo, aplicáveis em espécie, desde que isto seja necessário para lhe permitir a aplicação da

medida; Se a medida projetada afeta um produto que foi objeto da concessão contida na lista

correspondente anexa ao presente Acordo as disposições do parágrafo 18 serão aplicáveis.

18.23 Qualquer uma das medidas aplicadas em virtude da presente seção, deverá ser compatível com as

disposições ao parágrafo 20 do presente Artigo.

II. Evolução da Interpretação do Painel/Órgão de Apelação

1. Artigo XVIII:11

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

paras. 126 e 128

Para. 126. “(…) we are of the opinion that the use of macroeconomic policy instruments is not related to any

particular development policy, but is resorted to by all Members regardless of the type of development policy

they pursue. (…).”

Para. 128. “We believe structural measures are different from macroeconomic instruments with respect to their

relationship to development policy. If India were asked to implement agricultural reform or to scale back

reservations on certain products for small-scale units as indispensable policy changes in order to overcome its

balance-of-payments difficulties, such a requirement would probably have involved a change in India’s

development policy.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

paras. 102-103

Para. 102. “(…) Recourse to the dispute settlement procedures does not call into question either the availability

or the utility of the procedures under Article XVIII:12 and the BOP Understanding. On the contrary, if panels

refrained from reviewing the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions, they would diminish the explicit

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procedural rights of Members under Article XXIII and footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, as well as their

substantive rights under Article XVIII:11.”

Para. 103. “We are cognisant of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council with respect to

balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the BOP Understanding.

However, we see no conflict between that competence and the competence of panels. Moreover, we are

convinced that, in considering the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions, panels should take into

account the deliberations and conclusions of the BOP Committee, as did the panel in Korea - Beef.”

2. Artigo XVIII, Note Ad

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of

Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para.

98 e nota de rodapé 104

Para. 98. “As we have seen, through its reference to the “general principles of non-discriminatory treatment

prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders”, Article

XVII:1 imposes an obligation on Members not to use STEs in order to discriminate in ways that would be

prohibited if undertaken directly by Members. Yet even if Article XVII:1 itself did not exist, this would not

imply that STEs would be subject to no disciplines under the GATT 1994. For example, the express provisions

of Article II:4 of the GATT 1994 and the ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII constrain the

behaviour of STEs. Other provisions of the GATT 1994, notably Article VI, also apply to the activities of

STEs.104 We need not identify, for purposes of this appeal, all of the provisions of the GATT 1994 that may

apply to STEs, nor consider how these disciplines interact with and reinforce each other. We do, however,

believe that these other provisions reveal that, even in 1947, the negotiators of the GATT created a number of

complementary requirements to address the different ways in which STEs could be used by a contracting party

to seek to circumvent its obligations under the GATT. The existence of these other provisions of the GATT

1994 also supports the view that Article XVII was never intended to be the sole source of the disciplines

imposed on STEs under that Agreement. This is also consistent with the view that Article XVII:1 was intended

to impose disciplines on one particular type of STE behaviour, namely discriminatory behaviour, rather than to

constitute a comprehensive code of conduct for STEs. Moreover, as the Panel observed, since the conclusion of

the Uruguay Round, a number of additional obligations, under different covered agreements, operate to further

constrain the behaviour of STEs.”

3. Artigo XVIII:11, Note Ad

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

para. 114

Para. 114. “We agree with the Panel that the Ad Note, and, in particular, the words “would thereupon produce”,

require a causal link of a certain directness between the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions and the

recurrence of one of the three conditions referred to in Article XVIII:9. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

para. 115

156

Para. 115. “We also agree with the Panel that the Ad Note and, in particular, the word “thereupon”, expresses a

notion of temporal sequence between the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions and the recurrence of

one of the conditions of Article XVIII:9. (…).”

4. Prima facie

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

para. 136

Para. 136. “(…) Assuming that the complaining party has successfully established a prima facie case of

inconsistency with Article XVIII:11 and the Ad Note, the responding party may, in its defence, either rebut the

evidence adduced in support of the inconsistency or invoke the proviso. In the latter case, it would have to

demonstrate that the complaining party violated its obligation not to require the responding party to change its

development policy. This is an assertion with respect to which the responding party must bear the burden of

proof. (…).”

5. Artigo XVIII:12

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

paras. 102-103

Para. 102. “(…) Recourse to the dispute settlement procedures does not call into question either the availability

or the utility of the procedures under Article XVIII:12 and the BOP Understanding. On the contrary, if panels

refrained from reviewing the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions, they would diminish the explicit

procedural rights of Members under Article XXIII and footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, as well as their

substantive rights under Article XVIII:11.”

Para. 103. “We are cognisant of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council with respect to

balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the BOP Understanding.

However, we see no conflict between that competence and the competence of panels. Moreover, we are

convinced that, in considering the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions, panels should take into

account the deliberations and conclusions of the BOP Committee, as did the panel in Korea — Beef.”

6. Artigo XVIII, B

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R,

paras. 84-86

157

Para. 84. “This dispute was brought pursuant to, inter alia, Article XXIII of the GATT 1994. According to

Article XXIII, any Member which considers that a benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the GATT

1994 is being nullified or impaired as a result of the failure of another Member to carry out its obligations, may

resort to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII. The United States considers that a benefit accruing

to it under the GATT 1994 was nullified or impaired as a result of India’s alleged failure to carry out its

obligations regarding balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII: B of the GATT 1994. Therefore,

the United States was entitled to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII with regard

to this dispute.”

Para. 85. “Article XXIII is elaborated and applied by the DSU. The first sentence of Article 1.1 of the DSU

provides:

The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought

pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed

in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the “covered

agreements”).

We note that Appendix 1 to the DSU lists “Multilateral Agreements on Trade in

Goods”, to which the GATT 1994 belongs, among the agreements covered by the

DSU. A dispute concerning Article XVIII:B is, therefore, covered by the DSU.”

Para. 86. “Article 1.2 of the DSU provides in relevant part:

The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or

additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered

agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding.

Appendix 2 does not identify any special or additional dispute settlement rules or

procedures relating to balance-of-payments restrictions. It does not mention Article

XVIII:B of the GATT 1994, or any of its paragraphs. The DSU is, therefore, fully

applicable to the current dispute.

III. Conclusão

158

Artigo XIX

Cynthia Kramer

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XIX

Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products

19.1 (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a

contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being

imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under

such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory

of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such

product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such

injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.

(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being

imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in

subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic

producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which

receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that

other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or

to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such

time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.

19.2 Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this

Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be

practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a

substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect

of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a

preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical

circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under

paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition

that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.

19.3 (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not

reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall,

nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected

contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to

suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such

suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the

contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this

Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially

equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which

the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is taken

under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious

injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by

the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair,

be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation,

such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

159

Artigo XIX

Medidas de emergência para os casos de importação de produtos especiais

19.1 (a) Se, em conseqüência da evolução imprevista das circunstâncias e por efeito dos

compromissos que uma Parte Contratante tenha contraído em virtude do presente Acordo,

compreendidas as concessões tarifárias, um produto for importado no território da referida

Parte Contratante em quantidade por tal forma acrescida e em tais condições que traga ou

ameace trazer um prejuízo sério aos produtores nacionais de produtos similares ou

diretamente concorrentes, será facultado a essa Parte Contratante, na medida e durante o

tempo que forem necessários para prevenir ou reparar esse prejuízo, suspender, no todo ou

em parte, o compromisso assumido em relação a esse produto, ou retirar ou modificar a

concessão.

(b) Se uma Parte Contratante tiver feito uma concessão sobre uma preferência e que o produto

ao qual esta se aplica venha a ser importado no território dessa Parte Contratante nas

circunstâncias enunciadas na alínea (a) do presente parágrafo, de tal forma que essa

importação determine ou ameace determinar um prejuízo sério aos produtores do produto

similar ou de produtos diretamente concorrentes, estabelecidos no território da Parte

Contratante que se beneficia ou se beneficiava da referida preferência, esta poderá apresentar

um requerimento à Parte Contratante importadora que ficará então livre para suspender, no

todo ou em parte, o compromisso tomado ou retirar ou modificar a concessão, na medida e

pelo tempo necessário para prevenir ou remediar tal prejuízo.

19.2 Antes que uma Parte Contratante tome as medidas previstas para a aplicação das disposições do § 1º

do presente artigo, avisará por escrito às Partes Contratantes com a maior antecedência possível.

Proporcionará às Partes Contratantes, assim como a todas as outras Partes Contratantes que tenham

interesse substancial como exportadoras do produto em questão, oportunidade de consultar, com ela,

as medidas que se propõe tomar. Quando esse aviso prévio for dado a propósito de uma concessão

relativa a uma preferência será mencionada a Parte Contratante que tiver requerido essa medida. Em

circunstâncias críticas, em que qualquer prazo acarrete um prejuízo difícil de reparar, as medidas

previstas no § 1º do presente artigo poderão ser tomadas a título provisório, sem consulta prévia, com

a condição de que essa consulta tenha lugar imediatamente após a sua aplicação.

19.3 (a) Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um Acordo sobre essas medidas, nada

impedirá uma Parte Contratante, se o desejar, de adotar as medidas em questão ou de

continuar a sua aplicação.

Nesse caso será facultado às Partes Contratantes lesadas por essas medidas, se num prazo de 90 dias, a contar de

sua aplicação, suspender, após prévio aviso de trinta dias dirigido às Partes Contratantes, a aplicação, ao

comércio da Parte Contratante que tomou essas medidas ou, no caso considerado no § 1º (b) do presente artigo,

do comércio da Parte Contratante que solicitou a sua adoção, de concessões ou outras obrigações sensivelmente

equivalentes, resultantes do presente acordo, cuja suspensão não dê lugar a nenhuma objeção das Partes

Contratantes.

(b) Sem prejuízo das disposições da alínea (a) do presente parágrafo, quando essas medidas

forem tomadas sem consulta prévia, de Acordo com o § 2º do presente artigo e determinem

ou ameacem determinar grave prejuízo aos produtores nacionais de produtos por elas

afetados sobre o território de uma Parte Contratante, será facultado a essa Parte Contratante,

quando qualquer prazo a esse respeito determinar um prejuízo dificilmente reparável,

suspender, a partir da aplicação dessas medidas e durante o período dessa consulta, as

concessões ou outras obrigações que julgar necessárias para prevenir ou reparar o prejuízo.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

No parágrafo 1(b), deveria constar “livre para suspender”, e não “livre de suspender”, no sentido de que é

facultada às partes a suspensão, de acordo com o Aartigo em inglês, qual seja, “free (...) to suspend”.

160

No parágrafo 2, a palavra “consult” deveria ter sido traduzida como “consultar”, e não “examinar”.

II. Interpretação e aplicação do Artigo XIX

1. Geral

a) “Aplicação do Artigo XIX”

Em Argentina - Footwear e Korea - Dairy, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que qualquer medida de salvaguarda

imposta após à entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC deve respeitar as disposições do Acordo sobre

Salvaguardas e do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 76

Para. 76. “(…) any safeguard measure imposed after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement must comply

with the provisions of both the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy

Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 86

Para. 86. “As part of the context of paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX, we note that the title of Article XIX is:

‘Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products’. The words ‘emergency action’ also appear in Article

11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. We note once again, that Article XIX:1(a) requires that a product be

imported ‘in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to

domestic producers’. (emphasis added) Clearly, this is not the language of ordinary events in routine commerce.

In our view, the text of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, read in its ordinary meaning and in its context,

demonstrates that safeguard measures were intended by the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the

ordinary, to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, ‘emergency actions.’ And, such ‘emergency actions’ are to be

invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations incurred under the GATT 1994, a Member finds itself

confronted with developments it had not ‘foreseen’ or ‘expected’ when it incurred that obligation. The remedy

that Article XIX:1(a) allows in this situation is temporarily to ‘suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to

withdraw or modify the concession’. Thus, Article XIX is clearly, and in every way, an extraordinary remedy.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R para. 93

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação observou que o remédio previsto no Artigo XIX é de caráter

emergencial e deve ser invocado apenas em situações em que, como resultado das obrigações assumidas no

âmbito do GATT de 1994, um Membro encontra-se confrontado com desenvolvimento não previsto ou esperado

no momento que assumiu determinada obrigação.

Para. 93. “Our reading is supported by the context of these provisions. As part of the context of paragraph 1(a)

of Article XIX, we note that the title of Article XIX is: “Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products”.

The words “emergency action” also appear in Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. We note once

again, that Article XIX:1(a) requires that a product be imported “in such increased quantities and under such

conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers”. (emphasis added) Clearly, this is not

the language of ordinary events in routine commerce. In our view, the text of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT

1994, read in its ordinary meaning and in its context, demonstrates that safeguard measures were intended by

the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the ordinary, to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, “emergency

actions.” And, such “emergency actions” are to be invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations

incurred under the GATT 1994, a Member finds itself confronted with developments it had not “foreseen” or

“expected” when it incurred that obligation. The remedy that Article XIX:1(a) allows in this situation is

161

temporarily to “suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession”. Thus,

Article XIX is clearly, and in every way, an extraordinary remedy.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 94 e Relatório do

Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products

(Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 87

Em Argentina - Footwear e Korea - Dairy, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o objeto e a finalidade do Artigo

XIX também confirmam a sua interpretação.

Para. 94. “This reading of these phrases is also confirmed by the object and purpose of Article XIX of the

GATT 1994. The object and purpose of Article XIX is, quite simply, to allow a Member to readjust temporarily

the balance in the level of concessions between that Member and other exporting Members when it is faced with

“unexpected” and, thus, “unforeseen” circumstances which lead to the product “being imported” in “such

increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of

like or directly competitive products”. In perceiving and applying this object and purpose to the interpretation of

this provision of the WTO Agreement, it is essential to keep in mind that a safeguard action is a “fair” trade

remedy. The application of a safeguard measure does not depend upon “unfair” trade actions, as is the case with

anti-dumping or countervailing measures. Thus, the import restrictions that are imposed on products of

exporting Members when a safeguard action is taken must be seen, as we have said, as extraordinary. And,

when construing the prerequisites for taking such actions, their extraordinary nature must be taken into

account.”

Para. 87. “This reading of these phrases is also confirmed by the object and purpose of Article XIX of the

GATT 1994. The object and purpose of Article XIX is, quite simply, to allow a Member to re-adjust temporarily

the balance in the level of concessions between that Member and other exporting Members when it is faced with

‘unexpected’ and, thus, ‘unforeseen’ circumstances which lead to the product ‘being imported’ in ‘such

increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of

like or directly competitive products’. In perceiving and applying this object and purpose to the interpretation of

this provision of the WTO Agreement, it is essential to keep in mind that a safeguard action is a ‘fair’ trade

remedy. The application of a safeguard measure does not depend upon ‘unfair’ trade actions, as is the case with

anti-dumping or countervailing measures. Thus, the import restrictions that are imposed on products of

exporting Members when a safeguard action is taken must be seen, as we have said, as extraordinary. And,

when construing the prerequisites for taking such actions, their extraordinary nature must be taken into

account.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line), Demandante: República da Coreia,

WT/DS202/AB/R, paras. 82-83

Em US - Line Pipe, o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou que o equilíbrio alcançado pelos Membros da OMC em

conciliar a tensão natural relativa às medidas de salvaguarda é encontrado nas disposições do Acordo sobre

Salvaguarda.

Para. 82. “[P]art of the raison d’être of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards is,

unquestionably, that of giving a WTO Member the possibility, as trade is liberalized, of resorting to an effective

remedy in an extraordinary emergency situation that, in the judgement of that Member, makes it necessary to

protect a domestic industry temporarily.”

Para. 83. “There is, therefore, a natural tension between, on the one hand, defining the appropriate and

legitimate scope of the right to apply safeguard measures and, on the other hand, ensuring that safeguard

measures are not applied against ‘fair trade’ beyond what is necessary to provide extraordinary and temporary

relief. A WTO Member seeking to apply a safeguard measure will argue, correctly, that the right to apply such

162

measures must be respected in order to maintain the domestic momentum and motivation for ongoing trade

liberalization. In turn, a WTO Member whose trade is affected by a safeguard measure will argue, correctly, that

the application of such measures must be limited in order to maintain the multilateral integrity of ongoing trade

concessions. The balance struck by the WTO Members in reconciling this natural tension relating to safeguard

measures is found in the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.”

b) “Standard of review”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel

Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Demandante:

Japão, WT/DS249/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; Demandante: China,

WT/DS252/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/R; Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Demandante:

Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/R; Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, para. 10.38

Em US - Steel, o Painel, em decisão mantida pelo Órgão de Apelação, concluiu que o padrão de revisão para as

alegações de violação de acontecimentos imprevistos do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994 foi previsto no Artigo 11

do DSU.

Para. 10.38. “[T]he role of this Panel in the present dispute is not to conduct a de novo review of the USITC’s

determination. Rather, the Panel must examine whether the United States respected the provisions of Article

XIX of GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Safeguards, including Article 3.1. As further developed below, the

Panel must examine whether the United States demonstrated in its published report, through a reasoned and

adequate explanation, that unforeseen developments and the effects of tariff concessions resulted in increased

imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the relevant domestic producers.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 276

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou o argumento dos EUA que o Artigo 11 do DSU não era aplicável

em alegação de violação do Artigo XIX do GATT.

Para. 276. “We explained in US - Lamb, in the context of a claim under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on

Safeguards, that the competent authorities must provide a ‘reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts

support their determination’. More recently, in US - Line Pipe, in the context of a claim under Article 4.2(b) of

the Agreement on Safeguards, we said that the competent authorities must, similarly, provide a ‘reasoned and

adequate explanation, that injury caused by factors other than increased imports is not attributed to increased

imports’. Our findings in those cases did not purport to address solely the standard of review that is appropriate

for claims arising under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. We see no reason not to apply the same

standard generally to the obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards as well as to the obligations in Article

XIX of the GATT 1994.”

2. Artigo XIX:1

a) “Artigo XIX:1(a): como resultado de acontecimentos imprevistos”

(i) Conceito de acontecimentos imprevistos

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 91 e Relatório do

Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products

(Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 84

163

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação se pronunciou a respeito da frase “como resultado de

acontecimentos imprevistos” que, embora não esteja prevista no Acordo sobre Salvaguardas, está no Artigo

XIX:1(a).

Para. 91. “To determine the meaning of the clause – “as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect

of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions … “ – in sub-

paragraph (a) of Article XIX:1, we must examine these words in their ordinary meaning, in their context and in

light of the object and purpose of Article XIX.79 We look first to the ordinary meaning of these words. As to

the meaning of “unforeseen developments”, we note that the dictionary definition of “unforeseen”, particularly

as it relates to the word “developments”, is synonymous with “unexpected”. 80 “Unforeseeable”, on the other

hand, is defined in the dictionaries as meaning “unpredictable” or “incapable of being foreseen, foretold or

anticipated”. 81 Thus, it seems to us that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “as a result of unforeseen

developments” requires that the developments which led to a product being imported in such increased

quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must

have been “unexpected”. With respect to the phrase “of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member

under this Agreement, including tariff concessions … “, we believe that this phrase simply means that it must be

demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the importing Member has incurred obligations under the GATT 1994,

including tariff concessions. Here, we note that the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994 are made an integral

part of Part I of that Agreement, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article II of the GATT 1994. Therefore, any

concession or commitment in a Member's Schedule is subject to the obligations contained in Article II of the

GATT 1994.”

Para. 84. “To determine the meaning of the clause — ‘as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect

of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions …’ — in sub-

paragraph (a) of Article XIX:1, we must examine these words in their ordinary meaning, in their context and in

light of the object and purpose of Article XIX. We look first to the ordinary meaning of these words. As to the

meaning of ‘unforeseen developments’, we note that the dictionary definition of ‘unforeseen’, particularly as it

relates to the word ‘developments’, is synonymous with ‘unexpected’. ‘Unforeseeable’, on the other hand, is

defined in the dictionaries as meaning ‘unpredictable’ or ‘incapable of being foreseen, foretold or anticipated’.

Thus, it seems to us that the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘as a result of unforeseen developments’ requires

that the developments which led to a product being imported in such increased quantities and under such

conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must have been ‘unexpected’.”

(ii) Requisitos para configuração de acontecimentos imprevistos

Em US - Lamb e Chile – Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação e Painel, respectivamente, concluíram que a

existência de “circunstâncias imprevistas” é uma “questão pertinente de fato e de direito” ao abrigo do Artigo

3.1 do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas, e o relatório publicado pelas autoridades competentes, nos termos deste

artigo, deve conter uma conclusão fundamentada sobre os acontecimentos imprevistos.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or

Frozen Lamb from New Zealand (US - Lamb), Demandantes: Nova Zelândia e Austrália, WT/DS177/AB/R

e WT/DS178/AB/R, para. 76 e Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard

Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina,

WT/DS207/R, paras. 7.134 e 7.139

Para. 76. “[W]e observe that Article 3.1 requires competent authorities to set forth findings and reasoned

conclusions on ‘all pertinent issues of fact and law’ in their published report. As Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT

1994 requires that ‘unforeseen developments’ must be demonstrated as a matter of fact for a safeguard measure

to be applied the existence of ‘unforeseen developments’ is, in our view, a ‘pertinent issue of fact and law’,

under Article 3.1, for the application of a safeguard measure, and it follows that the published report of the

competent authorities, under that Article, must contain a ‘finding’ or ‘reasoned conclusion’ on ‘unforeseen

developments’.”

164

Para. 7.134. “We recall that the Appellate Body in US – Lamb stated that “unforeseen developments” is

a circumstance whose existence must be demonstrated as a matter of fact for a safeguard measure to be applied

consistently with Article XIX. According to the Appellate Body, the demonstration of the existence of this

circumstance must feature in the published report of the investigating authorities. If the published report does

not discuss or offers any explanation as to why certain factors mentioned in it can be regarded as “unforeseen

developments”, that report does not demonstrate that the safeguard measure concerned has been applied as a

result of “unforeseen developments”.”

Para. 7.139. “According to Chile, the statement by the CDC regarding declining international prices reflects

the fact that a fall in international prices to such low levels and for such a long period is unusual and

unpredictable, especially with respect to products whose prices tend to undergo strong fluctuations. We wish to

point out that, although this ex post facto explanation provided by Chile cannot, in any event, cure the CDC's

failure to make findings and reasoned conclusions in its report, this explanation would not meet the requirement

to demonstrate the existence of “unforeseen developments” either. First, Chile in its explanation and the CDC in

its determination seem to refer to different events. Whereas the CDC spoke of “sizeable and rapid” decreases in

international prices, Chile now argues that it was the “sustained” fall in international prices which could not

have been foreseen. Second, it should be recalled that the safeguard measures do not impose any duty which

was not already being applied under the Chilean PBS. The duty applied pursuant to the safeguard measures is

merely a different label for the portion of the Chilean PBS duties exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate. The

Chilean PBS has the stated objective of providing additional protection to offset declining international prices.

The very fact that Chile established its PBS with such an objective constitutes, in our view, evidence that

declining international prices cannot have been unforeseen. If the safeguard measures are not adding any

protection to what already resulted from the Chilean PBS, in force since 1983, it is difficult to see how those

safeguard measures could then have been adopted as a result of developments which could not have been

foreseen at the end of the Uruguay Round.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches

(Argentina - Preserved Peaches), Demandante: Chile, WT/DS238/R, para. 7.33

Em Argentina - Preserved Peaches, a autoridade investigadora tinha se referido a “acontecimentos imprevistos”

apenas em sua conclusão final, o Painel considerou que isso era insuficiente.

Para. 7.33. “A mere phrase in a conclusion, without supporting analysis of the existence of unforeseen

developments, is not a substitute for a demonstration of fact. The failure of the competent authorities to

demonstrate that certain alleged developments were unforeseen in the foregoing section of their report is not

cured by the concluding phrase.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel

Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS249/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; Demandante: China, WT/DS252/R;

Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/R; Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia,

WT/DS258/R; Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras. 10.52-10.53

Em US - Steel, o Painel concluiu que “acontecimentos imprevistos” devem ser demonstrados em um relatório

antes de a medida ser aplicada.

Para. 10.52. “Given that the demonstration of unforeseen developments is a prerequisite for the application of a

safeguard measure, it cannot take place after the date as of which the safeguard measure is applied. This has

been confirmed by the Appellate Body, which noted, in US - Lamb, that although Article XIX provides no

express guidance on where and when the demonstration of unforeseen developments is to be made, it is

nonetheless a prerequisite, and ‘it follows that this demonstration must be made before the safeguard measure is

applied. Otherwise, the legal basis for the measure is flawed.’ Any demonstration made after the start of the

application of a safeguard measure would have to be disregarded automatically as it cannot afford legal

justification for that measure.”

165

Para. 10.53. “(..) such a reasoned and adequate explanation of how unforeseen developments resulted in

increased imports causing serious injury must form part of the overall reported explanation by the competent

authority that it has satisfied all the WTO prerequisites for the imposition of a safeguard measure. Since the

demonstration of unforeseen developments must be included in the published report of the competent authorities

it is necessary to look for the demonstration of unforeseen developments in the ‘report of the competent

authority’, completed and published prior to the application of the safeguard measures.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 279

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a autoridade competente deve fornecer uma “explicação

fundamentada e adequada” de como os fatos apoiam sua determinação, incluindo “acontecimentos imprevistos”

nos termos do Artigo XIX: 1 (a) do GATT 1994.

Para. 279. “We do not see how a panel could examine objectively the consistency of a determination with

Article XIX of the GATT 1994 if the competent authority had not set out an explanation supporting its

conclusions on ‘unforeseen developments’. Indeed, to enable a panel to determine whether there was

compliance with the prerequisites that must be demonstrated before the application of a safeguard measure, the

competent authority must provide a ‘reasoned and adequate explanation’ of how the facts support its

determination for those prerequisites, including ‘unforeseen developments’ under Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT

1994.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 316

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a decisão do Painel de que cada medida questionada deve ter

sido objeto de uma demonstração especifica de “acontecimentos imprevistos” e também que a demonstração

factual de “acontecimentos imprevistos” deve se relacionar com o produto específico abrangido pela medida

específica em questão.

Para. 316. “To trigger the right to apply a safeguard measure, the development must be such as to result in

increased imports of the product (‘such product’) that is subject to the safeguard measure. Moreover, any

product, as Article XIX:1(a) provides, may, potentially, be subject to that safeguard measure, provided that the

alleged ‘unforeseen developments’ result in increased imports of that specific product (‘such product’). We,

therefore, agree with the Panel that, with respect to the specific products subject to the respective

determinations, the competent authorities are required by Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 to demonstrate

that the ‘unforeseen developments identified … have resulted in increased imports [of the specific products

subject to] … each safeguard measure at issue.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 319

166

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação concordou com o Painel no sentido de que com relação a produtos

específicos sujeitos às determinações respectivas, as autoridades competentes são obrigadas pelo Artigo XIX:

1(a) do GATT 1994, a demonstrar que os acontecimentos imprevistos resultaram em aumento das importações

dos produtos específicos sujeitos à medida de salvaguarda em questão.

Para. 319. “[W]hen an importing Member wishes to apply safeguard measures on imports of several products,

it is not sufficient merely to demonstrate that ‘unforeseen developments’ resulted in increased imports of a

broad category of products that included the specific products subject to the respective determinations by the

competent authority. If that could be done, a Member could make a determination and apply a safeguard

measure to a broad category of products even if imports of one or more of those products did not increase and

did not result from the ‘unforeseen developments’ at issue. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel that such an

approach does not meet the requirements of Article XIX:1(a), and that the demonstration of ‘unforeseen

developments’ must be performed for each product subject to a safeguard measure.” (Emphasis original)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 326

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que era para as autoridades competentes, e não para os Painéis,

fornecerem uma “conclusão fundamentada” sobre acontecimentos imprevistos.

Para. 326. “A ‘reasoned conclusion’ is not one where the conclusion does not even refer to the facts that may

support that conclusion. As the United States itself acknowledges, ‘Article 3.1 thus assigns the competent

authorities - not the panel - the obligation to “publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned

conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law”.’ A competent authority has an obligation under

Article 3.1 to provide reasoned conclusions; it is not for panels to find support for such conclusions by cobbling

together disjointed references scattered throughout a competent authority’s report.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 92

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a exigência de “imprevistos” não estabeleceu uma

“condição” separada para a imposição de medidas de salvaguarda, mas descreveu um certo conjunto de

“circunstâncias”.

Para. 92. “When we examine this clause - ‘as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the

obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions …’ - in its immediate

context in Article XIX:1(a), we see that it relates directly to the second clause in that paragraph - ‘If, …, any

product is being imported into the territory of that Member in such increased quantities and under such

conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly

competitive products …’. The latter, or second, clause in Article XIX:1(a) contains the three conditions for the

application of safeguard measures. These conditions, which are reiterated in Article 2.1 of the Agreement on

Safeguards, are that: (1) a product is being imported ‘in such quantities and under such conditions’; (2) ‘as to

cause’; (3) serious injury or the threat of serious injury to domestic producers. The first clause in Article

XIX:1(a) - ‘as a result of unforeseen developments and of the obligations incurred by a Member under the

Agreement, including tariff concessions …’- is a dependent clause which, in our view, is linked grammatically

to the verb phrase ‘is being imported’ in the second clause of that paragraph. Although we do not view the first

clause in Article XIX:1(a) as establishing independent conditions for the application of a safeguard measure,

additional to the conditions set forth in the second clause of that paragraph, we do believe that the first clause

describes certain circumstances which must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for a safeguard measure

167

to be applied consistently with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. In this sense, we believe that

there is a logical connection between the circumstances described in the first clause - ‘as a result of unforeseen

developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff

concessions …’ - and the conditions set forth in the second clause of Article XIX:1(a) for the imposition of a

safeguard measure.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel

Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS249/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; Demandante: China, WT/DS252/R;

Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/R; Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia,

WT/DS258/R; Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras. 10.39, 10.41 e 10.43

Em US - Steel, o Painel concluiu que a norma legal utilizada para determinar o que constitui um “acontecimento

imprevisto” pode ser tanto subjetiva quanto objetiva.

Para. 10.39. “The legal standard that is used to determine what constitutes an unforeseen development is, as

agreed by the parties, at least in part, subjective. This is supported by the Appellate Body, who stated in Korea

— Dairy that safeguard measures “are to be invoked only in situations when … an importing Member finds

itself confronted with developments it had not ‘foreseen’ or ‘expected’ when it incurred [its] obligation [under

GATT 1994].”

Para. 10.41. “What was ‘unforeseen’ when the contracting parties negotiated their first tariff concessions in all

likelihood differs from what can be considered to be unforeseen today. The Panel notes that after 50 years of

GATT, tariffs have, for many products, disappeared or reached very low levels. Further, what constitutes

‘unforeseen developments’ for an importing Member will vary depending on the context and the circumstances.

Nevertheless, the subjectivity of the standard does not take away from the fact that the unexpectedness of a

development for an importing Member is something that must be demonstrated through a reasoned and adequate

explanation.”

Para. 10.43. “In addition, the standard for unforeseen developments may also be said to have an objective

element. The appropriate focus is on what should or could have been foreseen in light of the circumstances. The

standard is not what the specific negotiators had in mind but rather what they could (reasonably) have had in

mind. This was recognized early in GATT by the US - Fur Felt Hats decision, which characterized unforeseen

developments as ‘developments […] which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the

country making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession was

negotiated’.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel

Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS248/R; Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/R; Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras.

10.97-10.100

Em US - Steel, o Painel concluiu que a confluência de vários eventos pode se unir para formar a base de um

“acontecimento imprevisto”.

Para. 10.97. “The United States argues that the robustness of the US dollar was a development which combined

with the other developments, namely, the currency crises in Asia and the former USSR and the continued

growth in steel demand in the United States’ market as other markets declined, lead to increased imports.”

Para. 10.98. “The Panel has already accepted that the Russian and the Southeast Asian financial crises, at least

conceptually, could be considered unforeseen developments that did not exist at the end of the Uruguay Round.

We have also found that the USITC did not consider the strength of the United States’ economy and the

168

appreciation of the US dollar as unforeseen developments per se; it had referred to these factors in relation to

other unforeseen developments, which together had resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to

cause injury.”

Para. 10.99. “Article XIX does not preclude consideration of the confluence of a number of developments as

‘unforeseen developments’. Accordingly, the Panel believes that confluence of developments can form the basis

of ‘unforeseen developments’ for the purposes of Article XIX of GATT 1994. The Panel is of the view,

therefore, that it is for each Member to demonstrate that a confluence of circumstances that it considers were

unforeseen at the time it concluded its tariff negotiations resulted in increased imports causing serious injury.”

Para. 10.100. “To the complainants’ argument that the changes in steel markets were much more pronounced in

1991 following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union than later on and could not, therefore, be unforeseen

after 1994, the Panel notes that the fact that the dissolution of the USSR and its overall effects may have

constituted an unforeseen development in 1991 does not mean that a subsequent financial crisis also resulting

somehow from the dissolution of the USSR, cannot, with other developments, be considered part of a

‘confluence of unforeseen developments’ in 1997 for the purpose of Article XIX of GATT 1994.”

(iii) Relação entre “acontecimentos imprevistos” e “condição para imposição da salvaguarda”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel

Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS248/R; Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/R; Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras.

10.104 e 10.110

Em US - Steel, o Painel considerou que a frase “como resultado de” implica uma “conexão lógica” entre

“acontecimentos imprevistos e os efeitos de tarifas concessões e obrigações” e “a condição para imposição de

uma medida de salvaguarda”.

Para. 10.104. “The Appellate Body has interpreted the phrase ‘as a result of’ in Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994

as a logical connection that exists between the first two clauses of that Article. In other words, a logical

connection must be demonstrated to have existed between the elements of the first clause of Article XIX:1(a) -

‘as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this

Agreement, including tariff concessions’ - and the conditions set forth in the second clause of that Article–

‘increased imports causing serious injury’ - for the imposition of a safeguard measure.”

Para. 10.110. “The Panel agrees with New Zealand that it would be improper to reduce to a nullity the

obligation to explain how ‘unforeseen developments’ resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to

cause serious injury. In some cases, the explanation may be as simple as bringing two sets of facts together.

However, in other situations, it may require much more detailed analysis in order to make clear the relationship

that exists between the unforeseen developments and the increased imports that are causing or threatening to

cause serious injury. The nature of the facts, including their complexity, will dictate the extent to which the

relationship between the unforeseen developments and increased imports causing injury needs to be explained.

The timing of the explanation, its extent and its quality are all factors that can affect whether a explanation is

reasoned and adequate.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 315

169

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que “acontecimentos imprevistos” devem resultar em aumento

das importações do produto que está sujeito a uma medida de salvaguarda.

Para. 315. “Turning to the term ‘as a result of’ that is also found in Article XIX:1(a), we note that the ordinary

meaning of ‘result’ is, as defined in the dictionary, ‘an effect, issue, or outcome from some action, process or

design’. The increased imports to which this provision refers must therefore be an ‘effect, or outcome’ of the

‘unforeseen developments’. Put differently, the ‘unforeseen developments’ must ‘result’ in increased imports of

the product (‘such product’) that is subject to a safeguard measure.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R;

Demandante: Japão, WT/DS249/AB/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R;

Demandante: China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/AB/R; Demandante: Noruega,

WT/DS254/AB/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 350

Em US - Steel, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu a relação entre acontecimentos imprevistos e aumento das

importações e concluiu que em situações de acontecimentos imprevistos, o aumento das importações também

deve ser imprevisto.

Para. 350. “In a similar vein, we said in Argentina - Footwear (EC) that ‘the increased quantities of imports

should have been ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unexpected’.’In doing so, we were referring to the fact that the increased

imports must, under Article XIX:1(a), result from ‘unforeseen developments’ in order to justify the application

of a safeguard measure. Because the ‘increased imports’ must be ‘as a result’ of an event that was ‘unforeseen’

or ‘unexpected’, it follows that the increased imports must also be ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unexpected’. Thus, the

‘extraordinary nature’ of the domestic response to increased imports does not depend on the absolute or relative

quantities of the product being imported. Rather, it depends on the fact that the increased imports were

unforeseen or unexpected.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 96

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação observou um relatório do Painel do GATT (Hatter’s Fur), que

confirmou que o desenvolvimento deve ter sido previsto à data da negociação de tarifas.

Para. 96. “In addition, we note that our reading of the clause — ‘as a result of unforeseen developments and of

the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions …’ — in

Article XIX:1(a) is also consistent with the one GATT 1947 case that involved Article XIX, the so-called

‘Hatters’ Fur’ case. Members of the Working Party in that case, in 1951, stated:

… ‘unforeseen developments’ should be interpreted to mean developments occurring

after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which it would not be reasonable

to expect that the negotiators of the country making the concession could and should

have foreseen at the time when the concession was negotiated.”

Em Korea - Dairy, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que os “acontecimentos imprevistos” são acontecimentos não

previstos ou esperados quando os Membros estabeleceram essa obrigação.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy

Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 86

Para. 86. “[S]uch ‘emergency actions’ [safeguard measures] are to be invoked only in situations when, as a

result of obligations incurred under the GATT 1994, an importing Member finds itself confronted with

developments it had not ‘foreseen’ or ‘expected’ when it incurred that obligation.”

170

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches

(Argentina - Preserved Peaches), Demandante: Chile, WT/DS238/R, paras. 7.25 e 7.28

Em Argentina - Preserved Peaches, o Painel concordou com a abordagem de ambas as partes de que os

acontecimentos deveriam ter sido imprevistos pelos negociadores no momento em que estes concederam as

concessão relevantes.

Para. 7.25. “There is the issue of the point in time at which Article XIX:1(a) requires that developments should

have been unforeseen. Chile stated that the developments should have been unforeseen by a Member at the time

it incurred the relevant obligation. In response to questions posed by the Panel, both parties submitted basically

that developments should have been unforeseen by the negotiators at the time at which they granted the relevant

concession.”

Para. 7.28. “We will apply this interpretation and determine whether the competent authorities assessed

whether the developments which they identified were unforeseen as at the time the relevant obligation was

negotiated. We emphasize that we are not now discussing the time at which the competent authorities must

demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments in order to adopt a safeguard measure.”

(iv) como resultado - do efeito das obrigações acordadas por um Membro

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que os compromissos assumidos por um Membro em

seus “schedules of concessions” integram suas obrigações no âmbito do Artigo II do GATT e, portanto, também

devem ser considerados quando estivermos analisando a compatibilidade de uma salvaguarda com as regras da

OMC, incluindo concessões tarifárias.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, paras. 91-92

Para. 91. “[W]e believe that this phrase simply means that it must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the

importing Member has incurred obligations under the GATT 1994, including tariff concessions. Here, we note

that the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994 are made an integral part of Part I of that Agreement, pursuant to

paragraph 7 of Article II of the GATT 1994. Therefore, any concession or commitment in a Member’s Schedule

is subject to the obligations contained in Article II of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 92. “as a result … of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member” as setting forth “certain

circumstances which must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for a safeguard measure to be applied

consistently with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel

Products (US - Steel), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Demandante: Japão,

WT/DS249/R; Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; Demandante: China, WT/DS252/R;

Demandante: Suíça, WT/DS253/R; Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Demandante: Nova Zelândia,

WT/DS258/R; Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, para. 10.140

Em US - Steel, o Painel considerou que fica evidenciada a relação entre concessão tarifária e aumento nas

importações se a salvaguarda foi imposta para um produto para o qual o Membro apresentou concessões

tarifárias.

Para. 10.140. “(…) the logical connection between tariff concessions and increased imports causing serious

injury is proven once there is evidence that the importing Member has tariff concessions for the relevant

product.”

3. Artigo XIX:2

171

(i) “avisará por escrito às Partes Contratantes com a maior antecedência possível” e “oportunidade

para consultar”

Apesar de não haver precedentes a respeito, devem ser interpretados conforme o Artigo 12 do Acordo de

Salvaguardas.

4. Artigo XIX:3

Não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB.

5. Relação com outros Acordos da OMC

a) “Acordo sobre Salvaguardas”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear

(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 89

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a conclusão do Painel de que medidas de salvaguarda

que atendam aos requisitos do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas automaticamente também satisfazem os requisitos do

Artigo XIX. O Órgão de Apelação considerou esta conclusão do Painel incompatível com os princípios de

interpretação de tratado e com o sentido comum dos Atigos 1 e 11.1(a) do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas.

Para. 89. “[I]t is clear from Articles 1 and 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards that the Uruguay Round

negotiators did not intend that the Agreement on Safeguards would entirely replace Article XIX. Instead, the

ordinary meaning of Articles 1 and 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards confirms that the intention of the

negotiators was that the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Safeguards

would apply cumulatively, except to the extent of a conflict between specific provisions … We do not see this as

an issue involving a conflict between specific provisions of two Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods.

Thus, we are obliged to apply the provisions of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article

XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 cumulatively, in order to give meaning, by giving legal effect, to all the applicable

provisions relating to safeguard measures.”

Relatório do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Safeguard Measure on Imports of

Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New Zealand (US – Lamb), Demandante: Nova Zelândia e Austrália,

WT/DS177/R, WT/DS178/R) paras. 7.11; WT/DS177/AB/R e WT/DS178/AB/R, para. 70

Em US - Lamb, o Painel referindo-se às conclusões do Órgão de Apelação em Argentina - Footwear e Korea -

Dairy, sobre a relação entre o Acordo sobre Salvaguardas e o Artigo XIX do GATT 1994, observou que os

normativos devem ser interpretados conjuntamente.

Para. 7.11. “Thus the Appellate Body explicitly rejected the idea that those requirements of GATT Article XIX

which are not reflected in the Safeguards Agreement could have been superseded by the requirements of the

latter and stressed that all of the relevant provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and GATT Article XIX must

be given meaning and effect.”

Para. 70. “[A]rticles 1 and 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards express the full and continuing applicability

of Article XIX of the GATT 1994, which no longer stands in isolation, but has been clarified and reinforced by

the Agreement on Safeguards.”

III. Comentários

Nos termos dos relatórios aprovados pelo DSB da OMC, o remédio previsto no Artigo XIX (imposição de uma

salvaguarda) é de caráter emergencial e deve ser invocado apenas em situações em que, como resultado das

obrigações assumidas no âmbito do GATT de 1994, um Membro se encontrar confrontado com acontecimento

não previsto ou esperado no momento que assumiu determinada obrigação.

172

Acontecimentos não previstos devem ser demonstrados em um relatório antes de a medida ser aplicada e a

autoridade competente deve fornecer uma explicação fundamentada e adequada de como os fatos apoiam sua

determinação.

Cada medida questionada deve ter sido objeto de uma demonstração especifica de “acontecimentos imprevistos”

e também deve haver uma demonstração factual de que os “acontecimentos imprevistos” se relacionam com o

produto específico abrangido pela medida específica em questão.

O padrão de revisão para alegações de violação de acontecimentos imprevistos do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994

foi previsto no Artigo 11 do DSU.

A exigência de “imprevistos” não estabeleceu uma “condição” separada para a imposição de medidas de

salvaguarda, mas descreveu um conjunto de “circunstâncias”.

O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que qualquer medida de salvaguarda imposta após a entrada em vigor do Acordo

Constitutivo da OMC deve respeitar as disposições do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas e, cumulativamente, do

Artigo XIX do GATT 1994.

Em Argentina - Footwear, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a conclusão do Painel de que medidas de salvaguarda

que atendam aos requisitos do Acordo de Salvaguardas automaticamente também satisfazem os requisitos do

Artigo XIX do GATT. O Órgão de Apelação considerou esta conclusão do Painel incompatível com os

princípios de interpretação de tratado e com o sentido comum dos Artigos 1 e 11.1(a) do Acordo de

Salvaguardas.

173

Artigo XX

Fábio Morosini

Carina Oliveira

Luísa Niencheski

Matheus Bassani

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XX

General Exceptions

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of

arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised

restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or

enforcement by any contracting party of measures:

(a) necessary to protect public morals;

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;

(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the

provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement

of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of

patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices;

(e) relating to the products of prison labour;

(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value;

(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective

in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;

(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement

which conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by

them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved;

(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities

of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of

such materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan;

Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection

afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement

relating to non-discrimination;

(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; Provided

that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are

entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any such

measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be

discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The

CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June

1960.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

174

Artigo XX

Exceções Gerais

Desde que essas medidas não sejam aplicadas de forma a constituir quer um meio de discriminação

arbitrária, ou injustificada, entre os países onde existem as mesmas condições, quer uma restrição disfarçada

ao comércio internacional, disposição alguma do presente capítulo será interpretada como impedindo a

adoção ou aplicação, por qualquer Parte Contratante, das medidas:

I. a) necessárias à proteção da moralidade pública;

b) necessárias á proteção da saúde e da vida das pessoas e dos animais e á preservação dos

vegetais;

c) que se relacionem à exportação e a importação do ouro e da prata;

d) necessárias a assegurar a aplicação das leis e regulamentos que não sejam incompatíveis com

as disposições do presente acordo, tais como, por exemplo, as leis e regulamentos que dizem

respeito à aplicação de medidas alfandegárias, à manutenção em vigor dos monopólios

administrados na conformidade do § 4º do art. II e do art. XVII à proteção das patentes,

marcas de fábrica e direitos de autoria e de reprodução, e a medidas próprias a impedir as

práticas de natureza a induzir em êrro;

e) relativas aos artigos fabricados nas prisões:

f) impostas para a proteção de tesouros nacionais de valor artístico, histórico ou arqueológico;

g) relativas à conservação dos recursos naturais esgotáveis, se tais medidas forem aplicadas

conjuntamente com restrições à produção ou ao consumo nacionais;

h) tomadas em aplicação de compromissos contraídos em virtude de acôrdos

intergovernamentais sôbre produtos básicos, concluídos dentro dos princípios aprovados pelo

Conselho Econômico e Social das Nações Unidas, na sua resolução de 28 de março de 1947,

que instituiu uma Comissão Provisória de Coordenação para os acôrdos Internacionais

relativos aos produtos básicos;

i) que impliquem em restrições à exportação de matérias primas produzidas no interior do país

e necessárias para assegurar a uma indústria nacional de transformação as quantidades

essenciais das referidas matérias-primas durante os períodos nos quais o preço nacional seja

mantido abaixo do preço mundial, em execução de um plano governamental de estabilização;

sob reserva de que essas restrições não tenham por efeito reforçar a exportação ou a proteção

concedida à referida indústria nacional e não sejam contrárias às disposições do presente

acôrdo relativas à não discriminação.

II. a) essenciais à aquisição e à repartição de produtos dos quais se faz sentir uma penúria geral ou

local; todavia, as referidas medidas deverão ser compatíveis com todos os acôrdos

multilaterais destinados a assegurar uma repartição internacional eqüitativa dêsses produtos

ou, na ausência de tais acôrdos, com o princípio segundo o qual tôdas as Partes Contratantes

têm direito a uma parte equitativa do aprovisionamento internacional dos referidos produtos;

b) essenciais ao funcionamento do contrôle de preços estabelecido por uma Parte Contratante

que, em conseqüência da guerra, sofra de penúria de produtos;

c) essenciais à liquidação metódica dos excedentes temporários de estoques pertencentes a

qualquer Parte Contratante ou por ela controlados ou de indústrias que se tenham

desenvolvido no território de uma Parte Contratante por motivo das exigências da guerra e

175

cuja manutenção em tempo normal seja contrária à sã economia, ficando entendido que

nenhuma Parte Contratante poderá instituir medidas dessa natureza, a não ser depois de

haver consultado as outras Partes Contratantes interessadas com o fim de ser adotada uma

ação internacional apropriada.

As medidas instituídas ou mantidas nos têrmos da Parte Segunda do presente artigo, incompatíveis

com as outras disposições do presente Acôrdo, serão suprimidas, logo que as circunstâncias que as

motivaram cessarem de existir e, em qualquer caso, a 1 de janeiro de 1951 o mais tardar, ficando entendido

que, com o consentimento das Partes Contratantes, o período considerado poderá ser prorrogado no que se

refere a aplicação, por qualquer Parte Contratante, de uma medida relativa a um produto determinado, para

novos períodos que as Partes Contratantes fixarem.

IC. Comentários à Tradução

O texto original, em inglês, do Artigo XX do GATT apresenta um caput e dez parágrafos, cada um

constando diferentes fundamentos para configuração de exceção (parágrafos “a” a “j”). A tradução do Artigo

XX para o português, prevista na Lei nº 313, de 30 de julho de 1948, divide os parágrafos deste Artigo em

duas partes. A parte I engloba a tradução dos parágrafos “a” a “i”, sem alterar o teor do texto original. Já a

parte II reproduz o teor original do parágrafo “j”, mas inclui dois dispositivos (Parte II, letras “b” e “c”) não

previstos no texto original em inglês.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XX

1. Artigo XX, Caput

a) “Objetivo do Artigo XX (Purpose)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 20

Page 20. “The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific

contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. It is, accordingly, important to

underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention

of abuse of the exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX]. This insight drawn from the drafting

history of Article XX is a valuable one. The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of

Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat

the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those

exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the particular

exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the

exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp

products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998, paras. 846, 158 e

155

O propósito do caput do Artigo XX é, segundo essa decisão do Órgão de Apelação, estipular limites e

condições que impeçam a utilização abusiva pelas partes frente às exceções trazidas nas alíneas do

referido Artigo.

176

Para. 846. “In our view, the language of the chapeau makes clear that each of the exceptions in paragraphs

(a) to (j) of Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive obligations contained in

the other provisions of the GATT 1994, that is to say, the ultimate availability of the exception is subject to

the compliance by the invoking Member with the requirements of the chapeau. This interpretation of the

chapeau is confirmed by its negotiating history. The language initially proposed by the United States in 1946

for the chapeau of what would later become Article XX was unqualified and unconditional. Several

proposals were made during the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Employment in 1946 suggesting modifications. In November 1946, the United

Kingdom proposed that ‘in order to prevent abuse of the exceptions of Article 32 [which would subsequently

become Article XX]’, the chapeau of this provision should be qualified. This proposal was generally

accepted, subject to later review of its precise wording. Thus, the negotiating history of Article XX confirms

that the paragraphs of Article XX set forth limited and conditional exceptions from the obligations of the

substantive provisions of the GATT. Any measure, to qualify finally for exception, must also satisfy the

requirements of the chapeau. This is a fundamental part of the balance of rights and obligations struck by the

original framers of the GATT 1947.”

Para. 158. “The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith. This

principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise

of rights by states. One application of this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of

abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a

right “impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say,

reasonably.”

Para. 155. “We must fulfill our responsibility in this specific case, which is to interpret the existing language

of the chapeau of Article XX by examining its ordinary meaning, in light of its context and object and

purpose in order to determine whether the United States measure at issue qualifies for justification under

Article XX. It is proper for us to take into account, as part of the context of the chapeau, the specific

language of the preamble to the WTO Agreement, which, we have said, gives colour, texture and shading to

the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement, generally, and under the GATT 1994, in

particular.”

b) “Discriminação arbitrária ou injustificada entre países em que prevalecem as mesmas condições

(arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail)”

b.1) Elementos constitutivos (Constitutive elements)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp

products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998,

O Órgão de Apelação declarou que são três os aspectos que devem ser observados para que uma

medida se enquadre no conceito de discriminação arbitrária ou injustificável. Primeiramente, a medida

comercial imposta por uma das partes deve ser discriminatória. Em segundo lugar, o Órgão de

Apelação afirmou que tal medida deve ser arbitrária e indefensável. Por último, deve ocorrer entre

países que gozem das mesmas condições comerciais.

O Órgão de Apelação, aprofundando-se na explicação do Artigo XX, consignou que deve haver um

equilíbrio entre o direito da parte contratante em invocar as exceções do Artigo e o seu dever de

observar os direitos da parte contrária e disposições em outros Acordos. Estabeleceu, também, uma

conexão entre esse equilíbrio e o princípio da boa-fé. Ainda, explicou a relevância do Preâmbulo do

Acordo da OMC, que se refere expressamente ao uso sustentável dos recursos naturais, para uma

interpretação mais alargada do caput do Artigo e, especificamente, da alínea g.

177

Para. 150. “In order for a measure to be applied in a manner which would constitute “arbitrary or

unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”, three elements must exist.

First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination. As we stated in United States - Gasoline,

the nature and quality of this discrimination is different from the discrimination in the treatment of products

which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such

as Articles I, III or XI. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character. We will

examine this element of arbitrariness or unjustifiability in detail below. Third, this discrimination must occur

between countries where the same conditions prevail. In United States - Gasoline, we accepted the

assumption of the participants in that appeal that such discrimination could occur not only between different

exporting Members, but also between exporting Members and the importing Member concerned. Thus, the

standards embodied in the language of the chapeau are not only different from the requirements of

Article XX(g); they are also different from the standard used in determining that Section 609 is violative of

the substantive rules of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.”

b.2) Forma de discriminação incluída no caput (Type of discrimination covered by the chapeau)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 22

Page 22. “The assumption on which all the participants proceeded is buttressed by the fact that the chapeau

says that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any

contracting party of measures ...” The exceptions listed in Article XX thus relate to all of the obligations

under the General Agreement: the national treatment obligation and the most-favoured-nation obligation, of

course, but others as well. Effect is more easily given to the words “nothing in this Agreement”, and Article

XX as a whole including its chapeau more easily integrated into the remainder of the General Agreement, if

the chapeau is taken to mean that the standards it sets forth are applicable to all of the situations in which an

allegation of a violation of a substantive obligation has been made and one of the exceptions contained in

Article XX has in turn been claimed.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp

products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998

O Órgão de Apelação também na decisão do caso US - Shrimp reconheceu que medidas discriminatórias

podem ocorrer não só entre os diferentes Membros exportadores, mas também entre exportadores e

importadores.

Para. 150. “In United States – Gasoline, we accepted the assumption of the participants in that appeal that

such discrimination could occur not only between different exporting Members, but also between exporting

Members and the importing Member concerned. Thus, the standards embodied in the language of the

chapeau are not only different from the requirements of Article XX(g); they are also different from the

standard used in determining that Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article XI:1 of the

GATT 1994.”

b.3) Padrão de Discriminação (Standard of discrimination)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 21

Novamente, por meio do relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US - Gasoline foi esclarecido outro

ponto da interpretação do caput do Artigo XX. Desta vez, a controvérsia versava sobre se as medidas

discriminatórias abrangiam tanto as condições dos países importadores e exportadores ou somente dos

países exportadores. Averbou-se que a discriminação refere-se aos países importadores e exportadores.

178

Page 21. “The enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be an unprofitable one if it involved no more

than applying the standard used in finding that the baseline establishment rules were inconsistent with

Article III:4. That would also be true if the finding were one of inconsistency with some other substantive

rule of the General Agreement. The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s)

by which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred. To proceed down that path

would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of

meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule

existed, with the further and separate question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that

inconsistency was nevertheless justified. One of the corollaries of the “general rule of interpretation” in the

Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An

interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty

to redundancy or inutility.”

b.4) Exemplos de discriminação arbitrária e injustificável (Examples of arbitrary and unjustifiable

discrimination)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp

products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998, paras. 161 e 177

Para. 161. “Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this measure's application relates to its intended and actual

coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments, Members of the WTO.

Section 609, in its application, is, in effect, an economic embargo which requires all other exporting

Members, if they wish to exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy (together with an

approved enforcement program) as that applied to, and enforced on, United States domestic shrimp trawlers.

As enacted by the Congress of the United States, the statutory provisions of Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) do

not, in themselves, require that other WTO Members adopt essentially the same policies and enforcement

practices as the United States.”

Para. 177. “Section 609 has been applied in a manner constituting “arbitrary discrimination between

countries where the same conditions prevail”. We have already observed that Section 609, in its application,

imposes a single, rigid and unbending requirement that countries applying for certification under Section

609(b)(2)(A) and (B) adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is essentially the same as the United

States' program, without inquiring into the appropriateness of that program for the conditions prevailing in

the exporting countries. Furthermore, there is little or no flexibility in how officials make the determination

for certification pursuant to these provisions. In our view, this rigidity and inflexibility also constitute

“arbitrary discrimination” within the meaning of the chapeau.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the granting of tariff preferences to

developing countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/R, 1 de dezembro de

2003, paras. 7.233-7.234

O Órgão de Apelação exemplificou situação em que ocorreu medida discriminatória arbitrária e

injustificável, justamente quando os EUA pretendeu coercitivamente aplicar a mesma política em

outros governos. Isto é, os EUA utilizou um padrão uniforme sem atender as particularidades de cada

região do seu território. Ainda, o Órgão criticou a exigência única, rígida e não flexível imposta pelos

EUA aos países pretendentes à certificação.

Nessa decisão, restou consignado que o padrão de discriminação estipulado no Artigo XX deve ser

diferente do padrão estipulado no Artigo III:4, haja vista que se fosse o mesmo, as exceções das alíneas

(a) e (j) do Artigo XX restariam sem significado.

179

Para. 7.233. “The Panel notes that the European Communities has not provided any evidence on the

existence of procedures or criteria, whether published or other, relating to the periodic selection of

beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements. While the European Communities provided a description of its

selection process during this litigation, stating that it is based on the “overall assessment of the gravity of the

drug problem in each developing country in accordance with objective criteria”, and also referred to UN

statistics on drug production and seizures, the Panel has no evidence before it to identify whether or not the

European Communities actually conducted a selection process as described by the European Communities

and whether such selection process, if it occurred, was actually based upon these UN statistics.”

Para. 7.234. “The Panel finds no evidence to conclude that the conditions in respect of drug problems

prevailing in the 12 beneficiary countries are the same or similar, while the conditions prevailing in other

drug-affected developing countries not covered by any other preferential tariff schemes are not the same as,

or sufficiently similar to, the prevailing conditions in the 12 beneficiary countries.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Measures affecting imports of retreaded tyres (Brazil -

Retreated Tyres), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 de dezembro de 2007, paras. 227,

230 e 246

Neste emblemático caso, a partir da decisão proferida pelo Painel, a qual considerou que a restrição à

importação de pneus usados pelo Mercosul não era improcedente, o Órgão de Apelação observou que para

determinar se uma medida é arbitrária, deve basear sua análise nas causas de tal discriminação e não apenas

nas consequências provindas dela. Também ressaltou que a discriminação deve guardar pertinência com o

seu objetivo legítimo e não somente depender da avaliação de seu impacto quantitativo. Assim, considerou

que houve discriminação entre os países do Mercosul com relação a outros Membros da OMC, em

decorrência da imposição do banimento à importação introduzida por uma decisão do Tribunal do Mercosul.

Ademais, o Órgão concluiu que uma medida é considerada discriminatória quando não tem relação com o

objetivo de uma medida justificada provisoriamente.

Para. 227. “We have to assess whether this explanation provided by Brazil is acceptable as a justification for

discrimination between MERCOSUR countries and non-MERCOSUR countries in relation to retreaded

tyres. In doing so, we are mindful of the function of the chapeau of Article XX, which is to prevent abuse of

the exceptions specified in the paragraphs of that provision. In our view, there is such an abuse, and,

therefore, there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure provisionally justified under a

paragraph of Article XX is applied in a discriminatory manner “between countries where the same conditions

prevail”, and when the reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective

falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective. The assessment

of whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in the light of the objective of the

measure. We note, for example, that one of the bases on which the Appellate Body relied in US - Shrimp for

concluding that the operation of the measure at issue resulted in unjustifiable discrimination was that one

particular aspect of the application of the measure (the measure implied that, in certain circumstances,

shrimp caught abroad using methods identical to those employed in the United States would be excluded

from the United States market) was “difficult to reconcile with the declared objective of protecting and

conserving sea turtles”. Accordingly, we have difficulty understanding how discrimination might be viewed

as complying with the chapeau of Article XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to

the pursuit of or would go against the objective that was provisionally found to justify a measure under a

paragraph of Article XX.”

O Painel analisou se os Acordos de Drogas da União Europeia estavam em consonância com o Artigo

XX (b) e, para tanto, analisou se tais medidas enquadravam-se nas hipóteses do caput do Artigo XX.

Especificamente, o Painel analisou a inclusão do Paquistão, a partir de 2002, como um beneficiário do

regime de preferências de Drogas e da exclusão do Irã, descobrindo que nenhum critério objetivo

poderia ser discernido no processo de seleção. Consequentemente, o Painel não se convenceu de que as

condições nos 12 países beneficiários de tais Acordos de Drogas foram os mesmos.

180

Para. 230. “Having said that, we recognize that in certain cases the effects of the discrimination may be a

relevant factor, among others, for determining whether the cause or rationale of the discrimination is

acceptable or defensible and, ultimately, whether the discrimination is justifiable. The effects of

discrimination might be relevant, depending on the circumstances of the case, because, as we indicated

above, the chapeau of Article XX deals with the manner of application of the measure at issue. Taking into

account as a relevant factor, among others, the effects of the discrimination for determining whether the

rationale of the discrimination is acceptable is, however, fundamentally different from the Panel's approach,

which focused exclusively on the relationship between the effects of the discrimination and its justifiable or

unjustifiable character.”

Para. 246. “As we explained above, the analysis of whether the application of a measure results in arbitrary

or unjustifiable discrimination should focus on the cause or rationale given for the discrimination. For Brazil,

the fact that Brazilian retreaders are able to use imported casings is the result of the decisions of the Brazilian

administrative authorities to comply with court injunctions. We observe that this explanation bears no

relationship to the objective of the Import Ban — reducing exposure to the risks arising from the

accumulation of waste tyres to the maximum extent possible. The imports of used tyres through court

injunctions even go against the objective pursued by the Import Ban. As we indicated above, there is

arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX, when a Member

seeks to justify the discrimination resulting from the application of its measure by a rationale that bears no

relationship to the accomplishment of the objective that falls within the purview of one of the paragraphs of

Article XX, or goes against this objective. Accordingly, we find that the imports of used tyres through court

injunctions have resulted in the Import Ban being applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or

unjustifiable discrimination.”

c) “Restrição disfarçada ao Comércio Internacional (disguised restriction on international trade)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 22

Page 22. “Arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction” on

international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It is clear to

us that “disguised restriction” includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that

concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning

of “disguised restriction.” We consider that “disguised restriction”, whatever else it covers, may properly be

read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade

taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a

somewhat different manner, the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a

particular measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, may also be taken into account in

determining the presence of a “disguised restriction” on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be

found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules

available in Article XX.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Measures affecting imports of retreaded tyres (Brazil -

Retreated Tyres), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 de dezembro de 2007, para. 248

Nesse relatório, o Órgão de Apelação fundamenta-se pela contrariedade da decisão do Painel que

condicionou a constatação de uma restrição disfarçada ao comércio internacional na existência de

importações de pneus usados em quantidades prejudiciais à consecução do objetivo da restrição de

importação.

A expressão “discriminação arbitrária e injustificável” foi considerada, nessa decisão, pelo Órgão de

Apelação similar e complementar à expressão “restrição disfarçada ao comércio internacional”.

181

Para. 248. “The Panel found that, “since imports of used tyres take place in significant amounts under court

injunctions to the benefit of the domestic retreading industry, the [Import Ban] is being applied in a manner

that constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade.” The Panel reasoned that the restriction on

international trade inherent in the Import Ban has operated to the benefit of domestic retreaders, because

“[t]he granting of court injunctions for the importation of used tyres has ... in effect meant that ... domestic

retreaders have been able to continue to benefit from the importation of used tyres as material for their own

activity in significant amounts, while their competitors from non-MERCOSUR countries have been kept out

of the Brazilian market.”

2. Artigo XX(a)

a) “Geral: moralidade pública” (public moral)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution

Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China - Publications and

Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 879

O Painel em China - Publications and Audiovisual Products adotou a interpretação de “moralidade

pública” elaborada pelo Painel em US - Gambling, no qual o termo “moralidade pública” prevê

determinadas condutas, certas ou erradas, a serem respeitadas conforme a cultura de uma comunidade

ou nação. O conteúdo dessas condutas pode variar no tempo e no espaço, dependendo de uma gama de

fatores sociais, culturais, éticos e valores religiosos. Os Membros da OMC, ao aplicarem esses

critérios, devem conceder uma margem para definir e aplicar a eles mesmos os conceitos de

“moralidade pública” no seu respectivo território, conforme seus próprios sistemas e valores.

Para. 879. “The Panel in China - Publications and Audiovisual Products adopted the interpretation of

“public morals” developed by the panel in US - Gambling, namely that:

1. “‘[T]he term “public morals” denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf

of a community or nation’… ‘the content of these concepts for Members can vary in time and space,

depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values’ …

Members, in applying this and other similar societal concepts, ‘should be given some scope to define and

apply for themselves the concepts of “public morals” … in their respective territories, according to their own

systems and scales of values.’”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 880

O painel China — Publications and Audiovisual Products lembrou que o conteúdo e o escopo do

conceito de “moralidade pública” tendem a variar de Membro para Membro, em razão dos distintos

valores sociais, culturais, éticos e religiosos e prosseguiu com a sua análise sobre o pressuposto de que

“cada um dos tipos proibidos de conteúdo listados nas medidas Chinesas é tal que, se fosse trazido para

a China como parte de um produto físico, isso poderia ter um impacto negativo sobre a “moralidade

pública” na China, no sentido do Art. XX, do GATT 1994.

Para. 880. “The Panel recalled that “the content and scope of the concept of “public morals” can vary from

Member to Member, as they are influenced by each Member’s prevailing social, cultural, ethical and

religious values” and it proceeded with its analysis on the assumption that “each of the prohibited types of

content listed in China’s measures is such that, if it were brought into China as part of a physical product, it

could have a negative impact on ‘public morals’ in China within the meaning of Article XX (a).”

182

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 881

O painel ressaltou que é a medida inconsistente com a OMC que a parte reclamada procura

justificar que deve ser necessária, e frisou que, no presente caso, as medidas, as necessidades que a

China deve estabelecer são os dispositivos que restringem o direito de importar contrário ao

Acordo de Acessão da China. Os dispositivos prevendo que a autoridade competente chinesa e/ou

instituições de importação devem revisar o conteúdo dos produtos audiovisuais acabados e

materiais de leitura, e que tais produtos não podem ser importados se eles contiverem conteúdo

proibido, não está em questão.

Para. 881. The Panel further recalled that “it is the WTO-inconsistent measure that a responding party

seeks to justify which must be ‘necessary’” and found that “in the case at hand, the measures, the necessity

of which China must establish, are the provisions that restrict the right to import contrary to China’s trading

rights commitments under the Accession Protocol. The separate provisions prescribing that the competent

Chinese authorities and/or import entities review the content of imported finished audiovisual products and

reading materials, and that such products may not be imported if they carry prohibited content, are not at

issue.”

(b) “Necessária” (“necessary”)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 882

Numa interpretação mais extensiva chancelada pelo Órgão de Apelação, o painel China —

Publications and Audiovisual Products avaliou o termo “necessidade” sob o Artigo XX (a) a partir

de várias disposições tidas como incompatíveis com os compromissos de direitos comerciais da

China. O Painel elaborou um processo passo-a-passo. Primeiro, o Painel considerou a relação

entre as disposições e objetivo declarado da China (para proteger a moralidade pública,

evitando a disseminação de bens com conteúdo proibido na China). O Painel considerou que cada

um dos tipos de conteúdo proibido pelas medidas da China poderia, se fosse trazido para a China,

causar um impacto negativo sobre a “moralidade pública” na China, na acepção do Artigo XX (a)

do GATT 1994. Em seguida, o Painel identificou a importância do objetivo perseguido (“a

proteção da moralidade pública entre os valores ou interesses mais importantes perseguidos pelos

Membros como uma questão de política pública”) e o nível de proteção pretendido pela China

(“um elevado nível de proteção da moralidade pública”).

Para. 882. The Panel in China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, in a finding largely upheld by

the Appellate Body, assessed the “necessity” under Article XX (a) of various provisions that it had found to

be inconsistent with China’s trading rights commitments. The Panel did so in a multi-step process. First, the

Panel considered the relationship between the provisions and China’s stated objective (to protect public

morals by avoiding the dissemination of goods containing prohibited content within China). The Panel

assumed that each of the types of prohibited content in China’s measures could, if it were brought into China,

have a negative impact on “public morals” in China within the meaning of Article XX (a) of the GATT 1994.

Next, the Panel identified the importance of the objective pursued (“the protection of public morals ranks

among the most important values or interests pursued by Members as a matter of public policy”) and the

level of protection sought by China (“a high level of protection of public morals”).

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio China – Publications and Audiovisual Products,

Demandante: Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 883

No estágio seguinte da análise, o painel abordou separadamente cada questão que tinha sido

considerada incompatível com os compromissos de direitos comerciais da China. Para cada uma,

o Painel: (i) identificou a contribuição para a realização do objetivo perseguido, (ii) identificou

o impacto restritivo sobre o comércio e sobre aqueles que desejam importar, e (iii) sopesou

três fatores, a saber: a extensão da contribuição, o impacto restritivo, e o “fato de que a

proteção da moralidade pública é um interesse muito importante do governo e que a China

tem adotado um nível elevado de proteção da moralidade pública no seu território.”

183

Para. 883. In the next stage of its analysis, the Panel addressed separately each provision that it had found

to be inconsistent with China’s trading rights commitments. For each, the Panel: (i) identified the

contribution made to the realization of the objective pursued; (ii) identified the restrictive impact on trade

and on those wishing to import; and (iii) “weighed and balanced” three factors, namely, the extent of the

contribution, the restrictive impact, and the “fact that the protection of public morals is a highly important

governmental interest and that China has adopted a high level of protection of public morals within its

territory.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 884

Tendo ponderado e equilibrado esses fatores para cada questão, o painel chegou a uma

“conclusão” sobre se a medida era “necessária” na ausência de alternativas razoavelmente

disponíveis. O Painel então analisou medidas alternativas propostas pelos Estados Unidos, e

descobriu que, por causa da existência de alternativas menos restritivas, as medidas em causa não

eram “necessárias” para proteger a moral pública.

Para. 884. Having weighed and balanced these factors for each provision, the Panel reached a

“conclusion” as to whether a provision was “necessary” in the absence of reasonably available alternatives.

The Panel then analysed alternative measures proposed by the United States, and found that because less-

restrictive alternatives were available, the measures in question were not “necessary” to protect public

morals.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 885

Pelo fato do Painel China — Publications and Audiovisual Products ter decidido que o Artigo XX

estava disponível como meio de defesa de medidas inconsistentes com os compromissos de

direitos comerciais da China, o Painel, num entendimento confirmado pelo Órgão de Apelação,

também decidiu que “deve-se sopesar não apenas a impacto restritivo das medidas em causa têm

sobre as importações de produtos relevantes, mas também o efeito restritivo que eles têm sobre

aqueles que desejam se engajar na importação, em especial sobre o seu direito ao comércio. Em

nossa opinião, se o Artigo XX é compreendido como uma defesa direta de medidas em violação

de compromissos dos direitos comerciais, faz sentido considerar o quanto essas medidas

restringem o direito de importar.”

Para 885. Because the Panel in China — Publications and Audiovisual Products decided that Article XX

was available as a defence for measures inconsistent with China’s trading rights commitments, the Panel, in a

finding upheld by the Appellate Body, also decided that it “should weigh not only the restrictive impact the

measures at issue have on imports of relevant products, but also the restrictive effect they have on those

wishing to engage in importing, in particular on their right to trade. In our view, if Article XX is assumed to

be a direct defence for measures in breach of trading rights commitments, it makes sense to consider how

much these measures restrict the right to import.”

(c) “Ponderação e equilíbrio” (weighing and balancing)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 886.

2.

Em China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, o painel, como parte de sua análise, sopesou

e equilibrou o efeito restritivo das medidas sobre o comércio internacional, incluindo tanto o efeito

restritivo sobre as importações quanto o efeito restritivo sobre aqueles que desejam se engajar na

importação. O Órgão de Apelação, abordando este aspecto, descobriu que: “Embora, em princípio,

um painel deva avaliar o efeito restritivo de uma medida sobre o comércio internacional, este teste

deve ser aplicado à luz da obrigação específica dos acordos abrangidos que a respectiva medida

está violando. A avaliação do efeito restritivo a ser considerada em uma disputa particular pode,

em certos casos, ser estendida além de uma avaliação do efeito restritivo sobre produtos

importados, já que esta avaliação deve ser realizada em função da medida em questão, da

específica obrigação dos acordos abrangidos que a medida viola, e da defesa invocada.”

184

Para. 886. In China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Panel, as part of its analysis, weighed

and balanced the restrictive effect of the measures on international trade, including both the restrictive effect

on imports and the restrictive effect on those wishing to engage in importing. The Appellate Body,

addressing this finding, found that

3. “while in principle a panel must assess the restrictive effect of a measure on international commerce,

this test must be applied in the light of the specific obligation of the covered agreements that the

respective measure infringes. The assessment of the restrictive effect to be taken into account in a

particular dispute may, in appropriate cases, extend beyond an assessment of the restrictive effect on

imported products, as this assessment must be undertaken in the light of the measure at issue, the specific

obligation of the covered agreements that the measure infringes, and the defence being invoked.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Demandante:

Estados Unidos, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 de dezembro de 2009, para. 887

Com relação à medida que se procurou justificar como “necessária para proteger a moralidade pública”, o

Órgão de Apelação considerou no caso China — Publications and Audiovisual Products: “Quanto menos

restritivos os efeitos da medida, mais provável é que seja caracterizada como “necessária”.

Consequentemente, se um membro optar por adotar uma medida muito restritiva, ele terá que garantir que a

medida é cuidadosamente projetada de modo que os outros elementos a serem levados em conta na

ponderação e equilíbrio dos fatores relevantes para uma avaliação da “necessidade” da medida seja

“compensar” o efeito tão restritivo.”

Para. 887. With regard to the measure sought to be justified as “necessary to protect public morals”, the

Appellate Body found in China — Publications and Audiovisual Products:

4. 5. “The less restrictive the effects of the measure, the more likely it is to be characterized as

‘necessary’. Consequently, if a Member chooses to adopt a very restrictive measure, it will have to

ensure that the measure is carefully designed so that the other elements to be taken into account in

weighing and balancing the factors relevant to an assessment of the ‘necessity’ of the measure will

‘outweigh’ such restrictive effect.”

3. Artigo XX(b)

a) “Ônus da prova”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia, WT/DS2/AB/R, para. 22

Nesse caso foi determinado que o ônus da prova, para demonstrar que a medida utilizada é justificada com

base em uma das exceções do Artigo XX, é da parte que alega a exceção.

Para. 22. “The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within one of the

exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute abuse of

such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception. That is, of necessity, a heavier

task than that involved in showing that an exception, (...) encompasses the measure at issue.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products

Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.177-8.178,

circulação do Relatório do Painel (setembro de 2000), circulação do Relatório do Órgão de Apelação

(março 2001)

Nesse caso, seguindo interpretações do caso EC - Hormones, o Painel entendeu que há a obrigação tanto para

o demandante como para o demandado de provarem suas alegações.

Para. 8.177. “With regard to the burden of proof, we refer, first of all, to our previous remarks concerning

those cases in which a party invokes a defence. We consider that the reasoning of the Appellate Body in

United States – Shirts and Blouses from India is applicable to Article XX, inasmuch as the invocation of that

Article constitutes a “defence” in the sense in which that word is used in the above-mentioned report. It is

therefore for the European Communities to submit in respect of this defence a prima facie case showing that

the measure is justified. Of course, as the Appellate Body pointed out in United States – Gasoline, the burden

185

on the European Communities could vary according to what has to be proved. It will then be for Canada to

rebut that prima facie case, if established.”

Para. 8.178. “If we mention this working rule at this stage, it is because it could play a part in our

assessment of the evidence submitted by the parties. Thus, the fact that a party invokes Article XX does not

mean that it does not need to supply the evidence necessary to support its allegation. Similarly, it does not

release the complaining party from having to supply sufficient arguments and evidence in response to the

claims of the defending party. Moreover, we are of the opinion that it is not for the party invoking Article

XX to prove that the arguments put forward in rebuttal by the complaining party are incorrect until the latter

has backed them up with sufficient evidence (See Report of the Appellate Body in European Communities –

Hormones, para. 104).”

b) “Ordem de análise”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

paras. 119, 120 e 149

Nesse caso foi determinado que a análise do Artigo XX deveria ser feita primeiramente com base no caput,

para depois serem analisadas as exceções dispostas nas alíneas.

Para. 119. “The sequence of steps indicated above [reference to the US – Gasoline case, see above] in the

analysis of a claim of justification under Article XX reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but rather

the fundamental structure and logic of Article XX. The Panel appears to suggest, albeit indirectly, that

following the indicated sequence of steps, or the inverse thereof, does not make any difference. To the Panel,

reversing the sequence set out in the United States – Gasoline 'seems equally appropriate'. We do not agree.”

Para. 120. “The task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse or misuse of the specific

exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if indeed it remains possible at all, where

the interpreter (like the Panel in this case) has not first identified and examined the specific exception

threatened with abuse. The standards established in the chapeau are, moreover, necessarily broad in scope

and reach (...). When applied in a particular case, the actual contours and contents of these standards will

vary as the kind of measure under examination varies.”

Para. 149. “(…) It does not follow from the fact that a measure falls within the terms of Article XX(g) that

that measure also will necessarily comply with the requirements of the chapeau.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia, WT/DS2/AB/R, para. 22

Nesse caso foi determinado que a análise do Artigo XX deveria ser feita primeiramente com base nas

exceções dispostas nas alíneas para depois ser aplicado o caput do Artigo.

Para. 22. “In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue

must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions - paragraphs (a) to (j) - listed under

Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis

is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of characterization of the measure

under one of the exceptions; second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of

Article XX.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products

Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.167

Para. 8.167. “In accordance with the approach noted by the Panel in United States – Gasoline and the

Appellate Body in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, we will first

examine whether the measure falls within the scope of paragraph (b) of Article XX, the provision expressly

invoked by the European Communities. If we decide that it does, we will consider whether, in its

application, the Decree satisfies the conditions of the introductory clause of Article XX.”

c) “Ordem de análise – Artigo XX (b)”

Especificamente com relação à alínea (b) do Artigo XX, observa-se que o caso US - Gasoline foi o leading

case, no que concerne à consideração inicial da exceção da alínea (b), para depois analisar a subsunção aos

critérios do caput. Os casos posteriores seguiram essa interpretação.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US

- Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia, WT/DS2/R, para. 6.20

186

6. Para. 6.20. “(…) The Panel observed that the United States therefore had to establish the following

elements:

7.

(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision

was invoked fell within the range of policies designed to protect

human, animal or plant life or health;

(2) that the inconsistent measures for which the exception was

being invoked were necessary to fulfil the policy objective; and

(3) that the measures were applied in conformity with the

requirements of the introductory clause of Article XX

8. In order to justify the application of Article XX(b), all the

above elements had to be satisfied.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences

to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/R, paras. 7.216–

7.218. Circulação do Relatório do Painel (dezembro 2003), circulação do Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação (abril 2004)

Para. 7.216. “Assuming a beneficiary country under the Drug Arrangements was not ensuring sufficient

customs controls on export of drugs, or was infringing the objectives of an international fisheries

conservation convention, the European Communities could then suspend the tariff preferences under the

Drug Arrangements to this country, for reasons unrelated to protecting human life or health. Given that this

beneficiary would be a seriously drug-affected country, the suspension of the tariff preferences would arrest

the European Communities' support to alternative development in that beneficiary and therefore also stop

efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs into the European Communities. The whole design of the EC

Regulation does not support the European Communities' contention that it is “necessary” to the protection of

human life and health in the European Communities, because such design of the measure does not contribute

sufficiently to the achievement of the health objective.”

Para. 7.218. “Recalling that the European Communities confirms that it is required to continue its

suspension of tariff preferences for Myanmar through the expiration of the EC Regulation on 31 December

2004, the Panel notes that any of the 12 beneficiaries is also potentially subject to similar suspension under

the same Regulation, regardless of the seriousness of the drug problems in that country. With one or more of

the main drug-producing or trafficking countries outside the scheme, it is difficult to see how the Drug

Arrangements are in fact contributing sufficiently to the reduction of drug supply into the European

Communities' market to qualify as a measure necessary to achieving the European Communities' health

objective.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences

to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/R, para. 7.199

Para. 7.199. “Following this jurisprudence, the Panel considers that, in order to determine whether the Drug

Arrangements are justified under Article XX(b), the Panel needs to examine: (i) whether the policy reflected

in the measure falls within the range of policies designed to achieve the objective of or, put differently, or

whether the policy objective is for the purpose of, ‘protect[ing] human … life or health’. In other words,

whether the measure is one designed to achieve that health policy objective; (ii) whether the measure is

‘necessary’ to achieve said objective; and (iii) whether the measure is applied in a manner consistent with

the chapeau of Article XX.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products

Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.184

Para. 8.184. “We must first establish whether the policy in respect of the measure for which the provisions

of Article XX(b) were invoked falls within the range of policies designed to protect human life or health.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)

from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 5.26-5.27

Para. 5.26. “Furthermore, the Appellate Body has established that the analysis of justification protection of

Article XX is two-tiered, that is, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the

particular exceptions under paragraphs (a) to (j) listed under Article XX, it must also satisfy the requirements

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imposed by the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau required that the measure should not constitute arbitrary

or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade.”

Para. 5.27. “Such sequence of analysis should be followed in this dispute because exceptions under Article

XX are invoked. Moreover, in the examination of the measures at issue in this case, China thinks it is proper

for the Panel to take into consideration the ever-growing attention given to environmental protection among

the international community and in WTO itself. The preamble of Marrakech Agreement declares that one

objective of WTO is to pursue “the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of

sustainable development” and “seeking both to protect and preserve the environment”. Under the guidance of

these statements, the Appellate Body, in several disputes, accepted the identification of certain disputed

measures with environmental concern as under paragraph (b) of Article XX (For example, in the cases of

US-Gasoline, and US – Shrimp).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil

- Retreated Tyres), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS332/ABR, para. 139

Para. 139. “We begin by recalling that the analysis of a measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994 is

two-tiered (Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22, DSR 1996; see also Appellate Body Report,

Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 64). First, a panel must examine whether the

measure falls under at least one of the ten exceptions listed under Article XX (In other words, the policy

objective of the measure at issue must fall under the range of policies covered by the paragraphs of Article

XX of the GATT 1994. See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, US –Shrimp, para. 149). Secondly, the

question of whether the measure at issue satisfies the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX must be

considered.”

9. d) “Política de proteção humana, animal, vegetal ou da saúde”

Alguns casos interpretaram o que seria a proteção humana, animal, vegetal ou da saúde, a exemplo de US -

Gasoline, Thailand - Cigarette e EC - Asbestos. Os casos referiram-se, sucessivamente, a políticas

específicas para: reduzir a poluição do ar causada pelo consumo da gasolina; diminuir o consumo de cigarros

como medida de proteção à saúde humana; e, limitar a utilização de amianto em função dos riscos à vida

humana e à saúde.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US

- Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia, WT/DS2/R, para. 6.21

Para. 6.21. “(…) the policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline was a policy

within the range of those concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health mentioned in

Article XX(b).”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes

(Thailand - Cigarettes), GATT DS10/R - 37S/200, para 73 (Circulação do Relatório do Painel em

novembro de 1990)

Para. 73. “(…) smoking constituted a serious risk to human health and that consequently measures designed

to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX(b). The Panel noted that this

provision clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade liberalization.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 162

Para. 162. “(…) the Panel remained well within the bounds of its discretion in finding that chrysotile-cement

products pose a risk to human life or health.”

e) “Treatment of scientific data and risk assessment”

10.

11. O Tratamento das informações e das provas científicas pelos Painéis e pelo Órgão de Apelação é

relevante para a interpretação das alíneas (b) e (g), pois a opinião da maioria dos cientistas pode ou não ser

considerada necessária para comprovar uma política adotada por um Membro, no contexto dessas alíneas. A

jurisprudência tem se direcionado no sentido de entender que a política adotada não precisa estar baseada na

posição majoritária dos cientistas. Ela pode ter por base a opinião de cientistas renomados que comprovem

que aquela medida tem amparo científico. Os Membros possuem uma discricionariedade em suas políticas,

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ponderada pela boa-fé das escolhas destas. Os casos que tratam do tema tangenciam outros Acordos como o

SPS e o TBT.

12. 13. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and

Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS26/AB/R,

WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 194 (Circulação do Relatório do Órgão de Apelação - janeiro 1998)

14. 15. Para. 194. “We do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic conclusion that

coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS measure. The risk assessment could set

out both the prevailing view representing the “mainstream” of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of

scientists taking a divergent view. Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily

embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community. In some cases, the very existence

of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at hand may

indicate a state of scientific uncertainty. Sometimes the divergence may indicate a roughly equal balance of

scientific opinion, which may itself be a form of scientific uncertainty. In most cases, responsible and

representative governments tend to base their legislative and administrative measures on “mainstream”

scientific opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative governments may act in good faith

on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected

sources. By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS

measure and the risk assessment, especially where the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is

perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety. Determination of the

presence or absence of that relationship can only be done on a case-to-case basis, after account is taken of all

considerations rationally bearing upon the issue of potential adverse health effects.”

16. 17. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 161

18. 19. Para. 161. “The Panel enjoyed a margin of discretion in assessing the value of the evidence, and the

weight to be ascribed to that evidence. The Panel was entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to determine

that certain elements of evidence should be accorded more weight than other elements — that is the essence

of the task of appreciating the evidence.”

20. 21. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 167

22.

23. Para. 167. “As for Canada’s second argument, relating to ‘quantification’ of the risk, we consider that,

as with the SPS Agreement, there is no requirement under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to quantify, as

such, the risk to human life or health. A risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms. In

this case, contrary to what is suggested by Canada, the Panel assessed the nature and the character of the risk

posed by chrysotile-cement products. The Panel found, on the basis of the scientific evidence, that ‘no

minimum threshold of level of exposure or duration of exposure has been identified with regard to the risk of

pathologies associated with chrysotile, except for asbestosis.’ The pathologies which the Panel identified as

being associated with chrysotile are of a very serious nature, namely lung cancer and mesothelioma, which is

also a form of cancer. Therefore, we do not agree with Canada that the Panel merely relied on the French

authorities’ ‘hypotheses’ of the risk.”

24. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 178

25.

26. Para. 178. “In addition, in the context of the SPS Agreement, we have said previously, in European

Communities - Hormones, that ‘responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the

basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.’ In

justifying a measure under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member may also rely, in good faith, on

scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion. A

Member is not obliged, in setting health policy, automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute

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a majority scientific opinion. Therefore, a panel need not, necessarily, reach a decision under Article XX(b)

of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the ‘preponderant’ weight of the evidence.”

f) Alternativas razoavelmente disponíveis (Reasonably available alternatives)

27.

28. As medidas alternativas existentes à adoção de uma política específica são observadas caso-a-caso de

acordo com a razoabilidade da decisão de adotar uma política em detrimento de outras que poderiam ser

menos discriminatórias.

29.

30. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and

Frozen Beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS161/AB/R, paras. 8.213-

8.214 (Circulação do Relatório do Painel - julho de 2000) e (Circulação do Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação - dezembro 2000)

Paras. 8.213-8.214. “In our view, France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative

measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree seeks to ‘halt’. Such an

alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen level of health protection. On

the basis of the scientific evidence before it, the Panel found that, in general, the efficacy of ‘controlled use’

remains to be demonstrated. Moreover, even in cases where ‘controlled use’ practices are applied ‘with

greater certainty’, the scientific evidence suggests that the level of exposure can, in some circumstances, still

be high enough for there to be a ‘significant residual risk of developing asbestos-related diseases.’ The Panel

found too that the efficacy of ‘controlled use’ is particularly doubtful for the building industry and for DIY

enthusiasts, which are the most important users of cement-based products containing chrysotile asbestos.”

31. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 174

Para. 174. “Given these factual findings by the Panel, we believe that ‘controlled use’ would not allow

France to achieve its chosen level of health protection by halting the spread of asbestos-related health risks.

‘Controlled use’ would, thus, not be an alternative measure that would achieve the end sought by France.”

4. Artigo XX (c)

Não foram identificados casos baseados neste parágrafo.

5. Artigo XX (d)

a) “Exceções Gerais” (General Exceptions)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea – Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and

frozen beef (Korea – Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: Austrália, Estados Unidos,

WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 de dezembro de 2000, para. 15

Para. 157 “For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under

paragraph (d) of Article XX, two elements must be shown. First, the measure must be one designed to

‘secure compliance’ with laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the

GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be ‘necessary’ to secure such compliance. A Member who invokes

Article XX(d) as a justification has the burden of demonstrating that these two requirements are met.”

b) “Necessárias” (Necessary)

Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o argumento da Coréia de que a proibição sobre

vendas no mercado interno e para importação de carnes (o sistema dual de comércio) tinha o

propósito de assegurar o cumprimento de uma de lei de defesa do consumidor e, apesar de

violar o Artigo III:4, todavia, estava amparada na exceção do Artigo XX, (d). Referindo-se ao

Relatório do caso EUA – Gasolina, o Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu a necessidade de dois

requisitos para fins de parágrafo d): que as medidas a assegurar a aplicação das leis e

regulamentos não sejam inconsistentes com outras provisões do GATT 1994 e que sejam

necessárias para assegurar tal aplicação.

190

Relatório do Painel no caso Canada – Certain Measures Concerning (Canada –Periodicals),

Demandante: Estados Unidos, WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 de junho de 1997, para. 3.13

Para. 3.13 “Canada's claim that the import ban does not seek “formal compliance” with Section 19 of the

Income Tax Act, but rather “real or substantial compliance”, which Canada admits “has nothing to do with

whether deductions are properly claimed”, is simply another way of stating that the import ban helps advance

the same overall (protectionist) aim as Section 19. However, the import ban does not “secure compliance”

with Section 19, and thus does not fall within the purview of Article XX(d). If accepted, Canada's view of

Article XX(d) would allow WTO Members to adopt all manner of GATT-inconsistent measures on the

ground that they further the same objectives as other protectionist legislation. As the EEC - Parts and

Components panel makes clear, the phrase “secure compliance” does not reach measures that merely help

ensure that domestic policy goals are realized.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea – Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and

frozen beef (Korea – Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: Austrália, Estados Unidos,

WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 de dezembro de 2000, paras. 161-162, 164

Para. 161 “We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the word ‘necessary’ is not

limited to that which is ‘indispensable’ or ‘of absolute necessity’ or ‘inevitable’. Measures which are

indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfil the requirements of

Article XX(d). But other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article

XX(d), the term ‘necessary’ refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this

continuum lies ‘necessary’ understood as ‘indispensable’; at the other end, is ‘necessary’ taken to mean as

‘making a contribution to’. We consider that a ‘necessary’ measure is, in this continuum, located

significantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making a contribution

to”

Para. 162 “In appraising the ‘necessity’ of a measure in these terms, it is useful to bear in mind the context

in which ‘necessary’ is found in Article XX(d). The measure at stake has to be ‘necessary to ensure

O Painel concluiu que as medidas de restrição à importação de periódicos por parte do

Canadá estavam em contradição com o Artigo XI:1 e não seriam justificadas pelo Artigo XX

(d), visto que não havia fornecido argumentos suficientes para demonstrar que a medida

restritiva à venda e à distribuição de jornais e revistas estrangeiros seria a menos restritiva ao

comércio, bem como que seria relevante para o estímulo da indústria canadense de

periódicos.

O Órgão de Apelação enquadrou o significado do termo “necessária” no contexto do Artigo

XX (d) como sendo uma medida “de absoluta necessidade”, “indispensável” e a “dar

contribuição para”. Além disso, o Órgão de Apelação declarou que, ao avaliar se uma medida

é necessária para assegurar a aplicação de uma lei compatível com o regime da OMC, pode,

em certos casos, levar em consideração a importância relativa dos interesses em comum e

valores que a lei ou o regulamento a ser cumprido se destina a proteger. Cumpre destacar

que o Painel, neste mesmo caso, definiu a ordem de análise, começando pela verificação da

alínea impugnada e, após, o caput. Ainda, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que a determinação

de se uma medida é realmente “necessária” e se está conformada no Artigo XX (d) – nas

hipóteses de tais medidas serem dispensáveis para alcançar a conformidade com a lei ou

regulamento em causa, envolve o processo de sopesamento e balanceamento de diferentes

fatores.

191

compliance with laws and regulations … , including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement

of [lawful] monopolies …, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of

deceptive practices’. (emphasis added) Clearly, Article XX(d) is susceptible of application in respect of a

wide variety of ‘laws and regulations’ to be enforced. It seems to us that a treaty interpreter assessing a

measure claimed to be necessary to secure compliance of a WTO consistent law or regulation may, in

appropriate cases, take into account the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or

regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or important those common interests or

values are, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a measure designed as an enforcement instrument.”

Para. 164 “In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may nevertheless be

‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and

balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to

the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected

by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Conditions for the granting of tariff preferences

to developing countries (EC — Tariff Preferences), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS246/R, 1 de

dezembro de 2003, para. 7.196

Para. 7.196 Although the Panel notes that the Appellate Body ruling in Korea – Various Measures on Beef

was made in the context of the invocation of Article XX(d), not Article XX(b), the Panel is of the view that

the same considerations apply to both these subparagraphs of Article XX because the structure of Articles

XX(b) and XX(d) is very similar. The Panel considers that the approach of analysis followed by the

Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef is also appropriate for the analysis of a measure under

Article XX(b).

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina – Measures affecting the export of bovine hides and the import

of finished leather (Argentina— Hides and Leather), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS155/R, 19

de dezembro de 2000, para. 11.304

Para. 11.304 “Having clarified this point, it should be recalled, next, that the parties are in disagreement over

the correct interpretation to be given to the term “necessary” as it appears in Article XX(d). For the

European Communities, a measure can be said to be necessary only if no alternative measure which is

consistent with the GATT 1994 is reasonably available to a Member. Argentina, on the other hand, rejects

Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação, valendo-se das disposições estabelecidas no caso Korea -

Beef sobre a interpretação do termo “necessária”, estabeleceu um continuum entre

“indispensável” e “dar contribuição para”.

Nesse caso, o Painel, apesar de se recusar a resolver a disputa interpretativa acerca do

significado de medidas “necessárias”, tem em vista que tanto a União Europeia quanto a

Argentina, partes contrárias no litígio, apresentavam escopo de interpretações diferentes ao

Artigo XX (d), concluiu que os argumentos apresentados pela Argentina levantavam uma

presunção, não refutada pela União Europeia, do que realmente poderia ser considerado

“necessária”. Isto porque o Painel apontou que a estrutura e a forma da medida

demonstravam o seu caráter necessário. A União Europeia alegou que uma medida pode ser

tida como “necessária” apenas se nenhuma outra medida alternativa compatível com o GATT

1994 estiver disponível ao membro. Já a Argentina rejeitou esta abordagem por restringir

demasiadamente o direito de um membro invocar a exceção prevista no artigo XX (d).

192

this approach as overly restrictive of a Member's right to invoke the exception set forth in Article XX(d).

We see no need to resolve this interpretative issue.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Dominican Republic – Measures affecting the importation and

internal sale of cigarettes (Dominican Republic — Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/AB/R, 25 de abril de 2005, para. 71

Para.71 As regards the first factor, “the Panel [did] not disagree with the Dominican Republic's argument

that tax stamps may be a useful instrument to monitor tax collection on cigarettes and, conversely, to avoid

tax evasion.” The Panel also recognized that “the collection of tax revenue (and, conversely, the prevention

of tax evasion) is a most important interest for any country and particularly for a developing country such as

the Dominican Republic.” With respect to the trade impact of the measure, the Panel noted that the tax stamp

requirement did not prevent Honduras from exporting cigarettes to the Dominican Republic and that its

exports had increased significantly over recent years. Accordingly, the Panel assumed “that the measure has

not had any intense restrictive effects on trade.” As far as the third factor is concerned, the Panel noted the

Dominican Republic's claim that “the tax stamp requirement secures compliance with its tax laws and

regulations generally, and more specifically with the provisions governing the Selective Consumption Tax.”

The Panel, however, was of the view that the tax stamp requirement was of limited effectiveness in

preventing tax evasion and cigarette smuggling. According to the Panel, requiring that tax stamps be affixed

in the Dominican Republic under the supervision of the tax authorities “in and of itself, would not prevent

the forgery of tax stamps, nor smuggling and tax evasion.” In this respect, the Panel indicated that other

factors, such as security features incorporated into the tax stamps, or police controls on roads and at different

commercial levels, would play a more important role in preventing forgery of tax stamps, tax evasion and

smuggling of tobacco products. Having considered the importance of the interests protected by the tax stamp

requirement, its trade impact, and its contribution to the realization of the end pursued, we are of the view

that the Panel conducted an appropriate analysis, following the approach set out in the Appellate Body

Reports in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and in EC – Asbestos, and affirmed in US - Gambling.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Measures relating to shrimp from thailand

(US— Shrimp (Thailand), Demandante: Estados Unidos, WT/DS343/AB/R, WT/DS345/AB/R, 16 de

julho de 2008, paras. 316-317

Para. 316 “We see no error in the Panel's analysis of the meaning of the term “necessary” and the factors

relied upon by it to evaluate the necessity of the EBR to secure compliance with certain laws and regulations

of the United States, as the Panel's analysis is in consonance with the previous jurisprudence of the Appellate

Body.”

O Órgão de Apelação revalidou os argumentos utilizados no caso Korea – Various Measures on

Beef para determinar quando uma medida é "necessária" para assegurar a aplicação das leis e

regulamentos, mostrando-se em consonância com a jurisprudência do Órgão de Apelação. O

Órgão de Apelação manteve a determinação do Painel de que “uma exigência de um maior

vínculo”, como o aplicado ao assunto camarão, não era medida “necessária” para assegurar a

aplicação de certas leis e regulamentos, nos termos do Artigo XX (d).

Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a decisão do Painel que recorreu aos diversos

aspectos estabelecidos no caso Korea – Various Measures on Beef a fim de avaliar se os selos

fiscais poderiam ser utilizados de forma eficaz a monitorar a cobrança de impostos sobre os

cigarros, evitando a evasão fiscal.

193

Para. 317 “The EBR is intended to secure potential additional liability that might arise from significant

increases in the amount of dumping after the imposition of an anti-dumping duty order. The United States

has not demonstrated that the margins of dumping for subject shrimp were likely to increase significantly so

as to result in significant additional liability over and above the cash deposit rates. Like the Panel, we do not,

therefore, see how taking security, such as the EBR, can be viewed as being “necessary” in the sense of it

contributing to the realization of the objective of ensuring the final collection of anti-dumping or

countervailing duties in the event of default by importers.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Colombia – Indicative prices and restrictions on ports of entry, (Colombia —

Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panama, WT/DS366/R, 27 de abril de 2009, para. 7.485, 7.487, 7.507

Para. 7. 485 “Colombia submits that the ports of entry measure meets the conditions to be provisionally

justified under paragraph (d) of Article XX. First, Colombia asserts that its customs laws and regulations are

not inconsistent with the GATT 1994. Second, the ports of entry measure is designed to secure compliance

with those laws and regulations. Third, the ports of entry measure is necessary to secure such compliance.”

Para. 7.487 “In assessing whether the measure is “necessary” to secure compliance with those laws,

Colombia argues that the Panel should weigh and balance a series of factors, including the contribution made

by the compliance measure to the enforcement of those laws and regulations.”

Para. 7.507 “In the Panel's view, Colombia has not met its burden (nor has it attempted) to demonstrate that

each of the requirements within the ports of entry measure contributes to enforcement of its customs laws.

As the arguments and evidence provided by Colombia are of a general nature, it is not possible to evaluate,

for instance, the extent to which the restriction on entry to Bogota and Barranquilla contributes to

enforcement, as separate from the contribution of the advance import declaration requirement, and so forth.

Hence, the Panel will not examine whether each of the requirements in the ports of entry measure which

have been separately found inconsistent with different provisions of the GATT 1994, are nevertheless

justified by Article XX(d).”

c) Aspectos de uma medida para ser justificada como “necessária” (Aspects of a measure to be justified

as “necessary”).

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline, (US—Gasoline), Demandantes: Brasil, Venezuela, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996,

página 14

O Painel avaliou a defesa da Colômbia justificada no Artigo XX (d) de que suas medidas para a

entrada de bens foram necessárias para garantir a aplicação conforme às leis da Colômbia e

combater o subfaturamento e o contrabando. No entanto, o Painel determinou que apesar das

leis aduaneiras do país serem compatíveis com o GATT, a Colômbia não apresentou provas

para demonstrar o aumento da aplicação decorrente da medida, demonstrando a ineficácia de

tal medida. Assim, o Painel concluiu que as medidas de entrada não foram suficientes para

evitar a fraude aduaneira e o contrabando na Colômbia.

194

Pag. 14. “One problem with the reasoning in that paragraph is that the Panel asked itself whether the “less

favourable treatment” of imported gasoline was “primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural resources,

rather than whether the “measure”, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were “primarily aimed at”

conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion on

Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head.

Obviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided “less favourable treatment” under Article III:4

before the Panel examined the “General Exceptions” contained in Article XX. That, however, is a

conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the “measures” which are to be

examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of “less favourable treatment.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Canada – Measures relating to exports of wheat and treatment of imported

grain, (Canada - Wheat), Demandante: Estados Unidos, WT/DS276/R, 6 de abril de 2004, para. 4.464

Para. 4.464 “Canada attempts to invoke Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 to justify the discriminatory

measures under Section 57 of the CGA and Section 56(1) of the Regulations. However, Canada fails to meet

its burden of proof with regard to this affirmative defence.”

d) “Leis ou regulamentos” (laws or regulations)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Protection of trademarks and geographical

indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs (EC - Trademarks), Demandante: Estados Unidos,

WT/DS174/R, 15 de março de 2005, paras. 7.296-7.297, 7.306

Nesse caso, o Painel apontou que o Canadá deveria demonstrar três elementos para que as

medidas alegadas pelos Estados Unidos como violadoras do regime da OMC pudessem ser

enquadradas no Artigo XX (d): a medida que se busca justificar deve assegurar o cumprimento

de outras leis e regulamentos; essas leis e regulamentos não podem ser incompatíveis com as

disposições do GATT de 1994 e deve ser necessária para assegurar o cumprimento de outras

leis e regulamentos. Contudo, o Canadá não conseguiu provar que tais medidas eram

necessárias para o cumprimento das disposições de algumas leis nacionais.

Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação foi de encontro à decisão do Painel quanto à interpretação

do Artigo XX (d), criticando que o Painel se absteve a questionar se o tratamento menos

favorável dado à gasolina importada foi destinado principalmente a conservação dos recursos

naturais, em vez de questionar se a medida foi destinada principalmente a conservação do ar

limpo. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o Painel errou ao referir a sua conclusão jurídica

sobre o Artigo III: 4 em vez de se apoiar a na medida “necessária”.

195

Para. 7.296 “The Panel takes note that paragraph (d) refers to laws or regulations, including those relating to

“the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices”. The

Regulation provides for the protection of GIs and is an analogous law or regulation, as the European

Communities points out. However, the term “laws or regulations” is qualified by the phrase “not inconsistent

with the provisions of this Agreement”.

Para. 7.297 “The European Communities argues that the requirements of examination and transmission of

applications by governments secure compliance with the Regulation. The Panel has found that the

Regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of GATT 1994 for the reasons set out in this report. Therefore,

the Regulation is not a law or regulation within the meaning of paragraph (d). In response to questions, the

European Communities argued that these requirements secure compliance with a provision within the

Regulation. However, if that provision could itself be a law or regulation within the meaning of paragraph

(d), the European Communities did not demonstrate that it was “not inconsistent” with GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.306 “Therefore, the Panel considers that the European Communities has not discharged its burden of

proving that the requirements of examination and transmission of applications by governments is covered by

paragraph (d) of Article XX. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the chapeau of Article XX.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico – Tax measures on soft drinks and other beverages,

(US—Gasoline), Demandante: Estados Unidos, WT/DS308/AB/R, 6 de março de 2006, paras. 69, 77

Neste litígio, Estados Unidos alegam violação ao tratamento nacional por parte da União

Europeia em virtude da disponibilidade de proteção a indicações geográficas, rotulagem dos

produtos com indicação geográfica, entre outras. A União Europeia, em contrapartida,

afirmou que a promulgação deste regulamento estava embasado no Artigo XX (d), visto que a

busca de informações, a cooperação com o país sede da indicação geográfica, eram

indispensáveis para a implementar o regulamento da União Europeia, justificando-se como

medida necessária para assegurar o cumprimento de sua própria regulamentação. O Painel

concluiu que o regulamento da União Europeia era incompatível com as regras do GATT, pois

a União Europeia não conseguiu provar que os requisitos de exame e transmissão se

configuravam uma medida protegida pelo parágrafo (d) of Article XX.

Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação delimitou o sentido do termo “leis ou regulamentos” em

“regras que formam parte do sistema jurídico interno de um membro da OMC”. Apesar de não

considerar as obrigações dos membros da OMC no âmbito de acordos internacionais, o Órgão

de Apelação considerou que “leis ou regulamentos” poderiam incluir regras internacionais que

tenham efeito direito dentro do sistema jurídico interno de um membro da OMC. Conclui sua

análise afirmando que “leis ou regulamentos” com as quais um membro da OMC invoque o

Artigo XX (d) pode assegurar a aplicação de obrigações não incluídas no sistema jurídico

interno de um membro da OMC no âmbito de um acordo internacional.

Ainda, nesta mesma decisão, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a interpretação do México sobre

“leis ou regulamentos” que incluía obrigações internacionais de outro Membro da OMC, já que

logicamente implicaria a invocação de um membro da OMC às exceções do Artigo XX (d) para

justificar medidas destinadas a assegurar o cumprimento de obrigações de outro membro da

OMC. Assim, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que caso fosse aceita tal interpretação,

permitiria que qualquer membro da OMC adotasse medidas incompatíveis com o regime da

OMC.

196

Para. 69 “In order to answer this question, we consider it more helpful to begin our analysis with the

terms “laws or regulations” in Article XX(d) (which we consider to be pivotal here) rather than to begin

with the analysis of the terms “to secure compliance”, as did the Panel. The terms “laws or regulations”

are generally used to refer to domestic laws or regulations. As Mexico and the United States note,

previous GATT and WTO disputes in which Article XX(d) has been invoked as a defence have involved

domestic measures. Neither disputes that the expression “laws or regulations” encompasses the rules

adopted by a WTO Member's legislative or executive branches of government. We agree with the

United States that one does not immediately think about international law when confronted with the term

“laws” in the plural. Domestic legislative or regulatory acts sometimes may be intended to implement an

international agreement. In such situations, the origin of the rule is international, but the implementing

instrument is a domestic law or regulation. In our view, the terms “laws or regulations” refer to rules that

form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member. Thus, the “laws or regulations” with which

the Member invoking Article XX(d) may seek to secure compliance do not include obligations of

another WTO Member under an international agreement”

Para. 77 We observe, furthermore, that Mexico's interpretation of Article XX(d) disregards the fact that

the GATT 1994 and the DSU specify the actions that a WTO Member may take if it considers that

another WTO Member has acted inconsistently with its obligations under the GATT 1994 or any of the

other covered agreements. As the United States points out, Mexico's interpretation of the terms “laws or

regulations” as including international obligations of another WTO Member would logically imply that a

WTO Member could invoke Article XX(d) to justify also measures designed “to secure compliance” with

that other Member's WTO obligations. By the same logic, such action under Article XX(d) would evade

the specific and detailed rules that apply when a WTO Member seeks to take countermeasures in response

to another Member's failure to comply with rulings and recommendations of the DSB pursuant to Article

XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 22 and 23 of the DSU. Mexico's interpretation would allow

WTO Members to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures based upon a unilateral determination that another

Member has breached its WTO obligations, in contradiction with Articles 22 and 23 of the DSU and

Article XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994.

Relatório do Painel no caso Brazil – Measures affecting imports of retreaded tyres, (Brazil — Retreated

Tyres), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS332/R, 12 de junho de 2007, paras. 7.388-7.389

Para. 7.388 “However, for the reasons explained in paragraphs 7.375-7.380, we found that the import ban, a

measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, could not be justified by Article XX(b).

Therefore, the Panel is of the view that the fines cannot be justified under Article XX(d) since they do not

fall within the scope of measures that are designed to secure compliance with “the laws or regulations that

are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994” (emphasis added).”

Para. 7.389 “Having found that Brazil has failed to demonstrate that the import ban – the domestic measure

with which the fines are allegedly designed to secure compliance – is consistent with the GATT 1994 and

thus has failed to show that the fines can be justified under Article XX(d), we do not consider it necessary to

proceed to examine whether the fines are necessary to secure such compliance.”

O Painel recusou-se a avaliar a defesa levantada pelo Brasil de que as multas impostas às

importações de pneus reformados eram justificadas sob abrigo do Artigo XX (d) como

"necessária para assegurar a aplicação" da proibição imposta às importações de pneus

reformados. O Painel concordou que as multas objetivavam assegurar o cumprimento da

proibição de importação, no entanto, concluiu que as multas não poderiam ser justificadas

nos termos do Artigo XX (d), uma vez que não "se inserem no âmbito das medidas que se

destinam a garantir aplicação às leis e regulamentos que não são compatíveis com algumas

disposições do GATT de 1994.”

197

Relatório do Painel no caso China – Measures affecting imports of automobile parts, (China — Auto

Parts), Demandante: União Europeia, Estados Unidos e Canadá, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R,

WT/DS342/R, 18 de julho de 2008, paras. 7.294-7.296

Para. 7. 294 “The Panel thus notes that the law or regulation that China claims the measures secure

compliance with is its interpretation of the tariff provisions for motor vehicles in China's domestic tariff

schedule. While not conceding that the law or regulation that is “not inconsistent” within the meaning of

Article XX(d) includes an interpretation of certain tariff provisions of a Members' Schedule, the

complainants submit that even if China's interpretation of its tariff provisions for motor vehicles were to be

considered as the law or regulation under Article XX(d), China has not proved that the measures meet the

requirements under Article XX(d) because China's interpretation of the tariff provisions for motor vehicles is

in fact inconsistent with the GATT 1994.”

Para 7. 296 “Accordingly, if we were to accept China's position that the law or regulation that the measures

secure compliance with is China's interpretation of its tariff provisions for motor vehicles, we conclude that

China has failed to prove that the measures are justified under Article XX(d) because the measures do not

secure compliance with the law or regulation that is “not inconsistent” with the GATT 1994 within the

meaning of Article XX(d).”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailiand – Customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the

Philippines, (Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS371/R, 15 de

novembro de 2010, para. 7.758

Para. 7.758.” Regarding both the administrative requirements imposed on resellers of imported cigarettes as

well as penalties imposed in case of failure to meet such administrative requirements, Thailand alleges that

these requirements and penalty provisions are necessary to secure compliance with the Thai VAT laws.

According to Thailand, this is because the filing obligations are the only way to verify that importers comply

with the VAT laws. As addressed in Section VII.F.6(b)(ii) above, however, we found that the Thai VAT laws

that Thailand purports to secure compliance with through the administrative requirement at issue, were not

WTO consistent. Therefore, we find that Thailand has not discharged its burden of showing that the

administrative requirements and the imposition of penalties for failure to complete VAT filing requirements

are necessary to secure compliance with the Thai VAT laws within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the

GATT 1994.”

e) “assegurar aplicação” (to secure compliance)

Nesse caso, o Artigo XX (d) foi levantado pela defesa da Tailândia para justificar que as

exigências administrativas impostas aos vendedores de cigarros importados (e as sanções

aplicáveis em caso de descumprimento) foram necessárias para garantir o cumprimento das

leis de Imposto sobre Valor Agregado (VAT - Value Added Tax) . Entretanto, o Painel

considerou que as Leis VAT em questão eram incompatíveis com o regime jurídico da OMC.

No caso envolvendo China, de um lado, e União Europeia, Estados Unidos e Canadá, do outro,

sob os auspícios do Artigo XX (d), China alegou interpretação válida das suas disposições

tarifárias referente aos veículos automotores. O Painel considerou que a interpretação chinesa

de suas concessões em veículos automotores não poderiam integrar sua pauta tarifária e

concluiu que tal interpretação não constituía defesa suficiente para enquadrar em leis ou

regulamentos do Artigo XX (d).

198

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico – Tax measures on soft drinks and other beverages,

(US—Gasoline), Demandante: Estados Unidos, WT/DS308/AB/R, 6 de março de 2006.

Para. 75 Nevertheless, while we agree with Mexico that the Panel's emphasis on “certainty” and “coercion”

is misplaced, we consider that Mexico's arguments miss the point. Even if “international countermeasures”

could be described as intended “to secure compliance”, what they seek “to secure compliance with”—that is,

the international obligations of another WTO Member—would be outside the scope of Article XX(d). This

is because “laws or regulations” within the meaning of Article XX(d) refer to the rules that form part of the

domestic legal order of the WTO Member invoking the provision and do not include the international

obligations of another WTO Member.

6. Artigo XX (e)

Não foram identificados casos baseados neste parágrafo.

7. Artigo XX (f)

Não foram identificados casos baseados neste parágrafo.

8. Artigo XX (g)

a) Conservação dos recursos naturais exauríveis (the conservation of exhaustible natural resources)

(i) Limitações jurisdicionais (jurisdictional limitations)

32. Relatório do Painel United States – Restrictions of Imports of Tuna (US – Tuna-Dolphin II),

Demandante: União Europeia, DS29/R, 16 de junho de 1994.

33. Para. 3.32. The United States maintained that, since there are no jurisdictional limitations in the provisions

of the General Agreement as they are currently written, to apply such a limitation would be essentially

legislating on the ability of contracting parties to adopt and enforce measures related to environmental

protection. A dispute settlement proceeding was not the forum in which to negotiate new disciplines on the

use of measures by contracting parties. That was properly the province of the Contracting Parties, which

A conservação dos recursos naturais exauríveis é o ponto central da exceção trazida pela alínea (g). O termo foi

interpretado por Painéis do GATT 1947 e pelo Órgão de Apelação. São exemplos de temas já abordados pelo

sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC a questão da extinção de tartarugas e determinadas espécies de

peixes. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação, de maneira a acompanhar o desenvolvimento de uma sociedade

preocupada com padrões ambientais, interpretou o termo “recursos naturais exauríveis” incluindo, também, os

organismos vivos. Entre os aspectos interessantes do termo podem ser citadas: as limitações jurisdicionais para

analisar a competência para a conservação das espécies e o significado de termos da alínea como recursos

naturais renováveis “relacionadas com” (“relating to”), “destinado principalmente a” (“primarily aimed at”) e

“medidas aplicadas conjuntamente com” (“measures made effective in conjunction with”).

Nesse caso, a partir da sustentação dos Estados Unidos acerca da inexistência de limitações

jurisdicionais dispostas no artigo XX e também de sua alegação de que a OMC não seria o fórum

apropriado para discutir a respeito das limitações jurisdicionais, isto é, sobre a aplicação de novas

matérias entre as partes contratantes, o Painel concluiu que a questão levada à discussão era saber

se os Estados Unidos, na persecução dos seus objetivos ambientais, poderiam impor embargos

comerciais para assegurar mudanças nas políticas ambientais dos outros países dentro de sua

própria jurisdição.

Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação, contrariando o Painel, afirmou que uma medida pode ser

considerada para “assegurar aplicação” mesmo que não possa garantir que irá atingir, com

absoluta certeza, seu resultado e que o “uso da coerção” não é um elemento necessário de

uma medida que vise assegurar a aplicação de leis ou regulamentos.

199

were free to pursue this issue, as they were currently doing, through a working group established for that

purpose, or through negotiations.

Para. 5.42. The Panel noted that the objective of sustainable development, which includes the protection and

preservation of the environment, has been widely recognized by the contracting parties to the General

Agreement. The Panel observed that the issue in this dispute was not the validity of the environmental

objectives of the United States to protect and conserve dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit of its

environmental objectives, the United States could impose trade embargoes to secure changes in the policies

which other contracting parties pursued within their own jurisdiction. The Panel therefore had to resolve

whether the contracting parties, by agreeing to give each other in Article XX the right to take trade measures

necessary to protect the health and life of plants, animals and persons or aimed at the conservation of

exhaustible natural resources, had agreed to accord each other the right to impose trade embargoes for such

purposes. The Panel had examined this issue in the light of the recognized methods of interpretation and had

found that none of them lent any support to the view that such an agreement was reflected in Article XX.

34. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

12 de outubro de 1998.

35. 36. Para. 133. “(…) We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional

limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We note only that in the specific

circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine

populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).”

(ii) Significado de “recursos naturais exauríveis” (Meaning of “exhaustible natural resources”).

37. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

12 de outubro de 1998.

Para. 128. Textually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the conservation of “mineral” or “non-living” natural

resources. The complainants' principal argument is rooted in the notion that “living” natural resources are

“renewable” and therefore cannot be “exhaustible” natural resources. We do not believe that “exhaustible”

natural resources and “renewable” natural resources are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern

biological sciences teach us is that living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in that

sense, “renewable”, are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction,

frequently because of human activities. Living resources are just as “finite” as petroleum, iron ore and other

non-living resources.

Para. 130. From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic

term “natural resources” in Article XX(g) is not “static” in its content or reference but is rather “by

Nesse relatório, o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou a necessidade de interpretar o termo “exauríveis”

de forma dinâmica a fim de acompanhar os valores de uma comunidade pautada em padrões de

sustentabilidade e proteção ambiental. Ademais, ressaltou a evolução do preâmbulo da OMC ao

enquadrar o desenvolvimento sustentável entre os objetivos do sistema multilateral de livre

comércio. Para tanto, o Órgão utilizou-se de instrumentos internacionais outros além dos Acordos

da OMC.

O Painel considerou que os Estados Unidos não poderiam justificar seu embargo à importação de

camarões sob alegação da alínea (g) do Artigo XX. Referido embargo havia sido imposto como

reivindicação de que os países exportadores adotassem condutas de proteção às tartarugas

marinhas, as quais estariam sendo incidentalmente extintas no momento da captura do camarão. O

Órgão de Apelação, reavaliando a decisão do Painel, considerou que não seria de sua competência

apreciar se haveria uma limitação jurisdicional à aplicação do artigo XX nesse caso, já que

inegavelmente as tartarugas marinhas deslocam-se pelas águas oceânicas da jurisdição de um país

para outro.

200

definition, evolutionary”. It is, therefore, pertinent to note that modern international conventions and

declarations make frequent references to natural resources as embracing both living and non-living resources.

For instance, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), in defining the

jurisdictional rights of coastal states in their exclusive economic zones, provides [...]

Para. 131. Given the recent acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of

concerted bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural resources, and recalling the explicit

recognition by WTO Members of the objective of sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO

Agreement, we believe it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 may be read

as referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural resources. Moreover,

two adopted GATT 1947 panel reports previously found fish to be an “exhaustible natural resource” within

the meaning of Article XX(g). We hold that, in line with the principle of effectiveness in treaty

interpretation, measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may fall

within Article XX(g).

(iii) Aspectos de uma medida para que seja justificada como “relacionado com” (Aspect of the measure

to be justified as “relating to”)

38. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and

Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia,

WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996.

39. 40. Pag. 14. “One problem with the reasoning in that paragraph is that the Panel asked itself whether the

‘less favourable treatment’ of imported gasoline was ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of natural

resources, rather than whether the ‘measure’, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were ‘primarily aimed at’

conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion

on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head.

Obviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided ‘less favourable treatment’ under Article

III:4 before the Panel examined the ‘General Exceptions’ contained in Article XX. That, however, is a

conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the ‘measures’ which are to be

examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of ‘less favourable treatment.”

(iv) Significado de “relacionado com” e “destinado principalmente a” (Meaning of “relating to” and

“primarily aimed at”).

41. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and

Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia,

WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996.

42.

43. 44.

Nesse julgamento, o Órgão de Apelação asseverou que a expressão “relativo a” seria equivalente à

expressão “destinado principalmente a”. Criticou a análise do Painel que havia baseado em analisar

se o aspecto discriminatório do embargo americano estaria relacionado ao objetivo da política

declarada, afirmando que o Painel utilizou-se de conclusão feita para outro caso, transpondo-o,

erroneamente, para este. Ademais, o Órgão conclui que as regras americanas estabelecidas à

produção de gasolina realmente eram destinadas à conservação dos recursos naturais, na acepção

do artigo XX (g).

O Painel decidiu que a medida adotada pelos Estados Unidos não poderia se enquadrar nas

exceções do Artigo XX (g), tendo em vista não haver conexão direta entre o tratamento menos

favorável dado à gasolina importada (que era quimicamente idêntica à gasolina interna americana)

e a alegação de ser altamente poluidora, segundo os padrões de qualidade de ar dos Estados

Unidos. Contrariamente, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que tal conduta se enquadraria na alínea (g)

– não havendo necessidade de se ponderar acerca do nexo entre a conduta discriminatória

americana e os objetivos da política de preservação ambiental, apesar de ser inconsistente com o

caput do artigo XX.

201

45. Pag. 18. “All the participants and the third participants in this appeal accept the propriety and

applicability of the view of the Herring and Salmon report and the Panel Report that a measure must be

‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in order to fall within the scope

of Article XX(g). We note that the same interpretation has been applied in two recent unadopted panel

reports: United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (1994); United States - Taxes on

Automobiles, DS31/R (1994).”

46. 47. Pag. 15. Furthermore, the Panel Report appears to have utilized a conclusion it had reached earlier in

holding that the baseline establishment rules did not fall within the justifying terms of Articles XX(b); i.e.

that the baseline establishment rules were not “necessary” for the protection of human, animal or plant life.

The Panel Report, it will be recalled, found that the baseline establishment rules had not been shown by the

United States to be “necessary” under Article XX(b) since alternative measures either consistent or less

inconsistent with the General Agreement were reasonably available to the United States for achieving its aim

of protecting human, animal or plant life. In other words, the Panel Report appears to have applied the

“necessary” test not only in examining the baseline establishment rules under Article XX(b), but also in the

course of applying Article XX(g).

48. 49. Pag. 17. The baseline establishment rules, taken as a whole (that is, the provisions relating to

establishment of baselines for domestic refiners, along with the provisions relating to baselines for blenders

and importers of gasoline), need to be related to the “non-degradation” requirements set out elsewhere in the

Gasoline Rule. Those provisions can scarcely be understood if scrutinized strictly by themselves, totally

divorced from other sections of the Gasoline Rule which certainly constitute part of the context of these

provisions. The baseline establishment rules whether individual or statutory, were designed to permit

scrutiny and monitoring of the level of compliance of refiners, importers and blenders with the “non-

degradation” requirements. Without baselines of some kind, such scrutiny would not be possible and the

Gasoline Rule's objective of stabilizing and preventing further deterioration of the level of air pollution

prevailing in 1990, would be substantially frustrated. The relationship between the baseline establishment

rules and the “non-degradation” requirements of the Gasoline Rule is not negated by the inconsistency, found

by the Panel, of the baseline establishment rules with the terms of Article III:4. We consider that, given that

substantial relationship, the baseline establishment rules cannot be regarded as merely incidentally or

inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the United States for the purposes of Article XX(g).

50.

51. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

12 de outubro de 1998.

52.

53. 54.

55. Pag. 141. “In its general design and structure, therefore, Section 609 is not a simple, blanket prohibition

of the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences (or lack thereof ) of the mode of

harvesting employed upon the incidental capture and mortality of sea turtles. Focusing on the design of the

measure here at stake, it appears to us that Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not

disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and

conservation of sea turtle species. The means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and

ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact,

endangered species, is observably a close and real one. In our view, therefore, Section 609 is a measure

‘relating to’ the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g) of the

GATT 1994.”

(v) “Medidas aplicadas juntamente com” (“measures made effective in conjunction with”)

O Órgão de Apelação, afirmando que a finalidade do embargo americano à importação de

camarões destinava-se principalmente à conservação dos recursos naturais, opinou que a medida

não era meramente uma proibição geral e constatou a existência da relação entre meio e fins da

medida adotada e a política de preservação ambiental.

202

56. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and

Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia,

WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996.

57.

58. 59. 60. Pág. 20. “Viewed in this light, the ordinary or natural meaning of ‘made effective’ when used in

connection with a measure — a governmental act or regulation may be seen to refer to such measure being

‘operative’, as ‘in force’, or as having ‘come into effect.’ Similarly, the phrase ‘in conjunction with’ may be

read quite plainly as ‘together with’ or ‘jointly with.’ Taken together, the second clause of Article

XX(g) appears to us to refer to governmental measures like the baseline establishment rules being

promulgated or brought into effect together with restrictions on domestic production or consumption of

natural resources. Put in a slightly different manner, we believe that the clause ‘if such measures are made

effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product or consumption’ is appropriately read as a

requirement that the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also

with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of evenhandedness in the imposition of

restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural

resources.”

61. 62. Pág. 21. “There is, of course, no textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and imported

products. Indeed, where there is identity of treatment — constituting real, not merely formal, equality of

treatment — it is difficult to see how inconsistency with Article III:4 would have arisen in the first place. On

the other hand, if no restrictions on domestically-produced like products are imposed at all, and all

limitations are placed upon imported products alone, the measure cannot be accepted as primarily or even

substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals. The measure would simply be naked

discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods. In the present appeal, the baseline establishment rules

affect both domestic gasoline and imported gasoline, providing for — generally speaking — individual

baselines for domestic refiners and blenders and statutory baselines for importers. Thus, restrictions on the

consumption or depletion of clean air by regulating the domestic production of ‘dirty’ gasoline are

established jointly with corresponding restrictions with respect to imported gasoline. That imported gasoline

has been determined to have been accorded ‘less favourable treatment’ than the domestic gasoline in terms of

Article III:4, is not material for purposes of analysis under Article XX(g). It might also be noted that the

second clause of Article XX(g) speaks disjunctively of ‘domestic production or consumption’.”

63. 64. Pág. 21. “We do not believe … that the clause ‘if made effective in conjunction with restrictions on

domestic production or consumption’ was intended to establish an empirical ‘effects test’ for the availability

of the Article XX(g) exception. In the first place, the problem of determining causation, well-known in both

domestic and international law, is always a difficult one. In the second place, in the field of conservation of

exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the

effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable. The legal characterization of

such a measure is not reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are not,

however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never relevant. In a

particular case, should it become clear that realistically, a specific measure cannot in any possible situation

have any positive effect on conservation goals, it would very probably be because that measure was not

designed as a conservation regulation to begin with. In other words, it would not have been ‘primarily aimed

at’ conservation of natural resources at all.”

65.

No relatório desse caso, o Órgão de Apelação descreveu a expressão “medidas aplicadas em

conjunto com” como uma exigência de imparcialidade na imposição de restrições, expressando

que não equivaleria a uma exigência de identidade de tratamento. Ademais, rejeitou o argumento

de que o termo “made effective” teria sido delineado para exigir uma “avaliação prática dos

efeitos”.

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66. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

12 de outubro de 1998.

67.

68. 69.

70. Para. 144 “We earlier noted that Section 609, enacted in 1989, addresses the mode of harvesting of

imported shrimp only. However, two years earlier, in 1987, the United States issued regulations pursuant to

the Endangered Species Act requiring all United States shrimp trawl vessels to use approved TEDs, or to

restrict the duration of tow-times, in specified areas where there was significant incidental mortality of sea

turtles in shrimp trawls. These regulations became fully effective in 1990 and were later modified. They now

require United States shrimp trawlers to use approved TEDs ‘in areas and at times when there is a likelihood

of intercepting sea turtles’, with certain limited exceptions. Penalties for violation of the Endangered Species

Act, or the regulations issued thereunder, include civil and criminal sanctions. The United States government

currently relies on monetary sanctions and civil penalties for enforcement. The government has the ability to

seize shrimp catch from trawl vessels fishing in United States waters and has done so in cases of egregious

violations. We believe that, in principle, Section 609 is an evenhanded measure”. “Accordingly, we hold that

Section 609 is a measure made effective in conjunction with the restrictions on domestic harvesting of

shrimp, as required by Article XX (g).”

b) Objetivo político da medida (political objective of the measure)

(i) necessidade da medida (“necessary”)

71. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and

Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia,

WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996.

72.

73. 74. Pág. 15 “The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. (…) The chapeau of Article XX makes

it clear that it is the 'measures' which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of 'less

favourable treatment'.”

75. Pág. 27. “It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what this [the Appellate Body's

finding] does not mean. It does not mean, or imply, that the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to

control air pollution or, more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue. That would be to ignore the

fact that Article XX of the General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important state

interests - including the protection of human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible natural

resources - to find expression. The provisions of Article XX were not changed as a result of the Uruguay

Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the

Decision on Trade and Environment, [footnote omitted] there is specific acknowledgement to be found about

the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the environment. WTO Members have a large measure

of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their

Dois aspectos importantes podem ser destacados quanto à análise do objetivo de política da

medida: a necessidade da medida; e qual tipo de política que corresponde à alínea (g).

A necessidade da exceção trazida na alínea (g) do Artigo XX foi expressa nesse julgamento em que

o Órgão de Apelação afirmou a relevância do enquadramento das condutas dos países litigantes

nas exceções do artigo e, não, a avaliação de que tais medidas apresentam tratamento menos

favorável.

O Órgão de Apelação, nesse caso, considerou que a medida dos Estados Unidos enquadrava-se nas

exceções do artigo XX (g). Para chegar a essa conclusão, o Órgão referiu-se ao julgamento do caso

US-Gasoline, especificamente na parte que afirma que “se tais medidas foram aplicadas em

conjunto com restrições sobre o produto ou o consumo interno” então haveria uma exigência de

imparcialidade no artigo XX (g).

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environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far as concerns the

WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General

Agreement and the other covered agreements.”

c) Interpretação do termo da aliena (g) “relacionado com” (“relating to”)

76. Relatório do Painel no caso Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and

Salmon (Canada - Unprocessed Herring and Salmon), GATT L/6268 - 35S/98, 22 de março de 1988.

77. 78. 79. Para. 4.6. “The Panel noted that some of the subparagraphs of Article XX state that the measure must be

“necessary” or “essential” to the achievement of the policy purpose set out in the provision (cf.

subparagraphs (a), (b), (d) and (j)) while subparagraph (g) refers only to measures “relating to” the

conservation of exhaustible natural resources. This suggests that Article XX(g)does not only cover measures

that are necessary or essential for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources but a wider range of

measures. However, as the preamble of Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the

General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to

ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the

conservation of exhaustive natural resources. The Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade

measure did not have to be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it

had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as “relating

to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). The Panel, similarly, considered that the terms “in

conjunction with” in Article XX(g) had to be interpreted in a way that ensures that the scope of possible

actions under that provision corresponds to the purpose for which it was included in the General Agreement.

A trade measure could therefore in the view of the Panel only be considered to be made effective “in

conjunction with” production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions”.”

80.

81. Relatório do Painel United States – Prohibition of Import of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada

(US - Tuna from Canada), Demandante: Estados Unidos, L/518 – 29S/91, 22 de fevereiro de 1982.

82.

83. 84. 85. Para. 3. 19. The representative of the United States stated that Article XX(g) applied to measures

“relating” to conservation of exhaustible resources, and did not require that the exclusive motivation or effect

of such measure necessarily be conservation. Certainly, it was not necessary that every official of the party

taking the action always explain the action in terms of its ultimate effect on conservation. Similarly, it was

not necessary that the interim agreement specify on its face that its purpose was conservation. The important

point was that the effect of the interim agreement was consistent with the international management

approach to conservation of tuna. He further stated that the import prohibition satisfied the “relating to” test

in Article XX(g), noting that the legislative history of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of

1976, and Section 205 in particular, showed that conservation was a substantial motive for the measure. He

added that the United States did monitor and impose restrictions on the production of tuna of its own

industry, and that the import embargo, catch restrictions and other measures taken together comprise the

whole of a comprehensive tuna conservation policy, and thus were taken in conjunction with each other.

O Painel adotou entendimento restritivo a respeito da adoção da medida americana em questão e

de sua adequação com a política de conservação dos recursos naturais. Em que pese os Estados

Unidos terem alegado que o artigo XX (g) aplicava-se a medidas “relacionadas com” a conservação

de recursos naturais e de que não haveria a exigência de uma motivação exclusiva acerca do

direcionamento de tal conservação, o Painel considerou que a medida americana não se

enquadrava nas exceções do artigo.

Nesse caso, o Painel combinou a interpretação da alínea (g) com o caput do Artigo XX para definir a

expressão “em conjunto com” e “relacionado com.” Concluiu que o recurso a essa alínea não

requer a comprovação de ela ser “necessária” ou “essencial” à conservação dos recursos naturais,

desde que seja “relacionada com” a conservação. Ademais, afirmou serem equivalentes as

expressões “destinadas principalmente a” e “relacionada com”.

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86. Para. 4.9 The Panel furthermore noted that both parties considered tuna stocks, including albacore tuna, to

be an exhaustible natural resource in need of conservation management and that both parties were

participating in international conventions aimed, inter alia, at a better conservation of such stocks. However,

attention was drawn to the fact that Article XX(g) contained a qualification on measures relating to the

conservation if they were to be justified under that Article, namely that such measures were made effective in

conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.

87. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

12 de outubro de 1998.

88.

89. 90. Para. 135. “Article XX(g) requires that the measure sought to be justified be one which “relat[es] to” the

conservation of exhaustible natural resources. In making this determination, the treaty interpreter essentially

looks into the relationship between the measure at stake and the legitimate policy of conserving exhaustible

natural resources. It is well to bear in mind that the policy of protecting and conserving the endangered sea

turtles here involved is shared by all participants and third participants in this appeal, indeed, by the vast

majority of the nations of the world. None of the parties to this dispute question the genuineness of the

commitment of the others to that policy.”

91. 92. d) “…em conjunto com restrições na produção e no consumo doméstico” (in conjunction with

restrictions on domestic production or consumption)

93. 94. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and

Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e República da Bolívia,

WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996.

95.

96. 97. Pág. 18. “[T]he ordinary or natural meaning of 'made effective' when used in connection with a measure - a

governmental act or regulation - may be seen to refer to such measure being 'operative', as 'in force', or as

having 'come into effect'. [footnote omitted] Similarly, the phrase 'in conjunction with' may be read quite

plainly as 'together with' or 'jointly with'.

[footnote omitted] Taken together, the second clause of

Article XX(g) appears to us to refer to governmental measures like the baseline establishment rules being

promulgated or brought into effect together with restrictions on domestic production or consumption of

natural resources. Put in a slightly different manner, we believe that the clause 'if such measures are made

effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product or consumption' is appropriately read as a

requirement that the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also

with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of

A interpretação do Órgão de Apelação com relação às restrições na produção e no consumo

doméstico é de que elas devem ser realizadas em conjunto com as medidas relacionadas à

conservação de recursos naturais esgotáveis. Nessa decisão, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a

expressão “em conjunto com” é similar ao termo “junto com” (together with) ou “unido a” (jointly

with). Trata-se de uma condição para a validade dessas medidas de conservação, isto é, que tais

medidas em questão sejam aplicadas em conjunto com as políticas internas do país de forma

efetiva e cuidando para não impedir o livre comércio. O objetivo é evitar que os países

importadores sejam parciais e que não criem barreiras ao comércio.

Retomando o entendimento do caso US – Gasoline, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que uma

medida para ser corretamente enquadrada como “relacionado com” deve objetivamente remeter-

se à conservação das tartarugas marinhas.

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restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural

resources.”

Pág. 19. “We do not believe, finally, that the clause 'if made effective in conjunction with restrictions on

domestic production or consumption' was intended to establish an empirical 'effects test' for the availability of

the Article XX(g) exception. In the first place, the problem of determining causation, well-known in both

domestic and international law, is always a difficult one. In the second place, in the field of conservation of

exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects

attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable. The legal characterization of such a

measure is not reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are not, however,

suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never relevant. In a particular case,

should it become clear that realistically, a specific measure cannot in any possible situation have any positive

effect on conservation goals, it would very probably be because that measure was not designed as a

conservation regulation to begin with. In other words, it would not have been 'primarily aimed at' conservation

of natural resources at all.”

98. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R,

12 de outubro de 1998.

Para. 143. In United States – Gasoline, we held that the above-captioned clause of Article XX(g), “(…) is

appropriately read as a requirement that the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of

imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of even-handedness

in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of

exhaustible natural resources”. In this case, we need to examine whether the restrictions imposed by Section

609 with respect to imported shrimp are also imposed in respect of shrimp caught by United States shrimp

trawl vessels.”

9. Artigo XX(h)

Não foram encontrados casos baseados neste parágrafo.

10. Artigo XX(i)

Não foram encontrados casos baseados neste parágrafo.

11. Artigo XX(j)

Não foram encontrados casos baseados neste parágrafo.

III. Comentários

Objetivo do Desenvolvimento Sustentável

Como veremos ao longo destes comentários, no âmbito das exceções previstas pelos parágrafos (b) e

(g), é perceptível a importância que o Órgão de Apelação tem gradativamente emprestado ao objetivo do

desenvolvimento sustentável para ampliar o espaço de políticas de meio ambiente e saúde na OMC. O

objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentável está previsto no preâmbulo do Acordo que estabelece a OMC:

“Reconhecendo que as suas relações na esfera da atividade comercial e econômica devem objetivar a

elevação dos níveis de vida, o pleno emprego e um volume considerável e em constante elevação de

receitas reais e demandas e demanda efetiva, o aumento da produção e do comércio de bens e

serviços, permitindo ao mesmo tempo a utilização ótima dos recursos mundiais em conformidade

com os objetivos de um desenvolvimento sustentável e buscando proteger e preservar o meio

Nesse julgado, o Órgão de Apelação, analisando como um dos últimos requisitos o enquadramento

da medida em questão no artigo XX (g), definiu que uma medida seja aplicada “em conjunto com”

medidas internas é elemento fundamental para enfatizar de maneira justa e imparcial às políticas

de conservação ao meio ambiente que se excepcionar.

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ambiente e incrementar os meios de fazê-lo, de maneira compatível com suas respectivas

necessidades e interesses segundo diferentes níveis de desenvolvimento econômico,” (grifos nossos).

Artigo XX, Caput

O Caput, ou Chapeau, do Artigo XX é uma obrigação de boa fé. Ao passo que os parágrafos do

Artigo XX se destinam ao conteúdo das medidas propriamente ditas, o caput se refere à forma de aplicação

dessas medidas. Deste modo, as medidas que se enquadrem provisoriamente dentro de uma das exceções

previstas nos parágrafos devem, de acordo com os critérios do caput, ser aplicadas de maneira a não

constituir uma discriminação arbitrária ou injustificada, ou uma restrição disfarçada ao comércio

internacional.

O requisito da discriminação arbitrária e injustificada entre os Membros foi interpretado desde os dois

primeiros Painéis envolvendo comércio e meio ambiente, ainda sob o GATT 47. Os primeiros casos foram

US – Tuna/Dolphin I e US – Tuna/Dolphin II. Nestes primeiros casos, foi destacado o fato de que os

Membros não estariam agindo de modo discriminatório, caso assegurassem: que as medidas adotadas são

necessárias, não discriminatórias e que elas não constituem restrições ao comércio. No caso Atum II, os EUA

poderiam ter se baseado na alínea (g) do Artigo XX, caso tivessem demonstrado que se tratava de uma

proteção justificada, por exemplo, em razão do cumprimento de Tratados Multilaterais Ambientais (TMAs).

Estas condições foram confirmadas e pormenorizadas tanto no caso US – Gasoline, quanto no caso US –

Shrimp.

Um aspecto importante sobre este Artigo, foi a interpretação de se o caput, ou a parágrafo, deveria

ser primeiramente analisado. Com o contencioso US - Gasoline o Órgão de Apelação ressaltou a necessidade

de a análise primeiramente recair sobre as exceções, para depois ser verificado o atendimento aos requisitos

do caput. A importância desse fato decorre da garantia de um tratamento inicial à medida que se pretende

protetora de uma política público como a proteção do meio ambiente, para que posteriormente seja analisado

se houve uma discriminação ao comércio.

No que diz respeito à interpretação do caput do Artigo XX, pelo menos dois casos merecem

destaques. O primeiro foi US – Gasoline, onde o Órgão de Apelação condenou os Estados Unidos por

aplicarem suas medidas de forma discriminatória. Mais especificamente, o Órgão de Apelação criticou o fato

de que anteriormente à adoção da medida restritiva de comércio, os Estados Unidos: 1) não levou em

consideração os custos da medida para os países importadores; e 2) não tentou realizar arranjos cooperativos

com os governos da Venezuela e Brasil. Tais falhas, na opinião do Órgão de Apelação, impediram que os

Estados Unidos atendessem aos requisitos do Artigo XX, caput, agindo de forma discriminatória.

No caso US – Gasoline, pela primeira vez o Órgão de Apelação fez referência ao objetivo do

desenvolvimento sustentável e à Decisão Ministerial sobre Comércio e Meio Ambiente:

“As disposições do Artigo XX não foram alteradas como resultado da Rodada Uruguai de

Negociações Comerciais Multilaterais. De fato, há um reconhecimento específico a ser considerado

sobre a importância de coordenar políticas de comércio e meio ambiente.” (US – Gasoline, Relatório

do Órgão de Apelação, pág. 30).

No caso US – Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que os Estados Unidos deixaram de cumprir

com os requisitos do caput do Artigo XX por: 1) exigirem que outors Membros adotem um programa

regulatório que não é meramente comparável ao seu, mas essencialmente o mesmo; e 2) falharem em engajar

as partes da disputa em uma negociação ampla com o objetivo de concluir acordos bilaterais ou multilaterais

para a proteção e conservação de tartarugas marinhas.

Neste mesmo caso, ainda no contexto do caput do Artigo XX, o Órgão de Apelação se pautou no

objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentável para emitir uma de suas principais obiter dicta:

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“Nós mais uma vez salientamos que esta linguagem [Preâmbulo Acordo da OMC] demonstra um

reconhecimento pelos negociadores da OMC que o uso ótimo dos recursos naturais do mundo

deveria ser feito de acordo com o objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentável. Como esta linguagem

preambular reflete as intenções dos negociadores do Acordo da OMC, nós acreditamos que deva

imprimir cor, textura e contorno à interpretação dos acordos anexados ao Acordo da OMC,

neste caso, o GATT 1994.” (Grifos nossos). (US – Shrimp, Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, para.

153.)

Artigo XX, parágrafo “a”

O parágrafo “a” do Artigo XX do GATT tem sido bastante importante para avançar objetivos de

políticas culturais adotadas pelos Membros. Antes do caso China – Publication and Audiovisual Products,

especulava-se a utilização do parágrafo f (medidas impostas para a proteção de tesouros nacionais de valor

artístico, histórico ou arqueológico). Entretanto, hoje parece pacífica a utilização do parágrafo “a” como

forma de proteção da moralidade pública de um determinado Membro frente à importação de determinados

produtos culturais.

O fundamento da utilização do argumento da moralidade pública encontra-se no caso US-Gambling,

sob o Acordo GATS. Este caso envolveu uma reclamação de Antigua relacionada a certas medidas que

tornaram ilegal para fornecedores de fora dos Estatos Unidos fornecerem jogos de azar para consumidores

dentro dos EUA. Os Estados Unidos defenderam-se, inter alia, com base no Artigo XIV (a) do GATS

(medidas necessárias para proteger moralidade pública ou manter ordem pública). O painel, chancelado

posteriormente pelo Órgão de Apelação, entendeu que o termo moralidade pública “denota standards de

conduta certa e errada mantidos por ou em nome de uma comunidade ou nação.” (US-Gambling relatório do

painel, para. 6.465; relatório do Órgão de Apelação, paras. 296, 299). O painel também entendeu que “o

conteúdo desses conceitos para os Membros pode variar no tempo e no espaço, dependendo de uma gama de

fatores, inclusive valores sociais, culturais, éticos, e religiosos.” (US-Gambling, relatório do painel, para.

6.461), Finalmente, o painel concluiu que, ao implementar esses valores, os Membros “deveriam ser

oportunizados alguma margem para definir e aplicar por eles próprios os conceitos de ‘moralidade pública’

... nos seus respectivos territórios, de acordo com os seus próprios sistemas e escalas de valores.” (US-

Gambling, relatório do painel, para. 6.461.)

As interpretações do painel e Órgão de Apelação neste caso tiveram impacto direto no caso China –

Publications and Audiovisual Products, que também trata da moralidade pública, mas sob o enfoque do

Artigo XX (a) do GATT. Neste caso, a China foi demandada pelos Estados Unidos perante a OMC por

restringir a importação de uma série de produtos culturais entendidos como atentatórios contra a moralidade

pública chinesa. Na opinião da China, “produtos culturais importados, porque são vetores de diferentes

valores culturais, podem colidir com standards de conduta certa ou errada que são específicos à China.”

(China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, relatório do painel, para. 7.712). Perante o Órgão de

Apelação, a China requereu que fosse considerada a natureza peculiar dos bens culturais no contexto do

Artigo XX (a) do GATT:

“China aponta que produtos e serviços culturais tem uma natureza muito específica como ‘vetores de

identidade, valores e significado,’ quando eles não apenas satisfazem uma necessidade comercial,

mas também desenpenham um papel crucial para influenciar e definir as características da

sociedade.” (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, relatório do Órgão de Apelação, para.

25).

Atualmente, alguns acadêmicos especializados no debate “comércio e cultura” defendem a inclusão

da cultura como elemento integrante do desenvolvimento sustentável. Como se observa das disputas

“comércio e meio ambiente”, e “comércio e saúde”, o objetivo de desenvolvimento sustentável, presente no

Preâmbulo do Acordo da OMC, tem possibilitado uma interpretação mais fluida do Artigo XX, desta forma

aumentando o espaço de políticas ambientais e de saúde dentro da OMC. Esses acadêmicos esperam que o

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mesmo movimento possa surgir em favor da cultura, a partir do seu reconhecimento como parte do conceito

de desenvolvimento sustentável.

Artigo XX, parágrafos “b” e “g”

Tendo como objeto de análise o meio ambiente, como política estatal que possa resultar em uma

barreira ao comércio, analisamos diretamente os parágrafos (b) e (g). Algumas questões importantes podem

ser destacadas da interpretação desses parágrafos, como por exemplo as diferenças nas análises do parágrafo

(b) e do parágrafo (g).

No caso Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, o Painel, em suas conclusões, afirmou que para ser utilizado o

inciso (b) do Artigo XX, a medida deve estar incluída na política do Estado de realização da proteção à saúde

e ao meio ambiente. Além disso, deve ser necessária para o alcance deste objetivo, devido à existência de

efetivo risco para a saúde humana, dos animais ou dos vegetais. Como o Brasil alegou a proteção ao meio

ambiente, o Painel se manifestou no sentido de que o Artigo XX, parágrafo (b), trata do meio ambiente ao se

referir aos animais e vegetais. Nesse contexto, afirmou que o Brasil conseguiu provar que os pneus

remoldados causam, no final de sua vida útil, danos à saúde pela possibilidade de ocorrência de doenças

como a dengue ou a febre amarela, além de doenças ligadas à liberação de tóxicos após a queimada dos

pneus. O Painel dispôs que a política adotada e os níveis de proteção ambiental fazem parte da

discricionariedade dos Estados, não sendo competência da OMC analisá-los, como foi ressaltado no caso EC

- Asbestos. Dessa forma, foram estendidos os argumentos do caso EC - Asbestos, no que tange à saúde, para

a sua aplicação ao meio ambiente no caso Brazil - Retreated Tyres.

Na análise sobre a necessidade da medida, o Painel examinou três critérios: a importância do

interesse protegido; a contribuição da medida para o fim perseguido; e, ainda, a repercussão desta para o

comércio. Quanto ao primeiro argumento, foi confirmada a importância da proteção à saúde, aos animais e

aos vegetais. Com relação ao segundo, o Painel aponta que para essa análise deve ser utilizado tanto o

argumento da quantificação, quanto o da possibilidade de se atingir o objetivo conforme a qualidade da

medida empregada. Além disso, entendeu que mesmo diante da impossibilidade da importação de pneus

recauchutados, a indústria brasileira teria condições de comportar a demanda de produção de pneus

remoldados.

Logo após, o Painel passou a analisar se haveria a possibilidade de utilização de medidas alternativas

à proibição de importações, o que ficou definido como impossível, tendo em vista a já utilização destas

técnicas pelo Brasil, como medidas complementares à proibição da importação.

O Órgão de Apelação, no nosso entender, pautou-se no objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentável para

flexibilizar a obrigação do Brasil de aplicar medidas alternativas razoavelmente disponíveis (reasonably

available alternatives):

“A capacidade de um país de implementar medidas que seriam particularmente custosas, ou que

requereriam tecnologias avançadas, podem ser relevantes para a averiguação se tais medidas ou

práticas são alternativas razoalvemente alternativas a uma medida preventiva, tal como a barreira à

importação, que não envolve ‘custos proibitivos ou dificuldades técnicas substanciais’”. (Brazil –

Tyres, Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, para. 171).

Quanto à conformidade da medida com o caput do Artigo XX, o Painel afirmou que deve ser

analisada a relação entre o direito que um Membro tem de alegar uma exceção do Artigo XX, e o direito dos

outros Membros de não serem discriminados. Incumbia ao Brasil demonstrar que não aplicou essa medida de

maneira discriminatória.

No que concerne à discriminação arbitrária ou injustificável, o Painel alegou que as vantagens

conferidas ao MERCOSUL correspondem a uma discriminação não arbitrária e não injustificada, em função

da existência de uma sentença do Tribunal do MERCOSUL obrigando tal medida. Ademais, de acordo com

o Painel, as importações não comprometiam o objetivo da medida adotada pelo Brasil, pois ocorriam em

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pequenos volumes. A fim de assegurar que as importações dos Membros do MERCOSUL permanecessem

em volumes considerados aceitáveis pelo Painel, e tendo presente os impactos negativos ao meio ambiente e

à saúde pública, no que se refere à importação de pneus reformados, o Brasil editou a Resolução CAMEX nº

38, de 22 de agosto de 2007, estabelecendo quotas à importação de pneus recauchutados provenientes do

Paraguai e do Uruguai, com base em valores históricos de importação. A Portaria SECEX nº 30, de 19 de

outubro de 2007, fixou os critérios para a distribuição das quotas.

Entretanto, em dezembro de 2007, o Órgão de Apelação reverteu a decisão do Painel no que tange à

possibilidade de exceção às importações realizadas dos pneus provenientes dos Membros do MERCOSUL.

O Órgão de Apelação considerou que, independente do volume de importações, a exceção para estes Estados

viola o caput do Artigo XX do GATT, haja vista contrariar o objetivo perquirido pelo Brasil de proteção ao

meio ambiente e à saúde pública, nos termos da alínea (b). Além disso, o Órgão de Apelação ressaltou a

incoerência, exposta pelo Painel, entre a necessidade de proteção ao meio ambiente e à saúde das pessoas, e a

existência de liminares no país que permitiam a importação de pneus recauchutados vindos de outros

Estados.

Diante dessa perspectiva, para que o Brasil cumprisse a decisão dada pelo Órgão de Apelação, duas

medidas foram fundamentais: em primeiro lugar, a adequação do ordenamento nacional às liminares emitidas

pelos tribunais, liberando a importação de pneus usados; em segundo, a negociação com o MERCOSUL

sobre a melhor forma de evitar as importações de pneus remoldados dos Membros do bloco, sem causar um

problema institucional, em função do descumprimento de uma decisão tomada pelo Tribunal Permanente de

Revisão do bloco.

O Brasil procurou se adequar a essas duas medidas, conforme argumentos apresentados pelo Brasil

em sua defesa à arbitragem fundada no Artigo 21.3 do DSU, circulada em agosto de 2008. Com relação às

liminares emitidas pelo judiciário, as quais permitiram a importação desses pneus, houve o julgamento de

uma Ação de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) que pretendeu cassar essas liminares. Em

24 de junho de 2009, a ação foi julgada procedente em parte, com uma interpretação favorável ao meio

ambiente. No entanto, há dúvidas quanto a sua efetividade no que tange às importações dos pneus usados,

tendo em vista que há algumas liminares que não podem ser cassadas, pois já transitaram em julgado. No que

diz respeito ao MERCOSUL, o Brasil conseguiu política e gradativamente reduzir as importações. No dia 7

de janeiro de 2009, foi notificado pelas CE ao DSB um acordo nos termos do Artigo 22 do DSU. Na reunião

de 25 de setembro de 2009, o Brasil informou que havia cumprido todas as determinações de implementação

emitidas pelo DSB.

Essa decisão deixou evidente o argumento de que caso a parte alegue uma proteção ambiental

sustentada em dados científicos coerentes, baseada nos riscos, pode haver uma interpretação protetiva ao

meio ambiente pela OMC. Todavia, as medidas nacionais têm de estar em conformidade com os argumentos

utilizados para a proteção ambiental. Vê-se, claramente, nesse caso, que a interpretação pelo Órgão de

Apelação da medida brasileira como discriminatória foi justamente a existência das liminares emitidas pelos

tribunais nacionais liberando a importação de pneus usados, bem como a permissão de importação dos pneus

provenientes de Membros do MERCOSUL. A decisão da OMC foi adequada no sentido de aceitar as

alegações ambientais brasileiras, mas não garantiu o uso da exceção em razão das incompatibilidades

existentes no âmbito interno do Estado, que tiveram de ser resolvidas.

É importante também analisar a interpretação da alínea (g).A jurisprudência manifestou-se quanto à

aplicação da alínea (g), no que concerne às medidas de restrição à produção nacional e a consumo,

relacionadas com a conservação de recursos naturais esgotáveis. De acordo com estas interpretações, é

preciso demonstrar o nexo de causalidade entre a medida e a sua utilização para a conservação. Ademais, a

medida pode se expandir para o âmbito extraterritorial, podendo ocorrer a responsabilização apenas dos

nacionais do Membro, e não de outros Estados, como ficou delimitado no caso Atum II. Neste caso, os EUA

poderiam ter expandido suas medidas para outros territórios, mas, sob a condição de não discriminar e nem

responsabilizar os não nacionais.

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Assim, o Membro deve aplicar as mesmas regras no âmbito nacional, à sua produção e consumo e

aos produtos importados. Esta interpretação foi conferida, também no caso US - Gasoline, no qual os EUA

não puderam aplicar medidas restritivas à gasolina brasileira e à venezuelana, pois não comprovaram que não

praticavam esse fato no âmbito nacional.

Outra interpretação foi sobre a expressão “recursos naturais esgotáveis”. No caso US - Shrimp houve

a defesa de que os únicos recursos esgotáveis seriam os não-vivos. Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação aplicou

a técnica da interpretação evolutiva para ampliar o significado de “recursos naturais exauríveis” a fim de

incluir seres vivos. O Órgão de Apelação justificou sua conduta com base em preocupações contemporâneas

da comunidade de nações sobre a proetção e conservação do meio ambiente, presente no objetivo do

desenvolvimento sustentável:

“Enquanto o Artigo XX não foi modificado na Rodada Uruguai, o preâmbulo anexado ao Acordo

OMC demonstra que os signatários deste Acordo estavam, em 1994, inteiramente conscientes da

importância e legitimidade da proteção ambiental como um objetivo de política nacional e

internacional. O preâmbulo do Acordo OMC – que informa não apenas o GATT 1994, mas também

os outros acordos ambrangidos – explicitamente reconhece ‘o objetivo do desenvolvimento

sustentável.’” (US – Shrimp, relatório do Órgão de Apelação, para. 129).

Apartir da consideração a respeito do objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentável, o Órgão de Apelação

evocou a Agenda 21, a Convenção sobre a Diversidade Biológica, entre outros Tratados, para dispor que os

recursos biológicos são esgotáveis. Note-se, entretanto, que o uso de Acordos além dos abrangidos pela

OMC são utilizados pela jurisprudência da OMC apenas para fins de interpretação dos Acordos da OMC.

Isso é diferente de adjudicar Acordos não-OMC pelo mecanismos de solução de controvérsias da OMC.

Artigo XX, parágrafo d

Percebe-se que a interpretação concedida pelo Órgão de Apelação e pelo Painel da OMC quanto à

alínea (d) do Artigo XX é no sentido de autorizar medidas que assegurem o cumprimento de uma outra

norma compatível com as regras multilaterais de comércio. Tais medidas encontram limite de abrangência

pela interpretação do termo “necessária” que, conforme o caso concreto, apresenta diferentes motivações.

Assim, ao avaliar se uma medida é necessária para assegurar a aplicação de uma lei compatível com o

regime da OMC, também se leva em consideração a importância relativa dos interesses em comum e valores

que a lei ou o regulamento a ser cumprido se destina a proteger.

Alguns desafios para a interpretação do Artigo XX

No que concerne a interpretação do Artigo XX, parágrafo “a”, o desafio está em aumentar o espaço

para a adoção de políticas públicas culturais sem violar os Acordas da OMC. Como observa-se do caso

China – Publications and Audiovisual products, este espaço ainda parece ser bastante restrito. Países que

adotam ou pretendem adotar medidas de comércio para proteger a cultura local poderiam se beneficiar do

argumento segundo o qual cultura/ proteção da diversidade cultural é parte integrante do objetivo de

desenvolvimento sustentável. Hoje é pacífico que o conceito de desenvolvimento sustentável engloba

desenvolvimento econômcio, desenvolvimento social e proteção do meio ambiente. Esta visão alternativa ao

desenvolvimento unicamente econômico tem influenciado positivamente a resolução de casos entre meio

ambiente/ saúde e comércio, aumentando o espaço desses valores sociais no comércio internacional. Estima-

se que a inclusão da cultura como elemento integrante do conceito de desenvolvimento sustentável gere um

efeito parecido nas disputas entre cultura e comércio, de forma a ampliar o espaço para políticas culturais

sem violar Acordos da OMC.

Ainda há também diversos desafios para que as interpretações sejam cada vez mais objetivas no

âmbito dos parágrafos (b) e (g) do Artigo XX. Podem ser citados: a subjetividade de alguns termos; a

aleatoriedade na aplicação das alíneas (b) ou (g) em casos específicos; e, o tratamento dos tratados

multilaterais ambientais no âmbito da OMC.

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Constata-se, diante desse cenário, que a interpretação do Artigo XX ainda não é estável, em razão

das expressões não tão objetivas existentes, e interpretadas na medida em que os contenciosos aparecem.

Podem ser citadas as expressões “necessárias” (alínea b) e “relacionadas a” (alínea g). Para alguns, é preciso

negociar a resolução de ambiguidades substanciais e procedimentais, adotando-se uma interpretação formal

das obrigações existentes. Para outros, as interpretações jurisprudenciais são eficazes no direcionamento da

aplicação dos dispositivos, sendo suficientes para delimitar a questão.

Um outro desafio, é o fato de os parágrafos (b) e (g) serem, em determinados momentos, utilizadas

de modo aleatório pela jurisprudência. O parágrafo (b) aborda a necessidade de proteção da vida humana,

animal ou vegetal; enquanto o (g) trata das medidas relacionadas à conservação dos recursos naturais

esgotáveis. Dessa forma, subentende-se que os parágrafos tratam de diferentes tipos de políticas e medidas.

Para medidas relacionadas à proteção da saúde humana, deveria ser aplicado o parágrafo (b) e não o (g).

Entretanto, a jurisprudência entende correta a aplicação do Artigo XX (g), para medidas consideradas na

alínea (b), como ocorre no caso da proteção do ar, um recurso natural esgotável, no contencioso US -

Gasoline.

Da mesma maneira, o parágrafo (b) é especificamente designado para a vida animal, mas, medidas

adotadas para a proteção das tartarugas foram classificadas no âmbito do parágrafo (g). Ademais, não há

indicação se um dos parágrafos é específico para medidas internas dos Membros, enquanto o outra seria

aplicado apenas para os problemas globais. Essas interpretações, as quais não percorrem uma direção

precisa, podem resultar em uma insegurança jurídica. Outras posições sublinham que, de qualquer forma, o

resultado será o mesmo, pois os parágrafos estão ligados ao caput. Por outro lado, a existência da

ambiguidade permite maior maleabilidade em novas soluções para as questões futuras. De qualquer forma, é

necessário existir uma interpretação coerente dos termos, para que haja uma maior objetividade na aplicação

dos termos.

Por outro lado, há entendimento doutrinário que compreende que o Órgão de Apelação, no caso

Brazil – Tyres, aproximou os requisitos dos parágrafos (b) e (g).1 Tradicionalmente, o parágrafo g (medidas

relacionadas à conservação de recursos naturais) era considerado mais amplo em alcance, enquanto o Artigo

XX (b) (medidas necessárias para a proteção da sáude) requeria um teste de necessidade mais rígido. De

acordo com este entendimento, a jurisprudência Brazil-Tyres parece ter fundido esses dois testes a fim de que

o requisito da relação entre a medida adotada e o objetivo perseguido entre estes dois parágrafos seja

equivalente, aproximando as exceções de meio ambiente e saúde.2

Até Brazil-Tyres, a versão mais recente do teste para medidas necessárias (parágrafo XX, b) era

inspirado no caso Korea – Various Measures on Beef, um caso de Artigo XX (d):

“(i) [t]he more vital or important those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to

accept as necessary a measure designed as an enforcement instrument;3 [t]he greater the contribution

[to the end pursued], the more easily a measure might be considered to be necessary;4 and (iii) [a]

measure with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as

necessary than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects.”5

No caso Brazil – Tyres, percebe-se que o Órgão de Apelação afastou-se do teste desenvolvido em

Korea – Beef para fins de “necessidade” ao enfatizar um elemento: esta medida restritiva contribuirá

1 Gabrielle Marceau e Julian Wyatt, Trade and the environment: The WTO’s efforts to balance economic and

sustainable development, in Liber Amicorum Anne Petitpierre-Sauvain: Economie Environnement Ethique, 225, 229-

230 (Rita Trigo Trindade et al. Eds, 2009). 2 Id., p. 230.

3 Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beefs (DS

161/ DS 169, 11 Dezembro 2000, para 162. 4 Id., para. 163

5 Id.

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materialmente para o objetivo de política invocado? De acordo com Marceau e Wyatt, o Órgão de Apelação

pode ter adotado esta alternativa interpretativa para dar coerência entre as exceções “ambientais” presentes

nos Artigo XX (b) e (g) do GATT, e Artigo XIV (b) do GATS, uma vez que o GATS não apresenta um

parágrafo equivalente ao parágrafo (g) do GATT.6 Por esta nova abordagem, a rigidez interpretativa do

parágrafo (b) do GATT foi suavizada, ampliando o espaço para políticas de meio ambiente e saúde. Este

novo teste, que aproxima os parágrafos (b) e (g) do Artigo XX do GATT foi assim elaborado pelo Órgão de

Apelação:

“Uma contribuição existe quando houver uma genuína relação de fins e meios entre o objetivo

perseguido e a medida em questão. Para ser caracterizada como necessária, a medida não precisa ser

indispensável. Entretanto, sua contribuição ao alcance do objetivo deve ser material, não meramente

marginal ou insignificante...” (Brazil –Tyres, Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, para. 210).

Um outro desafio, é o tratamento conferido aos tratados multilaterais ambientais (TMAs). Há o

questionamento sobre a necessidade de modificar ou não o Artigo XX para a previsão da possibilidade de

aplicar ou não os TMAs na OMC. Um critério que poderia ser acrescentado ao Artigo XX, seria a ideia de

ser possível a adoção de medidas para a implementação de obrigações contidas nesses tratados ambientais.

Há a opção, também, de negociar um mínimo de regras de proteção ambiental em um acordo TREMs

(Agreement on Trade Related Environmental Protection). Diante da perspectiva de que a OMC não tem

competências em matéria de meio ambiente, essa última alternativa dificilmente seria concretizada, tendo em

vista a inexistência de um consenso sobre as questões ambientais entre os Membros desenvolvidos, em

desenvolvimento e os de menor desenvolvimento relativo. Por ora, a interação entre tratados da OMC e

TMAs tem ocorrido de forma bastante limitada. Como vimos no caso US – Shrimp, os painéis e o Órgão de

Apelação podem utilizar Acordos não-OMC, aqui incluídos os TMAs, para fins de interpretar disposições

presentes nos Acordos da OMC. O uso mais extensivo dos TMAs em soluções de controvérsias da OMC

feririam o Artigo 3(2) do Entendimento de Soluções de Controvérsias, segundo o qual as recomendações e

decisões do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias não podem aumentar ou diminuir os direitos e obrigações

previstos nos Acordos da OMC.

O maior de todos os desafios no que diz respeito à futura interpretação do Artigo XX parece

atualmente pesar sobre medidas relacionadas à redução de gases de efeito estufa adotadas pelos Membros da

OMC. Diante do impasse em encontrar soluções multilaterais no regime de mudanças climáticas, observa-se

um número crescente de Membros tomar medidas unilaterais com vistas a reduzir a emissão de gases de

efeito estufa nacionalmente. Algumas dessas medidas nacionais supostamente violariam Acordos da OMC.

Uma defesa possível para os Membros que adotam essas medidas seria com base no Artigo XX, parágrafos

(b) e (g) do GATT.7 Até o presente momento, nenhum Membro provocou o Órgão de Solução de

Controvérsias com relação a este tipo de medida, mas a OMC já se prepara para este desafio.8

6 Marceau & Wyatt, p. 231.

7 Fabio Morosini, Trade and Climate Change: Unveiling the Principle of Common But Differentiated

Responsibilities from the WTO Agreements, The George Washington International Law Review, Volume 42, Número 4,

2010. 8 WTO-U.N. Env’t Programme, Trade and Climate Change (Ludivine Tamiotti et al., 2009), disponível em

http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf.

214

Artigo XXI

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXI

Security Exceptions

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed

(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers

contrary to its essential security interests; or

(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the

protection of its essential security interests

(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;

(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic

in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of

supplying a military establishment;

(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or

(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under

the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXI

III. Comentário

215

Artigo XXII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXII

Consultation

22.1 Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate

opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting

party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.

22.2 The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any

contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a

satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXII

Consultas

22.1 Cada Parte Contratante examinará com compreensão as representações que lhe sejam encaminhadas

por qualquer outra Parte Contratante e deverá se prestar a consultas a respeito daquelas

representações, desde que elas digam respeito a questões relativas à aplicação do presente Acordo.

22.2 As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma das Partes Contratantes, entrar em entendimentos

com uma ou várias Partes Contratantes sobre questões para as quais a solução satisfatória não

poderia ser alcançada através das consultas previstas no parágrafo primeiro.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e aplicação do Artigo XXII

Este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

III. Comentários

Nada a observar, uma vez que este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

216

Article XXIII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXIII

Nullification or Impairment

23.1 If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under

this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the

Agreement is being impeded as the result of

(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or

(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with

the provisions of this Agreement, or

(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory

adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting

party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached

shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.

23.2 If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a

reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the

matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall

promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to

the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as

appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental

organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING

PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may

authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or

parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be

appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or

other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty

days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting

Parties of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon

the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXIII

Proteção de Concessões e Vantagens

23.1 No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta

ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do

Acordo está sendo dificultado, em consequência:

a) do não cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma

assumidos em virtude do presente Acordo;

b) da aplicação por outra das Partes Contratantes de uma medida, contrária ou não às

disposições do presente Acordo; ou

c) da existência de qualquer outra situação, dita Parte Contratante, a fim de obter solução

satisfatória para a questão, poderá dirigir representações ou propostas por escrito à outra ou

outras Partes Contratantes que lhe parecerem interessadas. Qualquer Parte Contratante, por

217

essa forma interpelada, examinará, com boa vontade, as representações ou propostas que lhe

tenham sido dirigidas.

23.2 Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um Acordo satisfatório dentro de um prazo

razoável, ou se a dificuldade for uma das previstas no § 1 (c) deste Artigo, a questão poderá ser

submetida às Partes Contratantes. As Partes Contratantes iniciarão, sem demora, uma investigação

sobre qualquer assunto que lhes seja submetido e, se julgarem conveniente, dirigirão recomendações

especiais e apropriadas às partes Contratantes que julguem interessadas, ou baixarão normas sobre a

questão. As Partes Contratantes, quando acharem necessário, poderão efetuar consultas com as

outras Partes Contratantes, com o Conselho Econômico e Social das Nações Unidas e com qualquer

outra organização intergovernamental competente. Se as Partes Contratantes acharem que as

circunstâncias são suficientemente graves para justificar tal medida, poderão autorizar a uma ou a

várias Partes Contratantes a suspensão, relativamente a tal ou a tais Partes Contratantes, da aplicação

de qualquer obrigação ou concessão resultante do presente Acordo. Se, a observância de uma

obrigação ou o benefício de uma concessão em favor de uma Parte Contratante for suspenso

efetivamente, essa Parte Contratante poderá dentro de um prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data da

aplicação da medida, notificar o Secretário Geral das Nações Unidas por escrito, de sua intenção de

denunciar este Acordo e tal denúncia terá efeito, expirado o prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data

em que o Secretário Geral das Nações Unidas receba notificação escrita da denúncia.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

O título originalmente conferido (versão oficial em inglês) ao Artigo XXIII pelo GATT 1947 e,

subsequentemente, pelo GATT 1994, refere-se à “anulação ou prejuízo” enquanto conceitos imprescindíveis

para a apresentação de uma demanda perante o DSB com base no Artigo XXIII GATT. O conceito de “anulação

ou prejuízo” a benefícios decorrentes do Acordo é requisito essencial aplicável a qualquer um dos tipos de

demanda previstas nos incisos do Artigo XXIII, quais sejam, (a) “violação”; (b) “não-violação” e; (c)

“situação”. O próprio sistema de solução de controvérsias acabou por confirmar, em inúmeras oportunidades

(1), que qualquer violação a um dos Acordos da OMC configuraria uma “anulação ou prejuízo prima facie” (2)

a benefícios decorrentes dos Acordos.

A tradução para a língua portuguesa adotada pelo Decreto nº 1355, de 30 de Dezembro de 1994, em

contrapartida, não reflete este mesmo espírito, mas restringe o título conferido ao mesmo Artigo XXIII à

finalidade de um dos seus mecanismos (demandas fundadas em casos de “não-violação”), qual seja, a proteção

de concessões tarifárias recíprocas da utilização de medidas que acabem por anular ou reduzir benefícios

previstos nos Acordos da OMC.

Ainda que o título do Artigo XXIII, da forma como incorporado ao sistema legal brasileiro, acabe por restringir

o verdadeiro alcance do mencionado Artigo, suas provisões legais parecem ter sido traduzidas em observância à

versão original publicada em inglês, francês e espanhol, de forma a evitar qualquer efeito distorsivo na aplicação

global do mencionado dispositivo legal.

Footnote 1: EC - Commercial Vessels, para. 8.2; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15; EEC - Bananas II, para. 8.4 etc.

Footnote 2: Artigo 3.8 DSU: “In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action

is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a

breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the

Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge”.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXIII

1. Artigo XXIII:1

a) “uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo

anulada ou reduzida”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD

11S/95, para. 14

218

Para. 14: “(...) The Panel thought it essential to have a clear idea as to what would constitute a nullification or

impairment. In its view impairment and nullification in the sense of Article XXIII does not arise merely

because of the existence of any measures; the nullification or impairment must relate to benefits accruing to the

contracting party ‘under the General Agreement’.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United Kingdon - Customs Classification of Certain Computer

Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS67/AB/R, para. 80

Para. 80: “We disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the meaning of a tariff concession in a Member's

Schedule may be determined in the light of the “legitimate expectations” of an exporting Member. First, we fail

to see the relevance of the EEC - Oilseeds panel report with respect to the interpretation of a Member's Schedule

in the context of a violation complaint made under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. The EEC - Oilseeds

panel report dealt with a non-violation complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, and is not legally

relevant to the case before us. Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 provides for three legally-distinct causes of

action on which a Member may base a complaint; it distinguishes between so-called violation complaints, non-

violation complaints and situation complaints under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). The concept of “reasonable

expectations”, which the Panel refers to as “legitimate expectations”, is a concept that was developed in the

context of non-violation complaints. (3) As we stated in India - Patents, for the Panel to use this concept in the

context of a violation complaint “melds the legally-distinct bases for ‘violation’ and ‘non-violation’ complaints

under Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one uniform cause of action” (4), and is not in accordance with

established GATT practice.”

Footnote 3: Appellate Body Report, India - Patents, adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 36 and 41.

Footnote 4: Adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 42.

2. Artigo XXIII:1(a)

a) “do não cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma assumidos

em virtude do presente Acordo”

Relatório do Painel no caso Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962

Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 15

Para. 15. “(...) In cases where there is a clear infringement of the provisions of the General Agreement, or in

other words, where measures are applied in conflict with the provisions of GATT and are not permitted under

the terms of the relevant protocol under which the GATT is applied by the contracting party, the action would,

prima facie, constitute a case of nullification or impairment and would ipso facto require consideration of

whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the authorization of suspension of concessions or

obligations.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, adotado

em 17 de Junho de 1987, Demandante: Canadá, L/6175, BISD 34S/136, paras. 5.1.4-5.1.6

219

Para. 5.1.4. “(...) the practice of the Contracting Parties is to make recommendations or rulings on measures

found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement independent of the impact of such measures (...).”

Para. 5.1.5. “[Citing paragraph 5 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding:] “Thus, the 1979 Understand¬ing

does not refer to the adverse impact of a measure, and the possibility of a rebuttal, in connection with the power

of the Contracting Parties to make recommendations or give rulings on measures inconsistent with the General

Agreement; it does so only in connection with the authorization of compensatory action. This, in the view of the

Panel, supports the conclusion that the impact of a measure inconsistent with the General Agreement is not

relevant for a determination of nullification or impairment by the Contracting Parties.”

Para. 5.1.6. “The Panel examined how the Contracting Parties have reacted in previous cases to claims that a

measure inconsistent with the General Agreement had no adverse impact and therefore did not nullify or impair

benefits accruing under the General Agreement to the contracting party that had brought the complaint. The

Panel noted such claims had been made in a number of cases but that there was no case in the history of the

GATT in which a contracting party had successfully rebutted the presumption that a measure infringing

obligations causes nullification and impairment (...).”

3. Artigo XXIII:1(b)

a) Visão Geral da reclamação de “não-violação”

Relatório GATT Working Party no caso The Australian Subsidy on ammonium Sulphate, adotado em 03 de

Abril de 1950, Partes: Austrália e Chile, GATT/CP.4/39, BISD II/188, para. 12

Para. 12: “The working party next considered whether the injury that the Government of Chile said it had

suffered represented a nullification or impairment. (...) It was agreed that such impairment would exist if the

action of the Australian Government which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between sodium

nitrate and ammonium sulphate could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean Government, taking

into consideration all pertinent circumstances and the provisions of the General Agreement, at the time it

negotiated for the duty-free binding on sodium nitrate. The working party concluded that the Government of

Chile had reason to assume, during these negotiations, that the war-time fertilizer subsidy would not be removed

from sodium nitrate before it was removed from ammonium sulphate. In reaching this conclusion, the working

party was influenced in particular by the combination of the circumstances that:

(a) The two types of fertilizer were closely related;

(b) Both had been subsidized and distributed through the same agency and sold at the

same price;

(c) Neither had been subsidized before the war, and the war-time system of

subsidization and distribution had been introduced in respect of both at the same time

and under the same war powers of the Australian Government;

(d) This system was still maintained in respect of both fertilizers at the time of the

1947 tariff negotiations.

For these reasons, the working party also concluded that the Australian action should be considered as relating

to a benefit accruing to Chile under the Agreement, and that it was therefore subject to the provisions of Article

XXIII. (...) The inequality created and the treatment Chile could have expected at the time of the negotiation,

220

after taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances, including the circumstances mentioned above, and

the provisions of the General Agreement, were important elements in the working party’s conclusions.

The situation in this case is different from that which would have arisen from the granting of a new subsidy on

one of the two competing products. In such a case, given the freedom under the General Agreement of the

Australian Government to impose subsidies and to select the products on which a subsidy would be granted, it

would be more difficult to say that the Chilean Government had reasonably relied on the continuation of the

same treatment for the two products. In the present case, however, the Australian Government, in granting a

subsidy on account of the war-time fertilizer shortage and continuing it in the post-war period, had grouped the

two fertilizers together and treated them uniformly. In such circumstances it would seem that the Chilean

Government could reasonably assume that the subsidy would remain applicable to both fertilizers so long as

there remained a local nitrogenous fertilizer shortage.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, adotado em 31 de Outubro de

1952, Partes: Alemanha e Noruega, GATT/G/26, BISD 1S/53, para. 16

Para. 16: “The Panel ... agreed that ... impairment [of a benefit under Article XXIII] would exist if the action of

the German Government, which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between preparations of

clupea pilchardus and preparations of the other varieties of the clupeoid family could not reasonably have been

anticipated by the Norwegian Government at the time it negotiated for tariff reductions on preparations of

clupea sprattus and clupea harengus. The Panel concluded that the Government of Norway had reason to

assume, during these negotiations that preparations of the type of clupeae in which they were interested would

not be less favourably treated than other preparations of the same family and that this situation would not be

modified by unilateral action of the German Government.”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds

and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante:

EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 147-148

Para. 147. “(...) The Panel examined whether it was reasonable for the United States to expect that the

Community would not introduce subsidy schemes systematically counteracting the price effect of the tariff

concessions. (...) The essential argument of the Community in this respect was that it is not legitimate to expect

the absence of production subsidies even after the grant of a tariff concession because Articles III:8(b) and

XVI:1 explicitly recognize the right of contracting parties to grant production subsidies. This right would be

effectively eliminated if its exercise were assumed to impair tariff concessions.”

Para. 148. “The Panel (...) found the following: (…) At issue in the case before it are product-specific subsidies

that protect producers completely from the movement of prices for imports and thereby prevent tariff

concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds.

The Panel considered that the main value of a tariff concession is that it provides an assurance of better market

access through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions primarily to obtain

that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations on the expectation that the price

effect of the tariff concessions will not be systematically offset. If no right of redress were given to them in such

a case they would be reluctant to make tariff concessions and the General Agreement would no longer be useful

as a legal framework for incorporating the results of trade negotiations. The Panel does not share the view of the

Community that the recognition of the legitimacy of such expectations would amount to a re writing of the rules

221

of the General Agreement. The contracting parties have decided that a finding of impairment does not authorize

them to request the impairing contracting party to remove a measure not inconsistent with the General

Agreement; such a finding merely allows the contracting party frustrated in its expectation to request, in

accordance with Article XXIII:2, an authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations

under the General Agreement. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation thus essentially means the

recognition of the legitimacy of such a request. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation relating to

the use of production subsidies therefore in no way prevents a contracting party from using production subsidies

consistently with the General Agreement; it merely delineates the scope of the protection of a negotiated balance

of concessions. For these reasons the Panel found that the United States may be assumed not to have anticipated

the introduction of subsidies which protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of

prices for imports and thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship

between domestic and imported oilseeds, and which have as one consequence that all domestically produced

oilseeds are disposed of in the internal market notwithstanding the availability of imports.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities -Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 186

Para. 186: “Like the Panel in Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (“Japan -

Film”), we consider that the remedy in Article XXIII:1(b) “should be approached with caution and should

remain an exceptional remedy”. That Panel stated:

Although the non-violation remedy is an important and accepted tool of WTO/GATT

dispute settlement and has been ‘on the books’ for almost 50 years, we note that there

have only been eight cases in which panels or working parties have substantively

considered Article XXIII:1(b) claims. (5) This suggests that both the GATT

contracting parties and WTO Members have approached this remedy with caution

and, indeed, have treated it as an exceptional instrument of dispute settlement. We

note in this regard that both the European Communities and the United States in the

EEC — Oilseeds case, and the two parties in this case, have confirmed that the non-

violation nullification or impairment remedy should be approached with caution and

treated as an exceptional concept. (6) The reason for this caution is straightforward.

Members negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would

expect to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules.” (7)

b) (i) Finalidade

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and

Grani from (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD

37S/86, para. 144

Para. 144. “(...) The Panel noted that these provisions, as conceived by the drafters and applied by the

contracting parties, serve mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions. The idea underlying them is that

the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be

frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent with that

Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a

right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the

application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement.”

222

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar - containing Products

applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Heanote in Schedule of Tariff Concessions BISD 37S/228,

adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade Econômica Europeia, L/6631, BISD

37S/228, para. 5.21

Para. 5.21. “According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party bringing a

complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is ‘called upon to provide a detailed justification’ ... The Panel noted that

Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting Parties, serves mainly to protect

the balance of tariff concessions ... The party bringing a complaint under that provision would therefore

normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified

or impaired. (...)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan –

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.50

Para. 10.50. “[The purpose of Article XXIII:1(b)] is to protect the balance of concessions under GATT by

providing a means to redress government actions not otherwise regulated by GATT rules that nonetheless

nullify or impair a Member’s legitimate expectations of benefits from tariff negotiations. (8)”

(ii) Alcance

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,

Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WTO/DS90/AB/R,

paras. 87-88

Para. 87: “Any doubts that may have existed in the past as to whether the dispute settlement procedures under

Article XXIII were available for disputes relating to balance-of-payments restrictions have been removed by the

second sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, which reads:

The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied

by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters

arising from the application of restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-

payments purposes. (emphasis added)

Para. 88: “In our opinion, this provision makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures under Article

XXIII, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, are available for disputes relating to any matters concerning

balance-of-payments restrictions.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 187-189

223

Para. 187: “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a ‘benefit’ is

being ‘nullified or impaired’ through the ‘application … of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the

provisions of this Agreement ‘. (emphasis added) The wording of the provision, therefore, clearly states that a

claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure ‘conflicts’ with some substantive provisions

of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in breach

of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article XXIII:1(b). Of

course, if a measure ‘conflicts’ with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must actually fall within the

scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with the Panel that this reading of Article

XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan - Film and EEC - Oilseeds, which both support the view

that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously fall within the scope of application of other

provisions of the GATT 1994. (8) Accordingly, we decline the European Communities’ first ground of appeal

under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 188: “[W]e look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that ‘the application by another

Member of any measure’ may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of the word ‘any’

suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish

between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts the

European Communities’ argument that certain types of measure, namely, those with health objectives, are

excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b).”

Para. 189: “In any event, an attempt to draw the distinction suggested by the European Communities between

so-called health and commercial measures would be very difficult in practice. By definition, measures which

affect trade in goods, and which are subject to the disciplines of the GATT 1994, have a commercial impact. At

the same time, the health objectives of many measures may be attainable only by means of commercial

regulation. Thus, in practice, clear distinctions between health and commercial measures may be very difficult

to establish. Nor do we see merit in the argument that, previously, only ‘commercial’ measures have been the

subject of Article XXIII:1(b) claims, as that does not establish that a claim cannot be made under Article

XXIII:1(b) regarding a ‘noncommercial’ measure.”

b) “Teste nos termos do Artigo XXIII:1(b)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan -

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.41

Para. 10.41: “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that a complaining party must

demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable claim under Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application of a measure by a

WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment of the

benefit as the result of the application of the measure.”

c) “Ônus da prova”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962,

Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 15

224

Para. 15: “While it is not precluded that a prima facie case of nullification or impairment could arise even if

there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be in such cases incumbent on the country invoking

Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that

contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar – containing

Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of of Tariff Concessions (US -

Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade Econômica Europeia,

L/6631, BISD 37S/228, paras. 5.20-5.21 e 5.23

Para. 5.20: “(...) The Panel ... concluded that the fact that the restrictions found to be inconsistent with Article

XI:1 conform to the terms of the Waiver does not prevent the EEC from bringing a complaint under Article

XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement but it is up to the EEC to demonstrate that a nullification or impairment of

benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement has resulted from these restrictions.”

Para. 5.21: “According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party bringing a

complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is ‘called upon to provide a detailed justification’ (...) The Panel noted that

Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting Parties, serves mainly to protect

the balance of tariff concessions (...) The party bringing a complaint under that provision would therefore

normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified

or impaired. (...) the Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b) applies whether or not the measure at issue conflicts

with the General Agreement and that, therefore, the question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article

XI:1 remains inconsistent with the General Agreement even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself, determine

whether it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing under the General Agreement within the meaning of that

provision. A complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond

a mere characterization of the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General Agreement (...).”

Para. 5.23: “For the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel did not examine the case before it

in the light of Article XXIII:1(b). The Panel would however like to stress that nothing in this report is meant to

preclude the EEC from bringing a complaint under that provision with the required detailed justification.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper (Japan -

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.32

Para. 10.32: “Consistent with the explicit terms of the DSU and established WTO/GATT jurisprudence, and

recalling the Appellate Body ruling that ‘precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be

required to establish (…) a presumption [that what is claimed is true] will necessarily vary from (…) provision

to provision’, we thus consider that the United States, with respect to its claim of non-violation nullification or

impairment under Article XXIII:1(b), bears the burden of providing a detailed justification for its claim in order

to establish a presumption that what is claimed is true. It will be for Japan to rebut any such presumption.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing

Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.280-8.282 e 8.292

225

Para. 8.280: “We do not consider that Canada has correctly interpreted the Panel report in Japan - Film. First of

all, the presumption to which the Panel refers is that, if it is shown that a measure has been introduced after the

conclusion of the tariff negotiations in question, then the complainant should not be considered as having

anticipated that measure, which is only one of the tests applied by the Panel. Moreover, if the interpretation of

the burden of proof suggested by Canada were followed, the obligation to present a detailed justification for

which Article 26.1(a) provides might in certain cases be evaded. Accordingly, we do not follow the

interpretation proposed by Canada but the rule laid down in Japan - Film.”

Para. 8.281: “Furthermore, in the light of our reasoning in paragraph 8.272 above, we consider that the special

situation of measures justified under Article XX, insofar as they concern non-commercial interests whose

importance has been recognized a priori by Members, requires special treatment. By creating the right to invoke

exceptions in certain circumstances, Members have recognized a priori the possibility that the benefits they

derive from certain concessions may eventually be nullified or impaired at some future time for reasons

recognized as being of overriding importance. This situation is different from that in which a Member takes a

measure of a commercial or economic nature such as, for example, a subsidy or a decision organizing a sector of

its economy, from which it expects a purely economic benefit. In this latter case, the measure remains within the

field of international trade. Moreover, the nature and importance of certain measures falling under Article XX

can also justify their being taken at any time, which militates in favour of a stricter treatment of actions brought

against them on the basis of Article XXIII:1(b).”

Para. 8.282: “Consequently, the Panel concludes that because of the importance conferred on them a priori by

the GATT 1994, as compared with the rules governing international trade, situations that fall under Article XX

justify a stricter burden of proof being applied in this context to the party invoking Article XXIII:1(b),

particularly with regard to the existence of legitimate expectations and whether or not the initial Decree could be

reasonably anticipated.”

Para. 8.292: “[W]e consider that in view of the time that elapsed between those concessions and the adoption of

the Decree (between 50 and 35 years), Canada could not assume that, over such a long period, there would not

be advances in medical knowledge with the risk that one day a product would be banned on health grounds. For

this reason, too, we also consider that the presumption applied in Japan - Film cannot be applied to the

concessions granted in 1947 and 1962. Any other interpretation would extend the scope of the concept of non-

violation nullification well beyond that envisaged by the Panel in Japan - Film. On the contrary, it is for Canada

to present detailed evidence showing why it could legitimately expect the 1947 and 1962 concessions not to be

affected and could not reasonably anticipate that France might adopt measures restricting the use of all asbestos

products 50 and 35 years, respectively, after the negotiation of the concessions concerned. In the present case,

the burden of proof must be all the heavier inasmuch as the intervening period has been so long. Indeed, it is

very difficult to anticipate what a Member will do in 50 years time. It would therefore be easy for a Member to

establish that he could not reasonably anticipate the adoption of a measure if the burden of proof were not made

heavier.”

d) “Medida”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Canned Fruit (US - Canned Fruit), adotado em 20 de Fevereiro

de 1985, Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 51

Para. 51: “The Panel considered the definition given to 'nullification or impairment' of tariff concessions in past

GATT Panel reports which had examined “non-violation complaints” in respect of tariff concessions (BISD

II/193; 1S/58). It agreed with the findings in these reports that nullification or impairment of tariff concessions

226

would exist if the measure in question: (1) could not have reasonably been anticipated by the party bringing the

complaint at the time of negotiation of the tariff concessions and (2) the measure resulted in the upsetting of the

competitive position of the imported products concerned. In the present case, this meant that nullification or

impairment of the tariff concessions would exist if the introduction or increase of the EEC production aids could

not have been reasonably anticipated by the United States at the time of the negotiations for the tariff

concessions on those products (below under b) and the aid systems had upset the competitive position of

imported canned peaches, canned pears, canned fruit cocktail and dried grapes on the EC market (below under

c).”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar – containing

Products applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of Tariff Concessions (US -

Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade Econômica Europeia,

L/6631, BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21

Para. 5.21: “(...) The EEC has not claimed that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession made by the

United States in accordance with Article II have been nullified or impaired as a result of measures taken under

the Waiver. The main justification for its claim of nullification or impairment that the EEC presented to the

Panel was that the restrictions, in spite of the Waiver, have remained inconsistent with the General Agreement.

The Panel recognized that Article XXIII:1(b) does not exclude claims of nullification or impairment based on

provisions of the General Agreement other than Article II. However, the Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b)

applies whether or not the measure at issue conflicts with the General Agreement and that, therefore, the

question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 remains inconsistent with the General Agreement

even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself, determine whether it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing under

the General Agreement within the meaning of that provision. A complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) must

therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere characterization of the measure at issue as

inconsistent with the General Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper (Japan -

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.49, 10.52 e 10.57-10.59

Para. 10.49: “[A] government policy or action need not necessarily have a substantially binding or compulsory

nature for it to entail a likelihood of compliance by private actors in a way so as to nullify or impair legitimately

expected benefits within the purview of Article XXIII:1(b). Indeed, it is clear that non-binding actions, which

include sufficient incentives or disincentives for private parties to act in a particular manner, can potentially

have adverse effects on competitive conditions of market access. For example, a number of non-violation cases

have involved subsidies, receipt of which requires only voluntary compliance with eligibility criteria.”

Para. 10.52: “As the WTO Agreement is an international agreement, in respect of which only national

governments and separate customs territories are directly subject to obligations, it follows by implication that

the term measure in Article XXIII:1(b) and Article 26.1 of the DSU, as elsewhere in the WTO Agreement,

refers only to policies or actions of governments, not those of private parties.”

Para. 10.57: “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) is written in the present tense, viz. ‘If any Member should consider

that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired (…) as

the result of (…) (b) the application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the

provisions of this Agreement’. It thus stands to reason that, given that the text contemplates nullification or

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impairment in the present tense, caused by application of a measure, ‘whether or not it conflicts’ (also in the

present tense), the ordinary meaning of this provision limits the non-violation remedy to measures that are

currently being applied.”

Para. 10.58: “Moreover, GATT/WTO precedent in other areas, including in respect of virtually all panel cases

under Article XXIII:1(a), confirms that it is not the practice of GATT/WTO panels to rule on measures which

have expired or which have been repealed or withdrawn. (9) In only a very small number of cases, involving

very particular situations, have panels proceeded to adjudicate claims involving measures which no longer exist

or which are no longer being applied. In those cases, the measures typically had been applied in the very recent

past. (10)”

Para. 10.59: “[W]e do not rule out the possibility that old ‘measures’ that were never officially revoked may

continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. Similarly, even if measures were officially

revoked, the underlying policies may continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance.

However, the burden is on the United States to demonstrate clearly that such guidance does in fact exist and that

it is currently nullifying or impairing benefits.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS135/AB/R,

paras. 187-188

Para. 187: “Against this background, we turn now to the European Communities' argument that Article

XXIII:1(b) does not apply to measures that fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT

1994. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a “benefit” is being

“nullified or impaired” through the “application (…) of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the

provisions of this Agreement “. (emphasis added) The wording of the provision, therefore, clearly states that a

claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure “conflicts” with some substantive provisions

of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in breach

of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article XXIII:1(b). Of

course, if a measure “conflicts” with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must actually fall within the

scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with the Panel that this reading of Article

XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan – Film and EEC – Oilseeds, which both support the view

that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously fall within the scope of application of other

provisions of the GATT 1994. 189 Accordingly, we decline the European Communities' first ground of appeal

under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 188: “The European Communities also contends that the Panel erred in finding that Article XXIII:1(b)

applies to measures which pursue health, rather than commercial, objectives and which can, therefore, be

justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Once again, we look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which

provides that “the application by another Member of any measure” may give rise to a cause of action under that

provision. The use of the word “any” suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action.

The text does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of

Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts the European Communities' argument that certain types of measure, namely,

those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b).”

e) “Vantagem”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds

and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante:

EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 150-152

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Para. 150: “In the past Article XXIII:1(b) cases, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have adopted the same

approach: their findings of nullification or impairment were based on a finding that the products for which a

tariff concession had been granted were subjected to an adverse change in competitive conditions. In none of

these cases did they consider the trade impact of the change in competitive conditions to be determining. In one

case they specifically rejected the relevance of statistics on trade flows for a finding on nullification and

impairment. It is of course true that, in the tariff negotiations in the framework of GATT, contracting parties

seek tariff concessions in the hope of expanding their exports, but the commitments they exchange in such

negotiations are commitments on conditions of competition for trade, not on volumes of trade.”

Para. 151: “The approach of the CONTRACTING PARTIES reflects the fact that governments can often not

predict with precision what the impact of their interventions on import volumes will be. If a finding of

nullification or impairment depended not only on whether an adverse change in competitive conditions took

place but also on whether that change resulted in a decline in imports, the exposure of the contracting parties to

claims under Article XXIII:1(b) would depend on factors they do not control; the rules on nullification and

impairment could consequently no longer guide government policies. Moreover, the contracting parties facing

an adverse change in policies could make a claim of nullification or impairment only after that change has

produced effects. Such claims could consequently not be made to prevent adverse effects; they could only be

made to obtain redress ex post. If Article II were considered to be protecting expectations on trade flows it

would be necessary for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to determine what export volumes a contracting party

can reasonably expect after having obtained a tariff concession. The Panel is not aware of any criteria or

principles that could be applied to make such a determination. The Panel further noted that changes in trade

volumes result not only from government policies but also other factors, and that, in most circumstances, it is

not possible to determine whether a decline in imports following a change in policies is attributable to that

change or to other factors. The provisions of Article XXIII:1(b) could therefore in practice hardly be applied if a

contracting party claiming nullification or impairment had to demonstrate not only that an adverse change in

competition has taken place but also that the change has resulted in a decline in imports.”

Para. 152: “For these reasons the Panel found that benefits accruing to the United States under Article II of the

General Agreement in respect of the zero tariff bindings for oilseeds in the Community Schedule of Concessions

were impaired as a result of subsidy schemes which operate to protect Community producers of oilseeds

completely from the movement of prices of imports and thereby prevent the oilseeds tariff concessions from

having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan -

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.64-10.66

Para. 10.64: “GATT 1994 incorporates both ‘protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions’ under

paragraph 1(b)(i) and ‘the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994’ under paragraph 1(d). The ordinary meaning of

the text of paragraphs 1(b)(i) and 1(d) of GATT 1994, read together, clearly suggests that all protocols relating

to tariff concessions, both those predating the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994, are

incorporated into GATT 1994 and continue to have legal existence under the WTO Agreement.”

Para. 10.65: “Where tariff concessions have been progressively improved, the benefits — expectations of

improved market access — accruing directly or indirectly under different tariff concession protocols

incorporated in GATT 1994 can be read in harmony. This approach is in accordance with general principles of

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legal interpretation which, as the Appellate Body reiterated in US - Gasoline, teach that one should endeavour to

give legal effect to all elements of a treaty and not reduce them to redundancy or inutility.”

Para. 10.66: “The conclusion that benefits accruing from concessions granted during successive rounds of tariff

negotiations may separately give rise to reasonable expectations of improved market access is consistent with

past panel reports. (11) The panel in EEC — Canned Fruit found that the United States had a reasonable

expectation arising from the EEC’s 1974 tariff concessions pursuant to Article XXIV:6 negotiations and 1979

Tokyo Round tariff concessions (even though the panel separately found that the United States could have

anticipated certain subsidies in respect of the Tokyo Round tariff concessions). (12) And the EEC — Oilseeds

panel found that the United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EEC’s 1962 Dillon Round tariff

concessions. (13) As the United States points out, these findings would not have been possible if subsequent

multilateral tariff agreements or enlargement agreements were deemed to extinguish wholesale the tariff

concessions in prior tariff schedules.”

f) “Expectativas legítimas”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Canned Fruit, adotado em 20 de Fevereiro de 1985, Demandante: EUA,

L/5778, para. 76

Para. 76. “The Panel was of the view that the three Panel reports which had examined “non-violation

complaints” under Article XXIII of the General Agreement (i.e. the Report of the Working Party on the

Australian subsidy on ammonium sulphate, BISD II/188F the Report of the Panel on the treatment by Germany

of imports of sardines, BISD 1S/53; and the Panel Report on Uruguay's recourse to Article XXIII, BISD

11S/95) had not precluded the possibility that an unforeseeable subsequent introduction or increase of a

domestic subsidy on a product, for which a tariff concession had been previously granted, could constitute an

assumption of prima facie nullification or impairment of the tariff concession concerned. The Panel also noted

that the Working Party Report of 1955 on other barriers to trade (BISD 3S/222, 224) and the Panel Report on

subsidies of 1961 (BISD 10S/201, 209) had established a principle that “(...) a contracting party which has

negotiated a concession under Article II may be assumed, for the purposes of Article XXIII, to have a

reasonable expectation, failing evidence to the contrary, that the value of the concession will not be nullified or

impaired by the contracting party which granted the concession by the subsequent introduction or increase of a

domestic subsidy on the product concerned” (3S/224). Since the Panel agreed that it had established the

existence of nullification or impairment of tariff concessions and that this finding did not depend on any

assumptions of prima facie nullification or impairment of tariff concessions, the Panel found that an

examination of whether the production aid systems constitute prima facie nullification or impairment would

have no bearing on the Panel conclusions. The Panel decided, therefore, not to include its deliberations on this

legal question in the Panel report.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan -

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.76-10.77, 10.79-10.80

Para. 10.76: “As suggested by the 1961 report (14), in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the

challenged measures must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff concession was negotiated.

If the measures were anticipated, a Member could not have had a legitimate expectation of improved market

access to the extent of the impairment caused by these measures.”

230

Para. 10.77: “Thus, under Article XXIII:1(b), the United States may only claim impairment of benefits related

to improved market access conditions flowing from relevant tariff concessions by Japan to the extent that the

United States could not have reasonably anticipated that such benefits would be offset by the subsequent

application of a measure by the Government of Japan.”

Para. 10.79: “We consider that the issue of reasonable anticipation should be approached in respect of specific

‘measures’ in light of the following guidelines. First, in the case of measures shown by the United States to have

been introduced subsequent to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that the United

States has raised a presumption that it should not be held to have anticipated these measures and it is then for

Japan to rebut that presumption. Such a rebuttal might be made, for example, by establishing that the measure at

issue is so clearly contemplated in an earlier measure that the United States should be held to have anticipated it.

However, there must be a clear connection shown. In our view, it is not sufficient to claim that a specific

measure should have been anticipated because it is consistent with or a continuation of a past general

government policy. As in the EEC - Oilseeds case (15), we do not believe that it would be appropriate to charge

the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures, such as ‘measures’ to

improve what Japan describes as the inefficient Japanese distribution sector. Indeed, if a Member were held to

anticipate all GATT-consistent measures, a non-violation claim would not be possible. Nor do we consider that

as a general rule the United States should have reasonably anticipated Japanese measures that are similar to

measures in other Members’ markets. In each such instance, the issue of reasonable anticipation needs to be

addressed on a case-by-case basis.”

Para. 10.80: “[I]n the case of measures shown by Japan to have been introduced prior to the conclusion of the

tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that Japan has raised a presumption that the United States should be

held to have anticipated those measures and it is for the United States to rebut that presumption. In this

connection, it is our view that the United States is charged with knowledge of Japanese government measures as

of the date of their publication. We realize that knowledge of a measure’s existence is not equivalent to

understanding the impact of the measure on a specific product market. For example, a vague measure could be

given substance through enforcement policies that are initially unexpected or later changed significantly.

However, where the United States claims that it did not know of a measure’s relevance to market access

conditions in respect of film or paper, we would expect the United States to clearly demonstrate why initially it

could not have reasonably anticipated the effect of an existing measure on the film or paper market and when it

did realize the effect. Such a showing will need to be tied to the relevant points in time (i.e., the conclusions of

the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds) in order to assess the extent of the United States’ legitimate

expectations of benefits from these three Rounds. A simple statement that a Member’s measures were so opaque

and informal that their impact could not be assessed is not sufficient. While it is true that in most past non-

violation cases, one could easily discern a clear link between a product-specific action and the effect on the

tariff concession that it allegedly impaired, one can also discern a link between general measures affecting the

internal sale and distribution of products, such as rules on advertising and premiums, and tariff concessions on

products in general.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural

Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 42 e 45

Para. 42: “The meaning of this provision is clear: the only cause of action permitted under the TRIPS

Agreement during the first five years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement is a “violation” complaint

under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. This case involves allegations of violation of obligations under the

TRIPS Agreement. However, the Panel's invocation of the “legitimate expectations” of Members relating to

conditions of competition melds the legally-distinct bases for “violation” and “non-violation” complaints under

Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one uniform cause of action. This is not consistent with either Article

XXIII of the GATT 1994 or Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement (…).”

231

Para. 45: “The Panel misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Panel misunderstands the concept of

legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The

legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself. The duty of a

treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the parties. This should be

done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.

But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are

not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing

Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.291, 8.295-8.298

Para. 8.291: “[P]revious panels found that a number of elements were not relevant. We consider it necessary to

assess their applicability in relation to the circumstances of the present case.

(a) First of all, we note that the reports in Japan — Film and EEC — Oilseeds

concluded that a specific measure could not be considered foreseeable solely because

it was consistent with or a continuation of a past general government policy.

However, we note that, in contrast to the two cases mentioned above, France had

already developed a specific policy in response to the health problems created by

asbestos before the adoption of the Decree. This factor must certainly be taken into

account in our analysis.

(b) The Panel in Japan — Film, also concluded that it would not be appropriate to

charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent

measures. Consequently, we do not consider that Canada reasonably anticipated all

GATT-consistent measures, or even possible measures justifiable under Article XX.

(c) Finally, insofar as the Decree postdates the most recent tariff negotiations, we

could apply the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan — Film, according to

which normally Canada should not be considered to have anticipated a measure

introduced after the tariff concession had been negotiated. However, we do not

consider such a presumption to be consistent with the standard of proof that we found

to be applicable in paragraph 8.272 above in the case of an allegation of non-violation

nullification concerning measures falling under Article XX of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 8.295: “As we have found (…) the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan - Film cannot be applied to

the present case. (16) Unlike Canada, which claims that no recent scientific development could have made the

measure foreseeable, we consider that there is evidence to show that regulations restricting the use of asbestos

could have been anticipated. First of all, the hazardous nature of chrysotile has long been known (…).”

Para. 8.296: “Moreover, in the light of the information submitted by the parties and the experts, we consider

that the study of the diseases associated with the inhalation of asbestos is a field of science in which any

possible conclusion would appear to be based on the observation of pathological cases day by day (…).”

Para. 8.297: “On the other hand, the accumulation of international and Community decisions concerning the

use of asbestos, even if it did not necessarily make it certain that the use of asbestos would be banned by France,

could not do other than create a climate which should have led Canada to anticipate a change in the attitude of

the importing countries, especially in view of the long-established trend towards ever tighter restrictions on the

use of asbestos. We also note that the use of chrysotile asbestos was banned by Members of the WTO well

before it was banned by France. Admittedly, in Japan - Film the Panel considered that the adoption in other

Members’ markets of measures similar to the measures in question could not make the latter foreseeable.

However, here again it was a question of commercial measures. We consider that in the present case the

situation is different since it concerns public health and the competent international organizations have already

taken a position on the question. The adoption, in an already restrictive context, of public health measures by

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other States, faced with a social and economic situation similar to that in France, creates an environment in

which the adoption of similar measures by France, is no longer unforeseeable.”

Para. 8.298: “Moreover, as noted above, at the end of the Uruguay Round France already had in place a number

of measures regulating the use of asbestos. These included, in particular, measures relating to the exposure of

workers taken after asbestos was recognized as a carcinogen by the IARC (Decree 77-949 of 17 August 1977)

and the adoption of ILO Convention 162, as well as for the purpose of implementing Community directives

applicable. The Panel also notes that Decree 88-466 of 28 April 1988 on products containing asbestos had

prohibited the use of chrysotile asbestos in the manufacture of certain products.” (17)

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical

Products (Korea - Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, para. 7.75

Para. 7.75: “At the outset of our analysis of this issue, we must address some relevant issues relating to use of

negotiating history which arose in the European Communities - Computer Equipment dispute. In that dispute,

the Appellate Body specifically found that the standard of reasonable expectation or legitimate expectation

existing with respect to non-violation cases had no role in reviewing negotiating history in order to aid in

resolving the issues pertaining to a violation case. One of the reasons is that in a non-violation case the relevant

question is what was the reasonable expectation of the complaining party. However, if it is necessary to go

beyond the text in a violation case, the relevant question is to assess the objective evidence of the mutual

understanding of the negotiating parties. (18) This involves not just the complaining and responding parties, but

also involves possibly other parties to the negotiations. It is also important to note that there is a difference in

perspectives of the reasonable expectations of one party as opposed to the mutual understanding of all the

parties. The information available at the time of the negotiations may be available to some parties but not all. In

other words, the evidence before the panel may be different in the two analyses and the weighting and probative

value may also differ.”

g) “Anulada ou reduzida”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan -

Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.82, 10.84-10.88

Para. 10.82: “[I]t must be demonstrated that the competitive position of the imported products subject to and

benefitting from a relevant market access (tariff) concession is being upset by (‘nullified or impaired (…) as the

result of’) the application of a measure not reasonably anticipated. The equation of ‘nullification or impairment’

with ‘upsetting the competitive relationship’ established between domestic and imported products as a result of

tariff concessions has been consistently used by GATT panels examining non-violation complaints. For

example, the EEC - Oilseeds panel, in describing its findings, stated that it had ‘found (…) that the subsidies

concerned had impaired the tariff concession because they upset the competitive relationship between domestic

and imported oilseeds, not because of any effect on trade flows’. (19) The same language was used in the

Australian Subsidy and Germany - Sardines cases. Thus, in this case, it is up to the United States to prove that

the governmental measures that it cites have upset the competitive relationship between domestic and imported

photographic film and paper in Japan to the detriment of imports. In other words, the United States must show a

clear correlation between the measures and the adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships.”

233

Para. 10.84: “As to the first issue (…) Japan should be responsible for what is caused by measures attributable

to the Japanese Government as opposed, for example, to what is caused by restrictive business conduct

attributable to private economic actors. At this stage of the proceeding, the issue is whether such a measure has

caused nullification or impairment, i.e., whether it has made more than a de minimis contribution to nullification

or impairment.”

Para. 10.85: “In respect of the second issue (…) even in the absence of de jure discrimination (measures which

on their face discriminate as to origin), it may be possible for the United States to show de facto discrimination

(measures which have a disparate impact on imports). However, in such circumstances, the complaining party is

called upon to make a detailed showing of any claimed disproportionate impact on imports resulting from the

origin-neutral measure. And, the burden of demonstrating such impact may be significantly more difficult where

the relationship between the measure and the product is questionable.”

Para. 10.86: “We note that WTO/GATT case law on the issue of de facto discrimination is reasonably well-

developed, both in regard to the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment under GATT Article I (20) and in

regard to that of national treatment under GATT Article II (21) (…) We consider that despite the fact that these

past cases dealt with GATT provisions other than Article XXIII:1(b), the reasoning contained therein appears to

be equally applicable in addressing the question of de facto discrimination with respect to claims of non-

violation nullification or impairment, subject, of course, to the caveat, that in an Article XXIII:1(b) case the

issue is not whether equality of competitive conditions exists but whether the relative conditions of competition

which existed between domestic and foreign products as a consequence of the relevant tariff concessions have

been upset.”

Para. 10.87: “The third issue is the relevance of intent to causality (…). We note (…) that Article XXIII:1(b)

does not require a proof of intent of nullification or impairment of benefits by a government adopting a measure.

What matters for purposes of establishing causality is the impact of a measure, i.e. whether it upsets competitive

relationships. Nonetheless, intent may not be irrelevant. In our view, if a measure that appears on its face to be

origin-neutral in its effect on domestic and imported products is nevertheless shown to have been intended to

restrict imports, we may be more inclined to find a causal relationship in specific cases, bearing in mind that

intent is not determinative where it in fact exists.”

Para. 10.88: “Finally, as for the US position that the Panel should examine the impact of the measures in

combination as well as individually (a position contested by Japan), we do not reject the possibility of such an

impact. It is not without logic that a measure, when analyzed in isolation, may have only very limited impact on

competitive conditions in a market, but may have a more significant impact on such conditions when seen in the

context of - in combination with - a larger set of measures. Notwithstanding the logic of this theoretical

argument, however, we are sensitive to the fact that the technique of engaging in a combined assessment of

measures so as to determine causation is subject to potential abuse and therefore must be approached with

caution and circumscribed as necessary.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle,

Swine and Grain from Canada (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.289

Para. 8.289: “[T]he Panel finds it appropriate to consider that in view of the type of measure in question the

‘upsetting of the competitive relationship’ can be assumed. By its very nature, an import ban constitutes a denial

of any opportunity for competition, whatever the import volume that existed before the introduction of the ban.

We will therefore concentrate on the question of whether the measure could reasonably have been anticipated by

the Canadian Government at the time that it was negotiating the various tariff concessions covering the products

concerned.”

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h) “Reclamação de não-violação com relação ao Acordo de Compras Governamentais”

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement (Korea - Procurement),

Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, paras. 7.93 e 7.101

Para. 7.93: “[T]he non-violation remedy as it has developed in GATT/ WTO jurisprudence should not be

viewed in isolation from general principles of customary international law. As noted above, the basic premise is

that Members should not take actions, even those consistent with the letter of the treaty, which might serve to

undermine the reasonable expectations of negotiating partners. This has traditionally arisen in the context of

actions which might undermine the value of negotiated tariff concessions. In our view, this is a further

development of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the context of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1947 and

disputes that arose thereunder, and subsequently in the WTO Agreements, particularly in Article 26 of the DSU.

The principle of pacta sunt servanda is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention (22) in the following

manner:

‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them

in good faith.’”

Para. 7.101: “[W]e will review the claim of nullification or impairment raised by the United States within the

framework of principles of international law which are generally applicable not only to performance of treaties

but also to treaty negotiation. (23) To do otherwise potentially would leave a gap in the applicability of the law

generally to WTO disputes and we see no evidence in the language of the WTO Agreements that such a gap was

intended. If the non-violation remedy were deemed not to provide a relief for such problems as have arisen in

the present case regarding good faith and error in the negotiation of GPA commitments (and one might add, in

tariff and services commitments under other WTO Agreements), then nothing could be done about them within

the framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism if general rules of customary international law on

good faith and error in treaty negotiations were ruled not to be applicable. As was argued above, that would not

be in conformity with the normal relationship between international law and treaty law or with the WTO

Agreements.”

Footnote 5: Original footnote: Report of the Working Party on Australia — Ammonium Sulphate; Panel Report on Germany — Sardines;

[Panel Report on] Uruguay — Recourse to Article XXIII; Panel Report on EC — Citrus; Panel Report on EEC — Canned Fruit; [Panel

Report on] Japan — Semi-Conductors; EEC — Oilseeds I; [Panel Report on] US — Sugar Waiver.

Footnote 6: Original footnote: In EEC — Oilseeds I, the United States stated that it “concurred in the proposition that non-violation

nullification or impairment should remain an exceptional concept. Although this concept had been in the text of Article XXIII of the

General Agreement from the outset, a cautious approach should continue to be taken in applying the concept”. EEC — Oilseeds I, para.

114. The EEC in that case stated that “recourse to the ‘non-violation’ concept under Article XXIII:1(b) should remain exceptional, since

otherwise the trading world would be plunged into a state of precariousness and uncertainty”. Ibid, para. 113.

Footnote 7: Original footnote: Panel Report on Japan — Film, para. 10.36.

Footnote 8: Original footnote: GATT Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 144.

Footnote 9: Original footnote: See Panel Report on US — Gasoline, para. 6.19, where the panel observed that “it had not been the usual

practice of a panel established under the General Agreement to rule on measures that, at the time the panel’s terms of reference were

fixed, were not and would not become effective”. See also Panel Report on Argentina — Footwear, Textiles and Apparel, pp. 84-86

Footnote 10: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, where the panel ruled on a measure that was

revoked after the interim review but before issuance of the final report to the parties; Panel Report on EEC — Measure on Animal Feed

Proteins, where the panel ruled on a discontinued measure, but one that had terminated after the terms of reference of the panel had

already been agreed; Panel Report on United States — Prohibitions on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, para. 4.3.,

where the panel ruled on the GATT consistency of a withdrawn measure but only in light of the two parties’ agreement to this procedure;

Panel Report on EEC — Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, where the panel ruled on a measure which had terminated before

agreement on the panel’s terms of reference but where the terms of reference specifically included the terminated measure and, given its

seasonal nature, there remained the prospect of its reintroduction.

Footnote 11: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on EEC - Canned Fruit; and EEC - Oilseeds I.

Footnote 12: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Canned Fruit, para. 54.

Footnote 13: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, paras. 144-146.

Footnote 14: Original footnote: The “1961 report” referenced to is the GATT Panel Report on Operation of the Provisions of Article

XVI, adopted on 21 November 1961, BISD 10S/201.

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Footnote 15: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC — Oilseeds I, paras. 147 and 148.

Footnote 16: Original footnote: Even if it were applicable, we consider that the EC rebutted this presumption by their references to the

systems established at international and Community level concerning the use of asbestos.

Footnote 17: Original footnote: See Annex II, reply of the European Communities to the Panel’s question No. 4 at the Second Meeting

with the Parties, paras. 254 to 261.

Footnote 18: Original footnote: Appellate Body Report on EC — Computer Equipment at paragraphs 81-84, 93.

Footnote 19: Original footnote: Follow-up on the GATT Panel Report on EEC — Oilseeds, BISD 39S/91, para. 77 (emphasis added).

Footnote 20: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on European Economic Community — Imports of Beef from Canada, paras. 4.2,

4.3.

Footnote 21: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on US — Section 337, para. 5.11; Canada — Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain

Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, paras. 5.12-5.14 and 5.30-5.31; US — Malt Beverages, para. 5.30; and Panel

Reports on US — Gasoline, para. 6.10; Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.33; and EC — Bananas III, paras. 7.179-7.180.

Footnote 22: Original footnote: A reference to the rule of pacta sunt servanda also appears in the preamble to the Vienna Convention.

Footnote 23: Original footnote: “We note that DSU Article 7.1 requires that the relevant covered agreement be cited in the request for a

panel and reflected in the terms of reference of a panel. That is not a bar to a broader analysis of the type we are following here, for the

GPA would be the referenced covered agreement and, in our view, we are merely fully examining the issue of non-violation raised by the

United States. We are merely doing it within the broader context of customary international law rather than limiting it to the traditional

analysis that accords with the extended concept of pacta sunt servanda. The purpose of the terms of reference is to properly identify the

claims of the party and therefore the scope of a panel’s review. We do not see any basis for arguing that the terms of reference are meant

to exclude reference to the broader rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the Panel.”

4. Relação entre Artigo XXIII:1(a) e Artigo XXIII:1(b)

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds

and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante:

EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, para. 142

Para. 142: “(...) The Panel (...) examined whether its finding that the payments to the processors are

inconsistent with the General Agreement might make an examination of the question of the nullification or

impairment of the tariff concessions unnecessary. The Panel noted that this would be the case if compliance by

the Community with the finding on Article III:4 would necessarily remove the basis of the United States claim

of nullification or impairment. The Panel noted that the subsidies the Community presently grants to producers

of oilseeds result from the maintenance of producer prices at levels generally exceeding the price of competing

imports through payments to processors conditional upon the purchase or transformation of domestic oilseeds.

The finding of the Panel under Article III:4 does not relate to the benefits accruing to the Community producers

under the Community subsidy schemes but only to the benefits accruing to processors. The Panel further noted

that the Community could comply with the Panel’s finding on Article III and still make available in the

Community market oilseeds produced with the benefit of producer prices maintained at levels exceeding the

price of competing imports. Compliance with the finding on Article III thus could, but would not necessarily,

eliminate the basis of the United States complaint that the benefits accruing to the Community producers of

oilseeds impair the Community’s tariff concessions for oilseeds. The Panel therefore decided that it had to

examine that complaint as well.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Afecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 185

Para. 185: “Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to carry out one

or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a

Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth

a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the application of a measure, a Member has ‘nullified or

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impaired’ ‘benefits’ accruing to another Member, ‘whether or not that measure conflicts with the provisions’ of

the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the measure involved is

inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this

reason, sometimes described as ‘non-violation’ cases; we note, though, that the word ‘non-violation’ does not

appear in this provision. The purpose of this rather unusual remedy was described by the panel in European

Economic Community - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related

Animal-Feed Proteins (…) in the following terms:

The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that the improved

competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession

can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also

by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties

to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress when a

reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the

application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement.’

(24) (emphasis added)

Footnote 24: Panel Report on EEC — Oilseeds I, para. 144.

5. Artigo XXIII:2

a) “Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um Acordo satisfatório”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962,

Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 10

Para. 10: “Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides that the Contracting Parties shall promptly investigate any

matter referred to them under that paragraph. From the context it is obvious, however, that before a ‘matter’ can

be so referred to the Contracting Parties it must have been the subject of representations or proposals made

pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Article which have not resulted in a ‘satisfactory adjustment’ (unless the

difficulty is of the type referred to in paragraph 1(c) of the Article)”. (25)

b) “as Partes Contratantes ... dirigirão recomendações especiais e apropriadas ... ou baixarão normas

sobre a questão”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962,

Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 11-12 e 20

Para. 11: “Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides, apart from promptly investigating any matter so referred to

them, for two kinds of action by the Contracting Parties, namely:

(i) they shall make appropriate recommendations or give a ruling on the matter;

(ii) they may authorize the suspension of concessions or obligations.

The action stated under (i) is obligatory and must be taken in all cases where there can

be an ‘appropriate’ recommendation or ruling. The action under (ii) is to be taken at

the discretion of the Contracting Parties in defined circumstances.”

Para. 12: “The paragraph states that the Contracting Parties ‘shall make appropriate recommenda¬tions to the

contracting parties which they consider to be concerned or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate’. Whilst a

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‘ruling’ is called for only when there is a point of contention on fact or law, ‘recommendations’ should always

be appropriate whenever, in the view of the Contracting Parties, they would lead to a satisfactory adjustment of

the matter.”

Para. 20: “Where a measure affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the provisions of the

General Agreement (and is not covered by the ‘existing legislation’ clause of a Protocol), the Panel has in all

cases recommended that the measure in question be removed.”

c) “Recomendações com relação a reclamações de violação segundo Artigo XXIII:1(a)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Norway Trondheim Toll Ring, adotado em 13 de Maio de 1992, Demandante:

EUA, GPR.DS2/R, BISD 40S/319, para. 4.21

Para. 4.21: “Moreover, the Panel observed that, under the GATT, it was customary for panels to make findings

regarding conformity with the General Agreement and to recommend that any measures found inconsistent with

the General Agreement be terminated or brought into conformity from the time that the recommendation was

adopted. The provision of compensation had been resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure

was impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which were inconsistent

with the General Agreement (BISD, 26S/216). Questions relating to compensation or withdrawal of benefits had

been dealt with in a stage of the dispute settlement procedure subsequent to the adoption of panel reports.”

d) “Recomendações com relação a reclamações de não-violação segundo Artigo XXIII:1(b)”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Canned Fruit, adotado em 20 de Fevereiro de 1985, Demandante: EUA,

L/5778, para. 82

Para. 82: “Having established the existence of nullification and impairment of tariff concessions with respect to

canned peaches, canned pears, and canned fruit mixtures, the Panel considered what suggestions it could make

so as to assist CONTRACTING PARTIES in their task of formulating recommendations to achieve a

satisfactory settlement of the matter. The Panel noted that in past “non-violation” complaints of nullification or

impairment of tariff concessions (BISD II/195; 1S/30, 31, 59) the CONTRACTING PARTIES had

recommended that the party against which the finding had been made consider ways and means to remove the

competitive inequality brought about by the measure at issue. The Panel was aware of the finding of the

Working Party Report on the Australian subsidy on ammonium sulphate that “there is nothing in Article XXIII

which would empower the CONTRACTING PARTIES to require a contracting party to withdraw or reduce a

consumption subsidy” (...) and that the “ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII

is that of authorizing an affected contracting party to suspend the application of appropriate obligations or

concessions under the General Agreement” (BISD II/195, para. 16). In making the following draft

recommendation, the Panel also wishes to emphasize that the recommendation cannot constitute a legal

obligation for the EEC to remove or reduce its domestic production subsidies and does not preclude other modes

of settling the dispute such as granting of compensation or, in the last resort, a request for authorization of

suspension of concessions. The Panel also wishes to emphasize that this recommendation cannot detract from

the rights of contracting parties under Article XXIV:6 of the General Agreement.”

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Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile (II),

(EEC - Dessert Apples), adotado em 22 de Junho de 1989, Demandante: Chile, L/6491, BISD 36S/93,

paras. 12.35-12.36

Para. 12.35: “The Panel observed that it was customary for a panel examining complaints under paragraph 2 of

Article XXIII to make a finding regarding nullification or impairment of benefits and to recommend the

termination of measures found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement. It noted that there was no

provision in the General Agreement obliging contracting parties to provide compensation, and that the Annex to

the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance indicated

that:

(...) The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate

withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the

withdrawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the General Agreement.

The Panel further recalled that a 1965 Secretariat note discussed this issue in relation to residual quantitative

restrictions affecting developing countries. This note indicated:

(...) Where a proposal for compensation has been made, it would appear that it is open

to the Contracting Parties to make an assessment of the loss sustained (...) and to

make a recommendation that pending elimination of these restrictions the country

applying such restrictions should consider the establishment of other appropriate

concessions which would serve to compensate this loss. There are, however, two

points which need to be noted in this connection. Firstly, any such recommendation

under the provisions of the present Article XXIII can be implemented only to the

extent that it proves acceptable to the contracting party to whom it is addressed. If

such contracting party is not in a position to accept the recommendation, the final

sanction must remain the authority for withdrawing equivalent obligations as provided

in paragraph 2 of Article XXIII.

Secondly, the nature of the compensatory concessions and the items on which these

are offered would have to be determined by the contracting party to whom the

recommendation is directed and would have to be a matter of agreement between the

parties concerned. It would not be possible for a panel or other body set up by the

Contracting Parties to adjudicate on the specific compensations that should be offered

(...).

Para. 12.36: “The Panel endorsed the views contained in this note. It recognized that it would be possible for

the EEC and Chile to negotiate compensation consistent with the provisions of the General Agreement; however

the Panel did not consider that it would be appropriate for it to make a recommendation on this matter.”

e) “As circunstâncias suficientemente graves para justificar suspensão da aplicação de qualquer

obrigação ou concessão”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962,

Demandante: EUA, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 13 e 20-21

Para. 13: “The latter part of paragraph 2 of Article XXIII states that “if the CONTRACTING PARTIES

consider the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or

parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other

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obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances”. In the view of the

Panel the requirement that the situation must be serious enough limits the applicability of the provision to cases

where there is nullification or impairment; it would at any rate be difficult to conceive a situation in which the

suspension of concessions or obligations could be appropriate where nullification or impairment was not

involved.”

Para. 20: “Where the Panel finds that there is prima facie nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to

Uruguay under the Agreement, it has proposed recommendations based on that finding. Where a measure

affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the provisions of the General Agreement (and is not

covered by the “existing legislation” clause of a Protocol), the Panel has in all cases recommended that the

measure in question be removed. Reference is made in these recommendations based on nullification or

impairment to the possibility of further action, in the event of non-fulfillment, by the CONTRACTING

PARTIES under paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. In respect of these particular cases the Panel proposes the

following procedure for adoption by the CONTRACTING PARTIES: The contracting parties concerned be

asked to report on their action taken to comply with the CONTRACTING PARTIES' Recommendations or any

other satisfactory adjustment (such as the provision of suitable concessions acceptable to Uruguay) by 1 March

1963. If by that date the Recommendations are not carried out and no satisfactory adjustment is made, the

circumstances shall be deemed to be “serious enough” to justify action under the penultimate sentence of Article

XXIII:2 and Uruguay shall be entitled immediately to ask for the authorization of suspension of concessions or

obligations. The CONTRACTING PARTIES should make arrangements for prompt determination as to what

concessions or obligations the suspension of which should be authorized.”

Para. 21: “In recommending this two-stage procedure, the Panel had principally in mind, once again, the

requirement stated in Article XXIII:2 that the situation must be “serious enough” before suspension should be

authorized. It noted, as a report of the ninth session (BISD, Third Supplement, pages 250-251) had made it

clear, the action of authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations should never be taken except as a

last resort; it also noted that the aim of Uruguay at this stage was to seek the prompt removal of the measures in

question.”

Footnote 25: Original footnote: “However, at least in respect of quantitative import restrictions applied inconsistently with the General

Agreement, it has been agreed by the Contracting Parties that the holding of a consultation under paragraph 1 of Article XXII would

fulfil the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article XXIII (see BISD, Ninth Supplement, pages 19-20).”

III. Comentários

Ainda sob a égide do antigo GATT e, portanto, previamente à criação da OMC, o Artigo XXIII do GATT

definiu as linhas gerais do sistema de solução de controvérsias, bem como os seus respectivos instrumentos

(“violation”, “non-violation” e “situation complaints”). Diferentemente da maioria dos acordos internacionais,

as disposições relativas à solução de disputas no GATT não fazem qualquer menção a “direitos e obrigações das

Partes Contratantes”, à “violação de obrigações decorrentes do tratado” e, tampouco, a “controvérsias legais

sobre interpretação do tratado ou qualquer questão de direito internacional” (26).

Ao contrário, adotou-se no Artigo XXIII do GATT o “conceito chave” de “anulação ou redução de uma

vantagem decorrente direta ou indiretamente do Acordo” (27) (“nullification or impairment of any benefit ...

accruing under this Agreement”) cuja aplicação foi referendada tanto pela jurisprudência desenvolvida no antigo

sistema do GATT, bem como pelos relatórios do atual sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. Até mesmo

casos nos quais foi alegada violação a obrigações do Acordo (conforme disposto no Artigo XXIII:1(a) do

GATT), reconheceu-se a “anulação ou redução de vantagem prima facie” (28). Muitos dos conceitos

incorporados pelo Artigo XXIII do GATT, no entanto, carecem de precisão jurídica: conceitos como “anulação

ou redução”; “qualquer vantagem”; “qualquer objetivo” e “qualquer situação” jamais foram objeto de análise e

definição, seja pelo próprio GATT, seja pelos sistemas de solução de controvérsias do GATT 47 e da OMC.

Tendo como origem tratados bilaterais de comércio, negociados nos anos 20 e 30, o conceito de “anulação ou

redução” foi concebido para evitar que concessões tarifárias fossem enfraquecidas por barreiras não-tarifárias ou

medidas governamentais sem caráter comercial. Buscava-se, portanto, impedir que medidas em conformidade

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com os termos dos tratados pudessem ter, em contrapartida, o efeito de anular ou reduzir os objetivos e

obrigações assumidas sob os mesmos. A evolução jurisprudencial confirma, no entanto, que a falta de segurança

jurídica dos conceitos adotados pelo Artigo XXIII, principalmente em relação aos casos de “não-violação”,

acabou por inibir a utilização do mencionado instrumento pelos Membros da OMC: dos 15 casos em que o

Artigo XXIII:1(b) foi utilizado como argumento jurídico principal, apenas 6 tiveram seus respectivos pedidos

acolhidos (29) (todos, ressalte-se, durante a existência do GATT). Em contrapartida, dos 4 casos em que

demandas de “não-violação” foram analisadas pelo DSB da OMC (30), todos tiveram seus pedidos rejeitados.

Relatórios de Painéis da época do GATT, adotados pelas Partes Contratantes, ressaltaram que o termo “anulação

ou redução de vantagens” não se refere a danos ao comércio, mas sim a mudanças imprevisíveis nas condições

de competitividade dos produtos importados em relação aos produtos domésticos. Não seria necessária,

portanto, a prova do dano para que se reconhecesse a “anulação ou redução” de um benefício.

Questiona-se, no entanto, se a “proteção do equilíbrio dos interesses das Partes Contratantes”, finalidade

almejada quando da elaboração do Artigo XXIII, ainda estaria apta a fornecer parâmetros para a revisão de

medidas questionáveis perante os Acordos da OMC. A própria teoria das “expectativas legítimas” foi muito

pouco explorada com relação a demandas de “não-violação” para se permitir o uso efetivo do Artigo em

questão. Ademais, não há qualquer parâmetro desenvolvido jurisprudencialmente que permita a utilização do

Artigo XXIII:1(c) (“situation complaints”) como cláusula de escape para impedir que mudanças nas

circunstâncias acabem por prejudicar o gozo de benefícios acordados sob a égide da OMC a um determinado

Membro.

Embora muito tenha sido desenvolvido através do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias, existem ainda muitas

lacunas a serem preenchidas na interpretação dos instrumentos previstos pelo Artigo XXIII. Em alguns dos

poucos casos de “não-violação” (31) analisados ainda na época do GATT 1947, os termos “vantagens

resultantes ... deste Acordo” foram aplicados também a outros benefícios – sem caráter tarifário - decorrentes do

GATT. Não ficou clara, no entanto, a extensão da aplicabilidade do Artigo XXIII para se determinar, por

exemplo, quais outros benefícios – além dos não-tarifários – seriam acionáveis sob os Artigos XXIII:1(b) e (c).

Tampouco foi possível definir, através da jurisprudência, a precisa relação entre as “demandas de violação” e a

proteção suplementar oferecida pelo uso de alegações de “não-violação”.

Footnote 26: O Artigo 36 do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça, por seu turno, menciona em seu parágrafo segundo que: “2. Os

Estados, partes do presente Estatuto, poderão, em qualquer momento, declarar que reconhecem como obrigatória, ipso facto e sem

acordos especial, em relação a qualquer outro Estado que aceite a mesma obrigação, a jurisdição da Corte em todas as controvérsias de

ordem jurídica que tenham por objeto: a) a interpretação de um tratado; b) qualquer ponto de direito internacional; c) a existência de

qualquer fato que, se verificado, constituiria violação de um compromisso internacional; d) a natureza ou extensão da reparação devida

pela ruptura de um compromisso internacional.”

(<http://www.mp.ma.gov.br/site/centrosapoio/DirHumanos/EstatCorteInternacional.htm>).

Footnote 27: Artigo XXIII:1: “No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou

indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do Acordo está sendo dificultado (...)”.

Footnote 28: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, para. ; EEC Bananas II, paras. 456-477; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15.

Footnote 29: EC - Citrus; EEC - Oilseeds I; EEC - Oilseeds II; EC - Canned Fruit; Australia Subsidies e Germany Sardines.

Footnote 30: Japan - Film; EC Asbestos; EC Poultry e Korea Procurement.

Footnote 31: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII; EEC - Citrus; Japan – Nullification or Impairment of the Benefits Accruing to the

EEC under the General Agreement and Impediment to the Attainment of GATT Objectives; US - Nicaragua Trade; e Japan - Semi-

Conductors.

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Artigo XXIV

João Henrique Ribeiro Roriz

Lucas da Silva Tasquetto

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXIV

Territorial Application - Frontier Traffic - Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas

24.1 The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs territories of the

contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been

accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of

Provisional Application. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the

territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party; Provided

that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to create any rights or obligations as

between two or more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under

Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional

Application by a single contracting party.

24.2 For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood to mean any territory with

respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial

part of the trade of such territory with other territories.

24.3 The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent:

(a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in order to facilitate

frontier traffic;

(b) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste by countries contiguous

to that territory, provided that such advantages are not in conflict with the Treaties of Peace

arising out of the Second World War.

24.4 The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development,

through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to

such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area

should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of

other contracting parties with such territories.

24.5 Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of

contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an

interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided

that:

(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs

union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such

union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such

union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general

incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories

prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case

may be;

(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free-

trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the

constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free trade area or the adoption

of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not

242

parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding

duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to

the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may be; and

(c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and

schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a

reasonable length of time.

24.6 If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5 (a), a contracting party proposes to increase any

rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII

shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the

compensation already afforded by the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the other

constituents of the union.

24.7 (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim

agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the

CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding

the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to

contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.

(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred to in

paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the

information made available in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the

CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation

of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to the

agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall

make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put

into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in

accordance with these recommendations.

(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5 (c) shall be

communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the contracting parties

concerned to consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the

formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.

24.8 For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory

for two or more customs territories, so that

(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those

permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with

respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or

at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such

territories; and,

(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other

regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the

trade of territories not included in the union;

(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in

which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary,

those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on

substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such

territories.

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24.9 The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the formation of a

customs union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations

with contracting parties affected.* This procedure of negotiations with affected contracting parties

shall, in particular, apply to the elimination of preferences required to conform with the provisions of

paragraph 8 (a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b).

24.10 The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals which do not fully

comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the

formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.

24.11 Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of the establishment of India and

Pakistan as independent States and recognizing the fact that they have long constituted an economic

unit, the contracting parties agree that the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent the two

countries from entering into special arrangements with respect to the trade between them, pending

the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive basis.*

24.12 Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure

observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and

authorities within its territories.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXIV

Aplicação Territorial – Tráfico Fronteiriço – Uniões Aduaneiras e Zonas de Livre Troca

24.1 As disposições do presente Acordo aplicar-se-ão ao território aduaneiro metropolitano das Partes

Contratantes, assim como a qualquer outro território aduaneiro, a respeito do qual o presente Acordo

tenha sido aceito nos termos do Artigo XXVI ou seja aplicado em virtude do Artigo XXXIII ou de

Acordo com o Protocolo de Aplicação Provisória. Cada um desses territórios aduaneiros será

considerado como se fosse uma parte no Acordo, exclusivamente para fins de aplicação territorial

desse Acordo, com a condição de que as estipulações do presente parágrafo não serão interpretadas

como estabelecendo os direitos e obrigações entre dois ou vários territórios aduaneiros, a respeito

dos quais o presente Acordo tenha sido aceito nos termos do Artigo XXVI ou seja aplicado em

virtude do Artigo XXXIII ou na conformidade do Protocolo de Aplicação Provisória, por uma só

Parte Contratante.

24.2 Para os fins de aplicação do presente Acordo, entende-se por território aduaneiro todo o território

para o qual tarifas aduaneiras distintas ou outras regulamentações aplicáveis às trocas comerciais

sejam mantidas a respeito de outros territórios para uma parte substancial do comércio do território

em questão.

24.3 As disposições do presente Acordo não deverão ser interpretadas como obstáculo:

(a) às vantagens concedidas por uma Parte Contratante a países limítrofes, para facilitar o tráfico

fronteiriço;

(b) ou às vantagens concedidas ao comércio com o Território livre de Trieste pelos países

limítrofes desse Território, com a condição de que tais vantagens não sejam incompatíveis

com as disposições dos tratados de paz resultantes da segunda guerra mundial.

24.4 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que é recomendável aumentar a liberdade do comércio

desenvolvendo, através de acordos livremente concluídos, uma integração mais estreita das

economias dos países participantes de tais acordos. Reconhecem igualmente que o estabelecimento

de uma união aduaneira ou de uma zona de livre comércio deve ter por finalidade facilitar o

comércio entre os territórios constitutivos e não opor obstáculos ao comércio de outras Partes

Contratantes com esses territórios.

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24.5 Em consequência, as disposições do presente Acordo não se oporão à formação de uma união

aduaneira entre os territórios das Partes Contratantes ou ao estabelecimento de uma zona de livre

troca ou à adoção de Acordo provisório necessário para a formação de uma união aduaneira ou de

uma zona de livre troca, com a condição de que:

(a) no caso de uma união aduaneira ou de um Acordo provisório concluído visando à formação

de uma união aduaneira, os direitos aduaneiros, estabelecidos no momento da formação

dessa união ou da conclusão desse Acordo provisório, não serão, no seu conjunto, no que

respeita ao comércio com as Partes Contratantes estranhas a tais uniões ou acordos, de uma

incidência geral mais elevada, nem os regulamentos de trocas comerciais mais rigorosos, que

os direitos e as regulamentações aplicáveis às trocas comerciais nos territórios constitutivos

dessa união, antes da formação de tal união ou da conclusão do acordo, segundo o caso;

(b) no caso de uma zona de livre troca ou de um Acordo provisório concluído visando a

formação de uma zona de livre troca, os direitos aduaneiros mantidos em cada território

constitutivo, no que respeita ao comércio das Partes Contratantes que não fazem parte de um

tal território ou que não participam de tal acordo, no momento da formação da zona ou da

conclusão do Acordo provisório, não serão mais elevados, nem as outras regulamentações de

trocas comerciais mais rigorosas que os direitos e regulamentações correspondentes

existentes nos mesmos territórios antes da formação dessa zona ou da conclusão do Acordo

provisório, segundo o caso;

(c) e com a condição de que todo Acordo provisório, tendo em vista as alíneas (a) e (b),

compreenda um plano e um programa para a formação de uma união aduaneira ou o

estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca num prazo razoável.

24.6 Se, em lugar das condições enumeradas na alínea (a) do § 5º, uma Parte Contratante se proponha

majorar um direito de maneira incompatível com as disposições do Artigo II, o procedimento

previsto no Artigo XXVIII será aplicável. Na determinação das compensações, levar-se-á

devidamente em conta a compensação que já tenha provindo das reduções do direito correspondente

aplicado pelos outros territórios constitutivos da união.

24.7 (a) Toda Parte Contratante que resolva participar de uma união aduaneira ou de uma zona de

livre troca ou de um Acordo provisório, concluído para o estabelecimento de tal união ou de

tal zona, comunicará sem demora às Partes Contratantes e lhes fornecerá, a respeito dessa

união ou dessa zona, todas as informações que lhes permitam endereçar às Partes

Contratantes os relatórios e recomendações que julgarem apropriados;

(b) Se, depois de ter estudado o plano e o programa compreendidos no Acordo provisório de que

trata o parágrafo 5, de Acordo com as partes deste acordo, e ter devidamente em conta as

informações fornecidas nos termos da alínea (a), as Partes Contratantes verificarem que o

acordo não é suscetível de resultar em uma união aduaneira ou no estabelecimento de uma

zona de livre troca, nos prazos previstos pelas partes de acordo, ou que tais prazos não sejam

razoáveis, farão recomendações às partes do acordo. As partes não manterão nem porão em

vigor, conforme o caso, tal acordo, se não estiverem dispostas a modificá-lo, tendo em vista

essas recomendações.

(c) Qualquer modificação substancial do plano ou do programa previsto na alínea (c) do

parágrafo 5 deverá ser comunicada às Partes Contratantes, que poderão pedir às Partes

Contratantes interessadas que a consultem, se a modificação parecer suscetível de

comprometer ou retardar, indevidamente, a formação da união aduaneira ou o

estabelecimento da zona de livre troca.

24.8 Para fins de aplicação do presente Acordo:

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(a) entende-se por união aduaneira, a substituição, por um só território aduaneiro, de dois ou

mais territórios aduaneiros, de modo que:

(i) os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentações restritivas das trocas comerciais

(com exceção, na medida necessária, das restrições autorizadas nos termos dos

Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV e XX) sejam eliminados para a maioria das trocas

comerciais entre os territórios constitutivos da união, ou ao menos para a maioria das

trocas comerciais relativas aos produtos originários desses territórios;

(ii) e, à exceção das disposições do parágrafo 9 os direitos aduaneiros e outras

regulamentações idênticas em substância sejam aplicadas, por qualquer membro da

união, no comércio com os territórios não compreendidos naqueles;

(b) entende-se por zona de livre troca um grupo de dois ou mais territórios aduaneiros entre os

quais os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentações restritivas das trocas comerciais (com

exceção, na medida necessária, das restrições autorizadas nos termos dos Artigos XI, XII,

XIII, XIV, XV e XX) são eliminados para a maioria das trocas comerciais relativas aos

produtos originários dos territórios constitutivos da zona de livre troca.

24.9 As preferências previstas no parágrafo 2 do Artigo I não serão afetadas pela formação de uma união

aduaneira ou pelo estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca; poderão, entretanto, ser eliminadas ou

ajustadas por via de negociação com as Partes Contratantes interessadas. Este procedimento de

negociação com as Partes Contratantes interessadas se aplicará notadamente na eliminação das

preferências necessárias para que os dispositivos das alíneas (a), (i) e (b) do parágrafo 8 sejam

observadas.

24.10 As Partes Contratantes poderão, por decisão tomada por maioria de dois terços, aprovar as propostas

que não estejam inteiramente de Acordo com as disposições dos parágrafos 5 a 9, inclusive, com a

condição de que elas visem à formação de uma união aduaneira ou ao estabelecimento de uma zona

de livre troca, no sentido do presente Artigo.

24.11 Levando em conta as circunstâncias excepcionais que resultam da constituição da Índia e do

Paquistão em estados independentes, e reconhecendo que esses dois estados formaram, durante

muito tempo, uma unidade econômica, as Partes Contratantes ajustam que as disposições do presente

Acordo não impedirão aqueles países de concluir acordos particulares referentes ao comércio mútuo,

atendendo a que as suas relações comerciais recíprocas sejam estabelecidas definitivamente.

24.12 Cada Parte Contratante tomará todas as medidas razoáveis de sua alçada, para que as autoridades

governamentais ou administrativas, regionais ou locais, em seu território, observem as disposições

do presente acordo.

Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo 24 em Inglês

Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Members,

Having regard to the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994;

Recognizing that customs unions and free trade areas have greatly increased in number and importance since

the establishment of GATT 1947 and today cover a significant proportion of world trade;

Recognizing the contribution to the expansion of world trade that may be made by closer integration between

the economies of the parties to such agreements;

246

Recognizing also that such contribution is increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of

duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of

trade is excluded;

Reaffirming that the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between the constituent

territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with such territories; and that in their

formation or enlargement the parties to them should to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects

on the trade of other Members;

Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of the Council for Trade in Goods in

reviewing agreements notified under Article XXIV, by clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment

of new or enlarged agreements, and improving the transparency of all Article XXIV agreements;

Recognizing the need for a common understanding of the obligations of Members under paragraph 12 of

Article XXIV;

Hereby agree as follows:

1 Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or

free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7

and 8 of that Article.

Article XXIV:5

2 The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general incidence of the duties and other

regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs union shall in respect of duties

and charges be based upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties

collected. This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous representative period to be supplied

by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of

origin. The Secretariat shall compute the weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in

accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral

Trade Negotiations. For this purpose, the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be the applied

rates of duty. It is recognized that for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations

of commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures,

regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required.

3 The “reasonable length of time” referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed 10 years only

in exceptional cases. In cases where Members parties to an interim agreement believe that 10 years would be

insufficient they shall provide a full explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods of the need for a longer

period.

4 Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV establishes the procedure to be followed when a Member forming a customs

union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty. In this regard Members reaffirm that the procedure set forth in

Article XXVIII, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the

Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must be commenced before tariff

concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the formation of a customs union or an interim agreement leading

to the formation of a customs union.

5 These negotiations will be entered into in good faith with a view to achieving mutually satisfactory

compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations, as required by paragraph 6 of Article XXIV, due account shall

be taken of reductions of duties on the same tariff line made by other constituents of the customs union upon its

formation. Should such reductions not be sufficient to provide the necessary compensatory adjustment, the

customs union would offer compensation, which may take the form of reductions of duties on other tariff lines.

Such an offer shall be taken into consideration by the Members having negotiating rights in the binding being

modified or withdrawn. Should the compensatory adjustment remain unacceptable, negotiations should be

247

continued. Where, despite such efforts, agreement in negotiations on compensatory adjustment under Article

XXVIII as elaborated by the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 cannot be

reached within a reasonable period from the initiation of negotiations, the customs union shall, nevertheless, be

free to modify or withdraw the concessions; affected Members shall then be free to withdraw substantially

equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII.

6 GATT 1994 imposes no obligation on Members benefiting from a reduction of duties consequent upon the

formation of a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union, to provide

compensatory adjustment to its constituents.

Review of Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas

7 All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be examined by a working party in the

light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of this Understanding. The working party

shall submit a report to the Council for Trade in Goods on its findings in this regard. The Council for Trade in

Goods may make such recommendations to Members as it deems appropriate.

8 In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make appropriate recommendations on

the proposed time-frame and on measures required to complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade

area. It may if necessary provide for further review of the agreement.

9 Members parties to an interim agreement shall notify substantial changes in the plan and schedule included

in that agreement to the Council for Trade in Goods and, if so requested, the Council shall examine the changes.

10 Should an interim agreement notified under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV not include a plan and schedule,

contrary to paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV, the working party shall in its report recommend such a plan and

schedule. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not

prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations. Provision shall be made for subsequent review

of the implementation of the recommendations.

11 Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report periodically to the Council for Trade in

Goods, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 in their instruction to the GATT 1947

Council concerning reports on regional agreements (BISD 18S/38), on the operation of the relevant agreement.

Any significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should be reported as they occur.

Dispute Settlement

12 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute

Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those

provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the

formation of a customs union or free-trade area.

13 Each Member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all provisions of GATT 1994, and

shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by regional and local

governments and authorities within its territory.

14 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute

Settlement Understanding may be invoked in respect of measures affecting its observance taken by regional or

local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member. When the Dispute Settlement Body has ruled

that a provision of GATT 1994 has not been observed, the responsible Member shall take such reasonable

measures as may be available to it to ensure its observance. The provisions relating to compensation and

suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible to secure such

observance.

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15 Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for

consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the

operation of GATT 1994 taken within the territory of the former.

Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo 24 em Português

Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo XXIV do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio 1994

Os Membros,

Tendo em vista as disposições do Artigo XXIV do GATT 1994;

Reconhecendo que o número e importância das uniões aduaneiras e áreas de livre comércio cresceram

muito desde o estabelecimento do GATT 1947 e hoje cobrem uma proporção significativa do comércio

mundial;

Reconhecendo a contribuição que pode ser feita à expansão do comércio mundial pela maior integração

entre economias das partes em tais Acordos;

Reconhecendo também que tal contribuição será maior quando a eliminação das taxas e outros

regulamentos restritivos ao comércio entre territórios constitutivos for estendida a todo o comércio e menor

quando qualquer setor importante for excluído;

Reafirmando que o propósito de tais acordos deveria ser facilitar o Comércio entre os territórios

constitutivos e não elevar barreiras ao comércio de outros Membros com aqueles territórios, e que ao

estabelecerem ou ampliarem tais acordos as partes nos mesmos deveriam na maior medida possível evitar o

surgimento de efeitos adversos ao comércio de outros Membros;

Convencidos também da necessidade de reforçar a eficácia do papel do Conselho para o Comércio de

Bens no exame dos acordos notificados sob o Artigo XXIV, mediante o esclarecimento dos critérios e

procedimentos para a avaliação de acordos novos ou ampliados e o aperfeiçoamento da transparência de todos

os acordos sob o Artigo XXIV;

Reconhecendo a necessidade para um entendimento comum sobre as obrigações dos Membros sob o

parágrafo 12 do Artigo XXIV;

Acordam o seguinte:

1 As uniões aduaneiras, áreas de livre comércio e acordos interinos que levem à formação de uniões aduaneiras

ou áreas de livre Comércio, para serem compatíveis com o Artigo XXIV, devem satisfazer entre outras, as

disposições dos parágrafos 5, 6, 7 e 8 daquele Artigo.

2 A avaliação, ao amparo do parágrafo 5(a) do Artigo XXIV, da incidência geral das taxas e outros

regulamentos sobre o comércio aplicáveis antes da formação de uma união aduaneira deverá, no que se refere a

taxas e tributos, basear-se no exame global da média ponderada das tarifas e taxas alfandegárias cobradas. Este

exame se baseará nas estatísticas de importação durante um período precedente representativo, a ser fornecido

pela união aduaneira com valores e quantidades por linha tarifaria, desagregada segundo a origem por país

membro da OMC. O Secretariado computará a média ponderada das tarifas e taxas alfandegárias de acordo com

a metodologia utilizada na avaliação das ofertas tarifarias na Rodada Uruguai de Negociações Comerciais

Multilaterais. Para este fim, as tarifas e taxas a serem consideradas serão aquelas aplicadas. Fica reconhecido

que para uma avaliação global da incidência de outros regulamentos comerciais para os quais a quantificação e

agregação são difíceis, o exame individual de medidas, regulamentos, produtos cobertos e fluxos afetados

poderá ser necessário.

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3 O “prazo razoável de tempo” referido no parágrafo 5(c) do Artigo XXIV só deve exceder dez anos em casos

excepcionais. Nos casos em que acreditarem que os dez anos são insuficientes, os Membros partes de um acordo

interino fornecerão explicação completa ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens sobre a necessidade de um

período mais longo.

Artigo XXIV:6

4 O parágrafo 6 do Artigo XXIV estabelece os procedimentos a serem seguidos quando um Membro parte em

uma união aduaneira se propõe à elevação de uma tarifa consolidada. A esse respeito, os Membros reafirmam

que o procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII, tal como desenvolvido nas linhas de orientação (guidelines)

adotadas em 10 de novembro de 1980 devem ser iniciados antes que as concessões tarifárias sejam modificadas

ou retiradas com a formação de uma união aduaneira ou de um acordo interino que leve à formação de uma

união aduaneira.

5 Essas negociações serão realizadas de boa fé com vistas a lograr um ajustamento compensatório mutuamente

satisfatório. Em tais negociações, conforme disposto no parágrafo 6 do Artigo XXIV serão plenamente levadas

em conta as reduções de direitos em uma mesma linha tarifaria realizadas por outros países partes quando da

formação da união aduaneira. Se tais reduções não forem suficientes para prover o ajustamento compensatório

necessário, a união aduaneira ofereceria compensação, a qual poderia tomar a forma de reduções em outras

linhas tarifarias. Esta oferta será considerada pelos membros que tenham direitos de negociação na consolidação

a ser modificada ou retirada. Se o ajustamento compensatório permanecer inaceitável, as negociações

continuarão. Nos casos em que, a despeito dos esforços realizados, após um prazo razoável de tempo não seja

possível chegar a um acordo nas negociações sobre ajustamentos compensatórios ao amparo do Artigo XXVIII,

tal como desenvolvido no Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo XXVIII do GATT 1994, a união

aduaneira estará livre para modificar ou retirar a concessão, os Membros afetados estarão então livres para

retirar concessões substancialmente equivalentes em conformidade com o Artigo XXVIII.

6 O GATT 1994 não impõe obrigações sobre os Membros que venham a se beneficiar da redução de tarifas

resultantes da formação de uma união aduaneira ou de acordo interino que leve à formação de uma união

aduaneira no sentido de prover ajustamento compensatório aos países partes nos mesmos.

Exame das Uniões Aduaneiras e Áreas de Livre Comércio

7 Todas as notificações feitas ao amparo do parágrafo 7(a) do Artigo XXIV serão examinadas por um grupo de

trabalho à luz das disposições relevantes do GATT 1994 e do parágrafo 1 do presente Entendimento. O grupo de

trabalho submeterá um relatório ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens com suas conclusões a esse respeito. O

Conselho para o Comércio de Bens poderá fazer aos Membros as recomendações que julgar apropriadas.

8 Com relação aos acordos interinos, o grupo de trabalho, em seu relatório, poderá fazer recomendações sobre

o prazo proposto e sobre as medidas necessárias a completar a formação da união aduaneira ou área de livre

comércio. Poderá, se necessário, prover novo exame do acordo.

9 Os Membros partes em um acordo interino notificarão modificações substanciais no plano e no calendário

incluídos naquele acordo ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens que, se for solicitado, poderá examinar ditas

modificações.

10 Caso o acordo interino não apresente um plano e um calendário, contrariamente ao que dispõe o parágrafo

5(c) do Artigo XXIV, o grupo de trabalho deverá, em seu relatório, recomendar um plano e um calendário. As

partes não manterão em vigor o referido acordo ou, conforme o caso, não o colocarão em vigor se não estiverem

preparadas para modificá-lo de acordo com essas recomendações. Serão previstos exames subseqüentes da

implementação das recomendações.

11 As uniões aduaneiras e os países partes em áreas de livre comércio reportarão periodicamente ao Conselho

para o Comércio de Bens, como previsto nas instruções das PARTES CONTRATANTES do GATT 1947 ao

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Conselho do GATT 1947, sobre relatórios de acordos regionais (BISD 188/38) relativos à operação do acordo

de que se trate. Quaisquer modificações ou evolução nesses acordos serão reportadas à medida que ocorrerem.

Solução de Controvérsias

12 As disposições dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994, tal como regulamentadas e aplicadas pelo

Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias, podem ser invocadas com respeito a qualquer assunto resultante

da aplicação das disposições do Artigo XXIV relativas a uniões aduaneiras, áreas de livre comércio e acordos

interinos que levem à formação de uniões aduaneiras ou áreas de livre comércio.

13 Cada Membro é plenamente responsável sob o GATT 1994 pela observância de todas as disposições do

GATT 1994 e tomarão as medidas razoáveis que estejam a sua disposição para assegurar tal observância por

governos e autoridades regionais e locais dentro de seu território.

14 As disposições dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994 tal como regulamentadas e aplicadas pelo

Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias podem ser invocadas com respeito a medidas que afetem essa

observância adotadas por governos e autoridades regionais e locais dentro do território de um Membro. Quando

o órgão de Solução de Controvérsias houver determinado que uma disposição do GATT 1994 não foi

observada, o Membro responsável tomará as medidas razoáveis que estejam a sua disposição para assegurar tal

observância. As disposições relativas a compensação e suspensão de concessões e outras obrigações se aplicarão

nos casos em que não houver sido possível garantir dita observância.

15 Cada Membro se compromete a considerar com compreensão e oferecer oportunidade adequada para

consultas relativas a quaisquer gestões realizadas por outro Membro concernentes a medidas que afetem a

operação do GATT 1994, adotadas dentro de seu território.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Há vários detalhes nas traduções brasileiras do Artigo XXIV e do Entendimento sobre a interpretação deste

dispositivo, os quais podem causar insegurança e dúvida ao intérprete ou aplicador. Uma leitura comparativa

atenta dos textos demonstrará várias passagens problemáticas nas versões traduzidas, que dão espaço a

interpretações diversas. Sem almejar exaurir todos os pontos duvidosos na tradução, selecionamos alguns que

demonstram as diferentes inadequações do texto em português:

a) Passagens onde o tradutor acrescentou palavras que não constavam na versão original. Por exemplo:

No parágrafo segundo do Artigo XXIV, a versão brasileira acrescenta a palavra “aplicação” em “Para os fins de

aplicação do presente Acordo (...)”, enquanto que na versão original não há: “For the purposes of this

Agreement (...)”. Ainda neste parágrafo, na versão brasileira foi acrescentada a palavra “aplicáveis” em “(...)

outras regulamentações aplicáveis às (...)”, enquanto a versão original dispõe: “(...) other regulations of

commerce (...)”. Na alínea “a” do parágrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV a versão brasileira inclui termos não

dispostos na versão original: a palavra “concluído” em “(...) Acordo provisório concluído visando à (...)” (“(...)

interim agreement leading to (...)” e a palavra “momento” em “(...) estabelecidos no momento da (...)” (“(...)

imposed at the (...)”).

b) Traduções que podem alterar o sentido do texto original. Por exemplo:

No parágrafo quarto do Artigo XXIV, a versão brasileira traduziu o termo “desirability” em “(...) recognize the

desirability (...)” como “recomendável”, “(...) reconhecem que é recomendável (...)”, o que pode alterar o

sentido da frase. Na alínea “a” do parágrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV, a versão traduzida alterou o sentido

original da seguinte passagem: “(...) be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence (...)”; já que foi

traduzida da seguinte forma: “(...) uma incidência geral mais elevada, nem os regulamentos de trocas comerciais

mais rigorosos (...)”. Ainda nesse mesmo dispositivo, o termo “duties”, aparece duas vezes traduzido como

“direitos” em “(...) união aduaneira, os direitos aduaneiros (...)” e em “(...) que os direitos e as regulamentações

aplicáveis (...)”; sendo que na primeira vez as palavras “and other regulations”, que aparecem na versão original,

não são traduzidas na versão brasileira. No Entendimento sobre a interpretação do Artigo XXIV, parágrafo

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segundo, a versão brasileira não incluiu a palavra “after” de “(...) commerce applicable before and after the

formation (...)” e a tradução ficou assim: “(...) comércio aplicáveis antes da formação (...)”. Ainda no

Entendimento, no parágrafo quarto, a versão original é assim disposta: “(...) the guidelines adopted on 10

November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT

1994, must be commenced (...)” e toda a parte em itálico não consta na versão traduzida: “(...) nas linhas de

orientação (guidelines) adotadas em 10 de novembro de 1980 devem ser iniciados (...)”.

c) Passagens com erros de pontuação. Por exemplo:

No parágrafo primeiro do Artigo XXIV, não se pontua corretamente a abreviação do “Artigo XXXIII”, pois é

utilizada uma vírgula na versão brasileira (“Artigo XXXIII”), e troca-se um ponto-e-vírgula por uma vírgula em

“(...) a contracting party; Provided that (...)” (versão brasileira: “(...) desse Acordo, com a condição de que

(...)”). No parágrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV, a expressão “(...) as between the territories of contracting parties,

(...)” está inserida entre vírgulas logo após o início da frase:

“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting

parties, (...)”, e, portanto, dá sentido a todo o restante da frase que vem a seguir, e faz referência tanto à união

aduaneira, quanto à área de livre comércio. Diferentemente, a versão brasileira insere a tradução dessa expressão

da seguinte forma: “(...) à formação de uma união aduaneira entre os territórios das Partes Contratantes (...)”,

restringindo o sentido da expressão inicial somente à união aduaneira.

É importante ressaltar que há passagens em que o texto foi traduzido de forma interpretada, não alterando,

necessariamente, o conteúdo original. Por exemplo: no parágrafo primeiro, a versão brasileira traduziu o termo

“more”, em “(...) as between two or more customs territories (...)”, como “vários”, “(...) entre dois ou vários

territórios aduaneiros (...)”, quando o mais exato seria “mais”.

Como exemplo de um possível problema que a tradução pode causar, destacamos uma passagem interpretada

pelo Órgão de Apelação da OMC, o subparágrafo 8(a)(i) (comentada com mais detalhes no item “III.

Comentários”). Na versão brasileira a expressão “(...) substantially all trade (...)” foi traduzida como “(...) a

maioria das trocas comerciais (...)”. Visto a dificuldade do Órgão de Apelação em explicar melhor o significado

de “substancialmente”, a tradução brasileira é inadequada ao quantificar este fluxo comercial como “maioria”.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXIV

a) “Interpretação da expressão “shall not prevent” do Artigo XXIV, caput”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), AB-1999-5, Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 45

Para. 45. “First, in examining the text of the chapeau to establish its ordinary meaning, we note that the chapeau

states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 “shall not prevent” the formation of a customs union. We read this

to mean that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not make impossible the formation of a customs union.

Thus, the chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a

measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a possible “defence”

to a finding of inconsistency.”

b) “Interpretação da expressão “the formation of a customs union” do Artigo XXIV, caput”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 46

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Para. 46. “Second, in examining the text of the chapeau, we observe also that it states that the provisions of the

GATT 1994 shall not prevent “the formation of a customs union”. This wording indicates that Article XXIV can

justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions only if the measure

is introduced upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the extent that the formation of the customs

union would be prevented if the introduction of the measure were not allowed.”

c) “Interpretação da expressão “substantially all the trade” do Artigo XXIV, 8(a)(i)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 48

Para. 48. “Sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV establishes the standard for the internal trade between

constituent members in order to satisfy the definition of a “customs union”. It requires the constituent members

of a customs union to eliminate “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” with respect to

“substantially all the trade” between them. Neither the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO

Members have ever reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term “substantially” in this provision. It is

clear, though, that “substantially all the trade” is not the same as all the trade, and also that “substantially all the

trade” is something considerably more than merely some of the trade. We note also that the terms of sub-

paragraph 8(a)(i) provide that members of a customs union may maintain, where necessary, in their internal

trade, certain restrictive regulations of commerce that are otherwise permitted under Articles XI through XV and

under Article XX of the GATT 1994. Thus, we agree with the Panel that the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) offer

“some flexibility” to the constituent members of a customs union when liberalizing their internal trade in

accordance with this sub-paragraph. Yet we caution that the degree of “flexibility” that sub-paragraph 8(a)(i)

allows is limited by the requirement that “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” be “eliminated

with respect to substantially all” internal trade.”

d) “Interpretação da expressão “substantially the same” do Artigo XXIV, 8(a)(ii)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 49-50

Para. 49. “[…] The constituent members of a customs union are thus required to apply a common external trade

regime, relating to both duties and other regulations of commerce. However, sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) does not

require each constituent member of a customs union to apply the same duties and other regulations of commerce

as other constituent members with respect to trade with third countries; instead, it requires that substantially the

same duties and other regulations of commerce shall be applied.”

Para. 50. “We also believe that the Panel was correct in its statement that the terms of subparagraph 8(a)(ii),

and, in particular, the phrase “substantially the same” offer a certain degree of “flexibility” to the constituent

members of a customs union in “the creation of a common commercial policy”. Here too we would caution that

this “flexibility” is limited. It must not be forgotten that the word “substantially” qualifies the words “the same”.

Therefore, in our view, something closely approximating “sameness” is required by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii). Sub-

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paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires the constituent members of a customs union to adopt “substantially the same” trade

regulations. In our view, “comparable trade regulations having similar effects” do not meet this standard. A

higher degree of “sameness” is required by the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii).”

e) “Invocação do Artigo XXIV como Defesa (dupla condição)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 52 e 58

Para. 52. “Given this proviso, Article XXIV can, in our view, only be invoked as a defence to a finding that a

measure is inconsistent with certain GATT provisions to the extent that the measure is introduced upon the

formation of a customs union which meets the requirement in sub-paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV relating to

the “duties and other regulations of commerce” applied by the constituent members of the customs union to

trade with third countries.”

Para. 58. “Accordingly, on the basis of this analysis of the text and the context of the chapeau of paragraph 5 of

Article XXIV, we are of the view that Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain

other GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this “defence” is

available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must

demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the

requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that party must demonstrate that

the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue.

Again, both these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV.”

f) “Teste econômico” colocado pelo Art. XXIV, 5(a)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 55

Para. 55. “We agree with the Panel that the terms of Article XXIV:5(a), as elaborated and clarified by

paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV, provide: “(…) that the effects of the resulting trade

measures and policies of the new regional agreement shall not be more trade restrictive, overall, than were the

constituent countries' previous trade policies”. And we also agree that this is: “an “economic” test for assessing

whether a specific customs union is compatible with Article XXIV”.”

g) “Artigo XXIV, 4, como contexto para a interpretação do Artigo XXIV, 5, caput”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 56

Para. 56. “The text of the chapeau of paragraph 5 must also be interpreted in its context. In our view, paragraph

4 of Article XXIV constitutes an important element of the context of the chapeau of paragraph 5. The chapeau

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of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV begins with the word “accordingly”, which can only be read to refer to

paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, which immediately precedes the chapeau.”

h) “Definição da natureza da linguagem do Artigo XXIV, 4”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products

(Turkey - Textile), WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 57

Para. 57. “[…] Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. It does not set forth a separate

obligation itself but, rather, sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV which is

manifested in operative language in the specific obligations that are found elsewhere in Article XXIV. Thus, the

purpose set forth in paragraph 4 informs the other relevant paragraphs of Article XXIV, including the chapeau

of paragraph 5. For this reason, the chapeau of paragraph 5, and the conditions set forth therein for establishing

the availability of a defence under Article XXIV, must be interpreted in the light of the purpose of customs

unions set forth in paragraph 4. The chapeau cannot be interpreted correctly without constant reference to this

purpose.”

III. Comentários

O Artigo XXIV do GATT 1994 segue praticamente a mesma redação do Artigo correspondente no GATT 1947,

complementado pelo Entendimento sobre o Artigo XXIV, que resulta das negociações da Rodada Uruguai. Em

que pese a redação frágil e confusa, e a multiplicação da assinatura de acordos de livre comércio pelas principais

economias do mundo, somente um contencioso do sistema GATT/OMC, no caso Turkey - Textile, enfrentou de

maneira efetiva a compatibilidade entre o regionalismo e o multilateralismo comercial. Como boa parte dos

países possui acordos potencialmente passíveis de serem questionados no Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias

da OMC, a tendência é que os Membros evitem questionar as iniciativas de acordos regionais dos outros países.

No caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu o caput do parágrafo 5 do Artigo XXIV como a disposição chave para

resolver a controvérsia. Para determinar o significado e importância do mesmo, deve-se olhar para o texto do

caput e seu contexto, entendido como sendo o parágrafo 4 do Artigo XXIV, que daria os instrumentos de

interpretação para o esclarecimento dos parágrafos seguintes.

O caput do parágrafo 5 afirma que as disposições do GATT 1994 ‘não devem obstar’ (‘shall not prevent’) a

formação de uma união aduaneira. Ao examinar o texto, o Órgão de Apelação entende que tais disposições ‘não

devem tornar impossível’ (‘shall not make impossible’) a formação de uma união aduaneira.

Por sua vez, o subparágrafo 8(a)(i) estabelece o critério para o comércio interno entre os membros constituintes

a fim de satisfazer a definição de união aduaneira. Ao fazer isso, requer que os membros constituintes eliminem

‘taxas e outras regulações restritivas ao comércio’ em relação à ‘substancialmente todo o comércio’. Tal

obrigação limita o grau de flexibilidade dado pelo dispositivo.

Todavia, o significado de ‘substancialmente’, que não foi esclarecido nem entre as partes contratantes do GATT

nem entre os Membros da OMC, não encontra maior clareza na decisão do Órgão de Apelação. Ainda que

afirme que ‘substancialmente todo o comércio não é o mesmo que todo o comércio, e substancialmente todo o

comércio é algo consideravelmente mais do que somente algum comércio’, não são dadas as bases mediante as

quais será feita essa análise pelos próximos Painéis em torno do tema.

Assim, a leitura do Órgão de Apelação permite que o Artigo XXIV possa justificar uma medida inconsistente

com outras disposições específicas do GATT, além da cláusula da nação mais favorecida. Em suma, para tanto,

primeiro, a parte que reclama o benefício dessa defesa deve demonstrar que a medida em questão é introduzida

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sob o processo de formação de uma união aduaneira que preencha plenamente os requisitos dos subparágrafos

8(a) e 5(a) do Artigo XXIV. E, segundo, a parte deve demonstrar que a constituição da união aduaneira seria

obstada caso não autorizada a introdução de medidas dessa natureza.